

great value for the history of philosophy so far as his works are extant. The author of the works which are known under the name of Dionysius the Areopagite was not, as some have thought, Augustine's younger contemporary Synesius, but a Christian, educated in the school of Proclus. This is the opinion of Engelhardt (*Die angeblichen Schriften des Areopagiten Dionysius*, 2 vols., Salzb., 1823). Franz Hipler, on the contrary (*Dionysius der Areopagite*, Regensb., 1861), seeks to prove that the author of these works must have taught earlier, since he was known to Gregory Nazianzen. E. Böhmer (*vid. Damaris*, 18. 64. Stettin, 1864) agrees with him and gives an excellent outline of the doctrines of the remarkable ascetic, monastic philosopher. The Pseudo-Dionysian writings have been often published. In Migne's *Patr. curs. compl.* they fill two volumes. The extant epistles of this Pseudo-Dionysius, upon mystical theology, the names of God, the heavenly hierarchy, the ecclesiastical hierarchy, attempt to construct, with the help of the triads which were borrowed from Porphyry, Jamblichus, or Proclus, the esoteric portion of Christian doctrine, whose goal is represented to be complete union with God. As is usual, mysticism shows here traces of Pantheism. God is conceived as the only being, to whom therefore all definitions are denied as limits. It is in this sense that the negative theology is placed above the positive, because it denies to God, as the absolutely positive being, the predicates of the temporal, which as such designate limits. In opposition to Him, evil is mere limit, want, and has no existence. Especially celebrated is the division of the angel-world into three triads, or the heavenly hierarchies. In respect to this the fullest information had been given to the pupil of that apostle who had been carried up into the third heaven. The decreasing series *Seraphim Cherubim Throni, Dominationes Virtutes Potestates*, finally *Principatus Archangeli Angeli* stands unchangeably fixed. But by some, e.g., by Gregory the Great, the *Principatus* are assigned the place before the *Potestates*, so that the *Virtutes* stand at the head of the third order (hierarchy). The Old Testament has provided the Seraphim and Cherubim, the Epistles to the Colossians and to the Ephesians the five following grades. To them are added the archangels and angels often mentioned not only by Christians but also by Porphyry. Dionysius however does not wish to have the series explained by successive

emanations of the one class from the other, but maintains that each has proceeded directly from God, or rather has been created by Him. The conception of creation is in fact maintained with the greatest decisiveness; and Dionysius therefore in subsequent ages is always cited as an authority against the Neo-Platonists. The Abbot Maximus (580–662), adorned with the well-earned title *Confessor*, follows the Areopagite as a zealous votary. In his writings he shows the last but brilliant flaming up of the speculative spirit in the Greek Church. His works have been edited by Combesius, Paris, 1675, 2 vols., supplemented by Oehler, *Anecdota græca*, Tom. I., Hal., 1875. That God reveals Himself in the books of nature and of Scripture; that He is to be described only by negative predicates; that the Logos includes in Himself the first causes of all things; that all true being is good, and therefore evil is neither a being nor an object of divine knowledge and will; that the Incarnation would have taken place even without the fall of man, because it is only the culminating point of the previous revelation; that sense, understanding (*ratio*), and intellect (*intellectus*) form the three grades of knowledge; that the final goal is the general Sabbath, on which all will pass into God, etc.,—all these are assertions of Maximus which play an important rôle in the following age. John of Damascus, who died in the second half of the eighth century, does not owe the great reputation, which he still enjoys in the Oriental Church, to his depth and originality. On the contrary, his works (ed. Lequien, 2 vols., Paris, 1712) reveal the mere industry, often mechanical, of a compiler. He shows, in his compilation, how the philosophers have defined, how the Peripatetics have divided, what categories the Fathers have employed, what heresies have arisen, finally what doctrines are regarded as orthodox. He did not wish to contribute anything of his own, and there were needed at that time no new productions of the philosophic spirit. A repertory of the doctrines of the Fathers was wanted, and this want he met by making a final summary of the results of patristic activity. Subsequent Greek theologians busied themselves greatly, as he did, with polemics against Mohammedans. Polemics and apologetics are all that the Greek Church still produces.

§ 147.

In the Occident also the creative activity of the philosophic spirit ceases at this time. The work of Claudianus Eccidius Mamertus, a presbyter at Vienne in Gaul, in which he combats the doctrine of the corporeality of the soul, employing the categories of Aristotle, is without importance and influence. The title of the work is *De statu animæ*, and it has been published by Mosellanus, Basil, 1520, and by Barth. Cygn., 1655. Martianus Mineus FELIX CAPELLA of Carthage exerted great influence upon the Church, although he did not himself belong to it. His *Satyricon* contains in nine books a brief outline of all the sciences known at his time. The work was written, according to most authorities, in the year 460, possibly some decades earlier. It was published in Venice, 1499, and since then has been issued frequently. This outline, clothed in the form of an account of the marriage of Mercury with philology, is a compilation from the works of Aquila, Aristides Quintilianus, Pliny, and above all Varro.—A short time later lived Anicius Manlius (Torquatus?) SEVERINUS BOËTHIUS (478–525). His great influence upon later philosophy is due, not so much to his own ethical work, *De consolatione philosophiæ Libri V.*, written in the eclectic spirit, as to his translations of all the analytical writings of Aristotle, his commentaries upon some of them, and his commentaries upon the work of Porphyry. By means of these translations he became one of the framers of the later terminology, which in part is still used. The work *De Trinitate*, prized very highly in the Middle Ages, does not belong to him. Nor is he the author of the works *De hebdomadibus*, so called because it treats of seven difficult questions, *De fide christiana*, *De duabus naturis in Christo*. It has been doubted whether he was a Christian. Even those who maintain it admit that he was not a very zealous one (cf. F. Nitzsch: *Das System des Boëthius*, Berlin, 1860). His complete works appeared first in Venice, 1492, then in Basel, 1546, and since then have often been published, and are contained in Migne's *Patr. curs. completus*.—Magnus Aurelius CASSIODORUS (469–508) has also given, like Martianus Capella, an encyclopædic outline of the sciences. The Geneva edition of his works (1650) publishes the notes of Fornerius, taken from the *editio princeps* (Paris, 1588), as well as those of Brosses

(1609). From their time onward every educated person regarded it as an accepted principle that systematic instruction must embrace first the three *artes* and then the four *disciplina*, in other words, must take the form of *trivium* and *quadrivium*. The three *artes*,—*grammatica*, *dialectica*, *rhetorica*,—were also called collectively *logica*, as well as *scientiæ sermocinales*; the four *disciplina*,—*arithmetica*, *geometria*, *musica*, *astronomia*,—were called *mathematica*, and also *scientiæ reales*, by Bede and Alcuin and, especially later, *physica*. Subsequently the names and the object of these “seven free arts” were stamped, for the sake of aiding memory, with the verses: “*Gram. loquitur, Dia. verba docet, Rhet. verba colorat, Mus. canit, Ar. numerat, Geo. ponderat, Ast. colit astra.*”—What John of Damascus was for the Oriental Church, that and much more the Spaniard ISIDORE was for the Occidental Church. He was born in the year 560, and was called Hispalensis because he was Bishop of Seville, as successor of his brother, during the last thirty-six years of his life, until 636. Remarkable for genius, piety, and ecclesiastical zeal, he made himself master, by his untiring industry, of all the knowledge accessible to the Latin-speaking world, and passed for so high an authority that later popes could think of ranking him as the fifth *doctor Ecclesiæ* with Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, and Leo, or even, in place of Ambrose, as the fourth. So, too, historical and medical works of a much later date sought to adorn themselves with the glitter of his name; and it is to this that the familiar Spanish collection of ecclesiastical *canones*, the so-called *Isidorian decretals*, owe a part of their effect. His *Sententiarum libri tres* (the fourth book is falsely ascribed to him) contain the entire doctrine of salvation, in a series of propositions formulated partly by himself, partly by earlier ecclesiastical teachers (Augustine, Leo, etc.). The work is therefore often cited as *De summo bono*. It gathers together the decisions of the great councils, that of Laodicea included, and recognises especially the Athanasian symbol. The aim is not, as in the later summaries (*vid.* § 167), to include controversial points and hints for their solution, but only such things as pass unchallenged among all the orthodox. For this reason it is not said who has given to each proposition its particular form. It is a mosaic picture, but at the same time a most excellent one, of what was regarded as ecclesiastical doctrine soon after the

death of Leo the Great. It aims to give only what is believed, and not to explain how it is related to reason. He who takes up Isidore's *Synonymorum libri duo* hardly expects to find in it an ascetic dialogue between a man, in despair on account of his sin, and reason which encourages him. The additional titles *De lamentatione animæ* and *Soliloquium* are manifestly better chosen. The historical writings, the practical advice to clergymen, the apologetic observations addressed to the Jews, have exerted by no means so great an influence as Isidore's chief work, to which *De natura rerum* and *De ordine creaturarum* are related as physical and theological introductions. This work also bears a title, suggested by its author's favourite studies, which promises much less than it accomplishes. The *Etymologiarum libri XX.* (also better called *Origines*) contain a complete encyclopædia, which for centuries was almost the only source from which general information was drawn. The subjects treated are grammar, rhetoric, and dialectics, the four mathematical branches, medicine, laws, composition, and bibliography, God and angels, Church and sects, peoples and languages, man, beast, the world and its divisions, the earth and its parts, buildings, stones and models, agriculture, war, navigation, household furniture. If one seeks, as some editors have done, to find the classical or ecclesiastical writer from whom the author drew for each subject, one will be astonished at the man's learning. It was natural that, under the influence of this thesaurus, it and the remaining works of its author should have found at first many copyists and afterwards many publishers. If we consider only editions of the complete works, that of de la Bigne, Paris, 1550, is to be named first, for the Basel edition of 1477, which is often cited as the *editio princeps*, appears to contain only the *Etymologiae*. After de la Bigne's is to be mentioned that of Jo. Grial, who, at the command of Philip II., published the more complete Madrid edition, 1599, 2 vols., fol., reprinted in 1776. In 1602 the edition of du Breul appeared in Paris, and was reprinted in Cologne in 1617. Finally, in the year 1797 the beautiful Roman edition was issued in seven quarto volumes at the expense of Cardinal Lorenzana. The editor, Franc. Arevalus, gives in the first two volumes, under the title *Isidoriana*, very thorough critical, biographical, and bibliographical studies, and has added in the seventh a complete index. Vols. iii. and iv. contain the *Etymologiae*, vol. v.,

almost exclusively allegorico-mystical observations on Scripture, and in addition the *Differentia verborum et rerum* and *De ortu et obitu Patrum*. In vol. vi. are found *Contra Judæos*, *Sententiæ*, *De officio ecclesiasticarum synonyma*, *Regula monach.*, *Epp. de ord. creat.*; in vol. vii. the historical writings, *Chronicon*, *De regib. Goth.*, *De viris illustr.*, and, in the appendix, spurious works.

§ 148.

With the philosophy of the Church Fathers the first period of mediæval philosophy comes to a close. Since in their philosophy Gnostic and Neo-Platonic thought are contained as elements, the period may be *a potiori* designated as the *patristic period* or the *period of Patristics*. The relation of the three tendencies to each other, not indeed the tendencies themselves, may be compared with what the first period of Greek philosophy had shown (§§ 18-48). When Origen combats the Gnostics with weapons whose use he had learned from Ammonius, and Athanasius combats the Arians with arguments drawn from Origen, when Augustine is freed from Manichæism by Plotinus and Porphyry, and the Areopagite endeavours to prove, by means of formulæ learned from Proclus, that Christian doctrine contains the true wisdom; and when, on the other side, the greatest Neo-Platonists, drawing no distinction between Gnostics and Church Fathers, complain of the latter also on account of their hatred and contempt for the world and on account of their want of appreciation of the beautiful and the like; all this is to be explained by the fact that the Church Fathers stand above both, as Empedocles stood above the Eleatics and physiologers.

SECOND PERIOD OF MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY

SCHOLASTICISM.

C. E. Buläus: *Historia universitatis Parisiensis*, etc. Paris, 1665. 6 vols. fol. Hauréau; *De la Philosophie Scolastique*. Paris, 1850 (2nd ed. 1872). By the same author: *Singularités historiques et littéraires*. Paris, 1861. W. Kaulich: *Geschichte der scholastischen Philosophie*. I. Th. Prag, 1863. Alb. Stöckl: *Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*. 3 vols. Mainz, 1862-66. (Stöckl has made extensive use in the first part of his work of Kaulich's book.)

INTRODUCTION.

§ 149.

NOT until the Christian community has secured worldly existence, or has become a Church, can it begin to conquer the world. But inasmuch as it owes to the world-power, at least in part, that change of condition, this filial relation to the State prevents the reckless struggle without which victory is impossible. In the Greek Church this relation continues, and the imperial primacy never entirely ceases. The Roman Church, on the contrary, in its relations with the plundering heathen, and still more in its relations with those Barbarian peoples to whom it sends its messengers, appears as the giver not only of belief but also of civil order and morality, and thus assumes rather a maternal relation toward the State. Where this is recognised, Church and State follow one path and find mutual recognition; but where it is not, there the Church rightly makes stand against such impiety. In contrast with the Oriental State-Church there is developed in the Occident the ecclesiastical State. The watchword now is to spread and to increase the power of the Church, or to bring all under clerical rule, extensively by means of missions, for which in the main the sword of the plunderer breaks ground, intensively by means of the efforts of energetic popes.

§ 150.

The work of the missionaries of the Roman Church is entirely different from that of the Apostles. It is not their mission to proclaim the glad message of salvation, but to make the doctrinal system of the Roman Church accessible to the minds especially of the Germanic peoples, and to accustom them to its constitution. For this is needed not only apostolic zeal, but also a thorough insight into the whole system of dogmas, and in addition great dialectic skill, in order to explain to the natural, untutored understanding of rude peoples doctrines produced with the help of a philosophy which has united the results of the combined efforts of classical and oriental minds at the zenith of their culture. As a consequence, mission schools arise, whose pupils, wandering from one to another, are often teachers and scholars at the same time, and are early given the name *scholastici*, which had long been used for school teachers.

§ 151.

As patristic philosophy had corresponded to the impulse of the Christian community to become a Church, a philosophy now arises which meets the desire of the Church to obtain entrance for its dogmas and its constitution among men of untrained intellects. This philosophy, on account of the similarity of its aim with that of the missionaries mentioned, has rightly received the name of *Scholasticism*, or *Scholastic Philosophy*. Its representatives do not have to help the Church into existence, but to work over the Church's doctrines. They are therefore not *Patres* but *Magistri Ecclesiæ*. Their aim and that of the Church Fathers can, it is true, be brought under one and the same formula, since both wish to make accessible to the understanding that which belief possesses; but "belief" signifies to the latter that which stands in the Bible as the message of the Apostles, while to the Schoolmen, on the contrary, it signifies the dogmas established by the Fathers. The Fathers have produced the dogmas, the Schoolmen have to systematize them and to make them comprehensible. When, therefore, the philosophizing of the Schoolmen always takes its departure from the propositions established by authority, this is not narrowness on their part, but their necessary confinement

to their vocation. The philosophy of the Schoolmen is ecclesiastical, and therefore their language the (ecclesiastical) Latin, the peculiarly catholic language by means of which the members of the most various peoples simultaneously receive and interpret the Gospel in the Church's own language. It may be regarded as characteristic, that, as the Church is ruled from the one centre which binds all together, science too has soon a recognised centre. Italy possesses the papal chair, Germany the imperial throne, France scholarship. With this difference between the missions of the Church Fathers and of the Schoolmen is connected the fact that, while the former necessarily adhered most closely to those earlier philosophers whose teachings showed the greatest similarity to the Gospel in respect to their content, the latter rank those writers highest from whom most is to be learned in respect to form. From this results their great veneration for logical and encyclopædic works, and this explains why, when later the complete Aristotle was again known, this father of logic, this living encyclopædia of all sciences, became the recognised master of the Schoolmen. In the beginning, however, some of the analytical writings of Aristotle and the Introduction of Porphyry, in the translation, with commentary, of Boëthius, occupy the first rank among the few books of antiquity which have not been forgotten. The *Analytica* and *Topica* remain for a long time unknown. The treatises of Boëthius upon the categorical and hypothetical conclusion, as well as upon topics, are obliged to fill their place.

FIRST DIVISION.

The Rise of Scholasticism.

§ 152.

THE aim of the mediæval spirit is to make the world serviceable to clerical interests. This appears so fully attained in the remarkable phenomenon of the Carlovingian empire, that all later attempts to approach it are directed, more or less consciously, toward the reproduction of that monarchy. The last Christmas of the eighth century witnesses a marriage of world-monarchy and of world-hierarchy such as the Middle Ages do not see again. Almost unprepared, Charlemagne finds himself faced by a problem which is solved only through the might of his genius, and that genius itself presents other problems which only after many centuries appear again. For this very reason, however, his work is only a temporary phenomenon, which, as epoch-making, places before the eyes of later ages the unattainable goal of their struggles, a prince of Christendom, namely, who is at the same time feudal lord and dearest son of the Catholic Church.

§ 153.

Scholastic philosophy, as the universal formula of this period, begins, likewise, with a man who grasps immediately by the power of his genius that which his successors are obliged to work out gradually. The complete unity of the ecclesiastical faith, as fixed by the Oriental and Occidental Fathers, with the results of rational investigation, is so certain to him that he offers to refute every doubt in relation to the former by means of the latter. It cannot be regarded as accidental that this epoch-making man, who promises what scholasticism in its completest form accomplishes (*vid.* § 205), belongs to a people who received their education from Rome. It was however especially important to them that such an agreement should be pointed out. To this is to be added the fact that in his fatherland, at a time when scientific culture was everywhere at a low ebb, the clergy formed a praiseworthy exception. Irish wisdom was celebrated. The method of instruction which began with the *trivium* and ended with the *quad-rivium* was called Irish. From Ireland it spread to Scotland

and England, and from there to the Continent. The names of BEDE (673-735) and of ALCUIN (736-804), which adorned the schools of Wearmouth and of York, belong not to their land alone but to the world. The learning of the former was so celebrated that posterity ascribed to him an alphabetically arranged *thesaurus* of philosophical, principally Aristotelian, sayings, from which they were accustomed to draw quotations, although men are cited in it who lived a long time after him, as Gilbert, Avicenna, Averroës, Marsilius, and others. These *Axiomata philosophica venerabilis Bedæ* (published at Ingolstadt, 1583, and elsewhere) have appeared very often under other names. Prantl, in the *Sitzungsb. d. Münchner Akademie*, July 6, 1867, has discussed most thoroughly their relation to the more complete, but not alphabetically arranged *thesauri* of somewhat later date, which have very often been printed under the name *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, or similar titles. In this study Prantl has pointed out the scholastic, especially Thomistic, reaction against the renaissance. The fact that Bede gave one of his works the title *De rerum natura* would seem to prove his veneration for Isidore of Seville. Charlemagne employed Alcuin to educate in his palace school and elsewhere (especially in the school founded by Alcuin in Tours) teachers for his people. His pupil and successor Fredegisus, likewise RHABANUS (Hrabanus) MAURUS (767-856) were the chief agents in arousing, the one in France, the other, through the school at Fulda, in Germany, an interest not only in learning but also in philosophy. Among the works of Alcuin are to be mentioned as not lacking in influence *De ratione animæ*; among those of Rhabanus, the encyclopædic work *De universo libri XXII.*, also called *De naturis*, as well as his commentaries upon the Introduction of Porphyry and upon Aristotle's work on the Proposition (whose genuineness is disputed); among those of Fredegisus, *De nihilo et tenebris*, in which he discusses why *nihil* is *aliquid*. A younger contemporary of the last two is a man who was born and educated in Britain, and whom one might be tempted to call the Charlemagne of scholastic philosophy, Erigena.

Cf. Gehle: *De Bedæ venerabilis vita et scriptis*. Lugd. Bat., 1835. F. Lorenz: *Alcuins Leben*. Halle, 1827. Monnier: *Alcuin*, etc. Paris, 1835. Kunstmann: *Rhabanus Magnentius Maurus*. Mainz, 1841.

A.—SCHOLASTICISM AS A FUSION OF RELIGION
AND REASON.

§ 154.

ERIGENA.

- F. Hjort: *Johannes Scotus Erigena, oder Vom Ursprunge einer christlichen Philosophie*. Copenhagen, 1823. F. A. Staudenmaier: *Jo. Scot. Erigena und die Wissenschaft seiner Zeit*. I. Th. Frankfurt a. M., 1834. St. René Taillandier: *Scot Erigena et la philosophie scolastique*. Strasburg, 1843. Th. Christlieb: *Leben und Lehre des Joh. Scot. Erigena*. Gotha, 1860. Jo. Huber: *Joh. Scot. Erigena*. München, 1861.

I. THE fact that the earliest manuscripts contain at one time the name JOANNES SCOTUS (or Scotigena), at another time JOANNES JERUGENA (later ERIGENA), has given rise to controversies in regard to Erigena's birthplace. Ergene in England, Ayre in Scotland, finally Ireland (*ἱερά νῆσος*, 'Iéppn, Erin), all contend for the honour which probably belongs to the last, since he is always cited as a representative of Irish wisdom. He was born between 800 and 815, and was still living in 877. His knowledge of the Greek language and his fondness for Greek dogma and Alexandrian philosophy lend plausibility to the report that he made many journeys especially in Greece, although such accomplishments and tendencies were not unknown in his fatherland. He was called to Paris by Charles the Bald, and there stood at the head of the royal, or of some other school. He was probably a layman, and the report that he died as Abbot of Athelney or, according to others, of Malmesbury, rests upon a confusion of names. That he was called by Alfred to Oxford and taught there is quite as uncertain. The fact that he introduced an entirely new standpoint caused him to be hated by the clergy, as did moreover the way in which he combated Gottschalk's doctrine of double predestination which was disapproved even by Hincmar of Rheims, who had induced him to write his polemic. The work against Paschasius Radbert upon the Lord's Supper, probably written by Ratramnus, which was burned at the command of the clergy, was formerly and is still by some ascribed to him. The translation in the year 860 of Dionysius the Areopagite,

published without papal permission, led Pope Nicholas I. to demand Erigena's removal from Paris. This did not however take place, for in 873 he was certainly still in France. His principal work, the five books *De divisione naturæ* (*περὶ φύσεων μερισμοῦ*, also cited as *περὶ φύσεως*, *De naturis*, *Perifision merismu*, *periphisis*, etc.), was publicly burned on the 23rd of January, 1225, and, being found in wide circulation among the Albigenses, was proscribed and thus became very rare. It was first published in the year 1681 by Gale, and again in 1830 by Schülter. A much more correct edition is that of A. J. Floss, who issued it in the year 1853, as the 122nd volume of Migne's *Patrologiæ cursus completus*, adding the work upon predestination and the translation of Dionysius the Areopagite, with the prefaces of Gale and Schülter. The commentary upon Marcianus Capella, whose authenticity Gale had called in question, is omitted in the edition of Floss, but has been published by Hauréau.

2. The sentence, enunciated by Erigena in his work upon predestination (i. 1), as well as elsewhere, that the true religion is also the true philosophy and vice versa, is the theme of the entire scholastic philosophy. The consequence, which follows naturally from this, that every doubt in regard to religion can be refuted by means of philosophy, still appeared so preposterous that a meeting of French clergymen declared it to be insanity or blasphemy. Religion is to Erigena in its relation to philosophy what authority is to reason. In respect to rank, reason precedes, so also in respect to time, since that which is taught by the authority of the Fathers was discovered by them with the help of reason. The weak must naturally subject themselves to authority, but those who are less weak should be content with this all the less because the figurative nature of many expressions, and further the undeniable accommodation exercised by the Fathers towards the understanding of the uneducated, demand the use of reason as a corrective (*Div. nat.*, i. 69). By reason is to be understood however not the mere subjective opinion, but the common thought which reveals itself in conversation, when out of two reasons are made one, each of the speakers becoming as it were the other (iv. 9). The organ of this general thinking, or of speculation proper, is the *intellectus*, called also *νοῦς* or *animus*, which stands above the *ratio* or the *λόγος*, and still more above the *sensus internus* or *διάνοια*. The latter again

has below it the five external senses and the life force, which belong to the soul only because the latter is bound to the body. The peculiarity of speculation is found by Erigena at one time to lie in the fact that it does not stop with the individual but always embraces the whole in its view, and hand-in-hand with this in the fact that it raises itself above all contradictions. At another time he finds its peculiarity to consist in the fact that through it the knowing agent becomes to a certain degree the thing known, so that the speculative knowledge of Erigena is unity of subject and object (ii. 20). Its immediateness is often indicated by the designations *intellectualis visio*, *intuitus gnosticus* or *experimentum*.

3. The totality of all being, called sometimes $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$, sometimes $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$, commonly *natura*, is divided into four classes: the uncreated creating, the created creating, the created uncreating, the neither created nor creating. On account of the designation $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$, sometimes used for the whole, Erigena calls his entire investigation in the fourth book *Physiologia*. Of these four classes mentioned, the first, the ground of all being, and the fourth, the last goal, which for that very reason nothing transcends, fall in God. And thus, since the second class forms the diametrical opposite of the fourth, and the third of the first, these two embrace in themselves the creation, and in such a way that the second class is composed of the first-created *causæ primordiales* of all things, the third of their effects, the things themselves (ii. 2, v. 39, and elsewhere). It has been rightly remarked that at least the first three classes are to be found in Augustine, who bases his division upon the Moved and Unmoved of Aristotle, between which stands that which is both. If any one should desire to say that in view of this agreement there remains to Erigena only to put the nothing in the fourth class, he would perhaps find little in Erigena's works to refute his view; see further, section 4. Of the five books into which the work of Erigena is divided the first four each discuss one class of being without confining themselves strictly to that limit. In the fifth book the return of every created thing into the source of creation is exhibited. The latter forms the content of Erigena's ethics, while the first four books correspond to the two other divisions of philosophy, to theology and physics. The method of procedure is such that rational grounds and authority are continually mingled. As to the latter, the Scrip-

tures are for the most part allegorically interpreted, Origen being directly followed, Philo indirectly. In addition to the Scriptures he summons to his aid the Fathers, the Greek as well as the Latin. Among the former, Origen, the Cappadocian Gregories, the Areopagite and Maximus the Confessor, are chiefly employed; among the latter, Augustine, and, almost more than he, the allegorical interpreter of the Scriptures, Ambrose. He takes as his starting-point therefore the results of the labours of the greatest men of the Orient and of the Occident.

4. God, as the uncreated Creator, is the chief subject considered in the *first book*. He is commonly called *summa bonitas*. As the One by whom, through whom, and to whom is all, He is beginning, middle, and end, and therefore rightly designated as the unity of three Persons, a thing which can excite offence all the less since every being, above all man, the likeness of God, in its *essentia*, *virtus*, and *operatio*, carries trinity in itself, whether one professes to find it with Augustine in the *esse*, *velle*, and *scire*, or with other Fathers in the *essentia*, *virtus*, *operatio*, or in the *intellectus*, *ratio*, and *sensus*. All three form the uncreated creating, for *Pater vult, Filius facit, Spiritus perfecit*. God is so completely the ground of all being, that properly there is no being outside of Him. All exists only in so far as God appears in it. All being is theophany (iii. 4). The being of God is in no way limited; therefore He is not really a *quid*, does not properly know what He is, because He is above every *quid* and in so far may be called *nihil* (ii. 28). It thus becomes possible for Erigena, in verbal agreement with Augustine, to deny the applicability of the categories to God and, with the Areopagite, to place the theology of negation above that of affirmation (iii. 20). Thus all plurality, even of properties, must be excluded from God. His knowledge is will, His will being. What God knows, that He wills, that He is; all is actual only in so far as it is in Him, indeed, as it is God (i. 12; iii. 17). The endless nature of God, this proper *nihilum*, out of which things proceed, according to theologians, becomes in His theophanies a particular being (*aliquid*), so that God, without ceasing to be above things, in them comes into being and creates Himself (iii. 19, 20).

5. The first transition (*progressio*) leads to the subject of the *second book*, the created and in turn creating nature. By

this is to be understood the content of the *causæ primordiales, ideæ, formæ, prototypa, immutabiles rationes*, etc., in the *Verbum Dei*, which embraces them all in itself, as the beginning in which God created all things, as the wisdom in which He saw all things before Him. Although they are created they are nevertheless eternal; for if there were a time when God did not create, then creation would be accidental to Him, and that is impossible (iii. 6). Among these first principles of all things are enumerated goodness, essence, life, reason, blessedness, etc., in short, the highest thinkable predicates, beneath which stands all that partakes of them, because the *participatum* is always more than the *participans* (iii. 1, 2). They themselves likewise stand toward one another in a relation of participation, and therefore essence is a (sub-) species of goodness, life of essence, reason of life, etc. That praises of Plato are not wanting in Erigena is from this easily understood. In their eternal existence in the word of God, the *causæ primordiales* form a unity, are an inseparable whole (*individuum*). The chaos and vacuum of the Mosaic account of creation are therefore referred to the *abyssus* of the primitive causes and interpreted as the brooding Spirit by whom that unity is divided into genera and species (ii. 18, 27). This gulf of causes or principles is the single material out of which things proceed as from their seed. The assumption of matter, indeed, even of a primitive nothing, outside of God, is always ranked with Manichæism (iii. 14). Whatever is real in things is a participation in the creating truth (iii. 9) by means of the principles which are, after God, the highest (ii. 32).

6. These causes and principles are followed by their principles and effects, the things, whose complex, the created not creating nature, forms the chief topic of the *third book*. This book contains therefore the physics of Erigena, in connection with which it must never be forgotten that he, like Augustine, looks upon creation and preservation as one. The introduction to this book is composed of an allegorical treatment of the six days' work, in which Erigena sees simultaneous acts pictured as successive. God did all that He did at once; Moses however can behold and recount the deeds only in succession. Erigena does not doubt that he is able to penetrate the meaning of the history of creation. The world indeed exists only in order that the rational creature may perceive it, and therefore attains the end for which the unenvious

Deity created it only when it is perceived (v. 33). Seeing is much more than the thing seen, hearing than the thing heard; the becoming cognisable is the highest existence of things. For this reason man does not belong properly to things, but things in their truth are in him when he perceives them (iv. 8). The example of Abraham, who, without the Scriptures, perceived God in the courses of the stars, teaches that not only the Bible but also nature reveals the Lord (iii. 85). Wilderness and emptiness are followed in the first place by the contrast of *obscuritas causarum* and *claritas effectuum*, that is, this contrast proceeds out of the abyss of principles by means of the Holy Spirit, which not only distributes gifts but in general establishes all manifoldness (ii. 32). Within the *claritas effectuum* the contrast between heaven and earth, that is, between *spiritus* and *corpus*, is most prominent, and to them belong life or animation as a mean. The general (*generalia* or *catholica*) elements form the intermediate steps between principles and bodies. They are themselves, properly speaking, not corporeal. In man all is so united that he is designated the *officina creaturarum*. The angels cannot be so named because they do not have a body formed from elements (iii. 26, 27). The twice-told account of the creation of man refers to a double creation; the first without sexual distinction in the likeness of God, to which man would have immediately attained if he had been obedient; the second the creation for the state of sin of an animal nature, male and female (iv. 5, 6). The latter occupies the prominent place, since man, whose state of innocence pictured in the Bible is as little a temporal condition as Paradise is an actual place (iv. 12, 17, 18), immediately after his creation, even before the devil tempts him, passes through the stadia of *mutabilitas voluntatis* and of *sopor*, and, after the temptation, proceeds to sin and loses his original body, which is to be his future glorified body (iv. 13, 14). He is now no longer in Paradise, whence flow from the one fountain of life the four streams—Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Righteousness.

7. This however is not the end. The goal is rather the return of man to God. This is the particular subject of the *fourth book*, but is treated with almost more fulness in the *fifth*. That it can be considered only in connection with the apostasy from God, that is, in connection with evil, lies in the nature of the case. The accusation of Pantheism, which

has been made against Erigena's doctrine of evil, is justified only in so far as the latter really avoids dualism more than the opposite extreme. Since the ground of all true being lies in God, and God wills and knows only true being, evil really possesses no substantial existence, indeed it cannot even be said that God knows of evil (iv. 6, v. 27). Man also, when he assumes the Divine point of view, that is when he considers the All in its entirety, sees nothing evil, but gains the impression of a harmony in which the single discord enhances by contrast the beauty of the whole (v. 35, 36). Since evil has not true being, it has also no positive cause; it is *incausale* (iv. 6). Free-will, to which many have attributed it, is something good; indeed every act of will is this, since it is directed toward good. That which makes it bad is only the delusion and error which picture as a good that which is none. Evil therefore consists only in the perverted tendency of the will, which is in itself good. Since it is in itself delusion and non-entity, it therefore becomes nothing, and that is called punishment, so that that only can be punished which does not exist (v. 35). This punishment issues in pardon or pain, according as the man who receives it turns to God or from Him (v. 32). The pain consists in the inability to do that which the perverted will wishes. Hell, therefore, is an internal state, just as Paradise is. Only on account of the sensuousness of men have the Fathers represented both as spatial and temporal (v. 29). The existence of hell does not disturb the harmony of the whole, since God's righteousness reveals itself in it (v. 35). Since the object of punishment is not the substance of the sinner willed by God, but empty willing accidental to the sinner, Erigena thinks of a restoration of all things as the final goal. Referring expressly to Origen (cf. § 137, 2), he does not entirely exclude from this restoration even the demons, since eternity and evil are incompatible (v. 27, 28). And yet it is only their complete exclusion which he does not admit, for he does not deny the distinction between such as retain a remembrance of their great sins and such as do not, and he connects this with the various steps in which the return of things to God and their *adunatio* with Him advance. This return must naturally, as the antitype of the procession from God, show all the steps of the descending process of creation, but in the reverse order. In creation arose first the distinction between Creator and creature; then, within the latter, the

distinction between the intelligible (the principles) and the material (the effects); in the last again the contrast between heaven and earth, and upon earth between Paradise and the rest of the world; and, finally, the contrast between man and woman; and, in the departure from Paradise, the contrast between this and the coarse material existence in the body composed of elements. Death sets free from this existence, for in death the elements are separated. In the resurrection the distinction between the sexes ceases. Thus the world is transformed into Paradise, the earthly becomes heavenly, and all passes over into the *causæ primordiales*. Finally *theosis* or *deificatio* takes place, which is not however to be thought of as absorption, for the individuality is preserved, the elevation consisting in the attainment of a full knowledge of God, in which the knowing and the known become one (v. 37). If all attain to Paradise, then there must be many dwellings and degrees of rank. Only a few chosen ones will taste of the *deificatio* as the Sabbath of Sabbaths.

§ 155.

1. The fact that in Erigena the principle of Scholasticism makes its appearance as a new or immediate thing, not only gives him the position of an innovator, distrusted by the watchful Church, but also causes the oneness of ecclesiastical doctrine and reason to appear immediate, that is, without distinction. On account of this want of distinction every rational ground is to him at once authority, and the dictum of authority he treats as if it were a ground of reason. The former gives to his philosophizing a heterodox character, the latter a mystical. He philosophizes still too much in the manner of the Church Fathers, who had to frame the dogmas, and from this arises his agreement with the Neo-Platonists. Nevertheless he regards it as certain that there exists already not only a revelation and sacred history, but also ecclesiastical doctrine of irrefragable authority. This is a contradiction. Its solution will be the first step of progress. This will be accomplished by assigning to the distinction between the two sides its proper importance, and by putting reflection in the place of the immediate *intuitus gnosticus*. This reflection proceeds on the one hand from the dogma, as something given to the conception of it; on the other hand, it makes the conception its starting-point, and arrives at the dogma as something in

agreement with it. Where the union of doctrine and of reason is mediate and the result of reflection, both can better secure their rights. The second father of Scholasticism is superior to the first in orthodoxy and in perspicuity. The fact that the union of which we are speaking is not asserted for the first time, takes from it the character of an innovation, and therefore secures it indulgence. The second author of Scholasticism is a highly honoured prince of the Church. The century and a half which lie between him and Erigena, the layman attacked by the Church, show no great philosophical results. The tenth century is at first too uncivilized, afterwards too much occupied with deeds to have time for philosophizing. The shattered State, the tottering Church, must be strengthened, cloisters and schools must be purified and reformed, in order that the luxury of thinking may again become possible and the leisure necessary for philosophy may be won.

2. The first place among the men who could have held up before the age the mirror of self-knowledge if it had only been another age, is occupied by GERBERT of Auvergne, who died in 1003 as Pope Sylvester II. He was borne on by the stream of efforts which sought to restore the ecclesiastical, civil and intellectual life, and he himself did more than any one else to advance them. He was a friend of the Ottos in Germany and of the Capets in France, and had charge of the education of their sons. Although he did not belong to the cloister, every one of whose abbots was made a saint, he yet was mighty in advancing the impulses which proceeded from it. As a teacher he was so celebrated that every school which was under his charge became a normal institute. Where he took part in Church government (in Bobbio, and in the "three R's," the bishoprics of Rheims, Ravenna, and Rome) he opposed abuses with great vigour. He was in fact so occupied with practical affairs that only his inextinguishable thirst for knowledge explains how he could still find time to pursue his studies. Although they embraced some of the free arts, he nevertheless devoted himself with especial fondness to the branches of the *quadrivium*. It is these which at one time procured for him the cognomen *musicus*, and again brought upon him the suspicion that such (astronomical) knowledge was not attained by right means, and finally caused posterity to make his services (in arithmetic) still greater than

they actually were. As regards the *trivium*, we know that he did a great deal for rhetoric, and we still possess a dialectic treatise by him, *De rationale et ratione uti*. The question how the use of reason may properly be predicated of a rational being, a narrower conception in this case, contrary to custom, being predicated of a broader, is answered by Gerbert in a manner which really results in the distinction of assumed and inherent judgments, since emphasis is laid upon the fact that the predicate is here an accident of the subject (*vid.* § 86, 1). This is perhaps less surprising than the fact that such a question should interest an emperor (Otto III.). This serves to prove that even among the most eminent of that age the interest extended at most only to the vestibule of philosophical speculation, as far as that gymnasium of the spirit in which the latter was to prepare itself by means of formal dialectic practice for an activity richer in results.

C. J. Hock: *Gerbert oder Papst Sylvester II. und sein Jahrhundert*. Wien, 1837.

3. BERENGAR of Tours, although he did not come into direct contact with Gerbert, is yet connected with him through the fact that he was educated in the school at Chartres, under one of Gerbert's greatest pupils, Fulbert, the "Socrates of the Franks." The writings of Erigena may also have exerted an influence upon him. This is true at least of the work which was so long ascribed to Erigena, that of Ratramnus against Paschasius Radbert and his doctrine of transubstantiation. Berengar appeared as a champion of this doctrine against those who agreed with Paschasius. Even the favour of Hildebrand, who as legate and again as pope endeavoured to protect him, could not prevent his being threatened to the last extreme at two Church councils, so that he felt it possible to rescue himself only by a public recantation. For this double subjection to the fear of men he blamed himself until his death (1088) more than for his unorthodox doctrines. The former as well as the latter may perhaps have been a result of the fact that he always combats the dogmatic definitions of his opponents with the fundamental propositions of dialectics, as he himself willingly admits. While Gerbert, in pursuing his investigations upon subject and predicate, leaves Christianity quite out of view, and is not at all hindered from formulating a confession of faith, as at his election to the

bishopric of Rheims, Berengar, on the contrary, argues that "real body" cannot be united as predicate with bread as subject, etc. Such emphasis of the grammatico-dialectic rules, at a time when no Anselm or Abelard had made logic the queen of the sciences, was an innovation in marked contrast to the ruling opinion. And, again, it is quite natural that the feeling of certainty and confidence of victory which are inspired by a phalanx of thinkers of like views should be wanting in him who was the first to advocate this appeal of theology to the *trivium*. If we compare Berengar with Anselm and Abelard, he appears as a mere beginner; his application of logic to theology as something premature and hence untimely. It is therefore not to be wondered at that he was obliged to yield before the unspeculative but learned Lanfranc, trained by a legal practice and leader of the "positive" theologians, who have been since then contrasted with the "scholastic." Again, Berengar exercises his dialectic talent upon one doctrinal point alone, and that is properly no dogma but a theological speculation, since it not only asserts the bodily presence of Christ but also seeks to explain it (cf. § 145). This fact, if we compare him with Anselm, who tests and sifts dialectically only dogmas, and those in their totality, causes Berengar to appear as a man who has not correctly understood the peculiar problem of his age. Not only the widespread predilection for heresy, which Dr. Strauss has called "romantic," but also the fact that Berengar has been made the subject of that little cabinet-piece of Lessing's, in which a newly-discovered work of his was given to the world, has surrounded him with a certain halo. (The work of Lessing has been published in full by A. F. and F. Th. Vischer, Berlin, 1834.) Finally, the fact is perhaps to be added, that he twice did what Galileo is especially praised as a hero for doing, recanted what he believed to be true.

4. WILLIAM, a contemporary of Berengar, was born in 1026, and became ABBOT OF HIRSCHAU in 1069, a position which he held until his death in 1091. Recently Prantl has again called attention to him, both in the *Sitzungsberichten der Münchener Akademie* and also in his great work. In the former (1861, *Heft I.*) he reviews a very rare quarto volume, printed by Henric Petri in Basel in 1531, which contains William's *Philosophicarum et astronomicarum institutionum libri tres*. More interesting than the attempt to conclude the

existence of almighty wisdom from the fact that the elements of the world are opposed to one another and therefore can be brought into unity only by an external power, is the circumstance that William had become acquainted, through the translations of Constantine of Carthage (Africanus), with some works of the Arabians, and that he quotes Johannitius, that is Honein (*vid.* § 181). Only their works upon the natural sciences, however, appear to have interested him; at least, although the honour of being the first to attain a knowledge of Oriental wisdom may be conceded to him, he cannot be regarded as the channel through which Mohammedan Aristotelianism first flowed into the Christian world. This became nevertheless, as will be shown later, an essential element in the development of scholasticism. Moreover K. Werner (*Entwicklungsgang der mittelalterlichen Psychologie*, Vienna, 1876) has recently asserted that the work in question is only a reprint of the four books *περὶ διδασκῶν* of William of Conches (*vid.* § 162).

§ 156.

ANSELM.

F. R. Hasse: *Anselm von Canterbury*. 2 Theile. Leipzig, 1843, 52.

1. ANSELM, a member of a noble family of Lombardy, was born in Aosta in 1035, and received his theological training in Normandy, first in Avranches, afterward in the monastery of Bec. Here he succeeded Lanfranc as Prior, and finally became Abbot. The school, which was celebrated before his time, became under him the first in Christendom, especially for dialectics. He became Lanfranc's successor likewise as Archbishop of Canterbury, and from the year 1089 until his death (April 21, 1109) victoriously maintained the rights of the Church, not intimidated by a double exile. His works were first printed by Casp. Hochfelder, Nuremberg, 1491, and again by Gerberon in one folio volume, Paris, 2nd ed., 1721. The latter contains Eadmer's biography of Anselm, and, freed from its typographical errors, forms the 155th volume of Migne's *Patr. lat.*

2. Anselm, like the Church Fathers, often quotes the Old Testament saying *nisi credideretis, non intelligetis* [cf. Anselm, *De fide Trin.*, ii.], in order to fix the relation of belief and knowledge, of authority and reason. Belief and purification

of heart must precede the establishment of doctrines; and for those who have not the capacity *intelligere*, belief and submissive *veneratio* suffice. But for the person who is capable of understanding, it would be neglect and indolence not to proceed from the means to the end, that is from belief to knowledge (*De fide Trinit.*, 2; *Proslog.*, 1), and so substitute *dilectatio*, free perception, for *veneratio* (*Cur Deus homo*, 1). However much therefore Anselm emphasizes the fact that all his doctrines agree with Scripture and with the Fathers, especially Augustine (*Monol.*, *praef.*), he nevertheless often reiterates his desire to develop them from reason as if there were no Bible, so that they may be proved even to the unbeliever who admits the validity only of reason, the supreme judge (*Cur Deus homo*, *praef.*). He says that rational grounds which do not contradict Scripture have *eo ipso* the authority of Scripture upon their side (*De conc. praesc. et lib. arb.*, iii. 7). For this very reason, in addition to a knowledge of ecclesiastical doctrine, a thorough dialectic training is most necessary to him who wishes to philosophize successfully. Whoever, for instance, accepts the heretical dialectics, according to which the genera are only *status vocis*, mere words, and thus answers the question stated by Porphyry (cf. § 123, 6) otherwise than he had done, is incapable of understanding any of the most important dogmas (*De fide Trinit.*, 2).

3. This method of Anselm is revealed in the investigations in regard to the nature of God to which the *Monologium* is devoted. In agreement with Plato and Proclus, he maintains that every predicate expresses only participation in that which it affirms, so that the predicate great presupposes greatness as its *prius*, etc. Therefore all things by their predicates point to a nature which not only has but is all these predicates. This nature, since the most general predicate of all things is that they exist, coincides with the absolute being, the *essentia*, a word which Anselm, in agreement with Augustine, prefers to *substantia*. This highest of all thoughts, to which all things look, but which points to nothing beyond itself, is the conception of God. God is thus *summum omnium quæ sunt* or *id quo majus cogitari nequit*. He is All in the highest degree, *summe ens*, *summe vivens*, *summe bonum*, etc., and is this All not by participation, but in Himself, *per se*. This nature must be thought of necessarily as one, since the opposite opinion, that it is many, is saved from contradictions

only by the tacit presupposition of unity (*Monol.*, i. 16, 26; 6, 4).

4. The conception of Deity thus gained is then used by Anselm in his ontological proof for the existence of God, which he develops in his *Proslogium*, a work whose second title is *Fides querens intellectum*. Referring to the opening words of the fourteenth Psalm, he seeks to prove to the *insipiens*, who says in his heart there is no God, that he contradicts himself. He presupposes only that the denier of God knows what he says, and does not utter mere empty words. If such a person understands by God one *quo nihil majus cogitari potest*, and if he is obliged nevertheless to admit that *esse, in intellectu et in re* is greater than *esse in solo intellectu*, he must also acknowledge that *Deus non potest cogitari non esse*, and that he has therefore been talking nonsense. For this very reason Anselm is quite right in his reply to the objection of Guanilo, formerly Lord of Montigny, who when over seventy years of age had entered the monastery of Marmontier and from there wrote against Anselm's new theology. He maintained that the existence of an island Atlantis could be proved in the same way; but Anselm replied that he had not taken his departure from a thing *quod majus omnibus est* but from the *quo majus cogitari nequit*, and had thus brought the *insipiens* into such a position that he must either admit that he thinks of God as actually existing, or must confess that he says what he himself does not think, which would make him an *impudens conspuendus* (*Lib. apol. c. Guanil.*, 5, 9). It is this very subjective turn which Anselm gives to his argument which imparts to it greater value than it possesses in the later form employed by Wolff and others.

5. The remainder of the contents of the *Monologium* finds its continuation in that which is developed by Anselm in his polemics against Roscellin in the work *De fide Trinitatis et de incarnatione Verbi*. It is an attempt to explain the doctrine of the Trinity. The highest being, compared with which things do not properly exist (*vix sunt*), expresses in the Word, consubstantial with Him, Himself and at the same time all that He creates, as the artist knows in one thought his work of art and himself as artist (*Monol.*, 28, 29, 33, 34). In this His Word the world exists as life and truth better and more beautiful than in reality. While our thoughts are copies, the Divine thoughts are models of things. The words pro-

duction, Son, express best the relation to the consubstantial Word, as *spirare* expresses the procession from the Father and from the Son whose *communitas* is the Spirit (*Ibid.*, 36, 39, 57). The Trinity is moreover by no means a doctrine hostile to reason. The fact that the one God is Father, Son, and Spirit, as the one Nile is fountain, river, and sea, ought not to surprise any one who realizes that in man, created in the likeness of God, *memoria*, *intelligentia*, and *amor* exist, all of which are one, indeed in each one of which the other two are contained (*De fid. Trin.*, 8; *Monol.*, 60, 61, 67). Thus the Occidental opinion, according to which Father and Son are quite alike in the *processio*, and the Son does not occupy something like a maternal position, is in accord with reason and is much to be preferred to the Oriental view (*Monol.*, 53; cf. *De proc. Spiriti Sti. c. græc.*).

6. In the same way in which he endeavours, in the works already mentioned, to explain the doctrines of God with the help of reason to such as do not respect authority, Anselm seeks to make soteriology clear. On account of the close relationship, however, in which this stands to the doctrine of the fall, which cannot itself be understood without the creation of free creatures, we must first notice what Anselm teaches in his three dialogues: *De veritate*, *De libero arbitrio*, and *De casu Diaboli*. The principal points are as follows: The being of things is not like that of God; as something borrowed, it is of itself no being, can scarcely be called being. This is the meaning of the statement that the world was created out of nothing, that is, out of a condition which forms a contrast to its own being, but not to that of God. Things were rather in God's thinking and willing before they were created (*Monol.*, 8, 9). The proper end of the world is the honour of God; indeed it may be said that the world is the manifested glory of God, inasmuch as His glory is reflected in its order, and therefore every attempt against this order is an attack upon His honour. The highest station among created things is occupied by rational natures, angels and men, the former counted first. They, like all things, are created to the glory of God, with the difference that in them as conscious beings His glory is known. It is God's glory to be known. To angels and men belong freedom of the will, the *liberum arbitrium*, which Anselm, like Augustine in opposition to Pelagius, conceives, not as the ability to sin or not to sin, but as the

potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem (*De lib. arb.*, 1, 12). But he differs from Augustine, inasmuch as he maintains in freedom the distinction between potentiality and actuality which causes him to assert that free will cannot be lost even when the fall has made it impossible to obtain righteousness without higher support. Thus man has the power of sight even when he cannot see because there is no light (*De lib. arb.*, 3). Without the fall, angels and men would have remained at most in their original state, and would not have succeeded in making themselves partakers of the higher good for which God had designed them. The possibility of the fall lies in the fact that the will of the creature has a double end: happiness for its own sake, righteousness for the sake of God's glory. Each of these is natural and necessary; one of them only involves no idea of merit (*De casu Diaboli*, 18, 13, 14). The angel, inasmuch as both are placed before him, can, by means of his free will, but not by means of that which makes him free, that is he can by means of his arbitrariness, will happiness alone (*De lib. arb.*, 2), can put his well-being in the place of the divine glory, and thus improperly will to be like God, that is autonomous. Or he can subordinate happiness to righteousness, his will to the glory of God. In the former case he loses his righteousness, his will becomes evil, that is lacks what it should have. In the latter case he confirms it and gives to it in a certain degree that which prevents its being lost. The only positive evil is the perverted direction of the will. The will itself comes from God and is good, so also the deed, that is the change produced in the world. Unrighteousness is absence and in so far is equal to nothing. The evil consists in willing this nothing instead of the prescribed something (*De cas. Diab.*, 4, 18, 15, 19, 20). We need not be surprised that God punishes the sinner for this nothing. His punishment consists in the fact that He cannot tolerate the vacancy, that He demands something where nothing is (*De conc. virg.*, 6). As sin lies only in the perverse will, the punishment concerns neither the action nor the work, but the will. If we ask finally what it was that caused the devil to will the negative instead of the positive, to let go instead of holding fast, we must reply that his action was without reason. The evil will is at the same time *causa efficiens* and *effectus*, it lies solely in arbitrariness (*De cas. Diab.*, 19, 20, 27).

7. What has been said so far is true of the fall of man as well as of that of the angels. Anselm, however, regards it as certain that for men there is a redemption, but for fallen angels none (*Cur Deus homo*, ii. 21). He is obliged to enter upon a more exact consideration of the distinction between the sins of angels and of men. This investigation is connected with a discussion of original sin, which cannot exist among angels since they do not constitute a genus growing by propagation, nor an angelhood similar to the family. In this connection the work *De conceptu virginali et originali peccatæ* is to be especially noticed. It is of the greatest importance that the nature, or the general essence by which each of us is man, be not confounded with the *individuitas*, or especial essence by which we are persons, by which each one is a particular man. In Adam human nature was whole. Outside of him it did not exist, and therefore it is stained by his personal sin, and the guilt passes over, as original or natural guilt, upon those who are in the *potestas propagandi* of Adam. Every one of them is *per creationem homo, per individuitatem persona, per propagationem Adam*, and this family bond makes them Adam's heirs. Sin has its seat only in the rational will, and consists in the fact that the will, good in itself, is subordinated to the desire for pleasure, also good in itself. Man's original guilt therefore first begins when he awakes to a *rationalis voluntas*, and hence, being inherited, is not so great as the personal sin of Adam. Nevertheless it is justly punished in Adam's posterity, since what he did took place not without the participation of the nature; at the same time, however, the various degrees of punishableness must not be forgotten (*De conc. virg.*, I, 10, 23, 4, 7, 22, 28).

8. With these propositions in regard to the rise and propagation of sin, the premises are given for the chief question in soteriology—the theory of satisfaction. These Anselm develops in his most celebrated work, *Cur Deus homo*. Again, as he himself says, he proceeds as if there had been no incarnation but the necessity of it were to be exhibited. The loss which natures designed for blessedness had suffered by the fall of the angels is again made good by the creation of men, although they are not created solely on that account. They are to shame the devil, inasmuch as they, although externally tempted, stand more firmly than he who tempted

himself. But man himself fell, and thus served as a triumph for the devil and robbed God of His glory, for which the entire world offered as yet no compensation. Since, however, the indulgence of evil would sanction disorder and disobedience and would justify unrighteousness, it was necessary, if man were not to be lost, that compensation be furnished for that transgression in addition to the punishment which it required. This, however, man himself, whose place it is to supply it, is not able to furnish, since he has made himself incapable of righteousness (*Cur Deus homo*, i. 10, 16, 21; ii. 11, 12, 23, 24). On the other side, God has taken upon Himself the necessity of completing His work, and this necessity is His grace. He alone is in a condition to do as much as must be done, *i.e.* more than all the world. Since God alone can, but man should do it, there remains but the one way open. God must accomplish it as man. Wholly God and wholly man, He must not so much lower Himself to mankind as raise mankind to Himself and complete the restitution which man owes (*Ibid.*, ii. 5, 6, 7). But the difficulty arises, that through the assumption of human nature God appears to take upon Himself also the original sin connected with it. This is not so; for the incarnate One is born, not after the method of natural generation (*De conc. virg.*, 23), but in such a manner that His birth, a creation from woman alone, ranks as a fourth beside the three different ways in which God created Adam, Eve, and their posterity. Thus by this miraculous creative act of God the hereditary activity of the father of the race was interrupted; and so, under these circumstances, even a mere man could have been born free from original sin, especially when, as in this case, the mother who bore him was purified from sin through hopeful belief in the One to come (*Cur Deus homo*, ii. 7, 16; *De conc. virg.*, 16). If the sin of man therefore is to be expiated, God must be born as man, and indeed as a sinless man. The question however arises, Why God the Son? It would be unreasonable to suppose all three Persons united with man to form one Person. It can therefore be but one. The Son (of God) alone in becoming Son (of the Virgin) will not deny His (sonly) nature. The fact, however, that it is the part of the true image of God to win the victory against the evil one, the caricatured likeness of God, is especially decisive (*Cur Deus homo*, ii. 9). There arises the further question: How is that compensation made

which only the incarnated One can offer? Naturally, not by the fulfilment of His own duty. But since every righteous *deed* of man is no more than the fulfilment of his duty, only *suffering*, and indeed undeserved suffering, can make compensation. In this lies the significance of the death of Christ. In His death Anselm does not, like most of the Church Fathers, emphasize the idea that the devil has sold his claim upon men, or that he has been tricked of it (as others, *e.g.* Isidore Hisp., *Senten.*, i. 14, teach), but rather the fact that the incarnate One offers as a sacrifice to God something which is greater than all that is not God, that is, Himself, an offering upon which God has no claim as He has upon His obedience. This self-sacrifice of the guiltless expiates, through the boundless worth which His life has, the guilt against God acquired in the fall, and shows therefore a contrast to the fall which can be pointed out in all its details. What lust perpetrates suffering atones; the robbery of God is expiated by the gift to God, etc. The fact that this offering of His own life takes place in the form of a painful death, makes the Saviour further a model and pattern, but this is not the principal thing. This sacrifice is necessary, but not in such a sense as to destroy its voluntariness, for only that, only the fact that it is not compulsory, gives the Saviour a claim to reward. Since nothing can be given to Him who possesses all that the Father has, that reward, remission, is imparted to the human race, and works backward upon the ancients and forward upon the brethren who cling to Him. Thus, inasmuch as hereditary righteousness blots out hereditary sin, righteousness and mercy alike gain their rights. Of course this hereditary righteousness belongs only to man, since the Son of God became a man, not an angel, and only man was subject to hereditary guilt (*Cur Deus homo*, ii. 11, 18, 19, 20, 21).

9. After it had been shown that only the death of the incarnate One could furnish that satisfaction without which no man can become blessed, and after the reason for this had been given, there was still needed a proof that the manner in which the redemption accomplished by Christ is appropriated by the individual is not throughout contrary to reason. This is given in the treatise *De concordia præscientiæ prædestinationis et gratiæ cum libero arbitrio*, which Anselm completed shortly before his death, convinced that if any one had refuted his doubts as he does those of his friend, he would have been

satisfied (*De conc. præsc.*, etc., *quæst.* iii. 14). In respect to foreknowledge and decrees, it is maintained that for God there is no before and after, and that one cannot properly say that God has known or decreed something before it comes to pass. The distinction, however, between the *necessitas quæ sequitur* and the *necessitas quæ præcedit* is especially urged. According to the former, when something is known it is, to be sure, to be concluded (reasoning backward) that it must be, but the latter is the cogent ground for an event. If, on account of this distinction, my deed does not follow from the fact that God (fore-)knows my action, but rather His (fore-)knowledge follows from my deed, all difficulty vanishes when we maintain that God knows completely this deed of mine, and therefore also knows that it will be the result of free impulse (*Ibid.*, *quæst.* i. 4; *quæst.* i. 7, 1). Human freedom is also just as little in contradiction with the grace of God as with the divine prescience and predestination, and that for the reason that the freedom of the sinless man itself is a gift of divine grace, while baptism and preaching impart freedom, that is the ability to maintain the obedient direction of the will, to the fallen man. But neither is freedom in conflict with converting and co-operant grace. It is mere misunderstanding which has read in the Scriptures that grace alone, or that free will alone, gives man righteousness. Only in respect to baptized infants can the former be asserted. Elsewhere it is free will through which man exercises belief in constant strife against evil; and this belief has also a meritorious side and brings man nearer the condition, in this world indeed unattainable, in which he will no longer be able to err. In order to call out this militant belief, the effects of sin remain even when baptism or martyrdom have wiped out the guilt, so that only when the appointed number of believers is complete will perfect incorruptibility take the place of corruption (*Ibid.*, *quæst.* iii. 3, 4, 6, 9).

§ 157.

As the original founder of scholastic philosophy was compared above (§ 153) with the gifted creator of the Frankish Empire, the activity of its second ancestor may be likened to the prudent persistency with which the Ottos labour for a Roman empire of German nationality. Not the prophetic

insight of genius, not mystical contemplation, but clear, rational thinking leads him to formulate a Theology which explains what had been established in Nice and in Constantinople, a Christology which proves what had been fixed at Chalcedon, finally an Anthropology which makes accessible to sound human reason the dogmas framed by Augustine, if in no other way, by a moderation of their offensive severity. To the reconciliation of belief with the reason of the natural man Anselm devoted his entire scientific activity. In it may be distinguished, in accordance with the objective (material) and subjective (formal) elements which belief as well as reason contains, four problems, which may be designated the dogmatico-systematic, the psychological, the dialectic and the metaphysical. Anselm keeps all of these in view, and that always at the same time. In the first place, the content of belief, the *fides quæ creditur*, must be rationally arranged and brought into a system. In the second place, there must be shown to be reason in the condition of faith on the part of man, or, what is the same thing, in the *fides qua creditur*. In the third place, the understanding must have formal dexterity in adjusting, if necessary by means of distinction, doctrines originating from the most varied sources. In the fourth place, there must be given the metaphysical conviction that not the world of things, but the supernatural and the ideal alone have truth. With Anselm, thinking is so bound to systematic form that the chronological succession of his works coincides with the order demanded by the system. At the same time he knows from experience the blessedness of belief, and has considered thoroughly the steps which separate it on the one side from sense perception, on the other from spiritual contemplation. He is however a dialectician even in his prayers; and his most subtle argumentations are clothed in the form of addresses to God. Finally, not only his metaphysics but his entire theology rests upon the certainty that the universals have true reality, that is that ideas, as models, go far ahead of things, which are mere copies.

§ 158.

From the strife of Anselm against the tri-theistic ideas of Roscellinus of Compiègne it is plain that the latter, as we know too from other sources, belonged to the dialecticians

who, like Heiric (Eric) of Auxerre (834-881) for instance, and others educated in the school at Fulda (*vid.* § 153), saw in the universals, after the example of Marcianus Capella (§ 147), mere words, or at least abstractions of the understanding copied from individual things, which alone actually exist. Anselm, on the contrary, held fast to the Platonism which, more than a century before, Remigius of Auxerre, pupil and successor of Heiric and afterwards teacher in Paris, had made current, in his commentaries upon Marcianus Capella. Remigius' pupil, Otto of Cluny, also had followed his master in this respect. It may indeed be carried back still further, since Erigena platonizes in the same way, although, to be sure, in him as epoch-making, and therefore containing latent in himself all that stirs his age, the first germs of the opposite opinions may also be discovered. The Church, in this strife, not only condemned the dogmatic heresy, but at the same time declared against the metaphysical principles, and thereby elevated an old dialectic controversy of the schools to a leading question of the Church. This, however, was not an abjuration of the wisdom which she had elsewhere shown, *e.g.* in connection with the strife of Augustine and Pelagius in regard to Traducianism, but it proceeded from the perfectly correct feeling that whoever ascribes more reality to things than to ideas is more attached to this world than to the ideal kingdom of heaven. Therefore it is not blind devotion to his own opinions which leads Anselm to call such dialectics heretical, but for every careful observer the significance which a person ascribes to the universals is a standard of his relation toward the Church. From this arises the fact that in that age the names of the various tendencies are drawn from the predicates which each of them attaches to the universals. Whoever, like Anselm, proceeds from the fundamental principle that *universalia sunt ante res*, and accordingly asserts that they are themselves *res*, or at least *realia*, is called a *realis*, later a realist. Whoever, on the contrary, like Roscellinus, holds that the universals are abstractions of things, and therefore *post res*, are mere *voces* or *nomina*, is called a *vocalis* or *nominalis*, later a nominalist. As it is no accident that the realists are the more ecclesiastical, it is likewise none that at this time the nominalists are intellectually the less important. At this time; for when the problem becomes the undermining of the mediæval, world-conquering Church, the nominalists

will show that they better understand the age, that is, that they are the greater philosophers (*vid. infra*, § 217).

- Cf. Cousin in *Cours de* 1829, Leçon 9, and further the introduction to his *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard*, Paris, 1836, and his *Fragmens de philosophie de moyen âge*, Paris, 1840-50. Also Prantl: *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*. 2nd vol., Leipzig, 1861; 3rd, 1867.—Barach: *Zur Geschichte des Nominalismus vor Roscellin*. Wien, 1866. Joh. Heinr. Loewe: *Der Kampf zwischen dem Realismus und Nominalismus im Mittelalter*. Prag, 1876.

§ 159.

I. The accusation that nominalism, consistently carried out, must lead to the deification of things, was no slander on the part of Anselm; it lies in the nature of the case. What he did not see, was the fact that the last consequences of realism must lead to the opposite extreme, to acosmism or Pantheism. Anselm himself does not go so far, nor, as it appears, does his pupil Odon, bishop of Cambrai, who is said to have attacked the nominalist Raimbert of Lille, in his *Liber de complexionibus* and his *Tractatus de re et ente*. A letter of the Bishop Hermann of Tournay, written in the twelfth century, in speaking of this strife, says that Raimbert read dialectics to his scholars "*juxta quosdam modernos in voce*"; Odo (Odoardius) on the contrary, "*more Boethii antiquorumque in re*." The realistically inclined Hildebert of Lavardin, Bishop of Mans and later Archbishop of Tours, approaches nearer to Pantheism, as well in his poetry as in the *Tractatus theologicus* which is ascribed to him. This is still more true of WILLIAM, who was born in the year 1070 at Champeaux, and died in 1121 as Bishop of Châlons. He carried realism further than any one else known to us. He was educated in theology by Manegold of Lauterbach and by Anselm of Laon, and in dialectics by Roscellinus, but took stand against the latter in Paris, where he taught first in the cathedral school and afterward in the monastery of St. Victor, which was founded by himself. While Roscellinus had ascribed substantiality only to the individual, William, on the contrary, asserts that in Socrates manhood alone is something substantial, Socratism only accidental. And not only does he ascribe this priority to actual genera, but he represents every generality reached by abstraction as a *universale ante res*, and asserts accordingly that *rationalitas* and *albedo* would exist even if

there were no *rationale* or *album*. Since the individual variety is not essential, he urges that the *universale* exists *essentialiter, totaliter et simul* in all individuals.

2. In his approach to Pantheism, BERNARD agrees with William. He bears the second name, Sylvester; but this is ordinarily omitted, and he is called Bernard OF CHARTRES, or Bernard Carnotensis, from the place where he laboured. He was born soon after William, but outlived him forty years. His principal work, *De mundi universitate, sive megacosmus et microcosmus*, has been recently published complete by Barach and Wrobel, Cousin having already issued extracts from it. It was written while Eugene III. was pope. Prose and verse alternate. Cosmology and psychology almost supplant theology. Nevertheless the enthusiastic Platonist combines with his doctrines of the three principles, spirit, soul, and matter, not only the reference to heathen myths but also the heavenly hierarchy of the Pseudo-Areopagite (*vid.* § 146). His enthusiasm for the ancients, which increased apparently from year to year, had as a result the fact that in his school at Chartres grammar and rhetoric were taught in a manner quite different from that which then prevailed. The account which John of Salisbury (*vid.* § 175) gives of him leads one to look upon him as the originator of a free philological tendency, and prevents one from being surprised at finding among his pupils those who are not considered very orthodox. It is certain that he led no one toward nominalistic tendencies, for he asserts as energetically as William, that the genera (ideas) precede the things.

Cf. J. S. Barach: *Bernardi Silvestris de mundi universitate libri duo, sive Megacosmus et Microcosmus*. Innsbruck, 1876.

§ 160.

The matter does not stop with this contrast between the extreme realism of William and of Bernard on the one side, and the extreme nominalism of Roscellinus and perhaps also of Raimbert on the other. Attempts at a reconciliation appear very soon, which, in accordance with the principle of nomenclature mentioned above, are denominated collectively the views of the *conceptuales*, later *conceptualists*, because one of them calls the universals *conceptus*. It lies in the nature of the case that these mediating doctrines approach one

extreme or the other. Those appear to have approached realism, who are mentioned as defenders of the *non-differentia* or *indifferentia*, because they assert that that which is common in genera and species embraces that in which the individuals do *not* differ, while the individuality consists in that by which they are distinguished. Since what others designated *universalia* or *communia* was thus called by them *indifferentia*, they received the special name "Indifferentists" (*vid. supra*, § 158). They appear to have held in common that the actual being is entirely unaffected by the differences of genus, species, and individual, since one and the same individual Plato is as species man, as genus living creature. There is controversy as to who was the author of this opinion. The same passages in contemporaneous writers are referred by some (*e.g.* Hauréau) to Adelard of Bath (Philosophus Anglorum), the translator of Euclid from the Arabic, by others (*e.g.* H. Ritter) to Walter of Mortagne, who died in 1174 as Bishop of Lyons. The work of the former, *De eodem et diverso*, must have been written between 1105 and 1117, before his *Quæstiones naturales*. Still others (as Cousin) refer them to a later doctrine of William of Champeaux, and appeal in support of this opinion to the testimony of Abelard in the *Hist. calamit.*, which lends a certain weight to their assertion, that is, to be sure, only if, in agreement with certain manuscripts, *indifferentiter* be read where the reading of other manuscripts, *individualiter*, is more probable (*vid.* § 161, 3). On the other hand the author of the work *De generibus et speciebus* plainly approaches nearer to nominalism. This work is regarded by its first editor, Cousin, to whom is due its title (perhaps not well chosen), as a youthful production of Abelard, by H. Ritter as a work of Joscelyn of Soissons, whom John of Salisbury mentions as a celebrated conceptualist. The universals are here taken as concepts (*conceptus, collectiones*), and accordingly it is asserted, in direct contradiction to the "*totaliter*" of William, that only a part of the species *homo* (as matter) is united with the *Socratitas* (as form) to make an actual substance, Socrates. More important than all the remaining conceptualists, and furthest removed from both extremes, is Abelard, the greatest of French Schoolmen. He really brings the strife between realism and nominalism to an end, so that this question ceases to be the chief philosophical problem.

§ 161.

ABELARD.

Charles Rémusat: *Abélard*. 2 vols. Paris, 1845.

I. PIERRE DE PALLET (or Palais, and hence Petrus Palatinus), better known under the cognomen ABÆLARDUS, was born in 1079. He first studied dialectics under Roscellinus, who, when driven out of England, taught in the little city of Loches in Touraine (or Lochmenach in Brittany?) before he became canon of Besançon, and afterwards under William of Champeaux in Paris. The result was, that the formulæ of both appeared to him to be repugnant to reason, and when, after having himself taught for a time in Melun and Corbeil, he returned to William to hear rhetoric from him, in a public disputation with him he brought him to moderate his extreme realism. From that time on Abelard alone was spoken of as the greatest dialectician, and he called himself *Philosophus Peripateticus*, which passed as a synonym for *Dialecticus*. (To these two Ps were added two others; and where PPPP are found, Abelard is meant.) Through his lectures on the hill of St. Geneviève his fame increased still more, and at the same time the hatred of William, who first aroused St. Bernard against him. Abelard's reputation continued to advance when he became a teacher of theology, after having been inducted into this science by Anselm of Laon. His love affair with Heloise, his marriage to her, the well-known catastrophe which resulted, exiled him from Paris and caused him to work, attacked everywhere by the same enemies, first in the monastery of St. Denis as monk, then as teacher in Maisonville, and later near Nogent upon the Seine, in the monastery which he himself built to the Paraclete. He was for a time abbot of the monastery of St. Gildas de Ruys in Brittany, then taught again in Paris, was condemned at the council of Sens in 1140, and ended his troubled life on the 21st of April, 1142, in the monastery of St. Marcel, near Châlons, after being reconciled with his enemies by Bishop Peter of Cluny. The edition of his works (Paris, 1616) by Duchesne (Quercetanus) based upon manuscripts collected by Fr. Amboise is not complete. Martène and Durand (*Thesaurus novus anecdott.*), Bernard Pezsius (*Thesaurus anecd. novissimus*), Rheinwald (*Anecd. ad hist.*

eccl. pertin., 1831, 35), and Cousin (*Ouvrages inédits d'Abelard*, Paris, 1836) have made important contributions. The last named has also published a new and complete edition of his works (vol. i., 1849; vol. ii., 1859). With the exception of the *Dialectics* they are all to be found in vol. 178 of Migne's *Patr. lat.* Many other writings of Abelard, e.g. a grammar, an elementary book on logic, etc., have not yet been found.

2. Logic, of which Abelard himself says that it was the cause of his ill-fortune, was and remained nevertheless his goddess. He confesses frankly his ignorance of mathematics, so that his sphere remained the *trivium* (cf. § 147), and he left to others the *quadrivium*. Logic takes its name from the Logos, that is from the Son of God (*Ep.* iv.), and the logician, especially he who pursues dialectics, much more than the grammarian and rhetorician, is the true philosopher (*Ouvr. inéd.* p. 453). His *Dialectics* (*Ibid.*, pp. 173-497) must therefore be first considered. As we have it in the form edited by Cousin, unfortunately not entirely complete, in its first part (not extant), which treats of the parts of speech (*partes*), it follows the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, which it comments upon, in the second part the *Categories* and the *Hermeneutics* of Aristotle. It thus handles first, as *sex antepredicamenta*, the familiar "*voces*," *genus*, *species*, etc., together with the "*individuum*" belonging to them, then in the extant section the *predicamenta*, and finally the *postpredicamenta*. The gaps can be filled only with great difficulty from Rémusat's reports of Abelard's *glossulis ad Porphyr.* This labour has been undertaken by Prantl. The second part gives the doctrine of the categorical conclusion, the third comments upon the *Topics*, the fourth treats of the hypothetical conclusion, and the fifth, which Prantl regards as an independent work, contains the theory of divisions and definitions. The last four contain comments upon the versions of Boëthius, for Abelard knows neither the *Analytics* nor the *Topics* of Aristotle, with the exception of a few principal passages. The respect with which Abelard in this work always mentions his teacher (whether it be William or any one else) leads us to conclude that it was composed early in life, in spite of the contrary opinion of Cousin. Abelard is more independent in his investigations upon unity and difference. They are contained in a theological work (the *Theologia*

christiana), but are purely dialectic. In at least five different senses a thing can be called the same (*idem*) as another, or different (*diversum*) from it. It is essentially (*essentialiter*) identical with it when both form only one nature, as living and man in Socrates. In this case they are also numerically the same. On the other side the essential difference may coincide with the numerical, but it is not necessary that it should. An example of the first case is two houses, of the second a house and its wall. The third unity and difference are those of definition. When from the fact that something is one thing it follows that it is also the other, then the two are the same according to definition, e.g. *micro* and *ensis*. On the other hand, such things as can be thought of, each without the other, are, according to definition, different. Whatever is the same according to definition, is also essentially the same, but not vice versa. Numerically it may be, but need not be the same, as for instance the sentence *mulier damnavit mundum et eadem salvavit* is correct if *eadem* be understood according to definition, but false if it be taken numerically. Things are the same in respect to quality when each shares the quality of the other, as when white becomes hard. Difference of property may be united with numerical unity, as for instance a picture of a plant does not possess all the qualities of the plant, nor the plant all those of the picture. Further, we speak of identity and difference in respect to resemblance, that is, in connection with existence in the same genetical conception. Finally, variety of contents is to be mentioned, of which we think when we contrast the wine in the cask with that in the cellar, although the wine and the space which the wine occupies are only one. These investigations, although proposed especially for the sake of the doctrine of the Trinity, acquire importance for Abelard in connection with the question of the age, namely the question in regard to the universals. Since he stands in opposition to both contending parties, this question no longer means to him that one must decide in favour of one or the other extreme. The fact that Roscellinus is wrong does not prove that William is right. In opposition to the formula of the latter, *ante res*, as well as to that of Roscellinus, *post res*, he places his own *Universalia sunt in rebus*, and emphasizes therefore the fact that the species "*non nisi per individua subsistere habent*" (*Dial.*, 204). He stands thus in relation to both exactly as

the genuine Peripatetic teaching stood toward Platonism which preceded, and toward Epicureanism and Stoicism which followed it (*vid.* § 97, 2). That which he especially finds fault with in William's theory, is the fact that he holds that the *humanitas tota* is in Socrates, an opinion which leads to absurdities, and that he does not recognise that it exists *individualiter* in the individual man; from which it follows that the difference of individuality is not an accidental but an essential one. Roscellinus' view, to be sure, that only the individual essentially exists, is absurd. The latter utterance is a decisive refutation of all those who make Abelard a nominalist. He was only more of one than William, and therefore, it is true, distrusted by the strict ecclesiastics. Nor can his nominalism be deduced from the oft-quoted statement of John of Salisbury, that according to Abelard the universals are *sermōnes*. That he sees in them not only a simple *dictio* (λέξις) or a mere *vox*, but *sermo* (λόγος), has its ground in the fact that he looks upon them as natural predicates. He says, "*id quod natum est prædicari*," which is an exact translation of a sentence of Aristotle's. Since the *natum* is thereby emphasized as much as the *prædicari*, the conflict between Platonists and Aristotelians seems to him a mere verbal strife. Of course he cannot call that which is *in rebus* a *res*, and therefore his utterance, *res de re non prædicatur*, does not make him a nominalist, although it does separate him from realists like William. The difference between *in re* and *res* or *aliquid* is very clear to him (*Dial.*, p. 241).

3. In these investigations the theological element is quite in the background; but in another work Abelard proposed to himself an entirely different object, to exhibit as a rationally ordered whole that which the chief teachers of the Church had asserted. This is the peculiar significance of his *Sic et non*, a work which we shall judge much more correctly if we regard it as the predecessor and pattern of all later collections of propositions and summaries, than if, misled by the mere title, we compare it with the works of the Skeptics. It was first published by Cousin, then much more correctly by Henke and Lindenköhl in 1851, and the text of the latter is reprinted in Migne's *Patr. lat.* The leading ideas which Abelard followed in the composition of this work were, first, to give an inventory, as exact as possible and at the same time systematically arranged, of what had been hitherto

taught within the Church, and then, where contradictories had been asserted, to state them, in order to arrive at the discovery of a point of reconciliation, but at the same time to stand firmly against too hasty decision and against indolent repose upon any ecclesiastical authority. The work, freely used but seldom named, gave rise to a multitude of imitations which lived and won fame while it soon sank into forgetfulness. Abelard, however, did not rest satisfied with this separation of formal dialectic investigations and dogmatic material. Both were for him only a preparation for his chief object, which he attempted to carry out in his *Introductio in theologiam*, with which the *Epitome theologiæ christianæ* is connected as a supplement, and also in his *Theologia christiana*. Only the first of these is to be found in his complete works, the second was published by Rheinwald in 1823, and the third is given in the *Thesaurus* of Martène and Durand. Migne's *Patr. lat.* contains them all. The object referred to is to point out the agreement of dogma with reason, and hence not so much to state the doctrines as to defend them against doubts, since heretics are to be refuted not by force but by reason alone. He was so convinced of the power of the latter to achieve this end, that his opponents accused him of ascribing to himself an exhaustive knowledge of God. He deviates from the customary formulæ also in representing knowledge less as a fruit of belief than as a critical means of defence against blind faith as well as against doubt; at the same time he does not deny the older position. His certainty is based upon his great respect for the power of reason. The superiority of the Jews in possessing the law and the prophets is counterbalanced among the heathen, according to Abelard, by their use of reason, by philosophy. He treats the latter with decided preference, finds fault with the carnal sense and the material hopes of the Jews, ranks Socrates upon an equality with the martyrs, claims that Plato taught the Trinity, and that the Sybils and Virgil proclaimed the incarnation, and gives expression repeatedly to the opinion that their possession of the truth and their strict apostolic life, of which he is never tired of furnishing examples, assure the heathen philosophers of salvation, while the safety of catechumens and of unbaptized children of Christian parentage appears very doubtful to him. Since the Son of God is wisdom, he hears everywhere in the voice of wisdom the Son

of God ; and wisdom in the mouth of Plato opens to the latter the understanding of the Christian faith. This concerns in part the nature of God, in part His offices of grace, and therefore these two are to be considered in order.

4. The sum of the Christian faith is the doctrine of the Trinity. The doctrine of the Church is first given, then its difficulties, and finally their solution. Abelard lays strong emphasis upon the simplicity of the Divine substance, asserted by the earlier ecclesiastical teachers, on account of which nothing is in God which is not God, and therefore might, wisdom, and goodness are not forms or definitions of His nature but are this nature itself. For this reason it cannot properly be said of God that He is substance, since then properties would belong to Him. This denial of the difference between nature and property in God, in consequence of which it must be asserted that the world, as a work of divine goodness, is a result of His nature, is the reason why Abelard in recent times has been accused of Pantheism (Fessler has very skilfully collected parallels between his *Christian Theology* and Spinoza's *Ethics*). From this absolute unity of the Divine nature the opponents of the Christian faith seek to deduce the impossibility of a Trinity of Persons, and Abelard cites twenty-three objections against the doctrine which he attempts to refute. He always identifies the difference of the three Persons with that of might, wisdom, and goodness, between which exists a difference of definition, and opposes the assertion that a Trinity of Persons is incompatible with the unity and indivisibility of the Divine nature, partly by the statement that Socrates' unity suffers no detriment when he is at the same time first, second, and third person in a grammatical sense, partly however, and especially, by the assertion that a difference of definition is not necessarily an essential and numerical difference. All the objections which are adduced in the third book he attempts to refute in the fourth book of the *Christian Theology*, not in the same order, but with comparative completeness. Those too are answered who urge against his identification of the Father with might, etc., that the Father is also wise and good. This Abelard willingly admits, without ceasing to maintain that only upon his theory is it conceivable why creation belongs to the Father, that is to the might ; incarnation, that act of illumination, to the Son who, as wisdom, is called Logos, or reason :

and finally why the Virgin receives the Saviour, and man the forgiveness of sins from the Spirit, that is from the goodness of God. By this the co-operation of the other Persons is not at all excluded. The objections against the doctrine of the Trinity appear to him collectively and separately so weak, the doctrine itself so in accord with reason, that he replies to the query, Why heathen and Jews, who cannot be denied the possession of reason, did not teach the Trinity? that they do actually teach it. Especially among the Platonists he finds this doctrine highly developed. Plato is in his opinion the greatest of all philosophers, Cicero the greatest of Roman philosophers. The fifth book is not confined to the negative object, expressed frequently in the earlier books, of proving the unity and trinity of God by refuting objections, but undertakes to prove it positively. That God exists is deduced from the order of the world, that He is one, from this and from the conception of the *summum bonum*. Abelard then proceeds to discuss the trinity of Persons, but considers here only the Father, the might, for the discussion, as we have it, breaks off rather abruptly. It is asserted with emphasis, that God's omnipotence does not suffer by the fact that there are many things which He cannot do, e.g., go, sin, etc., indeed that He cannot do more and cannot do other than He actually does. These sentences remind us again of what has been called Abelard's Spinozism.

5. The doctrine of the omnipotence of God, which is treated in the *Introductio ad theologiam* still more thoroughly than in the *Theologia christiana*, forms the stepping-stone to his doctrine of creation, in which he seeks to combine the two facts that God as unchangeable eternally creates, and yet that the world is created in time. In his historical, moral, and mystical commentary upon the six days' work, which he wrote for Heloise, it is repeatedly said, that by nature are to be understood only the laws which rule and preserve the completed creation, instead of which the creative will of the Almighty worked in the act of creation. This commentary is given in the *Thesaurus* of Martène and Durand, col. 1361-1416, and in Migne's *Patr. lat.*, col. 731-783. It has been remarked not incorrectly, that when Abelard considers the relation between God and the world, as well as when he considers the relation between the Divine and human in

Christ, his fear of all mystical immanence gives his doctrine great clearness, it is true, but at the same time that rationalistic character which caused so many, above all the mystically inclined Bernard of Clairvaux, to take offence at him.

6. Though in his *Dialectics* Abelard's interest was centred only in the logical, in his *Sic et non* only in the systematic, in his *Introduction* and his *Christian Theology* only in the speculative-theological element, he nevertheless showed by his life, which excited the admiration of Petrus Venerabilis of Cluny, that subjective piety was not a matter of indifference to him, and moreover a great part of his literary activity was devoted to its defence over against reason. To praise the blessedness of faith, in contrast with holiness by works, was one of his chief employments, not only in his sermons but also in his scientific investigations. That he has such a tendency to ascribe to the Greeks a superiority over the Jews is due in great part to the fact that the legal sense of the latter places greater difficulties in the way of their conversion. This element is above all prominent in his ethics. It is no accident that the title under which Abelard develops his ethical teachings, *Scito te ipsum*, appears oftenest in the history of morals in connection with a very subjective doctrine (cf. *int. al. loc.*, § 267, 8). (This work of Abelard's was first published in the *Thesaurus noviss.* of Pezsius, iii., p. 617, and is found in Migne's *Patr. lat.*, col. 633-676.) Abelard was really the first to propose an ethics in the modern sense of the term, regarding the ethical subject not as a member of a (human or divine) state but as an individual, and seeking the norm of conduct not so much in the whole to which he belongs as in the individual himself. From this comes the weight which he lays upon one's own voluntariness, for the sake of fixing the conception of *peccatum*. To this is due also, on the other side, the assertion that the actual commission of the sin contributes nothing toward condemnation, but that this rests only upon the *consensus* and the intention. From this results, finally, the emphasis with which, as far as duty is concerned, the agreement with one's own conviction and conscience is declared to be the principal thing. For this reason original sin, while to be sure a *vitium*, is no proper *peccatum*, and Abelard so strongly emphasizes freedom in the choice of evil, that he asserts the

possibility of a person's going through life quite without *peccata*. Forgiveness of sin is therefore the infusion of a repentant disposition. The sin against the Holy Spirit is the complete incapacity for repentance, which coincides with conduct in opposition to conscience and with doubt of God's grace, and which has no pardon. Exactly as in this larger work Abelard has also represented, in the poem addressed to his son Astralabius (Migne, col. 1759), truth to one's convictions as the only principle of morality. When therefore he is often designated as the rationalist among the Schoolmen, he deserves the title not only on account of his doctrine of the Trinity, which approaches Sabellianism in spite of all his polemics against it, and not only on account of his critical attempts, but also on account of his ethics, in which he actually completely agrees in the principal point with many modern rationalists. The fact that all those in whom the ecclesiastical sense was very powerful held aloof from Abelard, is due not only to his above-mentioned tendency toward nominalism, or rather away from extreme realism, but also to this rationalistic vein in his character.

§ 162.

The conflict of Abelard, the incarnation of French scholasticism in its keenness and elegance, with the clergy of his fatherland aroused there a widespread distrust in philosophy. The consequences of this had to be borne also by such as stood in no connection with Abelard, for instance by William of Conches (1080-1154), a pupil of Bernard of Chartres. By his youthful writings, *De philosophia*, as well as by his notes to Plato's *Timæus*, in which he brings forward a Platonizing atomism, he aroused accusations against himself which he was able to still only by a retraction which he later repeated in his *Pragmaticon philosophiæ*. (The latter work was printed in Strasburg in 1583, under the title *Dialogus de substantiis physicis confectus a Wilhelmo Aneponymo philosopho. . . . industria Guilielmi Grataroli*. Hauréau, in his *Singularités*, gives accurate information in regard to William's works.) Later he confined his instruction chiefly to grammar and the interpretation of the ancients. (I am not able to decide whether it is true that the work *περι διδύξεων*, published in *Beda venerab. opera*, is an extract from William's early

work, since I have not seen the latter, although it is said to have been published in 1474.) This distrust of the Church toward scholasticism is further the reason why the latter, its ground of support, ecclesiastical recognition, being taken away, begins to approach its dissolution. Its death is in a proper sense dissolution, since the elements which scholasticism contains (*vid.* § 157), and which in Anselm had been completely one, began to separate themselves in Abelard, and after him were wholly sundered. While Abelard was at one time a mere logician, as in his commentaries upon Boëthius, at another time a pure metaphysician, as in his ontological controversies with William, again only a systematic compiler of ecclesiastical tradition, as in his *Sic et non*, and finally only an extoller of subjective piety, as in his sermons and his ethics, his speculative talent nevertheless enabled him to unite these different elements, as formerly the most various tendencies were combined in Socrates. Whoever is unable to comprehend such a personality, must err respecting it. Socrates appears eccentric; Abelard is regarded by the friends of Bernard as dishonest. In spite of this, his personality is so powerful that all his contemporaries, attracted or repelled, take notice of him, and therefore divide themselves into his scholars, or at least friends, and his enemies. Even the former, however, are not able to reproduce Abelard as a whole, but only one or another side of the master, as formerly the lesser Socratic schools had done in connection with Socrates (§ 66, 67). His enemies, on the other hand, since they attack only one or the other side of Abelard's teaching, cannot avoid agreeing with him and learning from him in many things. Gilbert, a man of like spirit with Abelard, takes up the logical and metaphysical work with such effect that his theological accomplishments are soon forgotten. Hugo, on the contrary, one of Abelard's bitterest opponents, makes the material and formal side of faith so prominent that he very nearly despises dialectics. That which had been united is separated, and the attempts to transform scholasticism into mere rational teaching or into mere religious teaching appear side by side. Both tendencies bear an equally negative relation to the standpoint of Erigena, who had fused both into an undistinguishable unity.

B.—SCHOLASTICISM AS MERE RATIONAL SCIENCE.

§ 163.

I. GILBERT DE LA PORRÉE (Porretanus), born in Poitiers and educated under Bernard of Chartres, taught first in Chartres, then in Paris, finally in Poitiers, and in the last place was made bishop in 1142. He was celebrated as a dialectician and therefore called *Peripateticus*. For that very reason he fell under the suspicion of Bernard of Clairvaux and of the pope and was obliged to defend himself at two councils. He was however more yielding and therefore more fortunate than his contemporary Abelard, and died in the year 1154 without being attacked again. Of his writings the most celebrated is the *De sex principiis*, a work of but a few pages, which is contained in many old translations of Aristotle's *Organon*, among others in that which was published in Venice, *apud Juntas*, in 1562 (pp. 62-67). (An older edition without date, which has at the close the shield of the city of Halle, —which is also, however, the crest of Martin Landsberg of Würzburg,—contains ten leaves in folio.) It belongs to the *Organon* also, because it was composed with the intention of adding to the comments upon the first four categories, which Aristotle himself had written (*vid.* § 86, 6), equally exhaustive comments upon the remaining six, which explains the title of the work. The name, however, is not quite exact, since, in addition to the six Aristotelian categories, the form is discussed at length in the first chapter, and the assumption of differences of grade in the last. Moreover the eight chapters (or, according to another division, eleven chapters in three tracts) of this little work contain many references to other commentaries of the author upon Aristotle; and it may have gained especial prominence only because the others were early lost. Gilbert is the first who can be proved to have known, in addition to the portions of the *Organon* which were previously known, the *Analytics* of Aristotle. In so far there was a propriety in calling him more than others a Peripatetic. It is true that he makes little use of this additional source, and operates with the traditional logic of the schools, which was all that Abelard and his other contemporaries were acquainted with (*vid.* § 151). His investigations in regard to the various meanings of

ubi, habere, etc., often purely lexical, were regarded in the Middle Ages as very weighty additions to Aristotle. To us they seem rather unimportant.

2. In addition to this work there is extant a *Commentary* of Gilbert's upon the Pseudo-Boëthian works *De Trinitate* and *De duabus naturis in Christo*. Both are contained in the Basel edition of Boëthius' works of the year 1570. For the metaphysics of Gilbert the former is most important, for his theology the latter. In the former, from the proposition that being has the priority over that which is, is deduced the conclusion that the presupposition of all is that being which, since it is not a mere participation in being, is quite simple, or, as he calls it, abstract. This entirely pure being is God, from whom for that very reason Deity cannot be distinguished, as mankind, of which man partakes, can be distinguished from man. If the word substance designates that which possesses properties then God is not substance, He is *essentia non aliquid*. As there is no distinction between *Deus* and *Divinitas*, there is also none between Him and any of His properties; He is in no sense to be thought of as a union of manifoldness, as something concrete. Therefore our thinking also can comprehend nothing in Him; He is not *comprehensibilis*, but only *intelligibilis*. Essentially different from this perfectly simple being are the substances or things which, as possessors of attributes, have in themselves a doubleness which belongs to them on account of matter. By the latter is not to be understood corporeality, although it is the principle of corporeality, that is apparent existence. Matter is to be regarded as a negative principle, as the opposite extreme to mere or pure being, and, like the latter, is incomprehensible, but for a contrary reason.

3. Between the absolute being and substances stand the ideas (*εἶδη*), or forms, the original types after which all is created, and which themselves have their ground in being as pure form. Since they have no properties it cannot be said that they are *substant* or substances; but since they nevertheless *subsistunt* they are called *subsistentiæ*. They are accessible neither to the senses nor to the imagination, but to the understanding alone, and are *perpetuæ*, while God is *æternus* and things are *temporales*. Among them are reckoned not only genera and species but also all *abstracta*, e.g., *albedo*. In materializing themselves the forms become *formæ nativæ* or, since the materially existing was substance, *formæ substantiales*.

As these they are for the first time properly *universalia*, which then exist as such *in re*. This is in exact accord with Abelard. It is not in conflict with this however when Gilbert, in agreement with his teacher Bernard and with William, ascribes reality to the forms independent of their materialization and previous to it in the supersensuous world. In this double reality they are distinguished also by the expressions *exempla* and *exemplaria*. Gilbert rejects William's pantheistic formula, that the distinction of individuality is merely accidental. Properties, according to him, do not make this distinction, but simply show it (*non faciunt sed produunt*). The subsistencies, namely, or forms, constitute the proper nature of things, which originally has no relation to properties. When a form however exists in a substance it comes into an indirect relation to the latter's properties, which *insunt* in the substance, but *adsunt* to the form. In virtue of this indirect relation, the form excludes all properties which are contradictory to it and admits only such as are in conformity with it, and thus from them conclusions can be drawn in regard to it.

4. The distinction which Gilbert, in agreement with the Platonists, draws between eternal, temporal, and perpetual, causes him, like Aristotle, to distinguish three principal sciences, theology, physics, and mathematics. With these correspond the three modes of knowing, *intellectus*, *ratio*, *disciplinalis speculatio*, and each of them has its own underlying propositions. Theology thereby is widely sundered from the others, since the categories do not apply to God, nor is language sufficient to express a knowledge of Him. The way is thus really prepared for the proposition, which subsequently became so famous, that a thing may be true in theology which is false in philosophy, that is, the complete separation of the two is approached. Among the dogmas, Gilbert seems, like Abelard, to have busied himself especially with the Trinity, and to have treated it much as the latter did. The repeated assertion that language is inadequate, that none of the expressions used, such as nature, person, etc., are to be taken in the ordinary sense, is, accurately considered, an isolation of theology by which it ceases to be science. For Gilbert, as he proves by his action, science was especially dialectics, and from this is to be explained his readiness to recant his theological propositions that were regarded as

heretical. He would perhaps have held more firmly to the distinction between substances and subsistencies. In addition to dialectics, he busied himself much with exegesis. At least his commentary upon Canticles is often cited by Bonaventura.

§ 164

1. A tendency in philosophy, which John of Salisbury (*vid.* § 175) criticizes in his *Metalogicus*, developed itself, probably not without feeling the influence of Gilbert's dialectical studies, and certainly under the impetus which was given by the discovery of the weightiest analytical works, especially the Topics of Aristotle. This tendency had appreciation only for logical subtleties and the arts of disputation, and in connection with the union of the three *sermocinales scientiæ* which was recognised at that time, finally contented itself with mere logomachies which would have done honour to an Euthydemus and a Dionysodorus. In consequence a contempt for logic, as empty altercation of the schools, began to spread among those who desired substantial knowledge, a contempt which these "*puri philosophi*," as the logicians called themselves, seem to have answered with an equal contempt for all real knowledge. Without scientific value in themselves these phenomena are nevertheless significant as showing how one of those elements which are essential to scholasticism seeks to free itself at this time from the others and to occupy the field alone.

2. Those who first interpreted the Analytics and Topics of Aristotle, instead of the Boëthian school books which had hitherto been in use, received the name of *moderni*, a name by which the followers of Roscellinus had been designated. From *logica modernorum* was formed the term *logica nova*, and this was now taught in addition to the school logic, which had been previously in use, and which was called therefore *logica vetus*. Finally, when the superiority of Aristotle's doctrine of the syllogism became so apparent to all as to suppress the *logica vetus* and this term thus lost its meaning, it was employed, for the sake of preserving it, to designate something quite different. The division of dialectics which treats of the predicables, the categories, and the judgment, is called *logica (or ars) vetus* because it forms the presupposition for and is therefore older than that part which has to do with conclusions, proofs, and methods.

3. While thus, by Gilbert and the *puri philosophi*, the *Organon* was transformed from an authority ranking with the Scriptures and the Fathers into an authority which, as the only one, suppressed and drove the others into oblivion, on the other hand the rise of the opposite extreme may be quite easily explained. The doctrine of faith must be made the principal thing, and dialectics and metaphysics must take a subordinate position. Whoever emphasizes the former only at the cost of the latter occupies a twofold relation to Abelard, who was at the same time so decidedly both dialectician and theologian. It is therefore no wonder if such a one treats many dogmas exactly as Abelard had done, and yet speaks of him scarcely otherwise than with bitterness. The agreement is with the author of *Christian Theology*, the disagreement is with him who called logic his goddess. The man who does not strive after the name of *Peripateticus*, but who is called by his followers a theologian equal to Augustine, is Hugo. He placed in opposition to Abelard's French keenness, which falls only too easily into mere formal investigation, the rich profundity of the German spirit.

C.—SCHOLASTICISM AS MERE RELIGIOUS SCIENCE.

§ 165.

HUGO.

Alb. Liebner: *Hugo von St. Victor und die theologischen Richtungen seiner Zeit*. Leipzig, 1832. B. Hauréau: *Hugues de Saint-Victor. Nouvel examen de l'édition de ses œuvres*. Paris, 1850.

1. **HUGO**, Count of Blankenburg, was born in the paternal castle in the Hartz in the year 1096. He was thoroughly educated in German schools before he went, in his eighteenth year, to the Augustine monastery of St. Victor, which had been founded by William of Champeaux. To this monastery is due the cognomen by which he is ordinarily known. He remained there until his death, in 1141. His writings were collected after his death and have been often published, with the insertion of many works that are not genuine. The Paris edition of the year 1526 is the earliest. The Venice edition of 1588, in three folio volumes, is more common. In Migne's *Patr. lat.*, Hugo's works are printed

from the Rouen folio edition of 1648 and fill vols. 175-177. Hauréau has shown how carelessly they are edited. Only the first volume and the second, as far as col. 1017, contain the genuine works, the remainder of the second and the whole of the third are made up of other writings, a part of them under the names of their real authors.

2. That which distinguishes Hugo above most of his contemporaries is the fact that widely various theological tendencies have exerted an influence upon him, and he thus, with remarkable versatility, reveals an enthusiasm for the Scriptures as great as that of the men who were called in his day Biblical theologians, and at the same time is filled with respect for learned exegesis and for the traditional threefold method of interpretation, historical, allegorical, and anagogical or tropological. He is better acquainted with the ancients than most of his contemporaries, and he loves them, but at the same time he knows how to maintain the specific difference between heathen and Christian science better than Abelard, and urges that all worldly science is only a preparation for theology. As such it is treated by him in the first three books of his *Eruditio didascalica* (Migne, ii. 739-838), called also *Didascalon* and *Didascalion*, where it precedes in encyclopædic form the introduction to Biblical and ecclesiastical history, which fills the last four books. Following Boëthius and the Peripatetics, Hugo divides philosophy and the entire sphere of knowledge into theoretical, practical, and mechanical (technical). From this are excepted the logical inquiries which are to precede all others in the *trivium*, and which Hugo tolerates only as means to a correct and precise terminology. Otherwise he treats them rather contemptuously, and where they are made the end regards them as dangerous. The theoretical part mentioned is divided into theology, which deals with the Divine, eternal, intellectual; into mathematics, whose province is the sempiternal and intelligible, and whose four divisions form the *quadrivium*; and into physics, which has to do with the temporal and material. Practical philosophy is divided into ethics, economics, and politics. Finally, the mechanical division of science contains instructions in the seven arts, weaving, smithcraft, navigation, agriculture, hunting, medicine, the histrionic art. This encyclopædic outline is followed by methodological rules, and by an historical introduction to the

Bible. His guides for the former are Cassiodorus and Isidore of Seville, for the latter especially Jerome.

3. Hugo is much more independent in his chief theological works, by which are to be understood his *Dialogus de sacramentis legis naturalis et scriptæ* (Migne, ii. 18-42), his *Summa sententiarum* (*Ibid.*, 42-174) and his *De sacramentis christianæ fidei libri duo* (*Ibid.*, 174-618). The influence is apparent which was exerted upon him by Augustine, Gregory the Great, and Erigena, the last of whom he necessarily became acquainted with and prized as the translator of the works of the Pseudo-Areopagite, upon which he himself wrote a commentary. He felt also, though more indirectly, the influence of Abelard, against whom he was greatly prejudiced, not only on account of his love for Bernard but also on account of the great difference between their modes of feeling. They both agree that the problem of theology is to make belief comprehensible. But while Abelard emphasizes the fact that doubt makes this comprehension necessary, Hugo insists especially that comprehension is possible only as a result of previous experience. Both agree that nothing may be believed which is contrary to reason. But to Hugo the service of belief appears to be diminished if its content be composed only of that which arises from or is according to reason. The weightiest propositions of belief stand rather above reason (*De sacr.*, i. 3), and with this position the fact coincides that he, in agreement with Erigena, prefers negative to positive utterances in regard to God. That God is spirit is quite true only in so far as He is not body. Belief consists of two parts, the *cognitio*, or the *materia fidei*, that *quod fide creditur*, and the *affectu*, that is the *credere*. This subjective side as the proper *fides* he always places above the former, which a person may have without believing (*De sacr.*, ii. 10). This however has not hindered him from giving in his *Summa sententiarum* a logically arranged presentation of the content of belief, in connection with which one can scarcely help concluding that Abelard's *Sic et non* was the original occasion of the work. Moreover in this work too as elsewhere the practical point of view is prominent, inasmuch as the virtues of faith, of hope, and of love are first discoursed upon and afterward the content of belief is considered. After treating in the first tract of the being and attributes of God, the Trinity (in a manner very like Abelard) and the incarnation, he considers in the second

the creation of the angels and their fall. The third tract discusses the six days' work, the creation and the fall of man; the fourth the sacraments, that is the means of grace, and indeed those of the old economy, especially the law, which furnishes an opportunity for the consideration of the whole doctrine of ethics. The three following tracts have to do with the sacraments of the new economy: the fifth, baptism; the sixth, penance, the power of the keys, and the eucharist; the seventh, marriage. Up to this point there is no discussion of eschatology.

4. The subjective complement of this objective, almost dry, presentation of the contents of belief is formed by those works which have chiefly gained for him the name of Mystic. Here belong especially his dialogue with the soul, *Soliloquium de arrha animæ* (*Ibid.*, p. 951-970), the three closely connected works *De arca Noe morali* (*Ibid.*, p. 618 ff.), *De arca Noe mystica* (p. 681 ff.), *De vanitate mundi* (p. 701-741) and some other less important essays. With fondness and with almost trifling accuracy the comparison is carried out between the ark of Noah and the Church as a whole, or between the ark and the soul as it sails upon the waves of the world toward God, or again as it rests in God, and the succession of conditions through which the soul passes in nearing its last goal is fixed with exactness. This goal is the immediate contemplation of God, the *contemplatio*. The separate presentations differ from one another only in the fact that at one time are given as preparatory steps to that contemplation only *cogitatio* and *meditatio*, at another time the whole series beginning with the *lectio*, which is to be followed by *meditatio*, *oratio*, and *operatio*. *Cogitatio*, *meditatio*, and *contemplatio* appear then as the functions of the three eyes by which we perceive. Of these the outer, designed for material things, has been least affected by the fall, the inner, by which we contemplate ourselves, has become very weak, and finally our eye for God almost blind. It is clear that these three eyes are parallel with the three principles, matter, soul, and God. In spite of the great value which is laid upon moral purity, the practical appears to be subordinated to the theoretical enjoyment, which is often called a tasting of Deity. This condition is an absorption in oneself as well as in God, and is always brought into connection with renunciation of the world, still more with complete forgetfulness of the world. In this condition there

remains to man nothing, not even his own self. Whoever considers such expressions an indication of pantheism is not acquainted with the language of mysticism.

5. Hugo's *De sacramentis christianæ fidei*, which is one of his last, must be regarded as his ripest work. It treats of all the means of grace and therefore embraces his entire dogmatics. In this work the objective and subjective elements of his faith, rational reflection and mystical profundity, appear more than in any other of his writings, and he shows not only familiarity with the manner in which others dogmatize but also dogmatic keenness of his own. Since all that exists consists of those works of God by which the non-existent becomes existent (*opera conditionis*), and again of those by which the ruined is made better (*opera restaurationis*), the first book (*Ibid.*, pp. 187-363) treats of the former, and thus in general of the creation, and questions connected with it. In twelve sections, each of which is again divided into many chapters, are first considered the being and constitution of the world, then from this conclusions are drawn as to the original causes which lie at its foundation, and thus God is reached, and His Trinity is conceived, and parallels pointed out in creatures, just as by Abelard. Investigations follow in regard to our knowledge of God, and here the above-mentioned distinction between supra-rational and irrational is brought out. Hugo proceeds next to the consideration of the will of God, and the difficulties which arise from the existence of evil are met by very fine distinctions between will and signs of the will, as well as between the willing of evil and the willing that that which is evil may exist. The creation of angels and their fall, and the creation and fall of man follow. To this is joined the consideration of the restoration and of the means to it, first belief and then the remaining means of grace or *sacramenta* as well of the pre-Mosaic time, the *sacramenta naturalis legis*, as of the written law. All that is treated in this book forms at the same time the introduction to the subject of the second book (pp. 363-618), the means of grace under the new economy. This book is divided into eighteen sections and discusses the incarnation, the unity of the Church as the body of Christ, Church ordinances, holy garments, consecration of churches, baptism, confirmation, the sacrament of the body and blood of Christ, the minor sacraments, that is Church usages of all sorts (in which

connection an excursus upon simony is introduced), finally marriage and the vow. The incarnation is represented, as it had been by Anselm, as suitable, even if not absolutely necessary (*vid.* § 156, 8). The consideration of virtues and vices forms the step to the treatment of the confessional, forgiveness of sins, and supreme unction. Death, the last things, and the future world are treated in the last three sections, to which the *Summa sententiarum* is related as a more historical introduction.

§ 166.

That which in Anselm was completely one, and in Abelard at least closely united, appears separated in Gilbert and the *puri philosophi* on the one side, and in Hugo on the other. The separation of scholasticism into its elements proceeds however still further, since Hugo is followed by others who either look upon the content of belief, that which he calls *cognitio* or *quod fide creditur*, as the principal thing in all science, or place faith itself, Hugo's *affectio* and *ipsa fides*, so far above all else that even the doctrine of God recedes before the doctrine of piety, and they forget everything above their religious anthropology. Those of both tendencies, which are related to one another later in the eighteenth century as the orthodox and the pietistic, are able to make use of Hugo. The former, however, revere in him especially the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, and are therefore in a position to make use of the preparatory labours of Abelard, while the latter accept him because he wrote the *Arrha animæ* and the *Arca moralis* and *mystica*. Both, like their common father Hugo, occupy a negative relation toward those who look upon dialectics as the principal part of philosophy. The more one-sidedly they develop the more hostile will they become toward each other. The representatives of the former tendency, the writers of summaries, keep themselves freer from such one-sidedness, and are aided in this by the fact that they are not all scholars of a single master. Among the monks of the monastery of St. Victor, on the contrary, who allow only their great theologian to be regarded as an authority, this one-sidedness increases until it results in decided hatred for every other tendency.

§ 167.

THE SUMMISTS.

By the name SUMMISTS, which is derived by Buläus from Hugo's *Summa sententiarum*, are quite fittingly designated the authors of the so-called theological *Summæ*. These works, like those of Hugo and the earlier *Sic et non* of Abelard, aim to show, not so much what their author believes, as what the greatest teachers of the Church have regarded as true. At most they go on to show how casual contradictions among the authorities are to be solved, a task which Abelard had not undertaken. Soon after the above-mentioned works of Abelard and Hugo, perhaps contemporaneously with the latter, appeared the work of Robertus Pullus, who is the first of the mere Summists. The work of Peter of Novara attained a much greater reputation than that of Robert, in spite of the fact that it was drawn largely from the latter. His collection of sentences supplants gradually the works of Abelard and of Hugo. As at the beginning of scholasticism so here too the more gifted originator is eclipsed by the more logical arranger, the Briton by the Italian, and the glitter of the latter's name becomes so great that the most talented of the Summists, the German Alanus, has not been able to secure the reputation which he deserves. Chronologically the earliest is followed by the most celebrated, the most celebrated by the most talented.

§ 168.

I. ROBERTUS PULLUS (called also Poulain, Pulleinus, Pullanus, Pollenus, Pollen, Pully, Pulcy, Pudsy, de Puteaco, Bullenus, Bollenus) was born in England, and, after teaching in Paris and also, as it seems, for a time in Oxford (from 1129), was called to Rome, where he died in 1150, having been made a cardinal in 1141 and afterwards papal chancellor. His works have been published by Mathaud in folio, Paris, 1655. His *Sententiarum libri octo*, which alone come into consideration here, are contained in Migne's *Patr. lat.*, vol. 186 (pp. 626-1152). They are cited also as his *Theology*, and as *Sententiæ de sancta Trinitate*. Of his works are mentioned, in addition, *In Psalmos*, *In Sancti Johannis Apocalypsin*, *Super doctorum dictis libb. IV.*, *De contemptu mundi*, *Prælectionum lib. I.*, *Sermonum lib. I.*, et alia nonnulla.

2. It is characteristic of the standpoint of the *Sententia* that the doctrine of philosophers is very often contrasted with the teaching of the *Christiani*. The division of the work into eight books is rather artificial, since sometimes a new book begins in the very midst of a subject. The arrangement of the work is nevertheless quite logical. The *first* book, in sixteen chapters, shows that God exists; that He is only one, but one in three Persons; that He possesses no properties nor actual manifoldness; again, how the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit are related; how each of them is *alius non aliud quam Pater*; that God is everywhere present as the soul in the body; what is meant by the love, hate, anger, will of God; how God rewards and punishes; that even to His omnipotence many things are impossible, but that it extends farther than His actual willing; finally, that God foresees all things. Objections are continually adduced and answered. In the *second* book, which contains thirty-two chapters, the author teaches that God has created the world in order that His goodness and blessedness may be shared by others, and has destined heaven for the angels, the earth for man. To both freedom is given. The angels by means of it confirm themselves so thoroughly in the good that they are able only to be good; the devil estranges himself so completely from the good that he is able only to be bad. He is devil, therefore, only by his own agency. As regards man, the soul is created in the previously-formed body and receives its sinfulness from this impure environment. The body is joined with the soul, and man is not a third something beside the two. The soul possesses reason, temper (*ira*), and passion, and on account of the first is immortal. Man was created in order to compensate, not numerically but in merit, for that which God had lost through the fallen angels. In his original condition he was more perfect than we, but less perfect than that for which he was destined. Then he merely could sin and die, now he must. Adam, as the seed of all other men, propagates sin by means of the passion which accompanies generation. The means of transmission itself transmits.

3. In the *third* book, which contains thirty chapters, the means are considered by which God offers salvation, first to some, then to all. After a comparison of the particular Jewish economy of salvation with the universal Christian economy,

the author proceeds to consider the incarnation, the immaculate conception and birth of Christ, and the relation of the two natures in Him. Since Deity is joined with the entire man, body and soul, Christ is *persona trium substantiarum*, and His union with God is essentially different from that of every believer. The book is closed by investigations as to how the Divine and human are related in Christ, for instance in miracles. The *fourth* book, in twenty-six chapters, opens with the subordination of the incarnate One to God, and touches the question whether He was able to sin, without coming to a decision upon it. It inquires further how far omnipotence is to be ascribed to Him, and remarks in that connection that Scripture is accustomed often to say less than it means, and *vice versa*. The question why Christ prayed, and how this is consistent with omnipotence and omniscience, is subtly answered; and the author then proceeds to ascertain whether He possessed faith, love, and hope. Sight took the place of faith in Him. The necessity of the death upon the cross, the question as to how far in spite of this the murderers of Christ sinned, the fact that Christ offered Himself not to the devil but to God, and an investigation as to what the lower world contains and what Christ accomplished by His descent into Hades—these and related subjects make up the contents of the remainder of the book. The *fifth*, containing fifty-two chapters, opens with the subject of the resurrection, in which connection the going forth of the dead out of their graves for a short time, and appearances of Christ after His ascension, are considered. The latter are regarded either as appearances of angels, or as due to an ecstatic condition on the part of the beholder. An accurate presentation of justification by faith, and of the meritoriousness of works, of the necessity of baptism and the possibility of making up for it by martyrdom and faith, is not free from Semi-Pelagianism, which indeed at that time was regarded as orthodox. Baptism and the ceremonies belonging to it, the opening of heaven in connection with it and by means of it, the confessional, forgiveness of sins, works dead and meritorious, are considered at length one after the other, as well as the various degrees of spiritual death from which it is still possible to be rescued, and the last degree for which there is no salvation.

4. The *sixth* book, in sixty-one chapters, takes up first an

entirely different subject, discussing the nine orders of good angels and the corresponding orders of the bad. The investigation then returns to man, and devotes itself to the share which divine grace has in man's good works, and to the share which belongs to man's own activity. The latter is made to consist chiefly in the giving up of opposition. The various elements of repentance are given, and the confessional and absolution are considered from the side of the confessor, as well as from the side of the penitent, in such a way as to oppose levity on the part of the latter and hierarchical cupidity on the part of the former. The thirty-seven chapters of the *seventh* book treat of the forgiveness of sin, the life of the saved within the Church, and their various ranks; finally state and family life, and, with especial fulness, marriage. In the *eighth* book, which contains thirty-two chapters, the discussion concerns the Eucharist, its relation to the celebration of the passover, transubstantiation, laws in regard to meats, finally, with great fulness, death, resurrection, judgment, eternal perdition and blessedness. The discussion bears throughout an exegetical character. Difficulties are set aside by rather arbitrary conclusions.

§ 169.

I. PETRUS, born in Novara and therefore ordinarily called LOMBARDUS, died in the year 1164 as Bishop of Paris. He appears to have been originally a pupil of Abelard, but later he heard Robertus Pullus, and finally was directed by Bernard to Hugo, who captivated him above all others. His fame is due chiefly to his work *Sententiarum libri quattuor*, from which arises his common designation *Magister sententiarum*. The fact that this work became the basis for all dogmatic investigation, just as the *Decretum Gratiani* for studies in ecclesiastical law, and further the fact that the aim which Gratian had placed before himself in his *Concordantia discordantium*, as well as the division into distinctions and questions, are common to both works, made it possible for the tradition to arise that the two contemporaries were brothers. Indeed a third brother has been given them in the person of Petrus Comestor, the author of the *Historia scholastica*. The honour of being for some centuries the only recognised com-

pendium of dogmatics, so that teacher and students of that subject were called Sententiaries, is due to what might be called a defect in the work, if it be compared with the *Sententiæ* of Pullus. It shows, namely, less originality, in many points less decision, than the work of Pullus. There was thus left, however, more room for independence on the part of those who made it the basis of their lectures. Opinions for and against a thing are presented in the manner introduced by Abelard, then it is shown how the contradiction may be solved; but the conclusion is not so strongly supported that the teacher himself cannot modify it or at least its grounds. It thus became possible for the Jesuit Possevin to cite 243 commentaries on the *Sentences* as already known to him. The work was first printed in Venice, in 1477; since then times without number. Migne's *Patr. lat.* contains, in vol. 191, Lombard's commentaries on the Psalms and his Collects on the Pauline epistles, and in vol. 192 (pp. 519-963) the *Sentences*, according to the edition of Aleaume (Antwerp, 1757).

2. The work begins by referring to the difference between the *res* and the *signa* which had been noticed by Augustine and considered also by Hugo. This Lombard held to be important for the subjects of belief, since there are not only things but also signs which conduce to man's salvation, namely the sacraments. The latter are at first left out of consideration and taken up again in the fourth book. The first three books are devoted solely to the realities which contribute to salvation. They are however further subdivided. Augustine had already drawn the distinction between that which man enjoys (*frui*), that is, desires for its own sake, and that which he uses (*uti*), that is, wishes for the sake of something else. This distinction between *quo fruendum* and *quo utendum est* is adopted here, and the former predicate applied to God alone, of whom the *first* book treats. The divisions of this book as well as of all the others are called *distinctiones*. Each contains a number of questions which are considered from various sides and finally answered. In the forty-eight *distinctiones* of the first book the doctrine of the triune God is discussed, the author showing how the difficulties raised against it have been already answered by Augustine and others, since they have pointed out an image of the Trinity in creatures, especially in man. The author shows

further that the contradictions between the various authorities are only apparent, arising chiefly from the ambiguity of the words employed, and are therefore to be solved by distinctions. He opposes Abelard frequently in this part. The essential predicates of God, His omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence, as well as His will, are considered at length; and difficulties in part solved, in part simply mentioned. In the *second* book, in twenty-four *distinctiones*, the subject treated is *quo utimur*, created things. First the act of creation is considered, and its ground made the goodness of God, its end the true profit of the creature, which consists in serving and enjoying God. Protest is entered against the highest authorities of the dialecticians, Aristotle and Plato, because the former taught the eternity of the world, the latter the eternity at least of matter. The consideration of the six days' work, of angels and men, is followed by a discussion of evil, in which Peter comes to the conclusion that the dialectic rule of the incompatibility of opposites suffers an exception in the case of evil. Since this rule, however, was the basis of all dialectics, it is easy to understand how, as occasion offers, he speaks of dialectics itself somewhat scornfully, or contrasts the dialecticians, just as Pullus had the philosophers, with the Christians. The *third* book, containing forty *distinctiones*, considers first the incarnation. If it were not necessary it was nevertheless fitting that it should take place, and that the redemption should be accomplished by means of it exactly as it was accomplished. The question whether faith, hope, and love existed in Christ, forms the transition to the consideration of these virtues; and in this connection love is treated with the greatest minuteness. A hasty consideration of the four cardinal virtues and a fuller one of the Holy Spirit's seven gifts of grace (according to Isa. i. 2) follow. It is then shown that the ten commandments are only deductions from the command to love God and our neighbour. After a discussion of lying and of perjury, the relation between the old and new covenants is considered at the close. In the *fourth* book, which contains fifteen *distinctiones*, the sacred signs are treated, the conception of the sacrament is fixed, and then the seven sacraments are discussed, confirmation most briefly, the confessional most fully. Finally eschatology is taken up, and at the end the question is proposed, whether the unhappiness of the condemned can disturb the blessedness of

the saved. This question, which is discussed in the fifteenth *distinctio*, is answered in the negative.

3. One of the most zealous followers of Lombard was Peter of Poitiers. He was chancellor of Paris toward the end of the twelfth century, and himself wrote five books of *Sentences* or *Distinctions*, which he dedicated to William, Archbishop of Sens. They were published simultaneously with the works of Robert Pullus by Mathaud. The first book treats of the Trinity, the second of the rational creature, the third of the fall and of the necessary restoration, the fourth of the redemption accomplished by the incarnation, the fifth of the redemption which is repeated in the sacraments. The work agrees completely in its arrangement and essential contents with that of Lombard.

§ 170.

1. Intellectually the most gifted of the Summists was the German ALANUS (DE INSULIS because he was born in Ryssel), whose long life and extended literary activity has given rise to the assumption that there were two persons of the same name. He was first a professor in Paris, then a Cistercian monk, and later for a time Bishop of Auxerre. He died in the Cistercian monastery of Clairvaux in the year 1203, after he had won the cognomen of *Doctor Universalis* by his writings and disputations against the Waldenses and Patarenes. His works were first published by Visch in Amsterdam (1654), but appendices were added in the *Bibliotheca scriptorum ordinis Cisterciensis*, Colon., 1656. This edition was made the basis of Migne's edition (*Patr. lat.*, vol. 120), for which however manuscripts were especially collated, and which contains in addition the lexicographical work of Alanus, *Distinctiones dictionum theologiarum* (also called *Oculus SSæ.*), which was printed in 1477.

2. The shortest but most important of Alanus' works is his *De arte, seu de articulis catholicæ fidei, libri quinque*, which was first published by Pez in the *Thes. anecd. noviss.* and is contained in Migne, col. 573-617. It is a *Summa*, much shorter than usual, written with the purpose of opposing heretics and Mohammedans. For this reason there are given in the prologue a number of definitions (*descriptiones*), postulates (*petitiones*), and axioms (*communes animi conceptiones*),

in order to gain firm ground for the disputation, which is then carried on in a strictly syllogistic form. The *first* book, in thirty Sentences, treats of the *una omnium causa*, God. From the impossibility that anything should be *causa sui* is deduced the existence of a *causa prima* which has no properties and therefore is unchangeable and eternal, unending and inconceivable, an object not so much of knowledge as of faith, that is of an acceptance whose meritoriousness consists in the fact that it does not rest upon irresistible grounds. Faith stands therefore above opinion and below knowledge. All qualities which are ascribed to the perfectly simple, highest cause, belong only improperly to it, since they have been transferred from the effect to the cause. The Trinity of Persons in God, which does not conflict with His unity, must be concluded by a like transference from the fact that in everything are found matter, form, and their unity (*compago*). The thirty Sentences of the *second* book treat of the world and its creation, especially angels and men. Communicative love, joined with might in God, impels Him to the creation of rational spirits, which recognise in the world His goodness and might, and which are free because only to such can He show His righteousness. The rational angel-like spirit is united in man with that which is lowest, the earth. From this arises his frailty, as a result of which he falls, sins against God, and thus brings upon himself endless punishment. The *third* book considers, in sixteen doctrinal Sentences, the incarnation and redemption. In its arrangement it closely follows Anselm's *Cur Deus homo*, showing that that which man ought to accomplish but which God alone could accomplish, was performed by the incarnate God, and most fittingly by the Son, because He is the basis of all form and therefore opposed to all deformity. He takes upon Himself the hardest of punishments, the punishment of death. It is however in this connection expressly said that God might have adopted other methods of redemption. The *fourth* and the *fifth* books contain nothing peculiar. The former treats of the sacraments in nine Sentences, and the latter of the resurrection in six.

3. With this work agree in their contents two others, of which it is difficult to decide whether they are preparatory to or are further developments of what the first contains. They divide between them the ends which the work *De arte* had pursued, the one, *De fide catholica contra hæreticos libri*

IV., emphasizing the polemical element, the other, *Regulæ theologicae*, rather the systematic. The introduction to the latter work (Migne, pp. 617–687) reminds us of Gilbert (§ 163. 4), in so far as it is asserted that every science has its own fundamental principles, distinguished by special names. Dialectics has its *maximæ*, rhetoric its *loci communes*, mathematics its *axiomata* and *porismata*, etc. They all hold only so long as the accustomed course of nature lasts. The *regulæ* or *maximæ theologicae* alone have irrefragable necessity, since they treat of the eternal and unchangeable. These fundamental propositions are in part generally recognised, in part such as are convincing only to the one who looks deeply. Only the latter are to be considered here. They are especially such as follow from the fact that God is not only one but also unity itself (*monas*). Many of them are expressed in formulæ which sound paradoxical. For instance, *monas est alpha et omega sine alpha et omega, monas est sphaera cujus centrum ubique circumferentia nusquam*, etc. Especial weight is laid upon the fact that there is no difference in God between His being and that which He is, and that He is therefore not the subject of properties, and hence no theological proposition can speak of the accidental (*contingens*). God, as form itself, is naturally without form, just as He does not have being, because He is being itself. Since all predicates are taken from the forms which an object has, positive predicates do not apply to God. It is very carefully considered whether substantives or adjectives, abstracts or concretes, verbs, pronouns, or prepositions, may be used in speaking of God, and how their meaning is modified. The especial predicates are then considered which, although they belong to all three Persons of the Divine nature, are yet ordinarily applied in an especial sense to one or the other of them, as might to the Father, etc. The objections are then weighed which are brought against omnipotence, as well as those brought against wisdom and foreknowledge. A consideration of goodness forms the transition to a discussion of whether and in how far all is good. This is followed by ethical investigations, of which the work *De arte* contained none. The principal proposition is, that all that is worthy of punishment as well as of reward lies in the will alone. With this it is quite compatible that punishment is earned, while reward is unearned, since man accomplishes evil as *auctor* but good as *minister*. Alanus seeks to

avoid Pelagianism and extreme Augustinianism by distinguishing between *gratia ad meritum* and *gratia in merito*. *Vitium* is considered, both as the absence of *virtus* and as its opposite. *Caritas* is defined as the source of all virtues, and it is shown how it is unity with God, which was begun by the incarnation of the Son, who as a man earned nothing for Himself but all for us, and is continued by the sacraments. Some propositions which are said to hold not only for theology but also for the *naturalis facultas*, complete the book. It is divided into 125 chapters, and as an *inventarium* of that which is taught by the theological *sensus communis* stood for a long time in high esteem.

4. It was probably the four books *De fide catholica contra hæreticos* (Migne, pp. 305-428) which led Trithemius and others after him to ascribe to Alanus a commentary upon the *Sentences* of Lombard. The book has an entirely different, purely polemical tendency. In the *first* book, which contains sixty-seven chapters, dualistic, baptist, anti-sacramental, and other heresies are refuted by the authority of apostolic and patristic utterances. It appears often as if all these assertions proceeded from a single sect, but elsewhere it is seen that the author has various sects in mind. The *second* book, directed particularly against the Waldenses, embraces twenty-five chapters, and defends especially the dignity of the priesthood while it opposes also the rigorous morals of the heretics mentioned. The *third* book, in twenty-one chapters, combats the Jews, refuting their objections against the Trinity, against the abrogation of the ceremonial law, against the appearance of the Messiah as well as against His divinity and resurrection, with arguments drawn partly from the Old Testament and partly from reason. The *fourth* book is directed *contra paganos seu Mohametanos*. It is the shortest, containing only fourteen chapters. In connection with the doctrine of the Trinity, reference is made to that already said against the Jews, the conception by the Holy Spirit is justified, and finally the worship of images is defended, which are for the laity what the written word is for the clergy.

5. Alanus has gained still greater or at least wider fame from a poem in nine books entitled *Anticlaudianus* (Migne, pp. 483-575), sometimes called also *Antirufinus*, because it pictures, in opposition to Claudian's *Rufinus*, how nature forms a perfect man according to God's will. The

virtues and vices, which fight over the soul created by God and furnished by nature with an excellent body, are personified. The poem, in describing the journey of Wisdom to God, contains at once an encyclopædia of sciences and a representation of the universe with its circles of planets and its heavens. Arrived in the heavenly sphere, Wisdom is obliged to separate itself from the seven arts and sciences; Theology becomes its guide; and Faith and a mirror, in which all is seen only by reflection, become the means by which it approaches God. It is emphasized with a certain joy, how theological doctrines are in conflict with those of the *trivium* and the *quadrivium*. Logic is not accorded a very high position, and the novelties introduced by the discovery of Aristotle's *Analytics* are especially complained of. This is a confirmation of the opinion expressed in § 164, 1, that the *logica nova* led away from theology.

§ 171.

THE VICTORINES.

Over against the Summists, who, constituted the orthodox party, stand the religious ANTHROPOLOGISTS or teachers of piety, the pietists of the twelfth century. Their principal centre was the monastery of St. Victor, and hence they are called by some Victorines. For them, as for the Summists, belief without proof stands highest. But they emphasize in belief the act of faith itself much more than the content of faith. They do not wholly forget, it is true, the *fides quæ creditur* (to use the modifications of Hugo's expressions which later became common) in holding the *fides qua creditur*, but nevertheless the latter is treated with greater fondness by him who still follows closest in the footsteps of Hugo. His successors speedily become more one-sided, and thereby make enemies not less of the writers of Sentences and Summaries than of the untheological dialecticians. The solitary life, withdrawn from all scientific labour and devoted to contemplation, finds among them full approval.

§ 172.

J. G. V. Engelhardt: *Richard von St. Victor und Johannes Ruysbræk*. Erlangen, 1838.

1. RICHARD, a Scotchman by birth, was from 1162 until his death, in 1173, Prior of the monastery of ST. VICTOR, whose name is always added to his own. He was educated by Hugo, and did not neglect entirely the doctrinal side of theology, as his works upon the Trinity prove. Nevertheless he laid especial weight upon mystic contemplation, to whose description and glorification his most important works are devoted. He is also stirred with enmity against philosophers, whose arrogance makes him distrustful toward philosophy itself, so that he is disposed to admit its services only in connection with natural science. His works have been often published, first in octavo, in Venice, in 1506, then more complete in folio, in Paris, 1518, and elsewhere. In Migne's *Patr. lat.*, they constitute the 194th volume.

2. Although Richard's *De Trinitate libri sex* (Migne, pp. 887-992) was often cited after his age as an important work, it may be passed over here, since it contains scarcely anything which had not already been said, and in part better, by Hugo and the other Summists considered in the preceding paragraphs. He appears much more original, on the other hand, in the works which are commonly called mystical; thus, in the work *De exterminatione mali et promotione boni* (pp. 1073-1116), in which he interprets tropically the words of Psalm cxiv. 5, *quid est tibi mare*, etc., and shows how believers must fall into the Dead Sea of remorse, how their spirit (the Jordan) must flow upwards towards the source, etc. In the work *De statu interioris hominis* (pp. 1116-1158) the words of Isa. i. 5, 6, *omne caput languidum*, etc., are interpreted in an equally figurative way, and the might of free-will in contrast with arbitrariness, as well as the power of humility and of the prayer of devotion, is described and praised. The three books *De eruditione hominis interioris* (pp. 1229-1366) treat in the same manner the dream of Nebuchadnezzar. Finally, his two principal works, *De præparatione animi ad contemplationem* (pp. 1-64) and *Libri quinque de gratia contemplationis* (pp. 63-202), are designated as *Benjamin minor* and *Benjamin major* because they use the history of the sons of Jacob, especially Benjamin, allegorically. They are called also *De*

arca mystica by later writers. With these are connected the *De gradibus charitatis* (pp. 1195-1208) and *De quatuor gradibus violentæ charitatis* (pp. 1207-1224), which describe the aspiration that conditions the state of contemplation.

3. Contemplation, Benjamin, who is born only by the death of Rachel (reason), has as its content not only that which is above reason, as Hugo had said, but also that which is entirely outside of, and indeed opposed to reason. Only a occasional moments do Joseph and Benjamin kiss each other that is, *meditatio* and *contemplatio*, reason and revelation, go together. In general there is a sharp distinction to be drawn between *cogitatio*, whose organ is the imagination and which knows neither work nor fruit; *meditatio*, which belongs to the *ratio*, and toils but does not reap; and finally *contemplatio*, whose organ is the *intelligentia* and whose reward is fruit without labour. If the word *contemplatio*, however, be taken in the broader sense, six grades of it may be distinguished, which are mystically indicated by the principal parts of which the ark of the covenant was composed. Two belong to the imagination, and of these the lower is conformed to the imagination, the other to the reason. Two belong to the reason, and of these the lower leans upon the imagination and needs images, while the higher is pure rational perception. Finally, there is one that stands above reason but not outside of it; and, highest of all, one that is outside of reason and appears to be contrary to it, as for instance the contemplation of the Trinity. The object of the two highest grades is called the intellectual. All six species of contemplation are considered at length, and divided into various steps, in the *Benjamin major*; and it is repeatedly pointed out that Aristotle and the other philosophers remained upon the lower steps. Self-knowledge and self-forgetfulness which follows it, are praised above all else. The highest grade of contemplation is characterized as the state of being actually lifted out of oneself, and its various methods are described. It is a work of God's good pleasure; and the prayer of complete self-devotion is the means of securing it again when we have once experienced it. Richard repeatedly finds fault with the dialecticians, among other things, because they entirely forget the formal character of their science. Since even correct conclusions may lead to false results, the chief thing is the truth of the premises and fundamental propositions. But he blames not only the

dialecticians. It was early noticed that he often seizes the opportunity of making some accusation or other against Lombard, so that a theology which produces only a *Summa* does not seem to him the right one.

§ 173.

1. Richard was succeeded by WALTER OF ST. VICTOR. His work against the heresies of Abelard, Peter Lombard, Peter of Poitiers, and Gilbert is ordinarily cited, on account of an expression in its preface, under the title *In quatuor labyrinthos Franciæ*. It has become known through extracts made by Bulæus (*Hist. univ.*, Par. II. pp. 629 ff.). Walter condemns with equal scorn the logicians and the metaphysicians, who think so much of Aristotle that they forget the Gospel, and also, in their subtle investigations in regard to *aliquid*, become finally veritable *nihilistæ*. He condemns likewise the writers of Summaries, who say just as much against the existence of God as for it. When they say of anything that it is in violation of the rules of Aristotle, he inquires what difference that makes, and quotes the warning of the Apostle against all philosophy. He is disturbed by the fact that they give the various opinions side by side without deciding between them, and demands that they condemn heresy that they may not themselves become heretics. Quotations from the Church Fathers, especially from Augustine, and railing invectives are the weapons with which he attacks the "Dialecticians" as much as the "Theologians," and not less the "Pseudo-Scholastics." The teachers of the "Dialecticians" are the heathen Socrates, Aristotle, and Seneca, and they do not realize that the correctness of the conclusion is not a warrant for the truth of the thing concluded. By "Theologians" he plainly means the compilers of the various Summaries, since he places John of Damascus at the head. As for the "Pseudo-Scholastics," they propose a great number of useless questions, which are to be answered only by circumlocutions and subtle distinctions. Over against them all he places constantly living, world-conquering faith in the Son of God, who has become man with skin and flesh, with bones and nerves—that faith which is to the world indeed foolishness, but which drives out devils and raises the dead.

2. The influence of the monastery of St. Victor,—especially,

since the subjective side of piety (*affectus*) had been emphasized there at the expense of the objective element of religion (*cognitio*),—is not to be mistaken in the tendency of that age to awaken the people by sermons, rather than to study learned theology. The miracle-working, travelling preacher, Fulco of Neuilly, and Dominic, the founder of the predicant order, were at least indirectly influenced by the Victorines. Four Paris professors, the founders of the order of the *Vallis scholarium*, which took its rise in the neighbourhood of Langres, were directly stirred by them. Also the two monks, Isaac in Stella and Alcher in Clairvaux, a part of whose correspondence is extant, appear to have felt the influence emanating from St. Victor. The latter's work, *De spiritu et anima*, is often cited in later times as a production of Augustine. The unscientific mysticism of this age and the scientific mysticism of a shortly subsequent period found scarcely anywhere more nourishment than in the works which proceeded from this monastery, and that almost more in later writings than in those of Hugo and even of Richard. They may be regarded as diametrical opposites, and therefore as the corresponding correlates, of the *puri philosophi* mentioned above (§ 164).

§ 174.

When the Schoolmen have thus become mere metaphysicians, who concern themselves more about substances and subsistencies, about *nihil* and *aliquid*, than about belief, or logical pugilists who do not inquire as to the Trinity but as to whether the man or the knife accomplishes the slaughter; and when they have become, on the other side, theological compilers, for whom an authority stands higher than all logical laws of thought, or again glorifiers of piety, in whose opinion the pious heart is to take the place of all science—when these results have taken place, scholasticism has really been separated into its component parts, that is, has fallen. When within it are found men who are not satisfied with any of these extremes, but who do not possess sufficient intellectual power to give scholasticism a new impulse, they will either proceed to acquire knowledge of all that is taught in the name of philosophy,—to do justice to all in so far as possible,—or they will make the attempt to return to the primitive state of scholasticism, in which all its elements were still one, even if

they did form a chaotic mixture. The former learned historical interest is more or less sceptically inclined, the latter attempt, on the other hand, to animate the past is in itself mystical. As very frequently the disappearance of the speculative spirit has been heralded by the rise of scepticism and mysticism, thus the temporary exhaustion of the scholastic spirit became manifest in the appearance of the mediæval academician, John of Salisbury, and in the mystical reactionary attempt of Amalrich of Bene.

§ 175.

G. Schaarschmidt: *Johannis Sarisberiensis, nach Leben, Studien, Schriften und Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1862 (viii. 360).

I. JOANNES PARVUS (perhaps his family name was Short or Small) is ordinarily called, from his birthplace, JOHN OF SALISBURY, sometimes, from his bishopric, JOHN OF CHARTRES. By his education, which he himself describes in his *Metalogicus* ii. 10, he was better fitted than any one else to pass a final judgment upon previous Scholasticism. While still young, but with a thorough school education, he went to Paris in the year 1136, and became a zealous pupil of Abelard, who imparted to him a high respect for logic, which he never lost. This is proved by his *Metalogicus*, written in mature years, in the four books of which he combats, in the person of Cornificius, those who looked with contempt upon the investigations connected with the *trivium*. He declares them to be the necessary foundation of all scientific study. Being familiar, however, with the Aristotelian *Analytics* and *Topics*, he does not wish one to be satisfied, as Abelard still was, with the old logic, that is, that which follows Boëthius more closely than Aristotle. The genuine Aristotelian logic, above all the *Topics*, he cannot praise enough, in part because it performs such great services for rhetoric, in part because it does the same for scientific disputation. This does not hinder him, however, from characterizing logic as a study especially for youth, and from opposing those who, in making this study the only one, become Eristics and Sophists instead of philosophers. The method proposed by him he himself followed. Having studied the old logic under Abelard with great industry, he became, after the latter had given up his lectures, a pupil of Alberich, one of the most violent opponents of nominalism, and was thus initiated

into all the subtleties of the famous nominalistic controversy, and was in a position to give later an account of all the various attempts at compromise. By William of Conches, who was then his teacher for three years, and by two other pupils of Bernard of Chartres, perhaps also by the aged master himself, he was led to turn his attention to another sphere, namely, the Ancients, whom he now began to study with great zeal. Cicero especially captivated him, and rhetoric became from that time a principal object of his studies. At the same time he was inducted into the *quadrivium* by a German, Hartwin, and by a man whom he calls Richardus Episcopus. Both studies shattered his admiration for Aristotle, whose physics and ethics seemed to him to be in conflict with the doctrines of faith. His respect for Aristotle as a logician, however, increased all the more when his countryman Adam, by a new translation, made the hitherto almost unknown *Analytics* and *Topics* more accessible to the learned public. Under the tuition of Adam and of William of Soissons he now learned to prize this "new logic," and its fruitfulness for rhetoric. His studies were interrupted by three years of teaching, and then he went again to Paris and studied philosophy under Gilbert, but at the same time heard Robertus Pullus and a certain Simon on theology; and from the way in which he cites Hugo of St. Victor it must be concluded that he had made himself familiar with his views also; so that none of the tendencies which arose in that period remained unknown to him. He was thereby placed in a position to report as accurately as he does upon the different modifications which had been developed within the various contending parties. In the question as to the universals he proposes a compromising formula, which, when compared with that of Abelard, appears nominalistic.

2. He imitates Cicero, whom he greatly admires, in appropriating various opinions; and he zealously emulates him also in purity of language. Like Cicero, he is fond of calling himself an Academician, and desires no extreme scepticism, but as little does he wish a knowledge that mistakes its limits. Like Cicero also, he combats superstition, but at the same time, just as zealously, irreligiosity. With John, however, ecclesiastical considerations naturally take the place of political. His interest is above all practical. Church life and the freedom of the Church are for him more important

than dogma. He was confirmed more and more in this tendency by his position as Secretary of the Archbishop Theobald, of Canterbury, who, as well as King Henry II., sent him often as an Ambassador to Rome—a mission for which he was eminently fitted by his intimate friendship with Pope Hadrian IV. Thus Thomas à Becket, with whom he became acquainted soon after his return to England, found in him his truest servant and assistant when he undertook to defend the rights of the archbishopric against the encroachments of the State; and John himself was in danger of sharing the martyr's death. From the year 1176 he was Bishop of Chartres, and died there in 1180. Of his works, the *Policraticus*, in eight books, was completed in 1159. It considers in the first six books the *nugæ curialium*, in the last two the *vestigia philosophorum*. It appeared first in the year 1476 in folio, of which the Paris quarto edition of 1513 is a mere reprint. The Lyons octavo edition of 1513 made use of another manuscript. Both editions were used by the editor of a third, Raphelengius, Leyden, 1595, 8vo. This was reprinted by Jo. Maire, Leyden, 1639, 8vo, who united with it the *Metalogicus*, which had been written at the same time, and first published in Paris in 1610. The epistles of John were first published by Masson, Paris, 1611; his poem, *Entheticus de dogmate philosophorum*, by Petersen, Hamburg, 1843. In the year 1848, J. A. Giles, of Oxford, issued a very incorrect edition of John's complete works, in five octavo volumes. A reprint of this forms the 199th volume of Migne's *Patr. lat.* In all his works more learning is shown than was common at that time, united with a tasteful presentation quite unusual in his age. Throughout, the practical element is predominant. Love is for him the sum of all ethics; and in every theoretical investigation the question constantly forces itself upon him, whether it has also a practical value. This sometimes borders upon a very prosaic utilitarianism.

§ 176.

AMALRICH (the form Almarich is also found) is in every particular the opposite of John. He was born in Bena near Chartres, and is therefore called after both places. In the year 1204 he was condemned on account of his heretical doctrines by the University of Paris, where he had first been a

teacher of arts, that is a professor in the philosophical faculty, but had afterwards devoted himself to theology. With a sense of his innocence he appealed to Rome ; but his condemnation was confirmed, and he died in the year 1207, soon after making a recantation under compulsion. The proposition, that every Christian must view himself as a member of the body of Christ, which has alone come down to us as his error, can hardly have been the ground of his condemnation. It is probable that the latter was due rather to the way in which he proved it. The judgment, further, which was held over his bones in the year 1209, was caused by the fact that the Albigenses and other heretics, who had adopted the apocalyptic representation of Joachim of Floria and other fanatics, appealed often to Amalrich. Among the propositions which they are said by Bulæus to have asserted, are some which occur word for word in Erigena, and, as far as it is possible to draw a conclusion from the later notices of Amalrich himself, as well as the somewhat fuller notices of the so-called Almericians, the works of that father of scholasticism seem to have had more influence upon Amalrich than the Schoolmen of his own day. From this arises the oft-repeated accusation of his opponents, that in everything he had to make his own peculiar opinion current, and further the report that he had written a book under the name *Pision*, by which it is difficult to understand any other work than that of Erigena, whose title had long before undergone similar corruptions (§ 154, 1). Amalrich appears, to judge from the way in which Cardinal Henry of Ostia cites sentences from the work of Erigena, to have seized especially upon all that could be interpreted in a pantheistic sense, a phenomenon which can cause no surprise in connection with a mystical reactionary attempt. It is impossible to determine in how far the report is true which is found in later writers, that Amalrich had declared for the opinion that the sovereignty of the Son had now come to an end, just as the sovereignty of the Father had ceased with the old covenant, and that the reign of the Spirit was approaching.

§ 177.

CONCLUDING REMARK.

When John of Salisbury knows how to give only an inventory of what the various Schoolmen have attempted to accom-

plish ; when Amalrich, on the contrary, is able to counsel only a return to the original scholasticism of Erigena ; when Walter of St. Victor, finally, has only a cry of woe for that to which scholasticism has been brought by its leaders—all this is not much less than a declaration of bankruptcy on the part of the scholastic spirit. In fact, it has exhausted itself in the solution of the problem, how to make ecclesiastical dogma accessible to the natural understanding, a problem which it undertook to solve partly by pointing out rationality in the separate doctrines and logical arrangement in their totality, partly by exercising the natural understanding in the appropriation of the super-sensuous material, and by showing it the steps by which it can rise to a comprehension of the dogma. Scholasticism can make further progress only when it receives a new impulse. This is given to it simultaneously with a new problem, whose solution it attempts in the period of its glory.

SECOND DIVISION.

Scholasticism at its height.

§ 178.

THE more true it is that the spirit of Christianity is entirely new, the more must the Church, permeated with that spirit, look upon the pre-Christian and the un-Christian spirit as an unspiritual nature—as materialism. From this arises the struggle of the Christian community, later of the Church, against the world. It is a continual strife at the same time against Hellenism, the culminating point of classic heathendom ; and against Judaism, the summit of Orientalism ; finally against the world-empire of the Romans, which incorporated both in itself. To the first was opposed, even in the Apostolic age, the Judaizing tendency, which received its first impulse from Peter and James ; then, in the youthful days of the community, monkish asceticism, the desire for martyrdom ; finally, in the Church, the dogma of the one holy God, and of the creation of the world from nothing. Judaism is combated from the very beginning by Pauline heathen Christianity ; then the fresh and

animated spirit of a congregation composed solely of priests is contrasted with it ; and later the doctrines of the Trinity, of the Incarnation, of the worthlessness of all legal righteousness, are put in opposition to it. Christianity contends finally with Roman imperialism in undermining the pillars of the law, property and punishment, and in repudiating the deification of the world-power, the Roman State, symbolized in the worship of the emperors. Those who were foolishness to the Greeks, an offence to the Jews, and,—on account of their *odii generis humani*,—a *sceleratissima gens* to the Romans, richly returned such hatred, and considered it their duty, whenever they met even with that which was pre-Christian, or hitherto unaffected by the Christian spirit, not to rest until it should be made subject to the dominion of the Spirit. This work was comparatively finished towards the end of the eleventh century, when the greatest of the Popes, an anti-type of Charlemagne, united the world-hierarchy with the world-monarchy, having conquered the world which lay humbly at his feet.

§ 179.

The Kingdom of God, in order even to begin the struggle, had to become the kingdom of this world (*vid.* § 131); and still more, as a result of the strife itself, and of its continuation and long duration, it became infected, as is always the case, with its opponent's nature. The Church came out of its victory over the world conformed to the world. It became Jewish through its priesthood, patterned after the Old Testament, and through its Pelagianism, which, modified though it was, caused it to lay such great weight upon the ritual service and upon meritorious works, for which latter equivalents may in the end be substituted. The Church became heathen, since, instead of consisting solely of children of God or of priests, it accepted also children of the world, with whom the minority, as the (true) Church, were contrasted. It became heathen in putting in the place of the earlier conception of Salvation as belonging only to the next world, the material conception of it as a possession in this world, in accordance with which a sacred picture, a relic, a host, in short, a material thing, makes salvation present and performs miracles. It became, finally, in its greed for conquest and its pettifogging interpretation of the laws, a pupil of Rome, and boasted of being its successor, and following in its

footsteps. The degree to which the world has gained power over Christianity is shown more than in all this, in the fact that, having been accustomed to the conflict with the un-Christian world, Christianity can no longer dispense with its society. It is no more enough to have to do with Christians alone; but, as acid tends to unite with a base, the Christian spirit of this age seeks to combine with its opposite. All that Christianity had ever opposed reappears now, united in Islam in a rejuvenated form. Heathenism, Judaism, and Christian heresy were the teachers of Mohammed. What they gave their pupil was fused by him, in the spirit of a Roman world-conqueror, into one doctrine, which is entirely of this world, so that all the various traits which the Apostolic age had ascribed to Antichrist are united in Islam, the true Anti-Christianity. An encounter with it, the Antichrist, becomes a general desire, all the more because by that means the most priceless of all relics, the tomb of Christ, which has hitherto been lacking, may be obtained, and the most beautiful province, the Holy Land, be made subject to the sceptre of the Holy Father, and thus meritorious works of every sort be performed. It was therefore the universal wish of Christendom that the head of the Church declared to be the will of God, when he uttered the call to seek salvation by plundering the treasure which Antichrist possessed.

§ 180.

Philosophy, as self-consciousness of the mind, must likewise have its crusades. They show us scholasticism as it learns wisdom from anti-Christian philosophers. It is no longer satisfied with drawing upon Alexandrianism and Neo-Platonism, permeated with Christian ideas, nor with learning from Aristotle only that which passed as quite immaterial in antiquity and in the Christian age, namely, the rules of rational thinking. There arises the desire to incorporate in scholastic philosophy the entire content of pure Greek wisdom, which Aristotle,—who may therefore be called the arch-heathen,—had concentrated in himself (*vid.* § 92); so that now he obtains the honourable name of *magister* or *philosophus* in an eminent sense, since the men whom the Church looks upon as her *magistri* accept him as their teacher. At the same time, they do not fail, as Philo and the Church fathers did, to realize that

they have to do with a wisdom whose source is entirely different from that of the doctrine of the Church. This is, on the contrary, especially emphasized; for, as if Aristotle were not un-Christian enough, Mohammedan and Jewish commentators are obliged to unlock the true sense of his teachings. As the heathen is called the "*philosophus*," the most irreligious of Mohammedans is called the "*commentator*" *par excellence*. It is as surprising that the Church permitted, and later demanded, that its teachers should sit at the feet of Anti-Christians in order to learn wisdom, as it is that it spurred on believers to dangerous contact with the enemies of the faith. First in its period of glory can the representatives of scholasticism be called Aristotelians. Inasmuch as this took place through the influence of the Oriental Peripatetics, we must first consider these teachers. Since, however, they concern us here only as the teachers of the Christian Schoolmen, the sense which the first translators of their works made out of them is of more importance to us, even when it is incorrect, than that which has been shown by modern study of the sources to be the truer meaning of the original. And thus works of which the Christian Schoolmen knew nothing, even though they may have been the most important, must, since they remained without influence, be assigned a minor position in comparison with those works whose influence was felt.

A.—MOHAMMEDANS AND JEWS AS FORERUNNERS OF THE CHRISTIAN ARISTOTELIANS.

THE ARISTOTELIANS IN THE ORIENT.

Aug. Schmölders: *Documenta philosophorum Arabum*. Bonn, 1836. The same: *Essai sur les écoles philosophiques chez les Arabes*. Paris, 1842. Abu-'l-Fath' Muhammad asch-Scharastani: *Religionsparteien und Philosophenschulen*, übersetzt von Th. Haarbrücker. Halle, 1850-51, 2 vols. Munck: *Dictionnaire des sciences philosophiques*. Paris, 1844-52, 6 vols. The same: *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe*. Paris, 1859, Moritz Eisler: *Vorlesungen über die jüdische Philosophie des Mittelalters*. Wien, i. Abth. 1876, ii. Abth. 1870. M. Joël: *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie*, 2 vols. Breslau, 1876.

§ 181.

A syncretism like that of Islam, moreover a reactionary attempt such as its view of the world is over against the

Christian view, contains no seed of development; nor does the philosophy of those who belong to it. The mission of both is to keep pre-Christian ideas living in order that they may prove a spur and an animating force in the conflict with the Christian spirit. After this has been accomplished they perish. The persecution of the philosophers by Justinian mentioned above (§ 130, 5) drove them first to Persia, then to Syria. Here, in the sixth century, translations of at least some of the analytical works of Aristotle begin to appear, as well as of his commentators, especially the Neo-Platonic. In connection with the prosperity which the Caliphate of Bagdad enjoyed under the Abbasides, this place became speedily the centre of scientific studies. Galen, translated some time before, drew attention to Plato and Aristotle. The Nestorian physician, Honain ben Ishak, often cited later as Johannitius (809-873), compiler of the celebrated *Apophthegmata philosophorum*, and his son Isaac, both of them equally versed in Syriac and Arabic, translated into both languages the works of Plato, Aristotle, Porphyry, Themistius, and others; as did also another Nestorian, Costa ben Luca, to whom Albertus Magnus ascribes an original work, *De differentia spiritus et animæ*, which, according to Jourdain, still exists in manuscript. They are soon followed by others who translate the Greek authors into Arabic, usually through the medium of the Syriac, but often directly from the original. Through them is formed gradually the school of the so-called "philosophers," that is, of the more or less dependent paraphrasts of an Aristotelianism combined with Alexandrian ideas. Although the purely Arabic speculations which arose only from religious necessity may have had more originality, these Aristotelians mentioned have alone had a lasting influence upon the course of philosophy. Looked upon by their countrymen with distrust, they found early recognition among the Jews, whose school at Sora, in the neighbourhood of Bagdad, gained celebrity under Saadju and others. (Compare the work of Moritz Eisler, mentioned above.) In accordance with the worldly tendency of Islam, Aristotelianism retains, here much more the character of worldly wisdom, and remains, therefore, in spite of the introduction of emanative Alexandrianism, nearer its original form than in many of its Christian followers.

§ 182.

The line of philosophers is opened by Abu Jussuf Jakub Ibn Isaak al Kindi (ALKENDIUS), who was born in Basra probably at the very close of the eighth century, and died towards the end of the ninth. He was thus a contemporary of Erigena (*vid. supra*, § 154). He is called the "Excellent one of his century," the "Only one of his age," the "Philosopher of the Arabians," etc. Flügel has supplemented the notices given by Casiri (*Bibl. arab. escurial. i.*, 353 ff.) by the translation of the register, given in the Fihrist, of all of Alkendi's works. Almost all his works mentioned there,—two hundred and sixty-three in number, of which thirty-two are upon philosophy,—have disappeared. From their titles, however, it is clear that there was scarcely a province in which he was not active. Logic appears to have absorbed him especially; and he seems to have been no slavish translator, but an independent paraphrast. Mathematics he regarded as the foundation of all learning, natural science as an essential part of philosophy. Roger Bacon and Cardanus (*vid. infra*, §§ 212 and 242) esteemed him greatly, the latter indeed on account of his assertion of the unity and universality of the world, by reason of which the knowledge of a part contains that of the whole. To him is ascribed also the revision of an earlier Arabic translation of a very enigmatical work. This is later commonly called *Theologia Aristotelis* because Aristotle is introduced as speaking, and as citing some of his own works. Thomas Aquinas mentions its fourteen books as not in his time translated into Latin. He does not say in what language the copy which he used was written. That which later writers have read out of Thomas upon this subject, they have first read into him. Franciscus Patritius, who appends a Latin translation of this work to his *Nova de universis philosophia* (Venet. 1593), says that the translation was made from the Italian. He explains the work, however, as the mystic theology of the Egyptians and Chaldeans, as it was propounded by Plato and taken down by Aristotle after he had given up his hatred for Plato. The agreement with Plotinus is often verbal. Between the first originator and the *intellectus agens*, however, is always inserted the *verbum*, which, as *conceptum*, threatens to coincide with the former, as *expressum*, with the latter. The treatise of Haneberg (*Sitzungsberichte der*

Münchener Akademie, 1862, pp. 1–12) promises so much that its suspension is greatly to be regretted.

Cf. Flügel: *Al-Kindi genannt der Philosoph der Araber*. Leipzig, 1857.

§ 183.

Abu Nasr Muhammed Ibn Muhammed Ibn Torkhan, called al Farabi (ALPHARABIUS) from the province where he was born (the names ABUNAZAR and AVENNASAR also occur), died in the year 950. Casiri (ib. i. 190) gives a detailed register of his works. He is said in his thorough, logical works often to have followed Alkendi. His encyclopædia is most celebrated; but in addition to that, he undertook investigations upon all sorts of subjects, partly in commentaries upon Aristotle, partly in independent works. The report that he strongly emphasized the agreement of Plato and Aristotle points to Neo-Platonic influence. Even his opponents ranked him very high. The Christian Aristotelians quote him very often; and his commentary upon Aristotle's *Analyt. post.*, which is cited as *De demonstratione*, has exercised a great influence upon their logical development. A Latin translation of his works, or more correctly of two of them, *Alpharabii, vetustissimi Aristotelis interpretis opera omnia*, Paris, 1638, 8vo, is now very rare. Schmölders has lately translated a part of his works from the Arabic. A proof of the distrust with which these philosophical efforts were looked upon, is the fact that they concealed themselves in the obscurity of a secret society. The fifty-one treatises of the "Sincere Brethren," which were written in the second half of the tenth century, and of which Dieterici has translated a few, are the product of Aristotelianism coloured with Neo-Platonism, and soon after their composition found their way to Spain. It is interesting that in them branches of science are treated which we at least learn nothing of from Aristotle, for instance mathematics and botany.

Cf. F. Dieterici: *Streit zwischen Mensch und Thier*. Berlin, 1858; *Naturwissenschaft und Naturanschauung der Araber im zehnten Jahrhundert*. Berlin, 1861; *Die Propädeutik der Araber im zehnten Jahrhundert*. Berlin, 1865; *Die Logik und Psychologie der Araber im zehnten Jahrhundert*. Berlin, 1868; and *Aristotelismus und Platonismus im zehnten Jahrhundert nach Chr. bei den Arabern (Vortrag bei der Philologenvers. in Innsbruck)*.

§ 184.

1. Abu Ali al-Hussein Ibn Abdallah IBN SINA (AVICENNA) is universally regarded as the greatest of the Oriental philosophers. He was born in Bokhara in 978, lived in various places, and died in Ispahan in 1036, after winning a reputation as a physician and philosopher which has lasted for many centuries. Most of his works were translated before the end of the twelfth century. The Venetian edition, published in 1495, characterizes them as *opera philosophi facile primi*. Casiri (ib. i., 268 ff.) mentions a multitude of writings of which many are lost. Among these is the *Oriental Philosophy*, with which Roger Bacon was acquainted, and which, according to Averroës, was somewhat pantheistic. The work of Scharastani contains an accurate presentation of Avicenna's logic, metaphysics, and physics. The influence of Alfarabi is very apparent, especially in his logic. Only a part of this, treating of the five universals of Porphyry, is extant in a Latin translation, said to be from the hand of the Jew, Avendeath. The most interesting point is, that the question which was touched upon by Porphyry only in passing (*vid. supra*, § 128, 6) in this work receives its answer; not only the *genera* but all *universalia* are *ante multitudinem*, in the Divine understanding namely, and also *in multitudine*, as the actual common predicates of things, and finally *post multitudinem*, as our conceptions abstracted from things. And thus, if we examine the various modifications more carefully (cf. Prantl. ib. ii. 350 ff.), we see that the strife between realism and nominalism was settled in the Orient before it had burned out in the Occident. Really settled, for when all the contestants are held to be not only (as by Abelard) wrong, but also right, it is foolish to strive further. In addition to this fragment from one of Avicenna's larger works, there are extant two outlines of logic, one in prose, of which P. Vattier published a French translation in Paris in 1658 and one in metre, of which Schmölders gives a Latin translation in his *Documentis*. An old edition of his work *De anima* (*Papie impressum per magistrum Antonium de Carchano s.a.* designates it as *Liber sextus naturalium*. It forms a part of a course of instruction in philosophy addressed to a pupil, and was preceded by elements of physics in five books, and was to be followed in the seventh and eighth books by a treatment of plant and animal life.

After these eight books, which complete the discussion of natural science, the author promises to treat in the next four the *scientiæ disciplinales* and then the *scientia divina*. Finally, something from the *scientia de moribus* is to conclude the work. In how far this plan was carried out I cannot tell. The book which lies before me treats of the soul in general.

2. Passing from logic, which among the Arabs is only the tool of science, to science itself, we find placed at the head the absolutely Simple, which shuts out all mere possibility, and therefore does not admit of definition—the absolutely necessary and perfect, whose nature pre-supposes existence. This is the good after which everything strives and by which it becomes perfect. It is at the same time the true, since its existence is the most absolute certainty. Without impairing its unity, it is at the same time the process of thinking, the one thinking, and the thing thought; and in thinking itself it thinks all things, whose ground it is by its nature, not by design. This is to be limited in so far as only that which is general, *i.e.*, changeless laws, can form the subject of Divine thought, and not the accidental, for then a change would be introduced. Opposed to this, which is completely abstract (*χωριστόν*, according to Aristotle), is *materia* or *hyle*, to which belongs mere possibility as a predicate. Related in like manner to existence and non-existence, it needs, in order to exist, another which shall give the preponderance to existence. Matter, which is not corporeal stuff, but non-existence, limit, is the principle of all defect, therefore of lack of order, of beauty, of perfection. That which lies between the two consists of the intelligible, the form, and of the sensible, the matter, or, what is the same thing, there is to be distinguished in it possibility and existence. There is a single exception which is formed by the active understanding, this first efflux from the necessarily existent. In this, since it thinks the original one and itself, exists the first manifoldness, without which there would be an endless line of unities, but not a corporeal world, since unity can produce only unity. Since the active understanding has its possibility in itself, but derives its existence from the Original and the One, it ranks, in spite of its complete immateriality and perfection, below the latter, which is therefore often called the "More than perfect."

3. As the active understanding, which proceeds from the Original, receives from it unity, in the same manner emana-

tions from the understanding itself receive from it twofoldness. Therefore the heavenly circles consist of matter and of form, that is, every sphere is animated by a soul. In each one, however, since it is an emanation from a thinking principle, an intelligence also appears which Avicenna often designates as an angel. To these is attributed a perception of the particular, and thus through them the particular comes to the knowledge of the Deity, which, as such, knows nothing of it. All the heavenly circles have as their common ground that which was first caused, the active understanding, and therefore do not proceed from each other. The heavenly circle, however, which embraces all the others (whether the heaven of the fixed stars or the crystal sphere above it, remains undetermined), is the mover of those beneath. As regards its own motion, it is not natural in the sense in which the mounting upward of fire, etc., is, for this consists only in a struggle to pass from a foreign abode into its own element; but the heavenly sphere, on the contrary, is stirred by the immanent soul, which craves for the original ground which encompasses it, and therefore endeavours to approach every point of it. This craving is shared also by the souls of the lower circles. The aim is here as everywhere self-unmoved *movens*. The heavenly circles do not show the perfect and eternal, but nevertheless that which is satisfying and sempiternal. The realm of the unsatisfying and temporary begins below the latter. This explains the title *sufficiencia* of one of Avicenna's works. In the realm of the temporary, motion in a straight line shows itself, the spatial manifestation of the struggle to reach its own place by the shortest way. The distance from the natural state is the measure of this movement.

4. From the two active qualities, cold and warm, and the two passive, dry and moist, are deduced, as the possible combinations, the four elements, which can pass over into one another on account of the matter lying at their base. In the earth they lie in strata one above the other; only elevations and depressions modify the natural order. Fire, transparent as air and coloured only by smoke, forms above the four atmospheric strata a higher one in which the fiery meteors take their rise. The form of the rainbow is mathematically explicable but its colour not. From the vapours shut up within the earth not only earthquakes receive their explanation, but likewise the origin of metals, a co-operation of the stars being

assumed in the latter case. The metals, again, play a very important part in the formation of those bodies which attain life by the addition of a soul. The author's conception of the soul, with its three grades with their peculiar functions, agrees almost verbally with that of Aristotle; but the distinctions are carried further by means of more extended, mostly dichotomous, divisions. The senses are considered at length; and since in the fifth four separate sensations are distinguished (warmth, softness, dryness, smoothness), eight senses are often spoken of. To them is to be added the inner or common sense, which Avicenna often designates in conjunction with them by the Greek word *φάρρασια*. In addition to this, the estimating or judging powers, as well as the recollecting power, belong to the *anima sensitiva*. By means of certain fine substances, the *spiritus animales*, the various functions are connected with separate parts of the brain. In the rational soul of man, originating with the body but outliving it, because produced by other, immaterial causes, are distinguished the acting, and the knowing or speculative powers. The latter is able to occupy itself with the universal forms deduced from matter. In that connection are to be distinguished the stages of planning, of preparing, and of performing (*intellectus materialis s. possibilis, præparatus s. dispositus, finally in actu*). In order to obtain an actual knowledge of the former, there is needed an infusion of that which was first caused, the active understanding, which is also called general because it works in all rational souls. This illumination, which comes often in dreams, often in waking hours (if suddenly, as *raptus*), is a necessary condition of all knowledge. Its highest grade is prophecy, which is often united with visions of the imagination. A contradiction between rational knowledge and the teaching of the (highest) prophet is therefore impossible. Purifications of the soul, ascetic practices, prayer and fasting, by which man frees himself from evil, that is from limitation, are the preparations for that infusion in which the understanding, to the degree in which it perceives all, becomes an intelligible world. This apprehension of the world and of its grounds is the blessedness which constantly increases.

§ 185.

Two generations after Avicenna, Abu Hamid Muhammed

Ibn Muhammed AL-GHAZZALI (ALGAZEL) occupies the same position which was pointed out in § 174 ff. as that of John of Salisbury and Amalrich of Chartres. This shows that the speculative spirit among the Arabs had exhausted itself with Alfarabi and Avicenna. Philosophy declares bankruptcy in passing over into scepticism and mysticism. Casiri, Schmölders, and especially Gosche, give accurate accounts of Algazel. He was born in the year 1059 in a small town, Ghazzalah, which belonged to the Persian city Jûs. He was first thoroughly instructed in the Shafitic theology, then, after busying himself many years with Aristotelian philosophy, became a teacher in Bagdad in 1091, but finally devoted himself wholly to Sufism, and died in monkish seclusion in Jûs in the year 1111. He was thus a contemporary of William of Champeaux. His strong desire, from his youth up, to secure a knowledge of the most various opinions, betrays the spirit of a compiler rather than of an original creator, and thus encyclopædia and logic were always his strongest points. The war of philosophical opinions disgusted him with philosophy, and from this resulted his celebrated work *A Refutation of the Philosophers* (*Destructio philosophorum*), which for a long time was known only through the reply of Averroës (*vid. infra*, § 187), until Munck obtained direct information in regard to it from Hebrew manuscripts. Algazel regards philosophy only as a preparation for theology; as appears from his work *The Reanimation of the Religious Sciences*, which was especially prized by his countrymen. Hitzig supplied the first reliable information in regard to this in the year 1852. A work written shortly before his death reveals Algazel's entire intellectual development, and shows how he came at last to divide all knowledge into such as is beneficial or harmful to religion. The work is translated by Schmölders in his *Essai*, pp. 16 ff. His earlier, particularly his logical, writings, like his ethical "Scales," were highly prized, especially by the Jews, and were therefore speedily translated into Hebrew. In Latin appeared in Venice, in 1506, *Logica et philosophia Algazelis Arabis*, translated by Dominicus, Archdeacon of Segovia, and printed by Peter Liechtenstein. The first two sheets of this unpagéd work contain an outline of logic. The reputation of the work is shown by the fact that Lully, as late as his day (*vid.* § 206), composed a *Compendium logicæ Algazelis*. After the outline of logic follows the

Philosophia in two books, so that metaphysics, the *scientia divina*, is first treated, and then the *scientia naturalis*, a method which Algazel himself declares to be an innovation. In the introductory division of philosophy into *activa* and *theorica*, each of which is subdivided into three parts, the three theoretical sciences are designated as *scientia divina*, *disciplinabilis*, and *naturalis*, or as *philosophia prima*, *media*, and *infima*. Since all doctrines are represented only as opinions of the "philosophers," Munck is perhaps right when he asserts that this work does not contain Algazel's own opinions at all, but is a presentation of those which he intends to refute, and is therefore properly the first part of the *Destructio*. Makâzid (aims) and Tehâfot (fighting) are closely connected in the Hebrew version. The impulse which was given to many of his countrymen by his *Reanimation* remained without significance for the development of philosophy. Moreover, the earnestness of his scepticism was early doubted.

Cf. R. Gosche: *Ueber Ghazzâlî's Leben und Werke*. Berlin, 1858.

THE ARISTOTELIANS IN SPAIN.

Ernest Renan: *Averroës et l'Averroïsme*. Paris, 1852.

§ 186.

The tenth century was the golden age of Spain, especially of Andalusia. Unparalleled religious toleration gave rise to a great number of high schools, in which Christians, Jews, and Mohammedans taught at the same time. Libraries increased rapidly, and even a reaction of blind fanaticism was unable to suppress the impulse toward science when it had been once aroused. As philosophy withers in the Orient it blossoms up in Spain. Abu Bekr Mohammed IBN BADJA (AVEMPACE), a contemporary of Abelard (*vid. supra*, § 161), teaches under the impulse received from Algazel, but in opposition to his later scepticism and mysticism. He was born in Saragossa and died in the year 1138. Among his works, of which Wüstenfeld gives a list (*Geschichte der Arabischen Aerzte und Naturforscher*, Göttingen, 1840), his "Conduct of the Hermit" has become famous. In this, as in other works, it is maintained that by the natural advance from presentation to thought, etc., man is in a position to attain a knowledge of ever purer forms. It is easy to under-

stand that this assertion was condemned as irreligious. The "Goldsmith's Son" (Ibn-al-Cayeg) was repeatedly called an enemy of religion. In some points he anticipates the teaching of Averroës, who on his side esteems scarcely any one more than him. Also in his polemics against Algazel he is the predecessor of Averroës. The same character, *i.e.* rationalistic in contrast with Algazel, is shown by a follower of Avempace, Abu Bekr Ibn Tofail (sometimes called ABUBACER, sometimes TOPHAIL), who was born in a small city of Andalusia and died in Morocco in 1185. He was thus a contemporary of John of Salisbury (*vid. supra*, § 175). His philosophical romance, "The Natural-Man," is in the opinion of Schmölders a translation from the Persian, while others regard it as original. It has been published in Latin by Pocock (*Philosophus autodidactus*), and in German by Eichhorn, from Pocock's Latin edition. The author seeks to show that, without any revelation, man is in a position to attain to a knowledge of nature, and through it to a knowledge of God. Whatever is found in the positive religions above and beyond his natural religion, is in part a sensuous veiling of truth, in part accommodation. Since both are necessary for the uneducated and the weak, Abubacer, in spite of his rationalism, is an enemy of all religious innovations.

§ 187.

1. Abu Walid Muhammed Ibn Achmed Ibn Muhammed IBN ROSCHD (AVERROËS) was a friend of Abubacer, and was so familiar with the writings of Avempace and of his Oriental companions that many things which they had discovered have been ascribed to him by admiring posterity. Of the numerous corruptions of his name which Renan records, many, as the common one just given, have arisen from his patronymic, as for instance Aven Rois, Abenruth, Liveroys, Benroyst, etc.; others from his given name, as Membucius, Mauvitiis, etc. He was born in Cordova in the year 1120, and died, as a physician, in Morocco in the year 1198. During his life he was a part of the time a physician, a part of the time a supreme judge, now on most intimate terms with the reigning monarch, and again almost an exile on account of a breach of etiquette. In every position, however, he busied himself with philosophy, and thereby brought upon himself the hatred

and persecution of his countrymen. A list of his writings is given by Casiri, and a more complete one by Renan in the work mentioned in § 186. His (shorter) paraphrases, as well as his (medium and larger) commentaries upon Aristotle's works, have procured for him the cognomen "Commentator." These writings were early translated into Latin, and are found more or less complete in the old Latin editions of Aristotle, first in the edition of 1472. They are given most fully in the Venetian editions apud Juntas, of which that published in 1552, xi. vols. fol., is regarded as the best. This contains, in the *first* volume, the commentaries (in part medium, in part larger) upon the *Organon*, an epitome *In libros logicæ Aristotelis*, and eighteen *Quæsitæ varia in logica*; in the *second* volume, the paraphrases on rhetoric and poetics; in the *third*, his exposition of the *Nichomachian Ethics* and his paraphrases on Plato's *Republic*. The *fourth* volume contains a *Proœmium* as well as the larger commentaries and the exposition of the *Physics*. The *fifth* contains running commentaries upon *De Cælo*, *De gen. et corr.*, and *Meteor.*, as well as a paraphrase of the first of the three. The *sixth* contains paraphrases of *De part. anim.*, commentaries upon *De anima*, paraphrases of *Parv. natur.*, and of *De generat. anim.* The *seventh* contains nothing by Averroës, but the *eighth* his running commentary upon the whole of the *Metaphysics*, with the exception of Book K, which was unknown to him, and also an epitome *In librum metaphysicæ Aristotelis*. The *ninth* and *tenth* volumes are composed of independent works of Averroës, and contain nothing by Aristotle himself. In the former are contained *Sermo de substantiâ orbis*, *Destructio destructiorum philosophiæ Algazelis*, *Tractatus de animæ beatitudine*, *Epistola de intellectu*; in the latter, the medical work *Colliget*, *Collectanea de re medica*, commentaries upon Avicenna's *Cantica*, and the treatise *De theriaca*. The *eleventh* volume contains no writings either of Aristotle or of Averroës, but treatises of Zimara (*vid.* § 238, 1), which aim at solving apparent contradictions in the works of the two. In addition to the writings mentioned, this edition contains also the work of Gilbert, *De sex principiis* (*vid.* § 163), the work *De causis* (*vid.* § 189), and remarks of Levi ben Gerson (Gersonides) against Averroës. Many of the works named here have also been published separately. Of some there exist more than a hundred editions, while others have never been printed. Some are very likely lost, and some

hidden among the manuscripts of great libraries. Munck and Renan mention some of these, which comprise Arabic originals as well as Hebrew translations of such works as have probably perished. Among the latter was reckoned for a long time the treatise on Philosophy and Theology, which however was translated from the Arabic into German by Marc. Jos. Müller in Munich, shortly before his death, and was published in 1875 from manuscript left by him. The work is extant also in Paris in Hebrew. Unfortunately, the preface is omitted in the translation. Possibly the translator did not get to it, although he refers to it in the course of his work. If the work was actually written by Averroës, it is plain that he accommodated himself to a serious extent to the religious ideas of his countrymen.

2. Averroës' veneration for Aristotle is so great as to be almost worship. He doubts whether that which this "Ideal" could not find can ever be found. He blames Avicenna also because he so often, instead of following the positions of the master, began anew *quasi a se*, and was followed in this by others to their own injury (*De anim.* III., *comm.*, 1430). In accordance with this, Averroës' polemics against those mentioned is due almost wholly to the fact that he comes to other results simply by a different exegesis of Aristotle's works. He asserts, that since many of these works are lost, it is often necessary to take as authority conclusions drawn from his assertions instead of his own words. But wherever Aristotle speaks, his words are not paraphrased (as was done by Avicenna and others), but are verbally quoted, and then followed by a commentary which explains and proves sentence by sentence. One of the points, according to Averroës, in which Avicenna departs from Aristotle to the damage of the truth, is in regard to the origin of things. Here the doctrine that the forms are applied to matter is plainly an approach to the creation from nothing, as that is taught by the three religions, and among the Aristotelians by Joh. Philoponus (*vid.* § 146). In Averroës' opinion all these really do away with nature, and put in the place of its continuity new and merely sporadic creations. Aristotle long ago discovered the truth in this matter; and since him philosophy sees, in that which is called creation by those referred to, merely a transition from possibility to actuality. In eternal matter all forms exist potentially. They do not need to be first brought to it; but the forms are rather

drawn from it, according to the teaching of truth and of Aristotle, who by motion understands nothing else (*Met.* 12, *comm.*, 18). This actualization, therefore, which proceeds naturally from one, and which is not at all power, but only *actus*, brings to matter nothing new, so that strictly speaking no change and no increase takes place in being. All that exists potentially (*potentia*, which is to be sure something else than the merely being conceivable, *possibile*) must at some time become actual (*De anim. beat.* fol. 64), and therefore it is already actual, that is necessary, for him who stands in the midst of eternity where there is no past and no future, that is for the philosopher, just as for the eternal mover (*Extractor*), who takes in with a single glance (*subito*) whatever he regards. For this reason, among other questions the frequently agitated one, whether disorder has preceded order or *vice versâ*, has no sense. The same is the case with the question as to whether the world has progressed or retrograded. That the extraction of the actual from the potential cannot be an arbitrary act, lies in the very nature of the case. This is nevertheless expressly asserted in opposition to Avicenna.

3. In the *Metaphysics* of Averroës the *extractio* of the forms, in his *Physics* the passage which discusses the doctrine of heaven, distinguish him from his predecessors. Here also he prides himself upon his return to original Aristotelianism when he eliminates the active understanding which Avicenna had placed between heaven and the original mover. He eliminates it in this connection only; in another place it will be seen to occupy a prominent position. According to Averroës as well as Aristotle, the all-embracing heavenly sphere (*orbis, corpus caeleste*) strives after the extra-spatial unmoved by which it is surrounded. This sphere cannot be matter consisting of elements, for it has no opposite; but since it shows that *desiderium*, it must be thought of as intelligence, as of like nature with the soul, and as sharing with other souls the *virtus appetitiva*. Heaven, being in no way compounded, is without origin and permanent. Its daily revolution is the only motion of the fixed stars which are inserted in it, and which consist of the *quinta essentia*. With the planets it is different. The heaven of the planets (*corpora caelestia*), within the one heaven and concentric with it, have, in addition to the diurnal revolution, a motion of their own, and to this must be added that of the various epicycles. For the same reason that heaven must be an in-

telligence, there must be also *orbis* or *corpora cœlestia* included within it which strive after it, and therefore know of it. Since all knowledge is determined by the thing known, there follows the oft-repeated principle, that the lower always thinks of the higher, the *causatum* of the *causa*, and concerns itself about it, while the reverse never takes place. Therefore the first mover thinks himself alone; the heaven, on the other hand, thinks both itself and the first mover, but does not concern itself with the *orbis Saturni* which it sets in motion, and whose object and goal of desire it is. Passing from this still further down to the sixth (Jupiter) sphere, etc., we finally reach the *intelligentia (motor) lunæ*, which of course sets in motion no lower sphere, since the earth is the fixed centre of the world. Here then the system of cosmical motion closes, a system so complete, according to Averroës, that the least increase or diminution would result in the stoppage, that is the destruction of the whole. Since this is impossible, the sum of the motions is unchangeable. The commentary upon *Ar. de Cælo* and the *Sermo de subst. orbis* contain these doctrines.

4. As regards the earth, Averroës holds that the sun and all the stars contribute to its life and growth, especially by their warmth, which works more energetically in these ethereal beings than the warmth of earthly fire. In the series of living beings, man occupies the highest position, since he alone is capable of perceiving pure (*abstractæ*) forms. That which gives him this capacity, the intellect, occupies in the teaching of Averroës so peculiar a position between cosmology and psychology that it constitutes, beside the *extractio formarum* and the doctrine of the *corpus cœleste*, the third point which one is accustomed to think of in speaking of Averroism. Aristotle's distinction between *νοῦς παθητικός* and *ποιητικός* had given rise to strifes among subsequent thinkers, as to whether both or only one or neither of them were organic powers (that is, joined to an organ), and therefore perishable; whether they were individual, etc. Averroës believes that he finds contradictions in the master himself in regard to the *νοῦς παθητικός*, and in order to remove them considers it necessary to draw sharper distinctions than Aristotle did. The latter, according to Averroës, takes the word *intellectus* often in so broad a sense that it includes also the *imaginatio*, and then of course it is natural that it should appear as an organic power, and that it should be called *patiens*, *passivus*, etc. Among the

propositions of Aristotle, however, which concern this *intellectus patiens*, are some which are quite correctly used of the *intellectus* in the stricter sense of the term; that is, of the *intellectus materialis*. This, as the one side, joined with the *intellectus agens*, as the other, gives that which has been the object of attack on the part of Averroës' later opponents, and which, according to Averroës, should alone be called *intellectus*. Against this, as against the *intellectus universalis* and the *unitas intellectus*, these opponents have always directed their polemics. This lowest of all intelligences is related to the *motor Lunæ* (the *intellectus agens*), as the form of the heaven of the fixed stars is related to the prime mover, as the soul of the Saturn heavens is related to the mover of the heaven of the fixed stars, etc. It can hardly be designated otherwise than by the modern expression, *Erdegeist* (earth-spirit); but here, since man is the only being on earth possessed of intelligence, the spirit of man is to be thought of almost exclusively. This, as eternal as mankind, with whose destruction (impossible, to be sure) he too would come to an end, unites, in the individual man, its two sides, to form the *intellectus adeptus*, which acts both as *intellectus speculativus* and as *intellectus operativus*. The individual is then its subject during his life. His death does not destroy the speculative spirit, for, although Socrates and Plato are not eternal, philosophy is. The temporary union (*copulatio*) of this general human understanding with the individual man takes place by means of its lower part, the *intellectus materialis*. This, as intellect, has to do with forms lying in itself, and therefore does not suffer, but nevertheless only with material forms, while the above, *i.e.* the *intellectus agens*, has to do with the perfectly pure, abstract forms, and hence is often called *intellectus abstractus*. Averroës compares the *intellectus materialis* with sight, the *intellectus agens* with light. If the former were conditioned by the coloured substance (*coloratum*), it would be passive. But since the colour (*color*) is its object, and this is not substance but form, it is active in relation to it. From the canon given above, it is manifest that human intelligence, as the lowest, will be the widest in scope. At the same time, as sublunar intelligence, it is the most limited, in so far as it has intuitive knowledge of sublunar things alone, of all that lies above only an indirect knowledge. (These statements are taken in part from the commentary upon Bk. III. of *De anima*, in part from the *Epitome*

in libr. met., and in part from the *Libell. de connex. int. abstr. et hom.*)

5. The view that the human race is immortal, while the individual partakes of immortality, as Plato and Aristotle say of animals, through propagation alone—(the philosopher continuing to live in his doctrine)—does not appear to Averroës to be dangerous to morality. On the contrary, it is the best protection against that servility of conduct which has in view only rewards and punishments. The wise man acts without regard to such things, impelled by the love of virtue alone. Averroës acknowledges that there are weak persons who need the common religious ideas. An attack upon these is all the more out of place because it is often found, when the matter is considered more carefully, that that which the philosopher recognises as true is concealed under figurative expressions. The work translated by M. J. Müller, which was mentioned above, considers at length those who, being incapable of grasping the apodictical proofs, are referred to the dialectical (probable) and rhetorical (parenetic) grounds. It is shown also how a philosophical sense can be drawn from many expressions of the Koran by means of allegorical interpretation. Accommodation is carried still further here than in the *Destruct. destructt.*, where the apologetic tendency better explains it if it does not justify it. These writings are least calculated to give a knowledge of true Averroism.

§ 188.

In Spain also the Mohammedan philosophers found less acceptance with their brethren in the faith than with the Jews. Among the former, the princes who persecuted philosophy were always the most popular. The latter had already reached, in Southern France, a high grade of culture by the help of schools of all kinds. Under the Moorish rule in Spain they enjoyed a hitherto unheard-of toleration. A common language and intermarriages contributed to their advancement, so that soon not even chairs of instruction were closed to them; and thus, contemporaneously with the Moors, perhaps even before them, scientifically trained Jews pursued further the lines which were followed in Bagdad. Munck in Paris proved, in 1646, that the work *Fons vitæ*, so often quoted in

the Middle Ages, was written by the Jew SALOMON BEN GABIROL (AVICEBRON), who was born in Malaga. His Songs for the Synagogue are very celebrated. He was born in 1020, and died certainly before 1070. That which Munk held to be a Hebrew translation of this work, hitherto regarded as lost, he has since shown to be an extract from it made by Joseph Ibn-Falquera. His translation of the work is accompanied with a careful reproduction of its line of thought. The Mazarine manuscript *De materia universalis*, of which Seyerlen has given an account (Zeller's *Jahrb.*, vol. 15), appears to be a more complete Latin revision. In five books in the form of a dialogue, it is shown that the contrast between matter and form, which is the same as that between *genus* and *differentia*, rules the material as well as the moral world, but that above this contrast, as well as above the world, stands the being of beings. Above the Neo-Platonic series of hypostases, nature, soul, and intellect (*vid.* § 129, 2), and below the Deity, Avicebron places the will or the creative word, which is endless in its nature, temporary only in its activity (because it has a beginning); while with the intellect the reverse is the case. This is quite peculiar to Avicebron, and is in agreement with that taught by the *Theologia Aristotelis* (*vid.* § 182). The will, to which Avicebron devoted a special work, stands, as God does, above the contrast between matter and form, and is therefore not to be defined, nor to be grasped in ecstatic intuition. In the intellect, on the other hand, not a particular portion but common matter, matter in general, is united with form in general, or the content of all forms, in a simple substance. Avicebron, in deducing general matter and form from God, connected the former with His nature, the latter with His attributes. In consequence, the view that God is to be taken as the material principle of the universe has been attributed to him. The proposition, as well as the view, expressed also by the Arabs, that supersensuous substances are not without matter, was subsequently combated with great energy. Indeed, it can be interpreted scarcely otherwise than as pantheistic. To this is due the fondness of the heterodox for this book, as well as the aversion shown towards it by those who are ecclesiastically inclined. Ben Gabirol is also the author of a collection of sayings ("String of pearls"), and of an ethical work ("Ennoblement of the Character"). The exegete Ibn Ezra, who flourished in the middle of

the twelfth century, is regarded by the Jews as a follower of Ben Gabirol. In regard to him the works of Eisler and Joël, cited in § 181, may also be consulted.

Abr. Geiger: *Salomo Gabirol und seine Dichtungen*, Leipzig, 1867.

§ 189.

It has not yet been determined whether the work *De causis* was written by a Jew or not. This work is also cited as *De intelligentiis*, *De esse*, *De essentia pura bonitatis*. It was translated into Latin by the Jew David, later expounded by the Christian Aristotelians in their lectures, and discussed in commentaries. It was continually cited, and is attached to many translations of the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle (e.g. Ingolst., excud. David Sartorius, 1577). There are many arguments for Jewish authorship. Some of its commentators regarded it as a genuine work of Aristotle; others, a compilation made by the Jew David from writings of Aristotle and of certain Arabs; others, as an independent work of a certain Abucaten Avenam (?); still others, as a later restored work of Proclus. It is clearly of Oriental origin, for it speaks of *alachili*, i.e. *intelligentia ultima* (Prop. 5), asserts that even in the highest intelligence *ylchachim* exists, because it is the contrast between *esse* and *forma*, etc. At the same time, the standpoint of the work is not exactly the same as that of the *Fons vite*, for it maintains much more energetically than the latter, the agreement between religion and philosophy, and characterizes with the greatest emphasis the highest principle as *Deus benedictus et excelsus* and as *Creator*. It contains the gradation of the first cause, which is before all eternity because eternity participates in it (the being), of intelligence, which is with eternity, finally of the soul, which is after eternity but before time, because time demands a counting soul (*vid. supra*, § 88, 1). Again, the work teaches that the nature of the first cause is pure good, that the following principles emanate from it as from absolute rest, etc. All this reveals a fusion of Aristotelian and Alexandrian ideas, which would of necessity show points of contact with the Neo-Platonists (*vid. supra*, § 126 ff.) even if the latter were not directly drawn upon. In fact, the propositions just given are of Platonic origin, while others are drawn from Proclus. The author does not seem to care when, in the course of the investigation (Prop. 18), the order of Proclus,

unum, vita, intelligentia (vid. § 130, 2), replaces the original Platonic order.

Haneberg, in the *Sitzungsberichte der Münchner Akademie*. 1863, p. 361 ff.

§ 190.

1. The works mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs combine Jewish doctrines of religion with Neo-Platonic, and therefore only indirectly (cf. § 126) with Aristotelian philosophy, as this had long been done among the Mussulmans by Alkendi, Alfarabi, and the "Sincere Brethren." In the twelfth century, on the other hand, men appear who appeal directly to Aristotle, that they may gain the support and warrant of his philosophy for their doctrines of religion. In this they are not only counterparts, but conscious imitators of the believers in the Koran who had preceded them. The first to do this, and at the same time the most successful, was Moses ben Maimon (MAIMONIDES). No one can deny that he was influenced by Avicenna, and hence there is all the more reason to class him with the latter. He was born in Cordova on the 30th of March, 1135, and died in Cairo, Dec. 13th, 1204. He is still honoured by his people as almost the greatest of philosophers. A list of his writings is given by Casiri (I. p. 295). Among these should be mentioned the *Tractat. Aboth*, which contains a collection of rabbinical sayings. Moses himself wrote an introduction to it, in which his ethical (Aristotelian-Talmudic) doctrines are developed. Maimonides' *More Nevochim* (*Doctor perplexorum*) however is justly the most celebrated of his works. It was written originally in Arabic, but soon translated into Hebrew, and later by Buxtorf into Latin. The original text was first published by Munck in 1856, with a French translation and an introduction. This *Guide des égards* shows an able man opposed to all mysticism, who maintains, in addition to the results of Aristotelian philosophy, all that he finds in the Scriptures, because a contradiction between religion and philosophy is impossible. Wherever there appears to be contradiction, it is the result of false exegesis. When the grammatico-historical method does not suffice, the allegorical must be employed, as it had been by the Arabian Aristotelians. The work is divided into three parts. After a critical sifting of the names of God, the doctrine of the Divine attributes is discussed, in connection with which the

reader is warned against applying positive predicates to the Deity, and the anthropomorphism thus approached is combated strongly. This is followed by the division of all existing substance into macrocosm and microcosm. The world and man, however, are not to be thought of as if the former had only the latter as its object. With this is connected a critical comparison of the orthodox doctrines of Jews and Mussulmans. In the second part Maimonides develops the doctrines of the Peripatetics. He agrees with them for the most part, but will not admit the eternity of the world *a parte ante*. He complains in this connection as well as elsewhere that the laws of nature, that is, of that which already exists, are applied to that which precedes, and that thus what is true of production in the world is asserted of the primordial genesis. The third part considers the ultimate object of the world, Divine Providence, evil, and law, which contributes to evil. In the doctrine of providence, the author differs from Averroës in teaching that the Divine foresight, so far as man who perceives God is concerned, has reference to the individual. Otherwise only the general and unchangeable, the genera, come within Divine knowledge. The work closes with observations upon knowledge of God and communion with Him. These bring the author into a position to represent prophecy as, to a certain degree, a natural phenomenon, which can scarcely be wanting when very vivid phantasy and moral purity are joined with great intellectual talent. This is in complete consonance with the way in which Maimonides likes to refer miracles to higher natural laws.

Cf. Geiger: *Moses ben Maimon*, Breslau, 1850. Beer: *Philosophie und philosophische Schriftsteller der Juden*. Leipzig, 1852 (a treatise of Munck, which is again given with the additions of the German translator in the *Mélanges*, mentioned in § 181.) Eisler and Joël, in the works mentioned in the same paragraph.

2. The writings of Maimonides were received with favour, and soon had their commentators. Among these, Schëm Job ben Joseph ibn Falaguera, in the thirteenth, and Is. Abrahanel, in the fifteenth century, were distinguished for their zeal. It is a still greater honour to Maimonides that he influenced others to follow the path opened by him. The chief place among these followers is occupied by Levi ben Gerson (GERSONIDES), who was born about 1288 in Bagnol, in Provence. He was more thoroughly acquainted with the doctrines of

Aristotle than Maimonides, which was due in part to the fact that, instead of following Avicenna, he followed Averroës, and expounded his works. He was just as familiar also with the Biblical and Talmudic doctrines, as his Bible commentaries show. He continued that which Maimonides had begun, and antagonized the opponents of the latter by continuing his teaching, and his friends by adding to it. To point out the agreement, even to the smallest details, of Averroistic Aristotelianism with the doctrines of Scripture, is an affair of the heart to a man who asserts that there is no sphere of knowledge which the Bible has not intended to touch. His *Milchamot* is devoted to this object. Among the few almost timid attempts to improve upon the doctrines of Averroës is the endeavour to rescue personal immortality. Man, who is distinguished from the brute by the natural, bodily disposition to think, possesses a suffering, mortal understanding, since with this disposition to think is joined that which Alexander of Aphrodisias calls "hylic" understanding, and for which the name "Earth-Spirit" was proposed in connection with Averroës (*vid.* § 187, 4). As soon, however, as this understanding becomes "acquired" understanding, by the adoption not only of sensuous, but also of intellectual forms, which are imparted to it by the higher, active understanding, these cognitions make blessed and immortal, and the greater their number the more is this the case. It is natural that Gersonides, a contemporary of William of Occam (*vid.* § 216), should exert no influence upon scholasticism, which was already expiring. His influence upon Spinoza was all the greater. Joël has rendered the service of pointing out this influence on the part both of him and of Maimonides.

Cf. Joël: *Lewi ben Gerson*, Breslau, 1862 (contained also in the work mentioned above).

3. It is natural to compare the advance from Maimonides to Gersonides with the difference between their teachers Avicenna and Averroës. Less apparent but always justifiable is the comparison with the progress of Christian Scholasticism, which begins with maintaining that reason (that is the general ideas of all the educated) is the vindicator of dogma, and afterward proceeds to assign this function to Aristotelianism (*vid.* § 194 ff.). That to which both attain justifies a parallel. The error of Scholasticism in its immature and more natural state, shown in its becoming mystical and sceptical (*vid.* § 174 ff.),