

hope for the much more modest one of exhibiting this reduction in a single example. This example is warmth, which in its deepest basis, is for him nothing else than a shivering movement of the smallest material particles, so that, therefore, motion is the form of warmth. With regard to warmth, this is repeatedly and decidedly expressed. Indications occur in his works that other physical properties are similarly related; they at most, however, justify us in saying that he desired, not that he asserted, that all physical properties might be traced back to what is nowadays called molecular motion. On the other hand, another habit, which is to-day regarded as inseparable from such a tendency, the preference for applying mathematics to physics, is not to be found in Bacon at all. On the contrary, just as Aristotle on account of his teleological views (*vid.* § 88, 1) reproached the Pythagoreans, so Bacon reproaches the mathematicians with destroying physics, because the latter has to do with the qualitative. This disregard for mathematics is one of the reasons why he so little valued the immense discoveries of his age.

10. But even the discovery of the underlying forms is not the end. The latter rather consists in the dominion over nature based on such knowledge. The knowledge of the primitive forms puts us in a position to cause new, secondary qualities to appear. He who should know the basis of all the properties of gold, would be in a position to cause all its properties to appear together, and then he would have gold itself. The final aim of all knowledge is power over nature, and hence it properly aims at the production of *artefacta*. Here also a repertorium of what has been already invented is a condition of knowing what is to be invented. The last problem therefore divides itself into two, and Bacon can give as the *Fifth Part* of his great work a list of things already invented, and as *Sixth*, hints for new inventions. With regard to what he here supplies, he himself admits that it is extremely little. For us the most important point is the consistent practical point of view, which does not make him afraid even where it leads him to treat science like a vulgar handicraft and poetry prosaically. He still believes that he is doing the myths of antiquity great service, when he transforms them into often very frosty allegories of physical and moral theories. Social utility, the advancement of human convenience—this final aim of all human action and motive is

most surely reached by the knowledge of nature, for knowledge is power.

§ 250.

The actual and undeniable facts that when compared with the writings of the Italian natural philosophers those of Bacon breathe more of the modern spirit, and yet that he ignores the discoveries which have proved themselves to be most fruitful for subsequent times, and even their originators (Copernicus, Galileo, Gilbert, Harvey, and others), or at least is less able to appreciate them than the former,—that, further, in spite of his praise of natural science he has exerted on its development no influence worthy of the name—(facts which in recent times have led to such different verdicts on Bacon), can only be harmonised (but then easily harmonised) when we do not attribute to Bacon the position of the initiator of modern philosophy, but see in him the close of the philosophy of the Middle Ages. He has left behind him the standpoint from which natural science subjected itself to dogma and in which she contended against it. Therefore he stands higher and nearer to modern times. But this advance refers only to the relation of the doctrines of natural science to religion and the Church. But the doctrines themselves, even if stripped of their slave's or freedman's cloak, are fundamentally not very different from those which were the outgrowth of the lower standpoint. It is true he says, that previous science is not the true science; but he is unable to put a better in its place, and hence he constantly exhibits this contrast between the justifiable desire to stand in a quite different position from his predecessors, and the inability to expound a natural science which is specifically different from that of Telesius and Campanella. Like the bird which cannot yet fly, which with all its stretching of its wings raises itself at most only a little above the nest, and always falls back into it, so Bacon frets himself to emerge from the mediæval doctrines, amongst which he feels insecure, and again always falls back into them. The great step, by which modern research is distinguished from the ancient and mediæval—that in place of experience, which one undergoes, there is substituted experiment, in which a purpose is kept in view, he only hints at; whenever he tries to fix it in thought, it

disappears from him, or is grasped in a distorted form. The method of experiment, that everything particular in nature is intentionally put away, and only what is a condition of the law is left, he changes into a searching out of negative instances, as if to observe absence were equivalent to causing absence. And again, when in the theory of the prerogative of certain instances over others, he rightly points out that not everything which shows itself frequently or always is therefore a law found by experiment, yet he lacks the positive complement to this, that it is only when the discovered thing is rational, and therefore known *a priori*, that it can be regarded as a law—a want with which also his disregard for mathematics is connected. If he had been able to make more than a verbal distinction between experience and experiment, it could not have transpired, that, in the ascertainment of specific gravity his method should remain so rude, although he knew the process which had been hit upon long before by Archimedes, and shortly before his own time by Porta. The experience and therefore the induction, by which Bacon had chosen to be led, had already been taken as a guide by Telesius and Campanella; but the latter at best know only how to lie in wait for the secrets of nature; accordingly they are unable to confront her with questions to which she must answer, and with, Yes or No. Just as little can Bacon. Indeed his hatred of all anticipations makes him actually forbid experiment, as the experimenter must always anticipate the answer. The parallel between Bacon and A. von Humboldt, which in the study of Bacon's writings often obtrudes itself, and is often drawn, overlooks the circumstance that the latter not only noticed gaps in knowledge, but also filled them, and, further, was able to lay down definite problems by which they were filled, and for that reason, moreover, was able to place himself *en rapport* with every aspiring mind; while, by reason of his position, Bacon had no intercourse with the contemporary founders of modern natural science, and only sought the help of those who were already dead, *i.e.*, of books. His comparison of his own method of action with that of a judge who weighs the testimony for or against, is characteristic; he does not dare compare himself either with the eye-witness or the police spy. In short, the saying of Erasmus about Seneca (*v.* § 107, 3), holds good here: measured by the standard of the Middle Ages Bacon appears modern, by that of modern

times he appears mediæval. But to say this implies that his merit is no small one. He gathered together the fruits of mediæval natural philosophy; he gave it, in the second place, an entirely secular character by rejecting in the study of it all ideal ends, whether the honour of God or the satisfaction of the thirst of knowledge, and put in their place prosaic industrial aims. It would appear that a man of the world in both the good and bad sense of the word, was best fitted to carry this out. But certainly an English origin and the early breathing of the atmosphere described in an earlier section were essential moments in the development of this standpoint, which can, to be sure, boast that it is quite different from any hitherto, and yet stands to that of modern times almost in the same relation in which the saying of Protagoras, "Every man is the measure of all things," had stood to that of Socrates, "Man is the measure of all things" (*v.* § 64, 1).

C. (cf. § 240).—POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS.

H. Fr. W. Hinrichs: *Geschichte des Natur- und Völkerrechts, etc.* 1848-52
3 Bde.

§ 251.

While secular learning in the form of natural philosophy makes the macrocosm the exclusive subject of its treatment, with others, likewise turned away from the hitherto dominant divine learning, interest tends towards the microcosm. The investigation of the laws of that world whose component parts are not elements or constellations, but men, whose moving powers are not heat or cold, but passions and inclinations, now becomes the main object, and if in the former sphere the whole of philosophy was gradually subordinated to physics, a perfectly similar subordination here takes place with relation to the *jus naturæ et gentium*. The three different attitudes of secular philosophy to the Church and to the Christian religion have already been mentioned above (§ 240); the theory of Natural Law and the Science of Politics of this period, also pass through the ecclesiastical, anti-ecclesiastical, and non-ecclesiastical stages. The only distinction between the method of advance here and that in the case of the philosophy of nature is, that the break with the Church and hatred of her, enters earlier in this case. In the development of Political Philosophy,

the man who corresponds to Bruno (*v.* § 247) in the development of the philosophy of nature, stands almost as near the beginning of the period, as Bruno does to the end. A result of this is, that indifference towards the Church enters earlier upon the scene, and exhibits a greater number of intermediate stadia. When the political philosophers of ecclesiastical tone refer back to that break with the Church and discountenance it, their standpoint becomes reactionary; but where it is unknown to them, their ecclesiasticism is unbiassed and naïve, and even when living subsequently to the leader of the break with the Church, they must be treated of before him. This disregard of the historical order is rendered more possible, as the revolt against the Church had for its instrument a practical statesman, whose theory as such was not set forth; but has only subsequently been gathered from his practical counsels given with reference to local and temporal conditions.

§ 252.

THE ECCLESIASTICAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS.

C. von Kaltenborn: *die Vorläufer des Hugo Grotius*. Leipz., 1848.

I. It was involved in the nature of the case, considering the respect in which Thomas Aquinas was held in the Church of Rome, that those who persevered in the unaltered Romish doctrine, and who for that reason may be called the OLD-CATHOLIC political theorists, should not abandon the foundations which he had laid down (*v.* § 203, 8, 9). Especially so, when, as *e.g.* *Domenicus de Soto* (1494–1560), the author of the *Libri decem de justitia et lege* (printed, Venice, 1588, and elsewhere), they belonged to the order which Thomas had made illustrious. But we must not think of them as merely repeating his doctrines. By a more definite consideration of canonical law there is forced to the front with these successors of Thomas, much more than with himself, one and another determination of Roman law. Still more than among the theologians, who, like Thomas, held especially close to the Aristotelian basis, this naturally takes place with the Jurists, who in particular (like Cicero and other Roman writers) look upon the *jus naturæ* and the *jus gentium* as one, and now seek to bring its definitions into accord with canonical law. The

Jurists Franciscus Connanus, Didæus Covaruvius of Leyva (1517-1577), Albertus Bolognetus (1530-88), author of the treatise *De lege, jure et æquitate*, may here be mentioned as examples of a mode of treating the science of law, regarding which it is quite intelligible that it received the favour of the theologians.

2. The attitude which PROTESTANTS claim to occupy is indeed one of opposition to the Roman, but by no means to the Catholic Church. But considering the attitude which LUTHER took up as against canonical law, and considering the exclusive emphasis laid upon the scriptural principle, their investigations were bound to take a different form from those of the Roman Catholic theologians and canonists. Luther himself rather allowed the matter to rest with occasional expressions on the subjects of law and righteousness, the State and its power. The mystical trait in his character causes him frequently to treat these questions, as being concerned with the outer man, in such a manner, as to make it intelligible how Böhme with his disregard for the world (*v.* § 234) could borrow so much from him; and again his deep respect for authority as decreed by God causes him to use expressions which idolizers of the State have gladly quoted. This is always the lot of rich natures, which are not only one, but many-sided. The position of PHILIP MELANCHTHON is quite different from that of Luther (*v.* § 232, 3). His *Ethicæ doctrinæ elementa*, printed first in 1538, and often subsequently, were long, even in the part which refers to natural rights, of almost canonical authority for Protestants. The chief difference between him and the Roman Catholics consists mainly in the fact that he endeavours to identify the *jus naturale*, that foundation of all positive law, in particular with the Decalogue. This, however, does not hinder him from making use of the Aristotelian investigations of the nature of justice as well as the conceptual definitions of the *Corpus Juris*. The content of Melanchthon's doctrine naturally differs from the Roman Catholic, where the relation of Church and State comes into question. It is not indeed an absolute separation, such as Luther would perhaps for a long time have wished, which he demands; but still a strict separation of the spheres of both, and especially greater independence for the State.

3. In the identification of the *jus naturale* with the commands of the Decalogue, as well as in many other points, JOHANNES

OLDENDORP is an independent follower of Melanchthon. He died as *Professor Juris* at Marburg, in 1561; his collected works having appeared in two folio volumes at Bâle, in 1559. His *Juris naturalis gentium et civilis εισαγωγή* had already appeared at Cologne as early as 1539, and it is to be regarded as the first attempt to establish a system of natural law. The knowledge of the original *jus naturale*, for the extension of which to animals Ulpian is to be strongly censured, was obscured by the Fall and renewed again by means of the Decalogue. As the Greeks borrowed their wisdom from the Hebrews, and the authors of the Twelve Tables had learned from the Greeks, the agreement of Roman law with the Decalogue and natural law becomes intelligible.

4. The Dane NICOLAUS HEMMING (1518-1600), a personal pupil of Melanchthon's for many years, is especially worthy of mention, because in his treatise *De lege naturæ apodictica methodus*—(printed 1562, afterwards often. I know only the Wittenberg edition of 1564)—he claims for natural law a strict form according to the manner of the philosophic sciences, and a derivation from the principles of natural right. The natural law implanted in man by God, making itself heard in conscience, refers just as much to thought as to action. On the one side therefore, there arises a dialectic, on the other a moral philosophy. If it has been recognised as necessary in the case of the former to deduce everything methodically, it is illogical not to do so in the case of the latter. Accordingly a definition of the natural law for conduct must be established (similar to the law of thought in the other case) and the norms for all circumstances must be derived by analysis of all its content. According to the Aristotelian division, ethical, economical, and political life are distinguished, but the first is determined as *vita spiritualis* and set above the other two, as also in the Decalogue, that *epitome legis naturæ*, the first table refers to the *spiritualis*, while the commands which refer to the economic and political life, the household and the maintenance of peace, are found in the second. The obligatory character of all these determinations may moreover be deduced from reason, without appeal to revelation.

5. What Hemming had demanded, BENEDICT WINKLER (Professor of Jurisprudence at Leipsic, died as Syndic of Lübeck in 1648) seeks to give. His *Principiorum juris libri quinque* appeared at Leipsic in 1615, and is really a methodi-

cally thought-out book. Above all things he warns against any confusion of *lex* and *jus*, which are related as *constituens* and *constitutum*, or cause and effect. He treats first of the *lex naturæ*, but secondly of the *jus naturæ*. God is to him the primary and original ground of natural right or law, as of all things. Inasmuch, however, as law arises by means of human freedom and the will, God is only its final cause, and so long as God permits the existence of human freedom, the *causa proxima* of law, God himself cannot change it. In regard to law, however, a distinction must be made between the *jus naturæ prius*, the law, as it would be in an ideal state of man, where it has its basis in love, and the *jus naturæ posterius s. jus gentium*, i.e. the law which results from the nature of man at present, but which therefore also holds among all nations of the present time. The source of the latter is *prudentialia*, and it is related to the former as intercourse with non-friends is to intercourse with friends. To these two there is added as complement, the law defined by the *lex civilis*, which has therefore a positive character; while natural law as the result of the *ratio* which distinguishes man from the beasts, has a rational character. The third book of the work is devoted to the *jus naturæ prius*, the fourth to the *jus naturæ posterius*, the fifth to the *jus civile*, in which it is perpetually reasserted with emphasis that for the teacher of law the good of the individual is of subordinate, that of the State of the highest, interest. In the third as well as in the fourth book it is shown that the legal definitions derived from reason are to be found in the Decalogue, which on that account is also called the compendium (*index*) of natural law.

6. If the standpoint of the Jesuits is here distinguished from that of the old Romanists as NEO-CATHOLIC, this agrees with the task which this Order always recognised as its own—that of reaction against Protestantism. Every reactionary system is, when compared with the good old times, an innovation. But that Jesuitism by its peculiar emphasis of the doctrine of free will, actually introduced dogmatic innovations, and only secured itself from ecclesiastical censure by its accentuation of the papal power, might be admitted by the most orthodox Roman Catholic, provided of course that he did not himself belong to the Order. All three, however, the reaction against Protestantism, the doctrine of free will with

its tendency to Pelagianism, finally zeal for the defence of the papal power, jointly compose an essential moment in the Jesuitical view of law, especially that of the State. When the Protestant writers on natural law always emphasize the divine ordinance of the State; when they willingly put the subject as against the monarch in the relation in which the child stands to a father whom it does not even choose; when, finally, they firmly hold the indefeasible majesty of the head of the State,—the Jesuit writers on State law meet them with most decided opposition. In the interest of the Church they assert the human origin of the State by means of a primitive social contract, and it follows therefrom that where the prince shows himself unworthy of the power with which he is entrusted, the mandate which has been given him may be resumed. On the other hand, the head of the Church, whose origin is from above, cannot be deposed. These fundamental principles, which were publicly expressed by the second General of the Order, Laynez, as early as the Council of Trent, were afterwards more widely applied by Ferdinand Vasquez (1509–1566), Ludovicus Molina (1535–1600), more acutely by Bellarmine (1542–1621), the most harshly by Mariana (1537–1624). With Fr. Suarez (1548–1617) and Leonh. Less (1554–1623) they appear in a somewhat milder form, but not sufficiently so to enable us to assert (as does Werner in his treatise on Suarez [*v.* § 217]), that the theory of the social contract was foreign either to them or to the Jesuits in general. Moreover it is involved in the nature of the case, that the persons mentioned concerned themselves especially with canon law and State law, and on the other hand, neglected civil law and especially private rights. That Campanella could not be discontented with their doctrines (*v.* § 246, 5), is intelligible.

§ 253.

ANTI-ECCLESIASTICAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Leopold Ranke: *Machiavell; besonders über dessen politische Schriften, Anhang zu: Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker von 1494 bis 1535.* 1. Bd. Leipz. u. Berlin, 1824. Gervinus: *Histor. Schriften.* Bd. 1. Frkf. 1833. Rob. v. Mohl: *die Machiavelli-Literatur in s. Gesch. u. Lit. der Staatsw.* Erlangen, 1858. Th. Mundt: *Nicolo*
VOL. I. Y Y

Machiavelli und das Princip der modernen Politik (Dritte Ausgabe, Berlin, 1861). Von Gerbel: *Die Quintessenz von Machiavelli's Regierungskunst*. Dresden, 1865.

1. With all the difference between the treatment of natural law from the (old) Catholic, reforming, and anti-reforming (Neo-Catholic) standpoints, they are still agreed as to this, viz. that the two swords, whether they be borne by one individual or by two, must be used for the honour of Christ. Further, it is admitted in the end by the Protestants also, that the sword of the spiritual power takes precedence of the secular sword, and that the highest duty of the State is that of protecting the Church. Among Protestants, Winkler, although he glorifies human reason more than any one before him, is never tired of calling jurisprudence, *Theologiæ famula*, and the consistories and theological faculties find it quite in the regular order, when the prince demands of them whether he ought to undertake a war. If indeed the general fact that so much consideration is devoted to the State, is a proof that it enjoys much higher respect than in the period of scholasticism, yet so much of what is said in regard to it approximates so largely to earlier views, that it is quite intelligible when we find among the Jesuit teachers some who exerted themselves for the revival of the decaying scholasticism. And yet it was not possible to rest in the view that the Pope allotted the kingdoms. Exactly in cases in which Popes who took a powerful part in secular affairs wear the tiara, must it become clear to the bystanders, that their results are not reached by means of the Key of Peter, but by means of the sword and their allies, *i.e.* that they obey and not dictate the rules of statecraft. But to see this it was necessary to stand close to the machinery of the Roman Curia. It is intelligible, therefore, that in Italy the attempt could first be made, to see the salvation of the State not as heretofore in obedience to the Church, but in revolt against her, and instead of Christianity, which transcends nature and therefore also the nationalities, to make the national principle the determining standard.

2. NICOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, born at Florence on May 3rd, 1469, was already in his 29th year Secretary to the Government of his native city, and continued as such after the expulsion of the Medici. Diplomatic journeys to France and Germany frequently took him away from Florence for con-

siderable periods. The return of the Medici in 1512 deprived him of his post, brought him to the rack, to prison, and finally to the necessity of a life in the country at a distance from all state affairs, and in distressed circumstances. Here originated his *Discorsi* on Livy and his memorial *Del Principe*, the latter written with the expressed object of reconciling him with the Medici. It was only after the death of Lorenzo dei Medici (1519) that he stayed again for a considerable time in Florence; in intercourse with the circle which at that time gathered in the Rucellai gardens the *Discorsi* were finished, and his book on the art of war, as well as his Memoir on the reform of the Florentine government, intended for Leo X., was written. All that he gained from the party of the Medici was that the perjury of the Alamanni should not be visited upon him also, and that Cardinal Julius assigned him the task of writing the history of Florence, and subsequently (as Pope Clement VII.) of fortifying his native city. When in consequence of the occupation of Rome by the Imperial troops, the people again expelled the Medici, Machiavelli had to atone for the peace he had made with them. All activity in the State was taken from him and he died in discontent on the 22nd July, 1527. Of the collected editions of his works, that in quarto of the year 1550 (without place of publication) is the first.

3. It has been called an insoluble problem, that while Machiavelli's *Discorsi* throughout, but especially in his estimate of Cæsar, betray the enthusiast for the republic, he could write at the very same period his *Principe*, and in it impart the means whereby, with or without the observance of republican forms, a dominion of force may be founded and asserted. The solution of the problem is, that he is inspired by one sole desire, the desire of seeing Italy a united State like France or Spain, and if that were impossible, then at least a closely bound confederation,—that he regards it as the task of the politician, not to dream of the attainment of his desires, but to exhibit them as attainable, and that, himself born and bred to diplomacy, he has the courage to admit, what all diplomatists hitherto have only betrayed by their actions, that the end justifies the means. Although, of the five States of which Italy was then composed, Machiavelli admires Venice most, yet the Florentine cannot give up the wish that the unification of Italy should proceed from his own city. To

make Florence, first strong in herself, then the head of Italy, is the object after which he strives. If the Italian people of the present time were in as sound a condition as the Romans were after the expulsion of the kings and before Cæsar, or if they showed as much conscientiousness as the Germans, in whom, among other points, Machiavelli admires the fact (*Discors.*, I. c. 55), that in the free towns of Germany there is possible uncontrolled self-taxation (at the present time only surviving in Bremen) on the citizen's oath, a united Italy in the form of a republic would be possible. At present this is an impossibility, for of all peoples the Latin are the most corrupt, and amongst them, the Italians. Hence the only hope left is that in Florence one man (Lorenzo dei Medici) should possess himself of absolute power. By what means this may be brought about is explained in the *Principe*, and in the course of the explanation, Cæsar Borgia, on account of his ruthlessness in following out his aims, is frequently taken for a pattern. Once Florence has become a military monarchy, in the accomplishment of which it is to be recommended that republican forms, *e.g.* the easily guided universal suffrage, should be preserved, the means of approximation to the ultimate aim are given. For that end the development of the military power is the chief instrument, and in doing so the ancient Romans are especially to be taken as an example. The point in question is, namely, to substitute for the mercenary troops an army of citizens, but on the other hand, so to treat the citizen that when he has served his time in the army, he shall settle down into a quiet civilian. The obligation of all to serve as soldiers for some years seems to be the best means. Machiavelli admits that amid universal corruption the work cannot be done with clean hands. With the statesman the appearance of goodness is more than the reality. The ruler must guard absolutely against those crimes only, which, as experience teaches, universally embitter the minds of the people,—attacks upon private property and domestic honour. If he guards against these, if he never forgets that all men are wicked, and the most of them also stupid, and acts accordingly, he will maintain his position; otherwise not. The histories of Rome, Florence, Venice are especially drawn upon to furnish the weight of evidence for this demonstration.

4. As Machiavelli excuses everything which leads nearer to the goal of his desires, so on the other hand he is obliged

to reject everything that hinders its attainment. Accordingly he rejects above all things the Roman Catholic Church, which is the real obstacle to the unity of Italy (*Disc.*, I. c. 12). The only two ways in which the Church would not hinder this unity, would be: either that the secular power of the Pope should extend over the whole of Italy, or, that it should entirely cease. The latter means leads, as Dante's example shows, to a foreign protector. The former (which in opposition to Dante and Machiavelli, Campanella subsequently prefers) appears to Machiavelli as flat nonsense: thus he persists in an entirely negative attitude towards the Church. Away with her! His political theory is entirely anti-ecclesiastical. Accordingly he disputes the contention that the State is an institution which gives security for striving after the end of the Church, salvation, without disturbance; to him the State is its own end, and its sole problem is to maintain and increase itself. What Machiavelli's method of action shows, his theory also asserts: activity in the service of the State is man's highest task. Hence on the one side, his enthusiasm for the State of antiquity, and on the other side, his approximation to the modern conception of the State. He was really the first for whom, *il stato* designates not as heretofore the condition of a particular people, but the abstract State. Just as Giordano Bruno, on account of his hostile attitude to the Roman Catholic Church, was brought to turn his back, not indeed on all religion, but on Christianity, so it was with Machiavelli. His theory of the State is not irreligious; one needs only to read the 11th chapter in the first book of his *Discorsi*, the comparison of the merits of Romulus and Numa, to see that he is in earnest when he so often calls religion the foundation of the State. But he openly asserts without any timidity, that the religion of the Romans was better calculated to further the life of the State than Christianity, because the former taught manliness and love of country, the latter submission, and yearning for the other world. However, original Christianity may have been better than the present, in which things have gone so far that the nearer a district lies to the seat of the Pope, the less of religion is to be found in it. Christianity in its Roman Catholic form is to him the opposite of true religion, but he knows of no other. But Christianity being the peculiar upholder of all ideal interests, Machiavelli is accordingly brought

by his anti-ecclesiastical and anti-Christian tendency, to renounce all ideals in his political philosophy. He gives a theory of the State, which beyond the maintenance and the increase of the material power, in which the good of the State consists, knows nothing higher. Even the very love of freedom is grounded, according to him, on the fact that it affords more power and wealth (*Dis.*, II. 2).

§ 254.

THE NON-ECCLESIASTICAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS, BODIN, GENTILIS, GROTIUS.

1. The slavish subjection of the State to the aims of the Church by the theologians, the not less fettered hatred of the Church by the statesman, are transcended by those theorists, who, in their investigations of the philosophy of law and politics, do not in any way attack the Church, but allow it to be left behind, and only claim that the State should not be hindered in its action. Still very moderate in this respect are the demands of two men, who speak of one another's work with respect, and whose agreement would probably have been still greater, if the one had not by birth and all his feelings belonged to Catholic France, and the other by free choice had not made himself an English subject and a member of the Church of England. Jean Bodin and Albericus Gentilis point out and pave the way for a third, whose fame so far surpasses theirs, that at the present day they are at best only mentioned as his predecessors. This latter, not always grateful, heir of both, Hugo Grotius, whom an important post in a republic, then that of an ambassador sent from one of the greatest to the greatest statesman of his time, led to many-sided, and his position within his own confession to emancipated, views of State life, makes such an advance as to explain if not to justify his designation as the Father of natural law.

2. JEAN BODIN (born in Angers 1530, died 1597), after residing first as a teacher of law in Toulouse, then as advocate in Paris, finally as a royal official in Laon, comes into consideration here on account of his *Six livres de la République* published in 1577, which he published in a revised Latin edition in 1586 (because the translation published in England

was too full of errors), which he also defended in an anonymously published tract in 1581. It is only in recent times that his *Colloquium heptaplomeres* has been published complete (Noack, 1857), in which a disputation between seven religious parties is made a plea for tolerance. In the very beginning of his work, Bodin declares against all utopian representations of the State, and demands a constant reference to history. He himself complies with this demand to the extent of supporting every assertion by historical quotations, which were very familiar to the author of the *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem*, published at Paris in 1566, and praised by Montaigne. For that purpose he specially makes use of the history of Rome, but also of those of France, Switzerland and Venice. With the same emphasis, however, he demands that the conception of law should be firmly adhered to, but especially that exact definitions of all points should be established. His aim in doing so is to secure the theory of law and the State both against the defence of the traditional as such, and against unclear reasoning. His definition of the State defines it as a community of families regulated by authority and reason. (So in the *First Book*, pp. 1-173, of the Latin translation.) The family, as the first constituent part of the State, is treated first. The father of the family, who as such is an unconditioned lord, loses in meeting with others a part of his freedom, on account of the repressive power which here shows itself, and thereby becomes a citizen, *i.e.* a subject freeman. He complains, as the chief lack of theories of the State heretofore, that the conception of majesty, *i.e.* of enduring power, not bound by laws, is nowhere rightly determined nor properly accentuated. In the monarchy, majesty is the attribute of the prince, whose power is therefore absolute. Conversely, as the power of the Emperor is limited, he is not a monarch, and the German empire is an aristocracy. All rights of majesty, the investigation of which is naturally of the greatest importance, are reduced to the one right of giving laws and receiving them from no one, from which the other rights, such as the power of pardon, are naturally derived. At the same time, the indivisibility of the rights of majesty is expressly asserted. In the *Second Book* (pp. 174-236), the theory is expounded, that according as majesty resides in one, many, or all, the State is a monarchy, an aristocracy, or a democracy. The whole book is pervaded

by a polemic against Aristotle, against whom it is especially made a subject of reproach, that besides these three he adduces other mixed forms of government as sound, to which he, like many others, has been brought by the confusion between *status* and *gubernandi ratio*; a monarchical government may rule in a republican spirit, the difference between a king and a tyrant is not that the former is less independent, but that he subjects himself to the law of nature and of God: the tyrant does not.—The *Third Book* (pp. 237–365) treats of the different offices in the State, and first of all of the senate (an advising body only), then of those who are temporarily entrusted with a commission, finally of the permanent officers of government. The latter are repeatedly denied the right of questioning the justice of the laws; they are permitted to make representations. Only in cases of quite indubitable contradiction of the law of God is disobedience to the decree of the ruler permitted; but Bodin warns for that reason against taking subjective opinions for conviction. Unions of rank and corporations are necessary for the State, although, especially where secret assemblies are allowed, they may become dangerous. The ranking of the different orders of the State leads Bodin to the consideration of slavery, the disappearance of which he regards as desirable without declaring it to be absolutely unreasonable in itself. In the *Fourth Book* (pp. 365–490) the alteration of the forms of State and their decadence are treated. The latter is most surely delayed by prudence and slowness in the alteration of the laws. The replies given to the questions, whether State officers should be appointed for life, for a year, or on recall, whether the monarch should appear in all cases in person, how he and how private persons should conduct themselves in the formation of factions, universally show the man of affairs with a mind sharpened by experience, who, the less he hopes that virtue will everywhere sit upon the throne, seeks so much the more for means to secure it under all conditions. His utterances on the subject of religious sects are interesting. It is a decided error that the State can exist without religion; hence it cannot suffer atheism, just as little magic, which is utter godlessness, and against which Bodin has proved himself very strenuous both theoretically (*Démonomanie des sorciers*, Paris, 1578) and practically. With the difference of religions it is otherwise; here the State is to be so much

the less exclusive, as it can advantageously be. It is to be desired that the State should be divided not by two confessions only, but a greater number should render it possible to hold them all in check by pitting them against one another. The *Fifth Book* (pp. 491-620) treats of a subject which all writers hitherto had neglected, the natural differences of nations, from which there necessarily arise different forms of the State and of laws. It is not only that it is a natural law, that the southern peoples concede the highest place to religion, the northern to power, the middle races to cunning and justice, but within the same climate it is a law of nature that mountaineers should love freedom, etc. Regard must be had to this difference in considering the question whether a State should always be under arms. What may be right with reference to a republic might be false of a monarchy; what necessary for a small mountain land, useless for a larger country on the plain. Considerations on treaties and their guarantees close the book.—The *Sixth Book* (pp. 621-779) begins with politico-economical investigations, in the course of which Bodin shows his intimate acquaintance with the principles of coinage, as he had previously done in a treatise devoted to the subject (*Discours sur le rehaussement et la diminution de la monnaie*). He then passes on to a comparison of the different forms of government, and defines hereditary monarchy as the best, even in degeneracy, for the tyranny of one is much to be preferred to the tyranny of many. The closing chapter commends the monarchical State as the manifestation of true justice, the mathematical formula of which lies beyond the one-sided forms of arithmetical and geometrical relations, and which he designates as the harmonious relation. He reproaches Plato and Aristotle, with not having understood its meaning, and therefore with not having recognised how far above aristocracy, monarchy stands, the most beautiful image of the harmonious All, ruled by One.

3. ALBERICUS GENTILIS, born in 1551 in the March of Ancona, left his native country, perhaps on religious grounds, and came to England, where as Regius Professor in the University of Oxford (according to Bayle) he died on 19th June, 1608. His first treatise was probably the *De legationibus*, as to which he says in the year 1600, that it was written many years ago. (Von Kaltenborn refers to an edition of 1585; I know only of the Hanau ed., 1594. With regard also to his most im-

portant treatise, *De jure belli libri tres*, I am not acquainted with the ed. of 1588, cited by v. Kaltenborn, but only with the Hanau ed., 1612. Although Gentilis in his treatise *De nuptiis* Hanov., 1601, cites the above chief work, the title-page of the ed. of 1612 bears however the words: *nunc primum editi*. He also cites as his own writings: *De maleficiis*, *Disputatio a prim. libr. Machab.*, *De armis Romanis*, *De legitimis temporibus*, *De conditionibus*, none of which I have ever been able to see.) Gentilis distinguishes emphatically between the jurist, and him who promotes the Science of Law (*De nupt.*, I.), and therefore censures those who merely abstract their definition of law from history and dominant custom, instead of deriving it from higher principles. He declares himself against the mere followers of routine and practice as well as against the canonists and theologians, who do not suitably discriminate between what belongs to human and what to Divine law. Accordingly we no longer find him as we do Melanchthon, or even Winkler, regarding the Decalogue as an index to natural law, but he distinguishes: the first table of the law (*i.e.* the first five commandments, according to the Reformed division, not the Lutheran) is to be handed over to theology, on the other hand the second table, the principle of the composition of which is contained in the *non concupisces*, is the subject of investigation for jurisprudence much more than for theology. At the same time there are individual points where jurisprudence decides in ecclesiastical matters, *e.g.* on the crimes of the clergy, some points of marriage law, etc. On the whole, however, one must here be subject to the Church of the land (*De nupt.*, I. 88). Jurisprudence has to fashion its peculiar doctrines neither from history nor from ecclesiastical authority, but from natural law. The latter is founded partly on universal laws of nature, extending beyond the world of humanity, as *e.g.* the right of occupying the ownerless is only the outcome of the law that nature abhors a vacuum (*De jur. belli*, p. 131). But the definitions of natural law are preferably to be fashioned from the nature of man. Now the latter does not demand strife between individuals (*Ibid.*, p. 87), but much rather are we all members of a great body, and therefore meant for society (p. 107). But it is only in society that rights exist, as indeed, too, the *jus civinum* or *religio* entirely concerns association with God. As there exists no true society between man and beasts, so

also rights only exist amongst men (p. 101), hence the Roman distinction between *jus naturæ* and *jus gentium* cannot be maintained. From our destination for society there follows that the proper ethical condition is that of peace, and war is only permitted for the prevention or hindrance of the disturbance of the peace (p. 13). So also slavery, which is properly opposed to nature, is not injustice in the case of those who act against nature (p. 43). The open violation of natural right by cannibals, justifies all nations in beginning war against them (p. 191). So likewise against such idolatry as demands human sacrifice; but otherwise religious wars may not be waged, and tolerance on the part of the State, as demanded by Bodin, is the most correct attitude (p. 71). Only with declared atheists is it another matter; they are to be regarded the same as the beasts (p. 203). As the beginning of a war does not make an end of all rights, so also during a war rights still exist, and even new rights are formed: a war without declaration, with dishonourable weapons, etc., is against the *jus gentium* and the *jus naturæ*. It is also to be regarded as a violation of it, to attempt to close up the sea, which, according to natural law stands open to all (pp. 209, 228, 148).

4. HUGO DE GROOT (better known under the Latin name of GROTIUS), was born at Delft, April 10th, 1583, and equally famed as a jurist and theologian. While Fiscal General at Rotterdam he wrote his *Mare liberum* (Lugd. Bat., 1609), in which he proved from both natural and international law, that no one had the right of forbidding the Netherlands to trade with the East Indies. As *Rathspensionarius* in Rotterdam he was intimate with Oldenbarnevelde, then in 1619 he lost his office, and from that time lived mainly in Paris, at first in a private capacity, later as the Swedish Ambassador, having been nominated to that office by Oxenstierna. Before receiving this appointment, his world-famous work *De jure belli et pacis libri tres* was published, with a dedication to Louis XIII., in 1625. The authorship also of his theological works, the *Annotationes in V.T., in N.T.*, as also of his apologetical treatise *De veritate religionis christianæ* falls in the period of his residence in Paris. On the 28th August, 1645, he died at Rostock, on a journey. His chief work was often printed subsequently. The representation which here follows is founded on the edition *Amstelod. apud Janssenio Waesbergios, 1712.*

5. In the *Prolegomena*, which also includes a critical survey of previous performances in jurisprudence, Grotius praises Gentilis (p. 38) and Bodin (p. 35), but in the further progress of the work, quotes only the latter, although he might well have borrowed much from the former. What he blames in them, as well as in all previous political theorists, is that none of them suitably treats the law which binds nations among one another, and which is based on the nature of man (p. 1), much less, then, expounds it scientifically (p. 30). This noblest part of jurisprudence (p. 32) he desires here to work out, in such a manner as to seek to refer it to certain principles, which no one without doing violence to himself can doubt (p. 39), and further to establish exact definitions and strict logical divisions. The latter, in particular, is necessary in order to the avoidance of the usual error of the confusion of perfectly different things. The first point is that the Science of Law should not be confused, as it is by Bodin, with Politics, the statecraft which only pursues utilitarian ends (p. 57); further, that natural and therefore necessary law should not be compared with the law of a particular nation, nor with what is merely the arbitrary convention of nations (p. 40-41). To this end investigation must especially be made into the proper source of all right. Like everything else, right also has its first foundation in the will of God, and so far every right is *Divinum* and *voluntarium*. At the same time, a distinction is to be made between what God expressly utters as His will in the Bible, and what is the outcome of divinely-willed human nature. Of what God wills in the first manner it may be said: because He wills it, therefore it is good; but of what God wills in the second manner, mediately: because it is good, therefore He willed it (Lib. I. 1, 15). Correlatively, God can alter the first, but the second just as little as that twice two are four (*Ibid.*, 20). To the latter, therefore, must be ascribed a validity independent of God, so that it would be valid even if no God existed (*Proleg.*, p. 71). For the sake of greater definiteness, by *jus divinum* shall be understood only the contents of that which was or still is law, because God has expressly prescribed it, the former in the Old, the latter in the New Testament, and to it is to be opposed human law (*jus humanum*), with which alone the present investigation has to do. Casual quotations from the Bible can never prove that anything is a natural

law ; but, however, it can prove that it is not against natural law, as the two wills of God cannot contradict one another (I. 1, 17). As regards human law in its turn, it is according to its different subjects, personal law or national law (so that therefore by *jus gentium* Grotius understands only international law). With both, however, we must again distinguish that the source of law is either the nature of men and nations, or their pleasure, so that four kinds of distinctions are to be made : *jus naturæ* and *jus civile* ; *jus gentium naturale* (*internum, necessarium*) and *jus gentium voluntarium*, which latter therefore would be the *jus civile populorum* (*Prol.*, pp. 40-41 ; *Lib. III.*, 2, 7). By the neglect of these distinctions, which Grotius is never tired of censuring, it has come about that the pure positive definitions of Roman law have been regarded as natural laws, mere usages of civilized peoples as the rules of the law of nations. For the same reason it has also come about, that reference to utility, which is nevertheless the source of the *jus voluntarium*, has been made the principle of the theory of natural right (*Prol.*, p. 16). As the *jus divinum* is related to the *jus humanum*, so exactly are the *jus civile* and *jus gentium voluntarium* related to natural (individual and national) law : they contain further qualifications for the latter, therefore more than it, and are stricter than it. Accordingly, just as regard to the Divine law would be at least a negative corrective for the treatment of the human, so likewise regard to the *jus voluntarium* may be fruitful for the *jus naturæ*. This holds especially of national law : where certain definitions of national law are to be found among all, or at least all the noblest peoples, one may be pretty certain that they are not contrary to the natural law of the nations (p. 40).

6. By natural right or law is therefore to be understood, the law which is not arbitrarily established by God or men, but which follows necessarily from the nature of man. Only of man, for the definition of the *jus naturæ* received by the Roman jurists is too wide (*Lib. I.*, 1, 11 ; *Prol.*, p. 8). By his proper nature, however, that nature which distinguishes him from the beasts, man who for that reason has the faculty of speech, is destined for society, *i.e.* for quiet, rationally ordered society (therefore to be distinguished from a herd) (*Prol.*, p. 5). Everything therefore which is at strife with such an ordered society of rational beings is unlawful (*in-*

justum), but that which is not unlawful, is called law (*ius*). In this connection it is to be remarked, that this word is used, both to designate the moral condition of the person, and the legal regulations, which secure that condition (*Lib. I., 1, 3, 4, 9*). Whether anything is according to natural law, can be established *a priori*, and *a posteriori*. The former takes place when it is shown that the universal validity of the subject of proof follows from human nature as destined for society, the latter, on the other hand, when from its universal validity we may conclude that it lies in the nature of man. The second method of procedure is indeed more popular, but the first more scientific (*Ibid., p. 12*).

7. In this solidarity of law and society, it is natural that Grotius, where he discusses the origin of law (and he concerns himself with this problem in the beginning of the first book), should begin his treatment at the point at which society has not yet come into existence. The condition of the entirely isolated individual man he calls the condition of nature. In the latter each one has a like right to everything, in so far as everything belongs not to all but to none, a condition which when it has once ceased only recurs in cases of the most extreme misery, and, approximately, in war. To this condition occupation makes an end, by which the ownerless is changed into possession and property, a transformation which that which cannot be occupied, as the air and sea, escapes (*cf. II. 2, 6 ff.*). When that which is thus appropriated is attacked, war arises with defence by force, in which the attacked is justified, both in asserting his own, and in regaining it, and finally in punishing the aggressor. That in return for evil inflicted a man should suffer evil, is a natural law, and therefore in the condition of nature any one may not only guard against, but punish the aggressor. This is altered, when by the voluntary combination of men, those artificial bodies arise, in which unity is as it were the soul (*II. 9, 3*), and of which the most complete is the State in which for that very reason the superiority of the whole over the parts is greatest (*II. 5, 23*). Even if, just because it is a voluntary combination, the individuals are not so dependent as the limbs of a body (*II. 5, 8 and 6, 4*), yet in the State the rights of the individual suffer a very essential modification, inasmuch as the State now acquires the highest power. This does not mean that the people, *i.e.* all of them, have this power, for both equality and

inequality are compatible with the conception of society, and it is very possible indeed, that a people should come to the determination to subject themselves to an individual as head, who then alone possesses the right of rule, the *imperium* (I. 1, 3; 3, 7). In this case the highest power may be conferred temporarily or permanently; hence dictatorship and kingship are distinguished not by the greater power, but by the greater dignity (*majestas*) of the king (I. 3, 11.). Kingship itself, however, may vary, according as the *imperium* is looked upon as a mere property, of which the holder may divest himself (*regnum patrimoniale*), or according as the latter is looked upon as the mere usufructer and trustee (which is now mostly the case); further the power of the king may be more or less limited, it may be quite undivided or divided (*Ibid.*, 14, 16, 17). Which of these relationships may exist, and the extent to which according to it the subjects are justified as against the monarch, depends on the original treaty of subjection, which binds successors, because the nation, even though it now consists of different individuals, has yet remained the same (like a waterfall or a stream), and it must be presumed would have the same will now as then, a supposition which, for the rest, is confirmed by the tacit consent of the people (II. 7, 29). So, in like manner, new circumstances can only be rightly judged when we ask ourselves: How would those who concluded the original treaty have willed in this case? The answer to that question will tell what is right to-day. Exactly in this way, in civil law the right of intestate succession is founded upon the hypothesis that the father, if he had made a will, would have made the son his heir (*Ibid.*, 10, 11). According to this principle, it may not properly be said in the case of an hereditary monarchy, that the *imperium* is transferred, but that it remains in the family originally chosen (I. 3, 10). When the family dies out, the *imperium* returns to the nation, *i.e.* the condition of nature, which obtained before the State contract, re-enters (II. 9, 8).

8. As the State, exactly like the individual, is subject to Law, there arise a number of legal relationships between states, which form in fact the *jus gentium*. The State, like the individual, can, when its rights are violated, take to war, and thus four kinds of war must be distinguished: war of the individual against the individual, of State against State, of the State against an individual and moreover against its own or

foreign subjects, finally of the subject against the State. The three first may be lawful or unlawful, the last can never be lawful (I. 4, 1). To the investigation of what cases justify the one or the other of these wars, in which the guiding point of view is, that the normal condition is that of peace, the disturbance of which gives occasion for war and the restoration of which is the aim of war, by far the greater part of the work is devoted, and from that it has received its name. But the treatment of all sorts of legal relationships is interwoven. Further, moreover, inasmuch as the *jus externum* is very often contrasted with the *jus internum*, and everything is assigned to the latter which is connected with equity, the feeling of honour, and especially the conscience, morality, though not exhaustively treated, is at least marked off in its relation to the theory of law. As has been said, however, the treatment of war is the chief object. As public (State) war has exactly the same legal justification as private (individual) war, the case in which the State uses force, not to ward off an attack, but to punish an attack which has been made, is treated in great detail. As regards the punishment of individuals, in the first place, in the state of nature the evil-doer might suffer punishment at the hands of any one. In the State, the individual loses the right of punishment, and it is properly transferred to the holder of power in the State. The aim of punishment is always the improvement, partly of the punished, partly of the rest of the nation (by deterring them). To those who would regard punishment as retribution, and in doing so appeal to the Divine laws of punishment, Grotius answers: God's justification, in punishing even him who will not improve or has not improved, lies, like the visitation upon children, which man would not dare to decree, in the fact that He is the Almighty who disposes of and rules us according to His pleasure. Men may punish only, as Seneca rightly says, *non quia peccatum est sed ne peccetur*. As regards in the second place relationship to other States, the question is thrown out, whether one State may overrun another in war merely to punish it? Only open violation of the law of God and of nature would seem to give it a right to do so. Hence the State may suppress declared enemies of the "true religion, which is common to all ages,"—as the content of which he mentions the being of God and responsibility for our actions, when they are its own subjects, and when they are not, may

make war upon them. But let those who would extend this to all who are not Christians, consider how many quite unessential doctrines have attached themselves to primitive Christianity, which one dare not force upon any one. In closing it may further be added to this survey, that the work of Grotius discusses in the *First Book* in four chapters, the origin of law, the notion of war, the distinction between private and public war, finally the relation of ruler and subject; in the *Second Book*, which is the most detailed, in twenty-six chapters, the different ways in which war arises; but besides also property, the law of treaties, the law of punishment are treated; finally in the *Third Book* in twenty-five chapters he investigates the question, what is to be observed according to natural law during war, where he treats of the conclusion of peace and agreement, and comes to the result that truth and honesty are the best policy.

§ 255

However great the advance is which Bodin, Gentilis, and especially Grotius, may have made, when they are compared *e.g.* with the Jesuitic political philosophers, or even with Protestants of ecclesiastical sentiment, yet there appears in them a peculiar half-heartedness, which is absent in the latter. Gentilis, who only attained emancipation from the Decalogue to the extent of ignoring the first table and only retaining the second as a normal standard, shows this half-heartedness in its most striking form. But Grotius labours under it scarcely less and is led by it into the most curious contradictions. He proposed to himself to abstract entirely from the revealed word of God, even indeed from God Himself, and to treat of man *in puris naturalibus*, as the earlier expression went. And this natural man, being without any perception of the word of God, is depicted by him, as though he felt the Divine command of Christian brotherly love; for the yearning after peaceful and reasonable society is nothing else. Of the actual man Grotius admits, that his natural tendency leads him quite elsewhere, for the whole *jus voluntarium* tends for him to nothing else than utilities. But in that condition which precedes the formation of States, he must have forgotten his utilities and have aspired only after peaceful society. Can this be called anything else than introducing

under other names, the Biblical doctrine of Paradise and the Fall? His intention is, further, to abstract in his natural law from all history, to treat man as though he were not the child of a special people, therefore in his complete isolation, and yet in regarding the later generations as bound by the original contract, he cannot but think of the nation as a continuous entity (a stream), in which the individual drops receive their positions from the whole. Is this anything else, than in spite of the derivation of the State from the arbitrary choice of the individuals, to place its existence prior to them? He is in the same position here as he is in the case of intestate succession, which he grounds upon the hypothesis that had there been a will the disposition would have gone as was *æquissimum et honestissimum*; but he does not consider that he thereby presupposes an *æquum et honestum* independent of all testamentary dispositions, and that his assertion that in succession to the throne the sovereignty is not transferred at all, but remains in the family, is equally applicable to the property inherited without a will. The very thing that Grotius had denied is always pushing itself to the front with him, and the assertion that injustice (illegality) can only arise in society, is neutralised by the fact, that man by nature, and therefore before the original contract, has rights. All these instances of a want of thorough-going principle will disappear, when in the supposed condition which precedes the State, man is taken to be what he still is to-day, because human nature is one and the same, *i.e.* was then what it is now; and when it is shown, that even the men of the present day, seeking only for utilities, would form a State when they first met one another. With this elimination of a paradisaic nature, theology is for the first time really thrown overboard, but at the same time also every trace of the scholastic treatment of natural law will have disappeared. Instead of what is at least a half theological political philosophy there now appears a physical or naturalistic theory, which, because it entirely ignores history, constructs the State entirely *a priori*.

§ 256.

THE NATURALISTIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

I. THOMAS HOBBS, born at Malmesbury in Wiltshire, on

April 5, 1588, thoroughly instructed at school, was introduced to the scholastic philosophy at Oxford, and thence assimilated certain nominalist principles, which in spite of his opposition to scholasticism remained unshaken. Having journeyed to France and Italy as the companion of a young nobleman in 1610, he became acquainted with the most important men in those countries, and they still further estranged him from the scholastic philosophy. After his return, being especially occupied with the ancients, he became associated with Lord Bacon (only indeed after the latter's fall), to whom he appears to have rendered assistance in the translation of his works into Latin, but from whom he seems to have received in return much scientific inspiration. It is perhaps not an accident, that it was only after Bacon's death, during a second residence abroad, that Hobbes began to concern himself with mathematics, which brought him during a third visit to Paris (1631) into intimate friendship with Gassendi and Mersenne, as well as into contact with Descartes. On his return, the revolution which was already in preparation instigated him to embody his thoughts on the State, in the two English treatises, *On Human Nature* and *De corpore politico*, which, only imparted to a small circle, show us that from that time he experienced no modification whatever in his views. Discontented with the progress of affairs he went back to Paris, and in 1642 caused his treatise *De cive* to be published in a few copies. It was published in an enlarged form by Elzevir at Amsterdam in 1647. It was followed by the *Leviathan* in 1651 (Latin, 1670), after the publication of which, fearing the hatred of the Catholics, he returned to England. Here appeared the *De corpore*, 1655, and the *De homine*, 1658. He himself prepared the first collection of his works in the Latin language. It was published by Blaeu at Amsterdam, 1668. The eight treatises contained in it were printed in a series without recognisable principle. It was only after they were printed that Hobbes expressed the wish that they should have appeared in three parts, of which the first should have contained the *De corpore*, *De homine*, and *De cive*, the second the geometrical and physical essays, and the third the *Leviathan*. As, fortunately, each of the treatises had been paged separately, the publisher could fulfil the wish by an instruction to the book-binder. He afterwards wrote an autobiography as well as a translation of Homer, both in Latin verse. Shortly before

his death his *Behemoth*, a dialogue on the English Revolution, composed earlier, appeared against his will, as Charles II. had not desired its publication. He died on Dec. 4, 1679. Two years thereafter there appeared an anonymous biography (*Carolopoli apud Eleutherium Anglicum*, 1681), the author of which was Hobbes himself according to some, according to others, Aubry, and which was translated according to some by Ralph Bathurst, according to others by Richard Blackbourn. A collected English edition appeared in London, 1750, Fo. In recent times an edition has been prepared by Molesworth (London, 1839-45, 16 vols., of which eleven contain the English and five the Latin works).

2. Hobbes first of all places himself in antagonism to scholasticism, at which he is never tired of girding (*De corp.*, at the close, *Leviathan*, c. 8), by his definition of philosophy, according to which it contains cognitions inferred by mere reason partly from the causes forwards and partly from the effects backwards (*De corp.*, c. 1). For since theology is not sprung from reason, but from supernatural revelation, it is at once excluded from philosophy. The intermingling of the two, of faith and reason, is a sin against both. He who proves faith by reason, is like the sick man who, instead of swallowing the healing pill, chews it to pieces and only gains a bitter taste in his mouth (*De cive*, 17, 4; *Leviath.*, 32). And, again, he who would quote the Bible against physicists or political theorists, forgets that it was not given for the purpose of teaching us of nature or the earthly state, but the way to that kingdom which is not of this world. What is unconnected with this end, Christ has allowed to be set aside (*Leviath.*, 8, 45). So far Hobbes is quite in agreement with Lord Bacon, as, for instance, the comparison with the pill and that with the game (*c. supra*, § 249, 3) come quite to the same thing. His definition of philosophy, however, causes him in the *second place* to contrast it with empiricism; chiefly with that of Bacon, as Hobbes, the admirer of geometry, is not content with its contemner's estimate of induction, but expressly vindicates the philosophic method which is exactly opposed to induction. The whole sixth chapter of the treatise *De corpore* treats of the difference of the *methodus resolutiva* or *analytica* and *compositiva* or *synthetica*, and asserts with emphasis, that both must be followed. Then, however, he sets philosophy in general in contrast to all empiricism. In doing so he anti-

pates much which ought properly to be handled in the second part of his system: the primary origin of all knowledge consists in the impression of things on our organs of sense, which like all actions of impression, can be nothing else than movements. The effect of the object (not its image, for blue, sweet-smelling, etc., have not the smallest similarity to the movements in the object) mediated by the reaction of the organ, we call sensation (*sensio*) or perception (*conceptio*), as to which it must never be forgotten, that it lies entirely in us and is therefore *idea*, *phantasma*, *fancy*, in short something quite subjective (*int. al.*, *Human Nature*, c. 2; *Leviath.*, c. 1). Since all bodies react against impressions, some people are to a certain degree correct, in ascribing sensation to all things. Since by the object of a sensation we must understand its cause, we may indeed say: I see the sun, but not: I see the light; the motion, which imparts itself to my retina, is not seen. According to a universally valid law of nature the affection of the sense organ, when the impression has ceased, must continue, and this echo of the impression is called memory, thought, or imagination. It is so inseparable from the sensation, that it may be compared to a sixth sense accompanying the rest (*Human Nature*, c. 3); it is even the sensation itself, for *sentire se sensisse est memoria*, and without it no sensation would be possible, inasmuch as any one who only saw, and only saw one thing, in which he did not distinguish the seeing from (previous) hearing, the present colour from another (formerly seen), would really perceive nothing at all (*De corp.*, c. 25). The sum of what is found in our memory is called experience, which, the greater it is, is so much the more bound up with the expectation of what has been already experienced, *i.e.*, with foresight or prudence (*int. al.*, *Human Nature*, c. 4), which is not to be denied to the beast; but the beast does not on that account possess science or philosophy. Towards the latter, the invention of words is a great stride, *i.e.*, arbitrarily invented names or signs first for remembrance of things observed (*marks, notæ*), and secondly for imparting them (*signs, signa*), (*Human Nature*, c. 5; *De corp.*, c. 2). Since names designate the objects as they lie in memory, but since they are thus less plainly represented than when they are contemplated, they become signs for many like objects, and acquire the character of universality, which accordingly things never, but words always have (*Human Nature*, c. 5). If the union of

an idea with the proper word be called *understanding*, the latter is also the attribute of the beast, which, *e.g.*, understands a command (*Leviath.*, c. 2). On the other hand, man alone is able to combine the signs with one another or to separate them, a process which when the signs are numbers is called counting, but otherwise thinking, or reasoning. Reason is hence only the faculty of adding or subtracting, and children who do not yet speak, have none (*Leviath.*, c. 5). A combination of words which unites compatible terms, *i.e.*, when what follows from a word is affirmed of it, is a truth, its opposite an untruth or absurdity. Both predicates have only one sense for word combinations or propositions; to ascribe truth to things is to confound essential differences, as the Schoolmen confounded the essence of a king with its definition (*Leviath.*, c. 4). The possession of true propositions is *science*, of very many, *wisdom* (*sapientia*). Science, accordingly, has only to do with the consequences involved in the names of the designated things, and again with what follows from the true propositions, (*i.e.* the propositions which draw these consequences), and thus always with consequences (*Leviath.*, c. 9). Hence experience gives us information on individual facts, and protects us against error; science, on the other hand, gives us general truths, since words are generals, and secures us against absurdities. But since words and propositions are the work of man, we have real knowledge only of that which we have ourselves gone through, and this is the reason why Hobbes places Geometry above all the sciences, and indeed almost looks upon it as the only science (*De hom.*, c. 10; *De corp.*, c. 30).

3. The accurate determination of the meaning of words naturally appears here as the first problem. Their intelligibility is the proper light of the intellect, and intelligible definitions are the beginning of all reasoning (*Leviath.*, c. 5). The compendium of definitions of all those words, of which use is made in all sciences, forms Hobbes' *philosophia prima*. It is therefore not properly correct, when he treats of it in his treatise *De corpore* (c. 7-14), and in the schematic survey of all the sciences (*Leviath.*, c. 9) expressly ascribes it to natural philosophy. As without it the whole division of the system appears purely accidental, the fact ought to have been brought into greater prominence than it has been, that the first philosophy is the common foundation of all the sciences. Here the most

important chapters are the first three (*De corp.*, 7, 8, 9), which treat of space and time, substance and accident, cause and effect. Besides them, the division which treats of quantity deserves remark (c. 12). If, in order to develop the universe from principles, we think away for the moment everything objective, there yet remains with us the reminiscence of something which was objective to us, or existed outside of us; this *being-outside-of-us* we call space, by which therefore is to be understood an *imaginarium* or the mere *phantasma rei existentis quatenus existentis*. Quite in the same manner the reminiscence of movements previously perceived, leaves in us the *phantasma* of movement in so far as it is succession, *i.e.*, time, as to which Hobbes admits that Aristotle had already conceived it in the same manner (subjectively). A host of useless questions, which can never be decided, as for instance, about the infinity and eternity of the world, arose, he considers, only because space and time were regarded as inhering in things. Even if extension in space were determined as that without which objectivity would be impossible, it is hardly to be called a consequence of this, when it is further taught, that everything objective is extended, or a body, to which, because it is independent of us, we ascribe subsistence, and which we call *suppositum* or *subjectum* because it underlies the part of that (imaginary) space with which it coincides. The size or extent of a body, what has been called its real space, determines which part of (imaginary) space, or which place, it occupies. The two are distinguished as the perception and the memory picture of it. The movement or change of place, by means of which the body is never found in one single place, for that would be rest, brings it under the power of time, as size under that of space. This follows, as Hobbes himself says, from his definition of time. Movement is the explanation of everything which we call an accident of a thing, and of accidents, that by which we name a body, is called its essence. If, as customarily happens, we call this chief accident, the form, the substance or substratum receives the name of matter, which therefore only means the same thing as body. If we think of body, and abstract from all size, we get the thought of the *materia prima*, to which of course nothing in reality corresponds, but which is indispensable for thought (c. 8). Connected with this is the reduction of the notions of power and cause to that of mover, and of expression

and effect to that of moved, in which the greatest stress is laid on the fact, that only what is moved and capable of touching, can move, so that the scholastic idea of an unmoved mover, and the supposition of a distant effect, are equally nonsensical. Now, since all the accidents or qualities of things were their effects on our senses, it follows that the scientific treatment of their essences, *i.e.*, of their chief accidents, can only have their movements for object (c. 13), and philosophy is entirely concerned with the corporeal as the only kind of existence. To the objection that spirits nevertheless exist, he responds that incorporeal substances are four-cornered circles (*int. al.*, *Human Nature*, c. 11); to the further objection that yet God exists, he replies in turn, that God is not an object of knowledge and philosophy (*int. al.*, *Leviath.*, c. 3), apart from the fact, that men of great piety have ascribed corporeality to God (*Ans. to Bishop Bramh.*, p. 430). Philosophy therefore is the doctrine of bodies. But again, there are natural and artificial bodies, and as the State takes the highest place among the latter, philosophy is divided into *natural* and *civil* philosophy (Politics); the former treats *de corpore* the latter *de civitate* (*Leviath.*, c. 9, *Table*). The doctrine of man, who is the highest being in nature, and again the founder of the State, is now assigned to the second (*De corp.*, 1), now to the first part (*Leviathan*, c. 9, *Table*), both plainly because Hobbes does not get free from the idea of the Schoolmen, that division must be by dichotomy. If he had always held steadily to the principle which he explains in his first treatise, that philosophy in its three parts treats *de corpore*, *de homine* and *de civitate*, he would not have had the misfortune, in the tabular survey of all the sciences in the ninth chapter of the *Leviathan*, of inserting the arts of building and sailing between astronomy and meteorology, and separated from all that refers to other human *artefacta*. The *philosophia prima* is therefore followed by physics, anthropology and politics, as the three parts into which philosophy is divided.

4. In *Physics* he concerns himself by preference with the part which is more adapted for mathematics. Nine chapters of the treatise *De corpore* (c. 15-24) treat of the *rationes motuum et magnitudinum*, *i.e.* the laws of rectilinear and circular motion, constant and accelerated speed, reflection and refraction, in connection with which the notion of the *punctum* (the infinitely small) has an important part to play. The

distinction which he claims for this part, of strictly proving everything, is not his ambition in the part, which he himself calls *physica*, where he has to do with the qualitative, and which starts with the intention of explaining the phenomena of nature by assumed hypotheses (c. 25-30). He acknowledges that he is the grateful disciple of Copernicus and Kepler, with whom astronomy first began, of Galileo, since whom there has for the first time existed a general science of physics, but especially of Harvey, who was the first to make a science of living things possible. At the close of his *Physica* he declares his willingness to give up any one of his hypotheses, not indeed for the sake of the dreams of the Schoolmen of substantial forms and hidden qualities, but for the sake of simpler hypotheses than his own, and such as contradict as little as they do the principles of the *philosophia prima*. These principles demand that the centre of our planetary system, which sets the earth in motion, should itself be conceived as moving (in a small circle), and further that the movement of the planets should be explained not by a distant influence, but as mediated by the æther, existing between them and the sun, and in itself at rest. If at the same time we regard the land and the water hemispheres of the earth, we can deduce Kepler's assertion of the elliptical path of the earth, and the nutations of the earth's axis. Similarly we shall be able with Kepler to place the attractive power of the sun alongside of that of the magnet, without supposing an influence at a distance, and at the same time we shall be able to explain why the magnet always points to the North. In regard to this, it is only necessary to keep firmly in mind that its attractive power consists in the constant motion of its smallest particles, which, of course through a medium, imparts itself to the iron, and of which the direction is parallel to the axis of the earth. Not only in the case of beings without sensation, but also in the case of those so endowed, all phenomena are only differently complicated movements. Harvey proved that life consists in the circulation of the blood, death in its cessation. The heart, which serves as a force-pump in this process, is itself set in motion by certain small bodies breathed in with the air, which the organism retains, so that the air we breathe out no longer shows the same vivifying influence (*De hom.*, c. 1). Like life, so also sensation is a very complicated movement. Seeing, *e.g.*, with

which Hobbes concerns himself most, and to which he has devoted nine chapters (1-9) of his treatise *De homine*, takes place in such a manner, that the sun, or the flame, *i.e.*, the peculiar self-moving (burning) body, sets in motion the æther which surrounds it, and the unrest (*fermentatio*) into which it falls, sets the retina in motion, and the latter again by means of the fine matter (spirits) in the nerves, sets in motion the brain, from which the motion is transmitted to the heart, the proper seat of sensation, because from thence the reaction begins. Since this reaction proceeding from within outwards brings forth the sensation *blue*, etc., the latter may also arise without any external influence, in a dream, etc. It may be proved in a perfectly similar manner as regards hearing, tasting, etc. This all holds good of the beast not less than of man, hence in the tabular survey of the sciences, optics and music (*i.e.*, acoustics) are reckoned among the sciences which relate to *animals in general*. It is only the investigations with which the following chapter of the treatise *De homine* is occupied, that the survey above-mentioned reckons as relating to the science of man in particular.

5. With respect to *Anthropology*, the theoretical advantages of man over the beasts, *viz.* speech and science (*De hom.*, c. 10), have already been discussed under 2 above. Here therefore there only come under consideration the researches as to the practical circumstances of man, which are classified in the *De hom.*, c. 11, 15, and collected together in the tabular survey of the *Leviathan* under the name *Ethics*. As regards the relation of the theoretical and the practical, he distinctly subordinates the former to the latter. Although he often praises the blessing of knowledge, yet he always thinks a second time and rejects knowledge for the sake of knowledge; its aim is to be that of general utility. Even his pet science, geometry, must accept the position of being praised because it teaches how to build machines. Along with the reaction called forth by the influence of the objects, which engendered sensation, there goes another, which consists in the tendency to experience pleasure, to get rid of non-pleasure, *appetitus* and *fuga*. From its first stir, *i.e.*, the smallest and most inward motion (*conatus, endeavour*) it has a regular gradation up to its most vigorous state when it comes to the point of outbreak (*animi perturbatio*), a gradation which Hobbes describes pretty accurately, and in which both

these motions receive different names. The alternation of different desires is called reflection (*deliberatio*); what in this alternation is finally desired, is said to be willed. The will, which is not the potentiality (faculty) but the act of willing, is therefore the last movement preceding performance. Neither desire nor aversion can be called free; if only because it is the influence, first of the impressions, later of signs and words, and is therefore a passive state of being moved; but in the second place, because it is a logical error to ascribe the word, free, which has only a meaning in the case of subjects, *i.e.*, bodies, to an accident or a movement, such as desire or will is. Only in doing what is willed is one free, but one does not will to will (*int. al. Leviath.*, c. 21). The object of inclination is called good, of disinclination evil. Hence *bonum, jucundum, pulchrum, utile*, mean quite the same thing, *i.e.*, a relationship to a particular subject. To different people, different things are good or desirable. *Bonum simpliciter dici non potest.* But for each man there is a highest good, which is the maintenance of his own existence, and a highest evil, which is death. To seek the former, to protect and by emancipation from all limits to preserve it, and to avert the latter, is the highest law of nature. If now we imagine a number of men together, although the weakest and most stupid can take from the wisest and strongest his highest good, his life, yet they are nearly equal to one another in strength, intelligence, and experience. So likewise, in respect of the fact that each of them can do as he wills as well as the others, they are all equally free. The consequence of this similarity can only be mutual fear, mutual attempts at protection, in short war of all against all, of which the best expression is: *homo homini lupus* (*De cive*, I. 1, 3, 11, *Epist. dedic.*). Now it would be a self-contradiction, if man, to whom nature prescribed to protect himself, persevered in this condition; and since self-preservation is the first law of nature for individuals, so likewise it is nature's first law for a sum of individuals to seek security, *i.e.*, peace (II. 2); from which there springs the further consequence that that which is an indispensable condition of peace, is by that very fact laid down as a fundamental law of nature (I. 15, 1). Both in the treatise *De cive* (cap. 3) and in the *Leviathan* (c. 16) there are set up, in the former twenty, in the latter nineteen, of such fundamental laws, which follow as consequences of the above law of nature, inasmuch as if

treaties were not kept, if gratitude were not exercised, etc., the great final aim would not be reached. In closing, he gives the following as the simplest rule for finding out what to do: Let us always ask ourselves how we would wish that others should do to us. As security is incompatible with the natural freedom of all to do, each as he pleases, it only remains that each one should renounce this freedom on condition that the others do so also. This contract, therefore, is not, as has been said (*i.e.* by Aristotle and Grotius), a consequence of the social tendency or the love of one's fellows, but entirely of fear and care for one's own advantage (*De cive*, II. 4, I. 2). As such a contract would be mere absurdity without the security that others would be prevented by fear from violating it (V. 4), it is only possible, on condition that the power and freedom of all which has hitherto existed should be handed over to one (man or collection of men), under whom all now stand, and who has will and power instead of them (V. 8). By means of this act of subjection, through which government (*imperium, dominium*) takes the place of freedom, what has hitherto been a mere sum (*multitudo*) becomes a real unity, a person who has his will (V. 11). When this subjection is one set up by nature, and only founded upon force, we have patriarchal government, as it meets us in parental power, and in the government of slaves. When, on the other hand, it is self-determined and contracted (*institutiva*), we have a State (*civitas*), the combination in which the condition of nature in which man was free and therefore *homo homini lupus*, gives place to that of obligation, in which *homo homini Deus*. (*De cive, Epist. dedic.*)

6. The *Theory of the State* treats of production, which assumes the chief place; for if man but reproduces the living being in his automata, in producing the State he but produces a giant-man, which we may compare with the: Let us make men! (*Leviath., Introd.*) Just because the State is the work of man, there exists a demonstrative science of it, although it must be admitted, that before the treatise *De cive* was written, not even an attempt at such a science had been made. (*De hom.*, 10, 5; *De corp., Epist. dedic.*) The State is essentially different from the crowd, and it is a misfortune that the word people, which is synonymous with the former, is used by many to designate the crowd (*De cive*, 6, 1). As it is only by means of the *summum imperium* that the crowd becomes a people,

i.e., a personality with a will, so the ruler is to be compared not with the head but with the soul of a body (*Ibid.*, 6, 19); indeed the sovereign is the people, and those who stand under him may not call themselves people, but subjects (12, 8). Inasmuch as in the primitive contract they have all deprived themselves of their power and will, they stand powerless over against the State; it is the Leviathan which swallows them all up, or to speak more respectfully, the mortal God, who like the immortal, rules according to his own good pleasure, and to whom we owe our peace and security (*Leviath.*, c. 17). It is only in and through the State that mine and thine exist, as in the state of nature each man regarded all things as his own and therefore none possessed anything as his own (*De cive*, 6, 5). Since attacks upon property are unlawful, freedom to protect oneself against them, on the other hand, lawful, it is only in the State that lawful and unlawful properly exist. In the state of nature might and right coincide. In the State, on the other hand, unright is what the sovereign forbids, right what he allows. Custom is a source of right only in so far as the sovereign has permitted that anything should become customary (*Leviath.*, c. 29). The laws of the State, since it is the establishment of peace and security, cannot be antagonistic to the fundamental law of nature, to seek peace and its consequences; on the other hand, they are opposed to the natural freedom of all, as limiting it. In general it is a great confusion to take the conceptions *lex* and *jus* as identical instead of contrasted. According as the sovereignty is exercised by means of a majority of votes, by a few, or by one, the State is a democracy, an aristocracy, or a monarchy. Those who desire to speak reproachfully say instead, ochlocracy, oligarchy, despotism. As the contract by which the State first came into existence was one in which the majority compelled the dissentient minority, so it may be said, that democracy preceded all forms of the State in time (*De cive*, 7, 1, 7). For the rest, to the question, Which is the best of these forms? it must be answered, that which actually exists (*Leviath.*, c. 42). Hobbes is never tired of expressing the opinion, that every attempt to change a form of government must end like the attempts at rejuvenescence of the daughters of Pelias. But whichever of these forms may be the existing one in any State, the sovereign has the unconditional right of command, the subject the unconditional duty of obedience, and this relation-

ship, since it was not the individual who concluded the contract with the State, can only cease when, as in the original contract, all individuals, the sovereign therefore included, declare their desire to return to the state of nature or war (*De cive*, 6, 20). War is a survival of the state of nature, even when the State conducts it against the aggressor for punishment. Its aim in doing so is to break down the opposition which it finds, and hence to improve the criminal, or at least others (*Leviath.*, c. 28). In general no distinction may be made between the natural law of men and of peoples. So-called national law is the right, the subject of which is not an individual, but a people, a moral personality (*De cive*, 14, 4, 5). As it is the State only, *i.e.* the sovereign, who gives rights to the subject, it is self-evident, that neither can the former do the latter injustice, nor conversely has the latter rights as against the former (*De cive*, 7, 14). But at the present time there are certain fundamental principles everywhere diffused, which are equally false and dangerous to the State, towards the eradication of which the State must do all in its power, but especially must take care that the schools and universities be not dominated in all things by the doctrine of Aristotle, whose *Politics* is the most dangerous, as his *Metaphysics* is the most absurd, of books (*Leviath.*, c. 46). The widespread error, that the individual possesses property which the sovereign dare not lay hands on, forgets that property only exists in the State, *i.e.* through the sovereign; the not less widely spread nonsense, that the sovereign is subject to laws, does not consider that only his will is law; of the third error, that power in the State must be divided, Bodin alone has seen, that this would destroy the State; a fourth, according to which the people or the people's representatives, are set up in opposition to the sovereign, as if he were not the sole representative of the people, in fact the people itself (*Leviath.*, c. 22), we owe especially to Aristotle, who in his preference for the republican form of State, asserts that only in it is the good of the ruled made the principle; in a monarchy, on the other hand, it is the good of the ruler. This is entirely false; in every form of State, the good of the people, *i.e.* of the State, is the supreme law (*De corp. pol.*, II. 8, 5). No error, however, is so dangerous as that which asserts that the subject may not act against his conscience, and therefore when the latter forbids him any-

thing, may not obey the command of his sovereign. As if the conscience must not much rather urge the maintenance of the primitive contract tending to peace (*De corp. polit.*, II. 6), and as if the ruler, solely and single, were not answerable for the consequences of his commands (*Leviath.*, c. 29 and 16). There is indeed one case in which one does not need to obey, but it is the only one; no one is bound to put himself to death, since self-preservation was the very aim of the formation of the State (*Leviath.*, c. 21).

7. As the politically dangerous doctrine of the right of private judgment has a stronghold through involving the question of *Religion*, Hobbes expresses himself at great length on religion, especially on the Christian religion, and the Church in the mediæval sense. In the *De cive*, chap. 15-17, and *Leviath.* c. 32-47, which are entirely devoted to this subject, it must always be remembered that the speaker is a member of the English national Church. Of the two ways in which God makes Himself perceptible to man, sound reason and revelation by His prophets, the former is sufficient to lead to the expression of reverence based (entirely) on the omnipotence of the Creator of the world, by external signs, words, and actions, under which latter, obedience to the commands of nature takes the first place (*Leviath.*, c. 31). In this cultus religion consists (*De hom.*, c. 14). The State shows that it is a person, by commanding the persons of which it consists to exercise their cult publicly and uniformly. The more experience teaches that nothing disturbs peace so much as difference on this point, so much the less may the State admit that, as it is expressed, it has claims only to the worldly and not to the spiritual sceptre. The spiritual power of the State, which results from sovereignty, and in virtue of which the sovereign prescribes the cult, must be, as people think, incompatible with a religion revealed by prophets, although, indeed, Christ never prophesied to kings, that by conversion to Christianity they would suffer loss in power or rights (*Leviath.*, c. 49). The very opposite must much rather be asserted. The history of the old Covenant shows a complete amalgamation of the spiritual and secular power in Moses, Joshua, and subsequently in the kings, while the prophets only attempted to restrict it in individual instances (*Leviath.*, c. 40). As regards Christ, however, our King, He became the latter only by His completed atonement, and therefore was

not so before His death ; moreover He Himself says, that the kingdom of which He is king, is not of this world ; it will only begin when he shall come to assume the kingly functions in that kingdom in which believers shall live for ever. Till then, He demands of us that we prepare ourselves for that kingdom, by obedience to the laws of the existing State (c. 41). So Christ. Just as God revealed Himself in Moses as *one* person, in Christ as a *second* person, He also revealed Himself in the Holy Ghost, *i.e.* the Apostles and their successors, as a *third* person. (*Persona* taken in its dramatic sense.) By the imposition of hands the office of Christ, to seek to win and prepare souls for the future kingdom, is by them ever further and further propagated. They are therefore teachers, witnesses (*Martyrs*) of that which they have seen, who because their office is to bring to belief, which suffers no compulsion, ought to have no power of compulsion, and therefore in general no power of force at all. Excommunication only excludes from the future kingdom. With the moment in which the sovereign of a State becomes a Christian, the hitherto persecuted community becomes a Church, by which therefore is to be understood a State composed of Christians, in which the subordination under the sovereign is quite the same as with the Jews and heathens. As Constantine was the first bishop of the Roman Empire, so likewise in every State composed of Christians, if it is a monarchy, it is the king alone who for that reason proclaims himself "by the grace of God," while the bishops standing under him, are so called "by the favour of his majesty." The king indeed does not baptize, etc., but only because he has other things to do. The State fixes what scriptures have canonical authority, what cult is to be exercised, and demands in this matter unconditional obedience ; it treats as a heretic, whoever capriciously gives public utterance to his private conviction in opposition to the doctrine authorised by the sovereign (c. 42). None of these doctrines can disturb the man who draws his religious teachings from the Bible, and learns from it, that for admission to the kingdom of heaven only two things are necessary, obedience and faith. The just, it is said, (not the unjust) shall live by faith. The sum of the obedience demanded by Christ is contained in His words: Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, etc. Again, the sum of all faith is contained in the saying,

that Jesus is the Christ, from which the whole baptismal formula may be easily deduced. Thus, if one considers that above (*sub* 5) all natural laws were comprised under one precept, it is clear, that it is impossible that a conflict should arise between the citizen and the Christian; and again, how a sovereign, even if he himself were not a Christian, should come to the point of forbidding his subjects to hope for a kingdom beyond the day of resurrection, but commanding them, till then to obey the laws of the State, cannot be conceived (c. 43). But they are not scriptural believers, who preach disobedience and rebellion, but the children of darkness, who partly do not understand the Bible, partly corrupt it by heathenism, false philosophy, and all sorts of tales and legends. Their chief error is, that they interchange the future kingdom of Christ and a present institution, which calls itself a Church, without being a particular (*i.e.* national) Church, in which consecrations, such as the Sacraments, are transformed into heathen magic, in which instead of the sole Biblical doctrine—that man who by Adam's fall became mortal, has received eternal life by faith, and therefore that after the resurrection unbelievers will first receive their punishment, but afterwards will undergo the second (*i.e.* real) death—an immortality of unbelievers is also preached, and to it fables of purgatory and the like are attached (*Lev.*, c. 44). All these errors, which are indeed very profitable to the Romish clergy, find perpetual nourishment in the fact, that people do not separate the spheres of faith and reason, that all sorts of physical doctrines which yet belong entirely to reason have been introduced into the doctrines of faith, and again, that people pry into faith, without considering, that where a thing is known, faith ends (*De hom.*, c. 14). But above all, these errors are nourished by the Aristotelianism which prevails at the universities and schools. The sole hope remains, that writings like the *Leviathan*, which teach a sound philosophy, should fall into the hands of a powerful prince, and that by him the fundamental principles therein developed, should be more and more introduced into practice (*Lev.*, 46, 47, 31).

§ 257.

CONCLUDING REMARK.

Although the Reformation was designated above (§ 14) as
VOL. I.

the epoch which divides the Middle Ages from modern times, this does not compel us to reckon Böhme, Bacon, and Hobbes, because they lived after it, indeed grew up in the religious conceptions which it caused to prevail, among modern philosophers. The fact that a new principle is made good in philosophy only after it has been made good in other spheres, that when that principle is very important and fertile this often happens very much later, is a consequence of the conception of philosophy (cf. *supra*, § 12), and showed itself in the first beginnings of Christian philosophy, which are separated by almost two hundred years from the appearance of Christianity itself. And again, we are taught not only by the example of Luther, who warred against philosophy, but also by that of Melanchthon, who respected and taught it, that for them no other philosophy existed than the Aristotelianism of the Middle Ages, *i.e.*, of a time, to which they themselves had put an end in the sphere of religion. In all ages there have been such men, whose hearts outran their heads, or, whose hearts burned while their eyes were held fast, so that they knew not who it was that spoke to them; and therefore in and for itself it is no impossibility that children of the modern world and zealous Protestants should not have set themselves free in philosophy from the spirit of the Middle Ages. But that this, which is in itself possible, actually takes place in reference to the three individuals here in question, is the outcome of the content and character of their doctrine. It was mentioned above (§ 119) as the peculiarity of the Middle Ages, that through the opposition to the world the summons to become spiritual, had been transformed into the summons to become other-worldly. Thereby subjection to the world naturally acquires the character of being worldly, which in antiquity it had not had, and therefore, also, secular wisdom acquires the character of worldly wisdom. That modern times have to transcend this opposition, round which the Middle Ages revolve, has already been pointed out in treating of the latter, and will be the immediate subject of discussion in detail. Of any attempt at such transcendence there is no trace in the three individuals named. Böhme, with all his contempt of secular motives and all secular learning, remains no deeper fixed in this mediæval dualism than Bacon and Hobbes, with their contempt for the clergy and for clerical science. The number of historical expositions, in which they are exhibited

as beyond the limit of the Middle Ages, is very great; especially in the cases of Bacon and Hobbes. The main reason seems to be their opposition to scholasticism. But if this is to be decisive, we must be as logically consistent as Ritter, who counts all the names of this transition period as modern. Even if this is to be the guiding point of view, and mediæval philosophy is to be taken as synonymous with scholasticism, the question arises: To what period do the Church Fathers belong? who certainly were as little Schoolmen as Master Eckhart or Böhme, from whom they can only be distinguished by the fact that they were not yet, what the latter were no longer—Schoolmen. The place which is here ascribed to Bacon and Hobbes, namely that they close a period, also explains why, as is always the case with epoch-making systems, a circle of disciples and successors did not at once attach itself to them, but a long period had to elapse before the attention of later and much further advanced generations was directed to them. It is the same as with Nicolas of Cusa, regarding whom this reason might be added to those given in § 225, in order to justify his not being placed at the beginning of a period. Conversely, what was said at the end of that section may here be repeated word for word, in reference to Böhme, Bacon, and Hobbes. A glance back at the course which the philosophy of the Middle Ages has taken, shows that here also, as in antiquity, of the three periods which are separated from one another (§§ 121-148, 149-228, 229-256), the middle period not only shows the most systematic character, but is in general the most important. In it the three sub-periods, which were distinguished (§§ 152-177, 178-209, 210-228) repeat, on a smaller scale the differences of the patristic, scholastic, and transition period, and it need not cause surprise that the first thinker in the youthful period of scholasticism, Erigena, should recall in his philosophising the manner of the Church Fathers, and that the last in its period of decay should approximate to the philosophers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

INDEX TO VOLUME FIRST.

The larger numbers refer to the sections (§§), the smaller to the paragraphs; the asterisks indicate the chief sections and paragraphs. Vol. III. contains an Index to the entire work.

- A.
- Abel 144, 7.
 Abelard 155, 3. 160. 161*. 163. 164.
 165, 3. 167. 169, 1. 2. 173, 1. 175, 1.
 184, 1. 194. 214, 5. 216, 2. 222, 2.
 246, 3.
 Abrabanel 190, 2.
 Abraham 134, 1.
 Abubacer 186*. 187, 1. 200, 5.
 Abucaten 189.
 Abunazar *v.* Alfarabi.
 Achillini 238, 1.
 Acosta 249, 8.
 Adam 114, 5. 156, 7. 8. 195, 8.
 Adam, Brother 175, 1. 214, 5. 216, 1.
 Adami 246, 1.
 Adelard of Bath 160. 191.
 Ægidius Colonna 197, 3. 204, 4. 208,
 8. 214, 3. 217, 3.
 Ægidius of Lessines 204, 3.
 Æneas of Gaza 146*.
 Ænesidemus 102*.
 Agathon 72, 3.
 Agricola 232, 3. 239, 3.
 Agrippa 102, 2.
 Agrippa of Nettesheim 206, 11. 237,
 5*. 242, 3.
 d'Ailly, Pierre 218. 219*. 220, 1. 2. 4.
 221.
 Alanus 167. 170*. 194.
 Alberich 175, 1.
 Alberti 63 Lit.
 Albertus Magnus 194. 199-201*.
 202. 203, 1. 2. 5. 8. 9. 204, 2. 205.
 208, 6. 7. 210. 211. 212, 2. 214, 3.
 4. 5. 215, 220, 2. 247.
 Alcher 173, 2.
 Alcibiades 63, 3. 65.
 Alcinous 237, 2.
- Alcuin 147. 195, 2.
 Alemannus, Herm. 191.
 Alexander, Bishop 140, 2.
 Alexander of Aphrodisias 200, 5.
 Alexander of Hales 194. 195*. 196.
 197, 1. 2. 198. 201, 2. 202. 204, 5.
 212, 2. 220, 2.
 Alexander the Great 83. 108.
 Alexandre 237, 1 Lit.
 Alexinus 68 1.
 Alfarabi 183*. 184. 190, 1. 191.
 200, 1.
 Alfred 154, 1.
 Algazel 185*. 186. 190, 3. 191. 195,
 1. 2.
 Alhazen 212, 5. 6. 7.
 Alkendi 182*. 183. 190, 1.
 d'Allemand 101, 3 Lit.
 Alpetrongi 191.
 Alsted 206, 11.
 Amafinius 96, 5.
 Amalrich 174. 176*. 177. 185. 192.
 220, 2. 3.
 Ambrosius 143*. 144, 1. 147. 154.
 3. 195, 2.
 Amelius 128, 6. 129, 1.
 Ammonius 83 Lit.
 Ammonius *v.* Saccas.
 Amort 231, 4.
 St. Amour, William of 203, 1.
 Anastasius 142.
 Anaxagoras 24, 2. 28, 1. 3. 47, 3.
 49. 50. 51. 52*. 53. 58, 1. 63.
 64. 70. 74, 1. 77, 5. 78, 5. 92. 94.
 Anaximander 24*. 25. 26, 1. 28, 3.
 31. 32, 2. 43, 4. 44. 52, 2. 88, 2.
 Anaximenes 26*. 27. 28, 3. 37. 44.
 52, 1. 192.
 Andreae 214, 10.

Andronicus 91.
 Anjou, Carl of 203, 1. 208, 1.
 Anniceris 70, 3. 74, 2.
 Anselm 155, 3. 156*. 157. 159, 1.
 194. 195, 2. 206, 2. 222, 2. 5. 223.
 Anselm of Laon 159.
 Antimoirus 57.
 Antiochus 101, 3*. 102, 1. 106, 1.
 Antipater 97, 1.
 Antiphon 57.
 Antisthenes 63, 3. 72*. 73.
 Antoninus Pius 134, 1.
 Anytus 65.
 Apollinaris 140, 2. 142.
 Apollodorus 26, 1. 34, 1.
 Apollonius of Tyana 110.
 Apuleius 111. 113, 2.
 Aquila, Julius 147.
 Aquila, Peter of, 214, 10.
 Arcesilaus 80. 101*.
 Archelaus 52, 1. 53. 63, 1.
 Archimedes 250.
 Archytas 31. 32, 6. 110.
 Areopagite *v.* Dionysius.
 Arevola 147 Lit.
 Aristippus 63, 3. 70*. 72, 3. 96, 4.
 Aristo 74, 1. 91. 97, 1.
 Aristocles 74, 1.
 Aristodemus 64, 3.
 Aristophanes 75, 2.
 Aristotle I. 15 Note. 16. 22. 23. 24, 2.
 26, 1. 32, 1. 34, 3. 35. 36, 1. 41.
 48. 49. 51. 52, 2. 61. 64, 2. 67.
 69. 74, 1. 76, 2. 77, 1. 7. 81. 82.
 83-90*. 92. 93. 94. 96. 97, 2. 3. 4.
 98. 103, 2. 112. 114, 2. 127. 128,
 2. 3. 4. 154, 3. 161, 2. 163, 1. 164, 1. 2.
 173, 1. 175, 1. 180. 181. 182.
 184, 2. 4. 187, 2. 5. 189. 190, 2.
 192. 193. 194. 195, 1. 2. 198. 200,
 1. 5. 9. 201, 1. 202. 203, 2. 211.
 212, 2. 3. 4. 8. 213. 214, 3. 215, 1.
 216, 4. 7. 219, 4. 222, 2. 3. 232, 3.
 237, 1. 2. 5. 238, 2. 239, 2. 3. 4. 242,
 3. 4. 243, 4. 246, 1. 2. 247, 2. 248, 4.
 249, 5. 9. 254, 2. 256, 6.
 Aristoxenus 91.
 Arius 137, 1. 140, 2.
 Arnobius 135, 4.
 Arrianus 97, 1.
 Artemon 58, 1.
 Asclepius 83.

Ast 13 Note. 75, 3.
 Asterius 140, 2.
 Astralabius 161, 6.
 Athanasius 137, 1. 139. 140*. 141.
 142. 143. 194.
 Athenagoras 134, 2.
 Atticus 104. 111, 2.
 Augustine 16 Note. 143. 144*. 147.
 148. 154, 3. 4. 156, 6. 158. 165, 3.
 169, 2. 195, 2. 8. 196. 197, 2. 202.
 206, 2. 214, 3. 9. 220, 4. 237, 2.
 246, 3. 248, 6.
 Aureolus 215.
 Auvergne, William of 193.
 Avempace 186*. 187. 200, 5.
 Avendeath 191.
 Avennasar *v.* Alfarabi.
 Avicebron 188*. 200, 5.
 Avicenna 153. 184*. 187, 2. 191.
 193. 195, 1. 2. 200, 1. 2. 203, 2. 5.
 214, 5. 223. 241, 2. 242, 2.
 Averröes 153. 184. 185. 187*. 190,
 2. 191. 192. 193. 195, 1. 199, 1.
 200, 1. 5. 6. 8. 204, 4. 212, 2. 4. 214,
 3. 237, 2. 238, 1. 2.

B.

Baader, Fr. v. 234, 6.
 Bach 231 Lit.
 Bachsmeier 233, 4.
 Bacon, Francis 88, 1. 249*. 250, 1. 2.
 257.
 Bacon, Nicholas 249, 1.
 Bacon, Roger 182. 184. 191. 211.
 212*. 213. 219, 1. 223.
 Baconthorp 238, 1.
 Baguet 97, 1.
 Balentyne 15 Note.
 Barach 158 Lit. 159 Lit.
 Bardesanes 123, 3.
 Bartholmèss 247 Lit.
 Basilides 123, 1*. 124.
 Basilius 141. 195, 2. 3.
 Basingstocke 191.
 Bassolis 214, 10.
 Baumhauer 54 Lit.
 v. Baur 110 Lit. 124 Lit. 216, 7.
 Bayle 13 Note. 239, 1. 254, 3.
 Beatrice 208, 2. 5. 6.
 Beausobre 122 Lit.
 Beauvais, Vincent of 204, 2*.
 Beauvoir, Armand of 217, 1.

- Becket, Thomas à 175, 2.
 Beda 147. 153. 195, 2.
 Bekker, Imm. 103, 1 Lit.
 Bellarmin 252, 6.
 Bendixen 89, 2 Lit.
 Benedict XII. 219, 4.
 Berengar of Tours 155, 3*. 4.
 Bergk 45 Lit.
 Bernard of Chartres 159, 2*. 160.
 162. 163, 1. 3. 175, 1.
 Bernard, St. 161, 1. 5. 163, 1. 169, 1.
 195, 2. 3. 197, 2. 231, 4.
 Bernays 43 Lit. 84. 90, 3 Lit.
 Berthold, Brother 212, 9.
 Beryll of Bostra 137, 1.
 Bessarion 237, 1.
 Beza 247, 1.
 Biedermann, Bened. 233, 4.
 Biel 217, 4.
 Biese 85 Lit.
 Bigne, de la 147 Lit.
 Bindemann 144 Lit.
 Bischof 233, 3 Lit.
 Blanc 208, 2.
 Blyson 43, 1.
 Böckh 31. 32 Lit. 78 Lit. 78, 3. 4.
 Bodin 254, 2*. 3. 5. 255. 256, 6.
 Boëthius (Boetius) 147*. 151. 161,
 2. 163, 2. 165, 2. 175, 1. 195, 2. 200,
 1. 201, 2. 247, 1.
 Boëthus 91.
 Böhm 107 Lit.
 Böhme, Jacob. 234*. 257.
 Böhmer 146. 208, 2. 230, 5 Lit. 6
 Lit.
 Böhringer 140 Lit.
 Bolognetus 252, 1.
 Bonaventura 194. 196. 197*. 198.
 202. 203, 1. 204, 5. 214, 3. 215.
 220, 3. 223.
 Boniface VIII. 204, 4. 208, 1. 8.
 Bonitz 84. 86, 6 Lit. 87 Lit.
 Borgia 253, 3.
 Bouillé Bovillus 237, 5.
 Bradwardine, Thomas 217, 1.
 Brandis 16 Note. 32 Lit. 34 Lit. 64
 Lit. 84 Lit. 87 1 Lit. 88, 6.
 Braniss 13 Note.
 Breier 52 Lit.
 Breul du 147 Lit.
 Brosseus 147.
 Brucker 13 Note.
 Brumley 234, 6.
 Brunetto Latini 208, 1.
 Bruno, Giordano 206, 11. 245. 247*.
 248. 249, 3. 253, 4.
 Brunswick, Julian of 247, 1.
 Brutus 104.
 v. Büнау 246, 1.
 Buhle 13 Note.
 Bulæus 149 Lit. 176. 195, 1. 219, 1.
 Bunsen 135, 3.
 Buridanus 204, 3. 217, 2.
 Burleigh, Walter 214, 10.

 C.
 Cæsalpinus 238, 2. 239, 4. 243, 4.
 Cæsar, 208, 2. 253, 3.
 Cain 144, 7.
 Cajetanus 231, 4.
 Callippus 88, 2.
 Calisthenes 83.
 Campanella 245. 246*. 250. 252, 6
 253, 4.
 Can grande 208, 1.
 Candalla 113, 2 Lit.
 Cantimpré 191.
 Capella, Martianus 147*. 158.
 Capreolus 204, 3.
 Cardanus 182. 242*. 243, 2. 5. 244,
 4. 245. 246, 2. 249, 8.
 Carneades 97, 1.
 Carpocrates 124.
 Carrière 226 Lit.
 Casiri 182 Lit. 184. 185. 187.
 Cassiodorus 147*. 165, 2. 195, 2.
 Cassius 104.
 Cato 101, 2. 104.
 Cavalcanti 208, 1.
 Cavellus 214, 2.
 Cebes 32, 6.
 Celsus 111, 3.
 Cerinthus 122. 123.
 Chærephon 63, 1. 3.
 Champeaux, William of 159, 1*. 2.
 160. 161, 1. 2. 163, 3. 185.
 Chappuis, 72 Lit.
 Charlemagne 152. 178. 227.
 Charles 212 Lit.
 Charles the Bald 154, 1.
 Charmantidas 60, 1.
 Charmidas 101, 3.
 Charmides 63, 3.
 Charpentier 239, 3.

Charron 248, 3*. 4.
 Chasdai 7. Crescas.
 Christlieb 154 Lit.
 Chrysanthius 129, 2.
 Chrysippus 97, 1*. 4. 101, 2.
 Chrysostomus 144, 5.
 Cicero 16. 22. 84. 96, 2. 5. 97, 3. 4.
 101, 2. 3. 105. 106*. 110. 115.
 126. 144, 1. 161. 4. 175, 1. 2. 195,
 2. 206, 11. 239, 2. 3.
 Claudianus 147. 170, 5.
 Cleanthes 97, 1. 4.
 Clemens, F. J. 224 Lit. 247 Lit.
 Clement IV. (Pope) 212, 1.
 Clement VII. (Pope) 253, 2.
 Clement of Alexandria 16 Note.
 34, 1. 113. 123, 2. 136*. 137.
 237, 2.
 Clement of Rome 123, 2.
 Cleon 53.
 Clichtovius 237, 5.
 Clitomachus 101, 2.
 Coelestius 144, 5.
 Colebroke 15 Note.
 Comestor, Petrus 169, 1.
 Commodus 135, 4.
 Conches, William of 155. 4. 162. 175,
 1. 223.
 Connanus 252, 1.
 Constantinus, Emperor 256, 7.
 Constantius Africanus 155, 4. 191.
 Contarini 238, 2.
 Copernicus 247, 1. 256, 4.
 Cornutus 97, 1.
 Costa Ben Luce (Constabulus) 181.
 Cousin 13 Note. 34 Lit. 158 Lit.
 159. 160. 161, 2.
 Covarruvius 252, 1.
 Crantor 80.
 Crates 72, 1. 80. 97, 1. 101, 1.
 Cratippus 91.
 Cratylus 44. 74, 1.
 Cremona, Gerh. v. 191.
 Cremonini 238, 1.
 Crescas 190, 2.
 Critias 57.
 Critolaus 91. 97, 1.
 Cusanus 2. Nicolaus.
 Cyprian 135, 4*. 139. 144, 1. 195, 2.
 Cyril 142.

D.

Dähne 112 Lit.
 Damascenus, Jo. 146*. 173, 1. 195,
 2. 216, 4.
 Damascius 130, 5.
 Damon 63, 1.
 Dante 205. 207. 208*. 209. 210.
 246, 6. 253, 4.
 David, Jew 189. 191.
 David of Dinant 192*. 223 .
 Decker 22 Lit.
 Degerando 13 Note.
 Democedes 31.
 Democritus 47*. 52, 1. 58, 1. 96,
 8. 192. 239, 1. 247, 5. 249, 5.
 Dexinus 34, 1.
 Deycks 68 Lit.
 Dicaearchus 91.
 Dieterici 183 Lit.
 Diodorus of Tyre 91.
 Diodotus 106, 1.
 Diogenes Laertius 16 Note. 96, 1.
 97, 1. 99, 1. 101, 2.
 Diogenes of Apollonia 28*. 39.
 Diogenes the Cynic 72, 1.
 Diogenes the Stoic 97, 1.
 Dion 74, 2.
 Dionysius (jun.) 79, 6.
 Dionysius (sen.) 74, 2.
 Dionysius the Areopagite 146*. 154,
 3. 208, 7. 237, 2.
 Dionysius the Great 137, 1. 195, 2.
 Dionysodorus 57. 60.
 Dioscurus 142.
 Doering 90, 3.
 St. Dominicus, 173, 2.
 Draco 74, 1.
 Dreydorff 237, 3 Lit.
 Duehring 13 Note.
 Dux 224 Lit.
 Dumbleton (Jo.) 214, 10.
 Duns Scotus 194. 197, 3. 204, 5.
 213. 214*. 215. 216, 4. 8. 222, 2.
 247, 2.
 Durand 215. 217, 3.

 E.
 Eber, Paul 232, 3.
 Eckhart, Master 230*. 231, 2. 234, 2.
 257.
 Ephantus 32, 3.

Eisler 181 Lit.
 Elias 134, 1.
 Elizabeth of England 247, 1. 249, 1.
 Empedocles 24, 2. 28, 3. 40, 3. 44.
 45*. 47, 3. 52, 1. 2. 60, 1. 73. 78,
 5. 88, 2. 90, 2. 126. 148. 249, 5.
 Am Ende 233, 3 Lit.
 Engelhardt 146 Lit. 172 Lit. 231
 Lit.
 Epicharmus 74, 1.
 Epictetus 97, 1. 4.
 Epicurus 96*. 107. 1. 2.
 Erasmus 107, 3.
 Erigena 154*. 155. 165, 3. 176.
 182. 194. 205. 222, 2. 224, 2. 3.
 225.
 Essex, Earl of 249, 1.
 Euandrus 101, 1.
 Eubulides 68, 1.
 Euclid of Megara 63, 2. 68*.
 Eudemus 91.
 Eudoxus 80. 88, 2.
 Eugenius IV. (Pope) 224, 1.
 Euhemerus 70, 3. 96, 3.
 Eunomius 141.
 Euripides 52, 1. 63, 1. 3. 65.
 Eurymedon 83.
 Eurystratus 26.
 Eurytus 31. 32, 4. 8.
 Eusebius 15 Note. 113, 1. 127. 128,
 6. 140, 2.
 Eustachius 128, 6.
 Euthydemus 57. 60. 164, 1.
 Eutyches 142. 203, 7.
 Eve 114, 5. 195, 3.
 F.
 Faber Stapulensis 237, 5.
 Fabricius 16 and Note. 103, 1.
 Falaquera, Ibn 188.
 Faustus 144, 1.
 Fechner, H. A. 234 Lit.
 Felix, Minucius 135, 4.
 Feldner 233, 3 Lit.
 Fichte, J. G. 13. 213.
 Fiorentino 238 Lit.
 Fischer, Kuno 249 Lit.
 Floria, Joachim of 176.
 Forchhammer 65 Lit.
 Fornerius 147.
 Foss 60 Lit.
 Franck, Sebastian 233, 3*. 4.

Fredegisus 153.
 Frederick II. (Emperor) 191.
 Frey 58 Lit.
 Fritzsche 135, 4 Lit.
 Fulbert 155, 3.
 Fulco of Neuilly 173, 2.
 Fülleborn 34, 1.

G.

Gaëtano da Tiene 238.
 Galenos 16. 91. 181. 195, 2. 241, 2.
 242, 2.
 Galilei 155, 2. 246, 3. 250. 256, 4.
 Gannaco, Bernard de 204, 3.
 Garve 89 Lit.
 Gass 237, 1 Lit.
 Gassendi 239, 1. 256, 1.
 Gaunilo 156, 4.
 Gedike 16 Note.
 Geel 54 Lit.
 Geffers 101, 1. 2 Lit.
 Gennadius 204, 3. 237, 1.
 Gentilis, Albericus 254, 3*. 4. 255.
 Gerard Odo 214, 10.
 v. Gerbel 253 Lit.
 Gerbert 155.
 Gerson 218. 220*. 223. 225. 231, 4.
 Gersonides 187. 190, 3*. 3.
 Gervinus 253 Lit.
 Gfrörer 112 Lit.
 Gichtel 234, 6.
 Gilbert 250.
 Gilbertus Porretanus 153. 163*. 164.
 166. 173, 1. 175, 1. 187, 1. 194.
 198. 200, 2. 214, 5.
 Gladisch 17 Note. 32, 2.
 Glaser 84. 87, 1 Lit.
 Goclenius 239, 3.
 Godefroy de Fontaines 204, 4.
 Goethals 204, 3.
 Goethe 90, 3.
 Goettling 89, 2.
 Gorgias 57. 60*. 61. 72, 2. 76, 3.
 Gosche 185 Lit.
 Gottschalk 154, 1.
 Gratian 169, 1.
 Gregory 231, 4.
 Gregory VII. (Pope) 155, 3. 219, 4.
 227.
 Gregory of Nazianzus 141. 146. 195,
 2. 3.
 Gregory of Nyssa 141. 154, 3.

Gregory the Great (Pope) 165, 3.
195, 2. 197, 2. 208, 7.
Grial 147 Lit.
Geert de Groot 224, 1. 231, 4.*
Grosch 97, 4. Lit.
Grossetête (Grosseteste), Robt. 191.
212, 1.
Grossmann 114 Lit.
Grotius (Hugo de Groot) 254, 1. 4-8*.
255. 256, 5.
Gruppe 78, 4.
Guido of Ravenna 208, 1.

H.

Haarbrücker 181 Lit.
Hagen 226 Lit.
Hain 195, 1 Lit.
Halevi 190, 3.
Hamberger 234 Lit.
Haneberg 182. 189 Lit.
Hartel 135, 4.
Hartwin 175, 1.
Hase 233, 3 Lit.
Hasse 156 Lit.
Hauréau 149 Lit. 165 Lit. 195, 6.
Hegel 13 Note. 234, 6.
Hegesias 70, 2. 101, 1.
Hegesibulus 52, 1.
Hegesistratus 47, 1.
Heinrici 123, 2 Lit.
Heinze 97 Lit.
Heiric (Eric) of Auxerre 158.
van Helmont 241, 10.
Heloise 161, 1.
Hemming 252, 4*.
Hensen 52 Lit.
Hennequin 247, 1.
Henry of Ghent 214, 2. 215.
Henry II. Emperor 227.
Henry VII. Emperor 208, 1.
Henry II. of England 175, 2.
Henry III. of France 247, 1.
Heraclides Ponticus 80.
Heracleon 123, 2.
Heracitus 34, 1. 40, 3. 42. 43*. 44.
45, 1. 46. 58, 1. 2. 63, 1. 82. 88, 3.
97, 2. 134, 1.
Herbart 106, 2.
Herennius 128, 1.
Hermann, C. F. 75, 3. 101, 3 Lit.
Hermann, Conrad 13 Lit.
Hermann of Tournay 159.

Hermarchus 96, 5. [237, 2.
Hermes Trismegistus 113, 2.* 195, 5.
Hermias 83.
Hermias (Philosopher) 118.
Hermogenes 63, 3.
Hermotimus 52, 1.
Hervæus Natalis 203, 2. 204, 3.
Hesiod 24, 2.
Hestiaëus 80.
van Heusde, 76 Lit.
Hilaire, Barthélemy, St. 89, 2.
Hilary 141. 143*.
Hildebert of Tours 159, 1.
Hildenbrandt 98, 2 Lit.
Hilgenfeld 123, 3 Lit.
Hincmar of Rheims 154, 1.
Hipler 146.
Hippasus 31. 32, 6.
Hippias 57. 61*. 76, 3.
Hippo 22.
Hippocrates 241, 5.
Hippodamus 89, 2.
Hippolytus 16 Note. 123, 2. 135 a*.
Hiquæus 214, 2.
Hirsche, 231, 4 Lit.
Hjort 154 Lit.
Hobbes 256 1-7*. 257.
Hock 155, 2 Lit.
Hofmann, Melchior 233, 3.
Holkot 217, 3.
Holzherr 107 Lit.
Homer 43, 2.
Honein 155, 4. 181.
Huber 131 Lit. 154 Lit.
Hugo of St. Victor 162. 164. 165*.
166. 167. 169, 1. 2. 172, 1. 2. 175, 1.
194. 195, 2. 3. 196. 197, 2. 4. 198.
220, 2.
Humbert 204, 4.
Humboldt 250.

I.

Ibn Ezra 188.
Innocent III. (Pope) 219, 4. 227.
Irenæus 123, 2. 135, 2*.
Isaac, Judæas 195, 2.
Isaac of Stella 173, 2.
Isidorus Gnosticus 123, 1.
Isidorus Hispalensis 147*. 153.
165, 2.
Isidorus Neo. Plat. 130, 5.
Ithagenes 38, 1.

J.

James (Apostle) 178.
 James I. of England 249, 1.
 James of Majorca 206.
 Jamblichus 31. 126. 127. 129*.
 237, 2.
 Jandunus 214, 10. 216, 1. 238.
 Jerome St. 143*. 147. 165, 2. 195,
 2. 3. 204, 3.
 Joël 114 Lit. 181 Lit. 190, 1 Lit.
 Johannitus v. Honein.
 John of London 212, 1.
 John XXI. (Pope) 204, 3.
 Jonsius 16 and Note.
 Jordanus 199, 1.
 Joscelin of Soissons 160.
 Jourdain 191 Lit.
 Judas 208, 3.
 Julian 129, 2.
 Justinian 130, 5. 142.
 Justin Martyr 16 Note. 134, 1*.
 137, 1. 2.

K.

Kaltenborn 252 Lit.
 Kant 11. 13.
 Karsten 34 Lit.
 Keim 111, 3. Lit.
 Kirchner 128 Lit. 129, 2
 Knuber 233, 4.
 Kober 234, 1.
 Krische 87 Lit.
 Krohn 63 Lit. 79 Lit.
 Krug 16 Note.
 Krusicke 233, 4.
 Kühn 86, 3.

L.

Lactantius 113, 2. 135, 4*. 143.
 Lacydes 101, 1.
 Lambert of Auxerre 204, 3.
 Lanfranc 155. 156.
 Lasaulx 64 Lit.
 Lassalle 43 and Lit.
 Lasson 230 Lit. 1. 249, 3.
 Lautensack 233, 4.
 Lavinheta 206, 11.
 Laynez 252, 6.
 Lead, Jane 234, 6.
 Leibnitz 206, 11. 239, 4.
 Leo X. (Pope) 238, 1. 253, 2.

Leo the Great (Pope) 142. 144, 6
 147.
 Less 252, 6.
 Lessing 90, 3.
 Leucippus 47*. 52, 1. 58, 2.
 Lewes 13 Lit. 88 Lit.
 Liebig 249, 3.
 Liebner 165 Lit.
 Lipsius 122 Lit.
 Lipsius, Justus 239, 1.
 Lombard, Peter 167. 169*. 173,
 1. 195, 2.
 Lommatzsch 45 Lit.
 Longinus 128, 1. 6.
 Lorenzana 147.
 Louis XI. 217, 1.
 Louis XIII. 254, 4.
 Lucretius 96, 5*. 247, 2. 5.
 Lucullus 104.
 Lully 185. 205. 206*. 207. 242, 3.
 246, 4. 247, 1. 2. 3.
 Luther 232, 1. 3. 233, 1*. 2. 4. 241, 2.
 246, 6. 257.
 Lutterbeck 108 Lit.
 Lychetus 214, 2.
 Lyco 65. 91.
 Lyræ, Nicolaus de 214, 10.
 Lysis 32, 6.

M.

Macarius 203, 7.
 Machaon 83.
 Machiavelli 89, 2. 246, 6. 253*
 Macrobius 195, 2.
 Machly 61 Lit.
 Magnenus 239, 1.
 Mahancuria, Peter de 212, 1.
 Maiandrius 58, 1.
 Maimonides 190, 1*. 2. 3. 201, 4.
 Manegold of Lauterbach 159.
 Manfred 191.
 Mani 124.
 Marbach 13 Note.
 Marcion the Gnostic 123, 2. 125.
 Marcus Aurelius 97, 1. 4. 119. 134, 1.
 Mariana 252, 6.
 Marinus 130, 5.
 de la Marre 204, 5.
 Marsilius Ficinus 113, 2. 232, 2. 237,
 2*. 3. 244, 2.
 Marsilius of Inghen 204, 3. 217, 3.
 Marsilius of Padua 216, 1.

Marta 246, 1.
 Martensen 230 Lit.
 Martianus ?i. Capella.
 Martin 78 Lit.
 Massuet 122 Lit.
 Mathilda 208, 6.
 Matter 122 Lit.
 Mauritius Hispanus 192.
 Maximus Confessor 111, 3. 129, 2.
 146*. 154, 3. 246, 2.
 Mayro, Franciscus 214, 10.
 Medici, Lorenzo dei 253, 2. 3.
 Melanchthon 232, 3*. 233, 2. 3. 4.
 252, 2*. 4. 254, 3. 257.
 Meletus 65.
 Melissus 37. 38*. 43, 2.
 Ménard 113, 2 Lit.
 Menedemus 68, 1. 101, 1.
 Mentzius 70 Lit.
 Mersenne 256, 1.
 Methodius 128, 6. 137, 3*.
 Meton 45, 1.
 Metrodorus 96, 5.
 Meyer, J. Bona 88, 5 Lit.
 Michelet 89 Lit.
 Michelis 13 Note. 76 Lit.
 Middletown, Richard of 204, 5. 214, 3.
 Mnesarchus 31.
 Mocenigo 244, 1.
 Moderatus 110.
 Moehler 131, 140.
 Moeller, E. W. 121 Lit. 124.
 Moerbeka, William of 191.
 Mohl, Robert of 253 Lit.
 Molina 252, 6.
 Monica 144, 1.
 Montaigne 248, 2*. 3. 4. 6. 254, 2.
 Montesquieu 89, 2.
 Morlay, Alfred of 191.
 Mortagne, Walter of 160.
 Moses 114, 2. 5.
 Mosheim 122, Lit.
 Müller, Ad. 72 Lit.
 Müller, M. Jos. 187, 1 Lit. 5.
 Mullach 16 Note. 47 Lit. 52 Lit.
 Munck 181 Lit. 185. 187, 1. 190, 1.
 Mundt 253 Lit.
 Munk 75, 3 Lit.
 Musonius 97, 1.
 Mussmann 118 Lit.

N.

Naudæus 238, 1.
 Neander 122 Lit.
 Nemesius 146*.
 Nestorius 142. 203, 7.
 Nicolaus of Basel 230, 6.
 Nicolaus of Cusa 223. 224*. 225.
 231, 4. 233, 4. 237, 5. 242, 8. 247, 1,
 3, 4, 6. 257.
 Nicolaus I. (Pope) 154, 1.
 Nicolaus V. (Pope) 224, 1.
 Nicomachus 83. 110.
 Niebuhr 74, 1.
 Nigidius Figulus 110.
 Niphus 238.
 Nizolius 239, 2. 247, 2.
 Nopitsch 233, 5.
 Numenius 127*.

O.

Occam 190, 2. 204, 3. 215. 216*.
 217, 1. 3. 220, 2. 222, 2. 223.
 Ocellus 31. 32, 6. 110.
 Odon of Cambray 159, 1.
 Oehler 135, 4 Lit.
 Oldenbarnevelde 254, 4.
 Oldendorp 252, 2*.
 Olympiodorus 74 Lit. 130, 1.
 Opel 233, 4. 6 Lit.
 Oporinus 241, 10.
 Orelli 96, 1.
 Origen 16 Note. 123, 2. 128, 1.
 137, 1 and 3*. 140, 2. 154, 3. 193.
 203, 5. 237, 2.
 Orpheus 113, 1. 192.
 Orthomenes 34, 1.
 Osiander 233, 1. 4.
 Otto I. (Emperor) 227.
 Otto III. (Emperor) 155, 2.
 Otto of Clugny 158.
 Ostia, Henry of 176.
 Oxenstierna 254, 4.
 Oyta, Henry of 220, 1.
 Ozanam 208 Lit.

P.

Palæologus, John 237, 1.
 Panætius 97, 1.
 Pancratius 241, 10.
 Pantænus 136.
 Panzerbieter 28 Lit. 45 Lit.
 Papencordt 47 Lit.

Paracelsus 233, 4. 241*. 242, 2. 3.
 243, 2. 5. 246, 2. 247, 2. 249, 4.
 Paravia 231, 4.
 Parmenides 36*. 37. 38. 40. 44.
 45, 1. 77, 1.
 Parthey 113, 2.
 Paschasius 154, 1. 155, 3.
 Patritius 113, 2. 182. 244*. 245.
 246, 2. 247, 2.
 Paul (Apostle) 107, 1. 115. 122.
 178.
 Pelagius 156, 6. 158.
 Pericles 49. 52, 1. 74, 1.
 Persius 97, 1.
 Peter (Apostle) 115. 178.
 Petersen 96, 1. 97 Lit.
 Petrarca 238, 1.
 Petrus Hispanus 204, 3*.
 Petrus Venerabilis 161, 1. 6.
 Peyron 45 Lit.
 Pfeiffer 230, 1.
 Phædrus 96, 5. 106, 1.
 Phaleas 89, 2.
 Pherecydes 31. 123, 1.
 Philinus, 103, 1.
 Philip II. 246, 1.
 Philip of Macedon 83.
 Philippus Opuntius 80.
 Philo Judæus 113, 2. 114*. 115. 122,
 1. 127. 154, 3. 180. 222, 3.
 Philo of Larissa 101, 3. 106, 1.
 Philodemus 96, 5.
 Philolaus 31. 32, 4. 63, 1. 97, 1.
 Philoponus 146*. 187, 2.
 Philostratus, 61. 110.
 Photinus 142.
 Piccolomini 238, 1. 239, 4.
 Pico, Francis 237, 3.
 Pico, John 232, 2. 237, 3*. 4.
 Piso 104.
 Pius V. (Pope) 247, 1.
 Plato 16. 30. 32, 2. 45, 1. 46. 61.
 63, 3. 67. 68, 1. 73. 74-80*. 81.
 82. 83. 85, 1. 2. 86, 1. 5. 87, 3. 4.
 6. 8. 88, 1. 2. 6. 89, 1. 2. 90, 1. 94.
 97, 2. 98. 106, 3. 111, 2. 112.
 113, 1. 114, 2. 3. 123. 124. 127.
 128, 2. 3. 4. 130, 1. 2. 134, 1. 136.
 140, 2. 156, 3. 161, 3. 4. 181. 182.
 187, 4. 5. 195, 2. 237, 2. 239, 2.
 242, 4. 244, 3. 247, 2. 249, 5. 6.
 Pletho, Georgius Gemistus 237, 1*. 2.

Pliny 107, 1. 147. 249, 8.
 Plotinus 126. 127. 128*. 130, 1. 2. 3. 4.
 144, 3. 148. 203, 7. 237, 2.
 Plutarch 16 Note. 111*. 127. 129, 1.
 192. 248, 2.
 Plutarch (son of Nestorius) 130, 1.
 Poitiers, Peter of 169, 3*. 173, 1.
 Polemo 80. 97, 1.
 Polus 57. 61.
 Pomponatius 238, 2*.
 Ponzius 214, 2.
 Pordage 234, 6.
 Porphyry 128, 1. 6*. 129, 1. 144, 3.
 146. 156, 2. 181. 200, 2. 216, 4.
 232, 3. 237, 2.
 Porta 249, 8. 250.
 Posidonius 97, 1. 106, 1.
 Possevin 169, 1. 195, 1.
 Prantl 86 Lit. 6. 88, 2. 3. 155, 4. 158
 •Lit. 203, 2. 204, 3.
 Praxiades 24, 1.
 Preger 229 Lit. 230, 1.
 Preller 16 Note.
 Proclus 126. 127. 129, 2. 130*. 148.
 156, 3. 189. 237, 2. 244, 3.
 Prodicus 57. 59*. 61. 63.
 Protagoras 57. 58*. 59. 61. 64, 1.
 70, 2. 72. 73. 76, 3. 250.
 Psellus 204, 3.
 Ptolomæus 123, 2. 212, 5. 6. 7.
 Pullus 167. 168. 169, 1. 175. 194.
 Pyrrhes 36, 1.
 Pyrrho 99*. 100. 101, 1. 102, 1.
 Pythagoras 30. 31*. 34, 1. 43, 1. 4.
 45, 1. 113, 1. 114, 2. 124. 247, 2.

Q.

Quinctilianus 239, 2.
 Quintilianus, Aristides 147.

R.

Rabanus (or Rhabanus) Maurus 153.
 Rabirius 96, 5.
 Radbert *v.* Paschasius.
 Raimbert of Lille 159. 160.
 Ramus 239, 3*. 4. 247, 2.
 Ranke 253 Lit.
 Raphael 241, 10.
 Rassow 86, 3 Lit.
 Ratramnus 154, 1. 155, 3.
 Raumer, Fr. v. 90, 3 Lit.

Rawley 249 Lit. 2.
 Raymond of Sabunde 221. 222*.
 223. 225. 241, 2. 246, 2. 248, 2.
 Raymond of Toledo 191.
 Regiomontanus 242, 3.
 Reinkens 90 Lit.
 Remigius of Auxerre 158.
 Rémusat 161 Lit. 2.
 Renan 186 Lit. 231, 4.
 Rettberg 216, 7.
 Reuchlin 232, 2. 237, 4*. 5.
 Rhabanus Maurus *v.* Rabanus.
 Ribbing 63 Lit. 75. 76 Lit.
 Richard of St. Victor 172*. 194. 195,
 2. 196. 197, 2. 4. 219, 3.
 Richter 234, 1.
 Richter, Arthur 128 Lit. 232, 3 Lit.
 Rimini, Gregory of 217, 1.
 Ritter, Heinrich 13 Note. 16 Note.
 22. 32 Lit. 86, 6. 106, 2. 118 Lit.
 160. 222, 2. 257.
 Rixner 13 Note. 241 Lit.
 Robert (Palsgrave) 217, 3.
 Rochelle, John of 195, 6. 196.
 Roessler 131 Lit.
 Roeth 15 Note. 31 Lit. 32, 1. 110.
 Roetscher 13 Note. 64 Lit.
 Rohde 15 Note.
 Roscellin 156, 5. 158, 5*. 159. 161, 1.
 2. 164, 2. 215. 222, 2.
 Rossel 113, 2.
 Ruysbroek 220, 3. 230, 6. 231*.

S.

Saadja 181.
 Sabinus 194.
 Saccas, Ammonius 127*. 128, 1. 2.
 137, 1. 148.
 Salabert 217, 4.
 Salisbury, John of 160. 161, 2. 164.
 174. 175*. 177. 185.
 Salzinger 206, 1. 4.
 Sánchez 248, 4*.
 Sandys 249, 3.
 Saturninus 125.
 Savigny 206, 1.
 Scaliger 249, 3.
 Schaarschmidt 32 Lit. 175 Lit.
 Scharpff 224 Lit.
 Schaubach 52 Lit.
 Schelling 88, 6. 234, 6.
 Schem, Job *v.* Falaquera.

Scherbius 239, 4.
 Schleiermacher 13 Note. 24 Lit. 28
 Lit. 43 Lit. 64 Lit. 75, 3.
 Schlosser, C. F. 204, 2 Lit.
 Schmidt, K. 230, 6 Lit.
 Schmolders 181 Lit.
 Schneider, J. G. 91 Lit.
 Schneider, Leonhard 88, 6 Lit.
 Schorn 28 Lit. 52 Lit.
 Schultze, Fr. 237, 1 Lit.
 Schuster 43 Lit.
 Schwegler 13 Note. 87 Lit.
 Scioppius 239, 1.
 Scotus *v.* Duns.
 Scotus, Michael 191.
 Semisch 134, 1 Lit.
 Seneca 16. 107*. 110. 111, 1. 115.
 119. 173, 1. 248, 2.
 Serranus 75, 2.
 Severinus 241, 10.
 Sextius 110.
 Sextius Empiricus 16 and Note. 36, 1.
 43, 3. 99, 1. 101, 2. 103*.
 Seyerlen 188.
 Shyreswood 204, 3.
 Sibylla 161, 3.
 Sidney 247, 1.
 Siebeck 64, 1 Lit. 78, 1 Lit.
 Siegebert 204, 3.
 Sieveking 237, 2 Lit.
 Siger 204, 4. 208, 1.
 Sigismund of Austria 224, 1.
 Sigwart, Chr. 232, 2.
 Sigwart, H. C. W. 13 Note.
 Silbert 231, 4.
 Simmias 32, 6.
 Simon 175, 1.
 Simon, Jules 126 Lit.
 Simon Magus 122.
 Simplicius 16 Note. 146*.
 Sixtus IV. (Pope) 197, 1.
 Sixtus V. (Pope) 197, 1.
 Socher 75, 3.
 Socrates 52, 1. 62. 63-65*. 68, 1. 70.
 72, 1. 73. 74, 1. 76, 1. 2. 4. 77, 5.
 79, 2. 86, 5. 94. 97, 2. 134, 1. 161, 3.
 162. 173, 1. 187, 4. 250.
 Soissons, William of 175, 1.
 Solo 214, 2.
 Sophists 53. 54-61*.
 Sophroniscus 63, 1.
 Sotion 110.

- Soto 252, 1.
 Spalding, G. L. 68 Lit.
 Spedding 249 Lit.
 Spengel 55 Lit. 89, 2. 90, 3 Lit. 96, 1.
 Speusippus 80. 237, 2.
 Spinoza 11. 118. 161, 4.
 Stahr 83 Lit. 90, 3 Lit.
 Stallbaum 75, 3.
 Stanley 13 Note.
 Staudenmaier 154 Lit.
 Staupitz 233, 1.
 Steck 13 Note.
 v. Stein 76 Lit.
 Steinhart 75, 3. 114 Lit. 126 Lit. 128 Lit.
 Stephan (Bishop) v: Tempier.
 Stephanus, Henr. 16 Note. 34, 1.
 Stobæus 16 and Note. 113, 2.
 Stöckl 13 Note. 149 Lit. 228.
 Straton 91.
 Sturm, Joh. 239, 3.
 Sturz 45 Lit.
 Suarez 252, 6.
 Surlus 231, 1 Lit.
 Susemihl 75, 3. 77 7. 90, 2.
 Suso 230, 1. 3*. 231, 4.
 Süvern 64 Lit.
 Synesius 146.
 Syrianus 130, 1.
- T.
- Tacitus 119.
 Taillandier 154 Lit.
 Tasso 244, 1.
 Tauler 230, 1. 6*. 231, 4.
 Taurellus 239, 4*.
 Teichmüller 90 Lit.
 Telesius 243*. 244, 1. 3. 245. 246, 1.
 2. 5. 6. 247, 1. 2. 249, 4. 5. 250.
 Teleutagoras 40.
 Tempier 203, 5. 204, 1.
 Tennemann 13 and Note. 75, 3.
 Tertullian 135, 4*. 144, 6.
 Thales 22*. 24, 1. 25. 26, 1. 34, 1.
 43, 1. 44.
 Thaumaturgus, Gregory 137, 1.
 Themistius 181. 200, 5.
 Theobald 175, 2.
 Theodore of Mopsuestia 142. 143.
 144, 5.
 Theodorus the Cyrenaic 70, 3.
 Theodorus the Neo-Platonist 129.
- Theognis 72, 3.
 Theologia Aristotelis 182*. 188.
 Theophilus 135, 1*.
 Theophrastus 24, 2. 26, 1. 34, 2. 47, 1.
 91. 101, 1.
 Thilo 256 Lit.
 Tholomæus of Lucca 203, 9.
 Thomas Aquinas 182. 194. 199, 1.
 200, 8. 203*. 204, 1. 2. 4. 205.
 206, 4. 208, 6. 8. 210. 211. 212, 2.
 213. 214, 3. 4. 5. 7. 8. 215. 216, 5.
 217, 3. 222, 2. 246, 2. 247, 2. 252, 1.
 Thomas à Kempis 224, 1. 231, 4*.
 233, 4.
 Thomas of Strassb. 217, 1.
 Thrasyllus 75, 2.
 Thrasymachus 61.
 Thucydides 52, 1.
 Tibbon, ben 191.
 Tiedemann 13 Note. 97 Lit. 113, 2.
 Lit.
 Timæus 34.
 Timon 99, 1. 100.
 Tisias 60, 1.
 Titze 87, 1 Lit. 88, 5 Lit.
 Tomæus, Leonicus 238, 1.
 Trajan 119.
 Trapezunt, Ge. v. 237, 1.
 Trendelenburg 13 Note. 77, 7. 86, 6.
 Lit. 86, 6.
 Trilia, Bern. de 204, 3.
- U.
- Ueberfeld 234, 1 Lit.
 Ueberweg, 13 Note. 77, 2. 90, 3. 106, 2.
 Uhlhorn 123, 1 Lit.
 Ullmann 229 Lit. 231, 4.
 Ulpianus 252, 4.
 Urbano (Fra) 238, 1.
 Ursinus 241, 10.
- V.
- Vacherot 126 Lit.
 Valentinus 123, 2. 124.
 Valerius 144, 1.
 Valla 239, 2.
 Varro 104. 147.
 Vasquez 252, 6.
 Vautrollier 247, 1.
 Vernias 238, 1.
 Virgil 161, 3. 208, 3. 4. 5. 6.

Virneburg, H. v. 230, 1.
 Vischer 155, 3 Lit.
 Vitringa 58 Lit.
 Vives 239, 2.
 Volney z. Chassebœuf.

W.

Waging, Bern. v. 224, 1.
 Waitz 86 Lit.
 Wald 233, 3 Lit.
 Walter, Jul. 89 Lit.
 Walter of Glogau 234, 1.
 Walter of St. Victor 173, 1*. 177.
 Weber 58 Lit.
 Wegele 208 Lit.
 Weickert 233, 4.
 Weigel, Val. 233, 4-6*. 234, 1.
 Weil 90, 3.
 Welcker 59 Lit.
 Wendt 70 Lit.
 Werner, K. 155, 4. 203 Lit. 217 Lit.
 252 s.
 Wiegmann 88, 5 Lit.
 William (Franciscan) 212, 3.
 William of Hirschau 155, 4.

Windischmann 13 Note.
 Winkler 252, 5*. 254, 3.
 Witte, K. 208 Lit. 2.
 Wolff, Gust. 128, 6 Lit.
 Wytttenbach 232, 2.

X.

Xenocrates 80*. 83. 237, 2.
 Xenophanes 34*. 38, 2. 43, 1. 44.
 Xenophon 63 and Lit.

Z.

Zabarella 238, 1.
 Zacharias 146*.
 Zeller 16 Note. 45, 4. 75, 3. 76 Lit.
 77, 7. 89, 2.
 Zeno (Emperor) 142.
 Zeno the Eleatic 39. 40*. 73. 77, 2.
 Zeno the Epicurean 96, 5. 106, 1.
 Zeno the Stoic 97*. 98.
 Zenodotus 130, 5.
 Zetzner 206, 1 Lit. 11.
 Zimara 187. 238, 1.
 Zorzi 237, 5.
 Zwingli 232, 2*. 3. 237, 3.