EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION

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Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion ranks among the greatest writings in the history of Western philosophy. The work addresses the sensitive issue of the knowledge we have of God through reason alone, and, in the process, Hume presents arguments which undermine the classic proofs for God’s existence. The arguments in the Dialogues assume an important 18th century distinction between natural religion and revealed religion. Natural religion involves knowledge of God drawn from nature, solely by the use of reasoning. Often this involves drawing conclusions about the natural design we see in the universe. Revealed religion, on the other hand, involves religious knowledge derived from revelation, specifically divinely inspired texts such as the Bible. From his earliest writings, Hume attacked both of these alleged avenues of religious truth. In the Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), published when he was 27, Hume attacks natural religion arguing that our ideas reach no farther than our experience; since we have no experience of divine attributes and operations, then we can have no conception of divine attributes. In his infamous essay on miracles from An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), Hume goes a step further and attacks revealed religion. He argues that it is never
reasonable to believe in violations of natural laws, such as reports of miracles and prophecies, which in turn are the foundations of revealed religion. Given the rational bankruptcy of both natural and revealed religion, what remains, for Hume, is what he calls vulgar religion. Vulgar religion is the religious belief of the masses, and we understand this by uncovering the true psychological causes of these beliefs, such as emotions and instincts. He examines vulgar religion in his Natural History of Religion (1757), a work he composed simultaneously with the Dialogues. The Dialogues, though, deals exclusively with the subject of natural religion and in this work Hume offers his most systematic critique of the subject.

THE CHARACTERS OF THE DIALOGUES. Hume’s decision to compose this work in dialog form is significant. During the 18th century, Great Britain was among the most free countries in Europe, and political authorities allowed a great amount of unobstructed expression. However, religious leaders believed that rational proofs for God’s existence were almost as integral to Christianity as the Bible itself. Accordingly, officials viewed direct attacks on natural theology as an abuse of free expression. To avoid political confrontation, Hume adopted the common literary technique of presenting controversial arguments in dialog form. There are three principal characters in Hume’s Dialogues. On the conservative side of the issue, a character named Cleanthes offers a posteriori arguments for God’s existence, particularly the design argument:

(a) Machines are produced by intelligent design

(b) Universe resembles a machine

(c) Therefore, the universe was produced by intelligent design

The design argument rests on an analogy between the design we recognize in human-created artifacts and similar design we recognize in the universe. This similarity of design entitles us to conclude that the universe was likewise created by intelligent design. Most of the Dialogues focuses on aspects of the design argument. Next, a character named Demea prefers a priori arguments for God’s existence, particularly Leibniz’s cosmological argument:

(a) The world contains an infinite sequence of contingent facts;

(b) An explanation is needed as to the origin of this whole infinite series, which goes beyond an explanation of each member in the series;

(c) The explanation of this whole series cannot reside in the series itself, since the very fact of its existence
would still need an explanation (principle of sufficient reason).

(d) Therefore, there is a necessary substance which produced this infinite series, and which is the complete explanation of its own existence as well.

Earlier defenders of cosmological-type arguments, such as Aquinas, argued that an infinite series of causes of the universe is impossible. Thus, a first divine cause is required to start this series of individual causes. However, Demea (and Leibniz) assume that an infinite series of causes of the universe is possible. Even so, Demea argues, we still need an explanation of the entire collection of finite causes, which must be found outside of the infinite collection of individual causes.

Finally, a character named Philo is a skeptic who argues against both a posteriori and a priori proofs. Philo offers a stream of criticisms against the design argument, many of which are now standard in discussions of the issue. For Philo, the design argument is based on a faulty analogy: we don’t know whether the order in nature was the result of design since, unlike our experience with the creation of machines, we did not witness the formation of the world. The vastness of the universe also weakens any comparison with a human artifacts: although the universe is orderly here, it may be chaotic elsewhere. Similarly, if intelligent design is exhibited only in a small fraction of the universe, then we can not say it is the productive force of the whole universe. Philo also contends that natural design may be accounted for by nature alone, insofar as matter contains within itself a principle of order. And even if the design of the universe is of divine origin, we are not justified in concluding that this divine cause is a single, all powerful, or all good being. As to the cosmological argument, Philo argues that once we have a sufficient explanation for each particular fact in the infinite sequence of facts, it makes no sense to inquire about the origin of the collection of these facts. That is, once we adequately account for each individual fact, this constitutes a sufficient explanation of the whole collection.

The three characters in Hume’s Dialogues are loosely based on characters in Cicero’s classic dialog, On the Nature of the Gods and we may reasonably assume that Hume’s audience recognized this. In Cicero’s dialog, a character named Cotta was a religious skeptic, and his teacher was named Philo. Second, a character named Balbus voiced an orthodox Stoic view of the gods, and Balbus’s teacher was named Cleanthes. Finally a character named Velleius presented a third Epicurean view. Cicero himself introduced and concluded his dialog, declaring Balbus the winner. In Hume’s dialog, too, the narrator declares the orthodox Cleanthes the winner over the skeptical Philo. For Cicero, the main issue of the dialog is not so much the existence of the gods, but the nature of the gods, and whether they intervene. However, for Hume the existence of God is the most prominent issue.
PUBLICATION OF THE DIALOGUES. Hume began work on the Dialogues in about 1751. He apparently revised the manuscript about 10 years later, and probably again in 1776 prior to his death. During the last few months of his life, Hume scrambled to make arrangements for the publication of his manuscript, which ultimately appeared in print three years later in 1779. For more than 100 years, the 1779 publication was the basis for other printed editions of the Dialogues. However, because Hume did not oversee the 1779 publication, more recent editions return to the original manuscript, which is in the possession of the Royal Society of Edinburgh and is currently available on microfilm. Differences between the 1779 edition and more recent ones are insignificant, although recent editions contain annotations which describe the various revisions Hume made to the manuscript. In his correspondences, Hume left an interesting paper trail pertaining to the composition and ultimate publication of the Dialogues. The first indication of the manuscript is in the following letter to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, in which Hume asks Elliot to review some "sample" parts of the manuscript (probably Parts 1-4 from the final 12 sections):

You wou’d perceive by the Sample I have given you, that I make Cleanthes the Hero of the Dialogue. Whatever you can think of, to strengthen that Side of the Argument, will be most acceptable to me. Any Propensity you imagine I have to the other Side, crept in upon me against my Will ... I have often thought, that the best way of composing a Dialogue, wou’d be for two Persons that are of different Opinions about any Question of Importance, to write alternately the different Parts of the Discourse, & reply to each other. By this Means, that vulgar Error woud be avoided, of putting nothing but Nonsense into the Mouth of the Adversary: And at the same time, a Variety of Character & Genius being upheld, woud make the whole look more natural & unaffected. Had it been my good Fortune to live near you, I shou’d have taken on me the Character of Philo, in the Dialogue, which you'll own I cou'd have supported naturally enough: And you wou'd not have been averse to that of Cleanthes. I believe, too, we cou'd both of us have kept our Temper very well; only, you have not reach’d an absolute philosophical Indifference on
these Points. What Danger can ever come from ingenious Reasoning & Enquiry? The worst speculative Sceptic ever I knew, was a much better Man than the best superstitious Devotee & Bigot. I must inform you, too, that this was the way of thinking of the Antients on this Subject. ... I cou’d wish that Cleanthes’ Argument coud be so analys’d, as to be render’d quite formal & regular. The Propensity of the Mind towards it, unless that Propensity were as strong & universal as that to believe in our Senses & Experience, will still, I am afraid, be esteem’d a suspicious Foundation. Tis here I wish for your Assistance. ... The Instances I have chosen for Cleanthes are, I hope, tolerably happy, & the Confusion in which I represent the Sceptic seems natural. [March 10, 1751]

Three things are particularly noteworthy in the above passage. First, from the start Hume tries to portray Cleanthes as the "hero" or winner of the dialog. Second, Hume notes his conscious attempt to present all sides of the dispute in their strongest light, and thereby elevate the literary quality of the piece. Third, Hume argues that no public harm will result from considering Philo’s sceptical arguments.

Between 1751 and 1761 Hume worked on and further circulated his manuscript; however, at least one friend discouraged him from publishing it, presumably for political reasons. Hume thus set the project aside, and took it up again in 1776 when he found himself terminally ill. To secure its publication, Hume included in his Will the following request to Adam Smith:

To my friend Dr Adam Smith, late Professor of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow, I leave all my manuscripts without exception, desiring him to publish my Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, which are comprehended in this present bequest; but to publish no other papers which he suspects not to have been written within these five years, but to destroy them all at his leisure. And I even leave him full power over all my papers, except the Dialogues above
mentioned; and though I can trust to that intimate and
sincere friendship, which has ever subsisted between us, for
his faithful execution of this part of my will, yet, as a
small recompense of his pains in correcting and publishing
this work, I leave him two hundred pounds, to be paid
immediately after the publication of it. [January 1776]

In spite of Smith’s assigned task, Smith felt that the Dialogues
should remain unpublished even after Hume’s death. Smith himself
was a closet religious skeptic, and his hesitation was motivated
more by practical concern rather than religious piety. Smith
communicated his reluctance to Hume and, accordingly, in the
following letter to Smith, Hume relinquished Smith of the
immediate responsibility of publishing them:

After reflecting more maturely on that Article of my Will by
which I left you the Disposal of all my Papers, with a
Request that you shou’d publish my Dialogues concerning
natural Religion, I have become sensible, that, both on
account of the Nature of the Work, and of your Situation, it
may be improper to hurry on that Publication. I therefore
take the present Opportunity of qualifying that friendly
Request: I am content, to leave it entirely to your
Discretion at what time you will publish that Piece, or
whether you will publish it at all. [May 3, 1776]

In the above, Hume leaves it to Smith’s discretion as to when the
Dialogues should be published. But Hume quickly became
uncomfortable with this arrangement and, a month later, asked his
long time publisher, William Strahan, to arrange for its
immediate publication:

I am also to speak to you of another Work more important:

Some Years ago, I composed a piece, which woud make a small
Volume in Twelves. I call it Dialogues on natural Religion:

Some of my Friends flatter me, that it is the best thing I
ever wrote. I have hitherto forborne to publish it, because
I was of late desirous to live quietly, and keep remote from
all Clamour: For though it be not more exceptionable than
some things I had formerly published; yet you know some of these were thought very exceptionable; and in prudence, perhaps, I ought to have suppressed them. I there introduce a Sceptic, who is indeed refuted, and at last gives up the Argument, nay confesses that he was only amusing himself by all his Cavils; yet before he is silenced, he advances several Topics, which will give Umbrage, and will be deemed very bold and free, as well as much out of the Common Road. As soon as I arrive at Edinburgh, I intend to print a small Edition of 500, of which I may give away about 100 in Presents; and shall make you a Present of the Remainder, together with the literary Property of the whole, provided you have no Scruple, in your present Situation, of being the Editor: It is not necessary you should prefix your Name to the Title Page. I seriously declare, that after Mr Millar and You and Mr Cadell have publicly avowed your Publication of the Enquiry concerning human Understanding, I know no Reason why you should have the least Scruple with regard to these Dialogues. They will be much less obnoxious to the Law, and not more exposed to popular Clamour. Whatever your Resolution be, I beg you would keep an entire Silence on this Subject. If I leave them to you by Will, your executing the Desire of a dead Friend, will render the publication still more excusable. Mallet never sufferd any thing by being the Editor of Bolingbroke’s Works. [June 8, 1776]

In the above, Hume acknowledges that the publication of the Dialogues might cause some clamor because of the severity of Philo’s arguments. Again, though, he attempts to diffuse the issue by commenting that his Dialogues are less extreme than his Enquiry, presumably meaning his essay on miracles.

Unfortunately, Hume’s illness progressed to the point that he would not live to see this modest printing of the Dialogues.
In an addendum to his will, Hume requested that his nephew, Baron David Hume, see to the publication of the Dialogues if Strahan failed:

I desire, that my Dialogues concerning natural Religion may be printed and published any time within two Years after my Death; to which, he [William Strahan] may add, if he thinks proper, the two Essays formerly printed but not published.

... I also ordain, that if my Dialogues from whatever Cause, be not publishd within two Years and a half of my Death ...

the Property shall return to my Nephew, David, whose Duty, in publishing them as the last Request of his Uncle, must be approved of by all the World. [August 7, 1776]

A week later, though, Hume considered making additional plans to secure the survival of the Dialogues. In a letter to Adam Smith (August 15) he notes his intentions to have two additional copies made of his manuscript, one entrusted to his Nephew, and the other to Smith. Two days before his death, Hume dictated a final letter to Smith:

I am obliged to make use of my Nephews hand in writing to you as I do not rise to day.

There is No Man in whom I have a greater Confidence than Mr Strahan, yet have I left the property of that Manuscript to my Nephew David in case by any accident it should not be published within three years after my decease.

The only accident I could forsee, was one to Mr Strahans Life, and without this clause My Nephew would have had no right to publish it. Be so good as to inform Mr Strahan of this Circumstance. [August 23, 1776]

A week after Hume’s death, Strahan received the manuscript of Hume’s Dialogues. In a letter to Strahan, Smith continued voicing his belief that the manuscript should remain unpublished:

The latter, tho’ finely written, I could have wished had remained in manuscript to be communicated only to a few people. When you read the work, you will see my reasons
without my giving you the trouble of reading them in a
letter. But he [Hume] has ordered it otherwise. . . . I once
had persuaded him to leave it entirely to my discretion
either to publish them at what time I thought proper, or not
to publish them at all. Had he continued of this mind the
manuscript should have been most carefully preserved and
upon my decease restored to his family; but it never should
have been published in my lifetime. [September 5, 1776]

Smith continues in the above letter attempting to persuade
Strahan to at least publish the Dialogues in an edition separate
from Hume’s forthcoming short autobiography. Strahan apparently
agreed, and the autobiography was published separately in 1777.
Smith wrote him the following note of thanks to Strahan,
explaining how sales of Hume’s other works might be enhanced by
properly timing the release of the Dialogues:

I am much obliged to you for so readily agreeing to print
the life together with my additions separate from the
Dialogues. I even flatter myself that this arrangement will
contribute not only to my quiet but to your interest. The
clamour against the Dialogues, if published first, might
hurt for some time the sale of the new edition of his works,
and when the clamour has a little subsided the Dialogues may
hereafter occasion a quicker sale of another edition.

[October, 1776]

Almost a half of a year later, Strahan was still undecided about
whether he would even assume the task of publishing Hume’s
Dialogues. In the following letter to Hume’s nephew, Strahan
explains that it might appear better if it was published by the
nephew himself.

As for Mr. Hume’s Dialogues on Natural Religion, I am not
yet determined whether I shall publish them or not. I have
all possible regard to the will of the deceased: But as that
can be as well fulfilled by you as by me, and as the
publication will probably make some noise in the world, and
its tendency be considered in different lights by different
men, I am inclined to think it had better be made by you.

From you some will conclude it comes with propriety as done
in obedience to the last request of your Uncle; as he
himself expresses it; from me it might be suspect to proceed
from motives of interest. But in this matter I hope you will
do me the justice to believe I put interest wholly out of
the question. However, you shall not, at any rate, be kept
long in suspense, as you shall soon have my final
resolution. [February 3, 1777]

Ultimately, Strahan made his decision and declined to publish the Dialogues. In a letter to Hume’s brother (i.e., the father of Hume’s nephew) Strahan repeats his reasoning that the Dialogues "might be published with more propriety" by the nephew (March 3, 1777).

The almost absurd preoccupation with public image continued as Hume’s brother strategized as to how long his son should delay in bringing the Dialogues to the press. Hume’s brother recorded his thoughts in a reply to Strahan:

My opinion was that he [i.e., his son, and Hume’s nephew] should delay the publication of the dialogues on Natural Religion till the end of the two years, after this that he had a title by his uncles settlement upon your not publication of them; otherways it carried the appearance of being too forward, and of more than he was called upon in duty; and if a clamour rose against it, he would have a difficult task to support himself, almost in the commencement of his manhood. What weighs with him is, that his publishing as early as he had the power, would look more like obedience, than a voluntary deed, and of judgement; and exculpate him in the eyes of the world... [March 13, 1777]

Indeed, Hume’s nephew delayed for two years and the Dialogues finally appeared in the middle of 1779. Upon its publication, Hume’s friend Hugh Blair wrote to Strahan commenting on the lack of "noise" that it produced.
As to D. Hume’s Dialogues, I am surprised that though they have now been published for some time, they have made so little noise. They are exceedingly elegant. They bring together some of his most exceptionable reasonings, but the principles themselves were all in his former works. [August 3, 1779]

Within the following few months, four reviews of Hume’s Dialogues appeared, each of which confirmed Blair’s initial reaction. The first review to appear was the lead article in the Critical Review journal. The review opened noting that "neither the friends of religion have any occasion to be alarmed, nor her enemies to triumph. Freedom of enquiry can never be injurious to the cause of truth." The reviewer concludes with only mild criticism arguing that "If the objections advanced by Philo had been produced with modesty, and answered by Cleanthes as fully as the nature of the question would have allowed, the author would have been applauded by every sensible and discerning reader. But when they are proposed with an air of triumph and defiance, this work assumes a more disadvantageous form, the aspect of infidelity." (September 1779, Vol. 48, pp. 161-172). The second review of the Dialogues which appeared in the London Review was more flattering. The review expresses hope that "it will prove no unacceptable present to the orthodox" and concludes that "...in our opinion, whoever carefully peruses these Dialogues will not readily be infected with either of the two greatest corruptions of religion, enthusiasm or superstition" (1779, Vol. 10, pp. 365-373).

Finally, William Rose’s review in the Monthly Review opens noting that the Dialogues are "written with great elegance; in the true spirit of ancient dialogue; and, in point of composition, is equal, if not superior, to any of Mr. Hume’s other writings. Nothing new, however, is advanced upon the subjects." Rose concludes, though, on a more negatively. For Rose, if Hume is right that God does not exist, then "the wicked are set free from every restraint but that of the laws... the world we live in is a fatherless world; we are chained down to a life full of wretchedness and misery; and we have no hope beyond the grave." Rose notes that "Hume had been long floating on the boundless and pathless ocean of scepticism..." and Hume should have desired a more secure peace at the end of his life. "But his love of paradox, his inordinate pursuit of literary fame, continued..." and, for Rose, this formed Hume’s motive for publishing the Dialogues. Rose acknowledges that Hume lived a virtuous life, and suggests that Hume’s natural good temper, education, and fortune overcame the negative effects of his philosophy. But if his philosophy was let loose among humankind, Rose asks, "Will those who think they are to die like brutes, ever act like men?" Rose believes that even the best political system needs to be supplemented with fear of divine punishment to curb immortality within the law. Nevertheless, Rose concedes that philosophically minded readers will not be harmed by the Dialogues, although the Dialogues "may serve, indeed, to
confirm... the unprincipled in their prejudices..." (November 1779, Vol. 61, pp. 343-355)

INTERPRETIONS OF THE DIALOGUES. In Hume’s day, as now, the two key interpretive questions of the Dialogues were (1) Which character, if any, represents Hume?, and (2) What are the views of that character? Given its literary style, the Dialogues involve a complex web of concealment, and, accordingly, Hume’s contemporaries took greater pains to understand the hidden meaning of the Dialogues. Virtually all early commentators on the Dialogues attempted to identify Philo as Hume’s mouthpiece, as Rose does below in his review when declaring Philo the hero:

Cleanthes... defends a good cause very feebly, and is by no means entitled to the character of an accurate philosopher.

Demea supports the character of a sour, croaking divine, very tolerably; but P/HILO\ is the hero of the piece; and it must be acknowledged, that he urges his objections with no inconsiderable degree of acuteness and subtlety.

The London Review also made this clear from the outset of their review:

The following sentiments, which are represented as the genuine opinions of Philo, or Hume himself, seem to us so important as to deserve insertion as a specimen of the whole.

For the reviewer, the representative sections of Philo’s views are the first half of Part XII of the Dialogues in which Philo reduces the conflict between atheism and theism to a verbal dispute. The reviewer concludes that "This reconciliation of these two seemingly most distant opponents, is of more service to true religion than volumes of divinity...." The reviewer is reflecting the editorial slant of the London Review as a whole, which tended to be religiously skeptical.

Thomas Hayter made efforts to establish clearly that Philo, and not Cleanthes, speaks for Hume. The introductory comments to his Remarks focus exclusively on this issue. After quoting Pamphilus’ portrayal of the three characters, Hayter argues,

From this representation one might at first be led to look
for Mr. H/UME\ himself under the mask of C/LEANTHES\, and to expect from the mouth of C/LEANTHES\ the celebrated Metaphysician’s own sentiments. Let us consider however that Mr. H/UME\, after the great nominal superiority attributed to C/LEANTHES\, could not possibly, without appearance of vanity, have appointed C/LEANTHES\ his representative. The fact indeed indisputably is, that P/HILO\, not C/LEANTHES\, personates Mr. H/UME\ C/LEANTHES\ assumes at times (p. 242 and 244) the tone of D/EMEA\: while P/HILO\ possesses in general the sole exclusive privilege of retailing the purport of Mr. H/UME\’s former Philosophical productions. -- Every remarkable trait and feature of those productions may be traced in the parts of the Dialogue assigned to P/HILO\.

Other critics attempted to expose a deeper concealment on Hume’s part. Joseph Milner in his Gibbon’s account of Christianity considered argues that Hume is insincere when pronouncing Cleanthes the victor of the debate:

In his dialogues concerning natural religion, we have the substance of all his sceptical essays; and notwithstanding his declaration at the close in favour of Cleanthes, the natural religionist, it is evident from the whole tenour of the book, and still more so from the entire scepticism of his former publications, that Philo is his favourite.

Sincerity constitutes no part of a philosopher’s virtue.

He continues that Hume’s aim is to "reduce Polytheism, Spinozism, Christianity, and all sorts of views of the divinity to the same level of evidence, or rather of no evidence; and on the ruin of all, to establish his horrible universal scepticism.”

Perhaps the most penetrating analysis of Philo was given by John Ogilvie in his Inquiry into the causes of the infidelity and scepticism of the times. Like his contemporaries, Ogilvie argues
that Philo is Hume’s mouthpiece.4 However, Ogilvie charges further that even Philo’s concessions cannot be taken at face value:

...Philo expresseth, in very strong terms, his belief of a Deity, such as he represents him. He even thanks this Being, or Mind, or Thought, that atheists are very rare. And, notwithstanding his love of singular argument, he professeth to pay to him profound adoration. P. 232. But, as Philo’s declarations upon this subject are contradictory, I construct his notions most favourably, when I consider him as excluding a Deity from the universe.

For Ogilvie, Hume is involved in double concealment. First, he conceals his views behind the veil of the character of Philo. Second, Philo himself is concealing his true views by making empty concessions toward God’s existence. Ogilvie’s discussion of Philo’s concealment is particularly relevant in view of the 20th century commentators, noted above, who take Philo’s concessions as sincere.

Ogilvie continues that, for Philo, the options for believing in the creation of the universe are between "a blind nature" or "an Omnipotent Tyrant, having neither wisdom, justice, goodness, nor any perfection." Ogilvie argues that it would please us "much better to think that this world was formed by a fortuitous concourse of atoms... rather than to view it as framed by an intelligent Mind to be an immense Lazar-house, crowded with the victims of disease...." Given Philo’s view of the intelligent mind, Ogilvie asks that we

...judge whether he who looks up to such a Being can seriously worship Him with ‘profound adoration.’ I repeat, therefore, that I construct his contradictory assertions most favourably when I consider ‘a blind nature’ as the object of his belief, rather than such a cause of all things as being entitled to his homage.

Ogilvie concludes by focusing on Philo’s concession of thanks to the creator "that Atheists are rarely to be met with." Ogilvie asks,
To whom, Sir, let me ask, are your thanks addressed upon this occasion? Are they offered to that Intelligence who "involves individuals in ruin and misery?" Are they due to the "coarse Artificer, the Author of physical and moral evil, &c. &c. &c.?" With much more reason may you thank Him for having so framed His work, as that His miserable creatures by denying His existence, may turn from objects that cannot be viewed with other feelings than those of horror and detestation.

This feature of double concealment was also recognized by George Horne in his Letters on infidelity (1784). In that work Horne presents "A dialogue between Thomas and Timothy on philosophical skepticism" which exposes Hume’s literary device. Horne’s dialogue opens,

Tim. ... Where art [you] going this morning?
Tom. I am going to be made a Christian.
Tim. The very last thing I should have dreamed of. But pray, who is to make you one?
Tim. David Hume.
Tom. David Hume? Why, I thought he was an Atheist.
Tim. The world never was more mistaken about any one man, than about David Hume. He was deemed a sworn foe to Christianity, whereas his whole life was spent in its service. His works compose altogether a complete Praeparatio Evangelica. They lead men gently, and gradually, as it were to the Gospel... here is chapter and verse for you. Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, p. 263, "To be a philosophical sceptic, is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step
Horne’s dialogue proceeds farcically with Timothy and Thomas each producing evidence from Hume’s Dialogue in defense of their respective interpretations of Hume. Horne, of course, did not believe that Hume’s life was spent in service of Christianity (as Timothy does in Horne’s dialog).

In recent years there has been an even greater diversity of interpretations of the Dialogues and many commentators argue that Hume was not as critical of natural religion as his reputation would have us believe. Here is a sample of some of the recent interpretations of Hume, beginning with the most "moderate." Nicholas Capaldi argues that Hume outright accepted the design argument for God’s existence.5 Similarly, according to James O’Higgins, Hume accepted the design argument, although remained skeptical about the entire enterprise of reasoning. For O’Higgins, Hume reluctantly conceded God’s existence, yet, like the Deists, denied that God concerns himself with governing the world.6 J.C.A. Gaskin sees Hume as an attenuated deist insofar as Hume held that there was a weak probability that natural order resulted from an intelligence remotely analogous to our own. For Gaskin, Hume maintains that this weak probability combines with our more subjective human feeling that natural order springs from a designer, hence we assent to the existence of a designer (although this being has no moral claim on us). Norman Kemp Smith argues that religion for Hume consists exclusively in an intellectual assent to the proposition "God exists." Kemp Smith concludes, though, that religion for Hume ought not to have any influence on human conduct.7 Similarly, for B.A.O. Williams, Hume’s religion consisted of merely holding open the possibility of an intelligent creator.8

Ernest C. Mossner argues that Hume denied all supernatural and conventional religion, but advanced a "religion of man" insofar as Hume optimistically believed that the enlightened determine the fate of humanity and are the measure of all things.9 Similarly, Donald Livingston argues that Hume offers a "philosophical theism" which is an historically determined natural belief, yet one which eschews the writings and rituals of the theistic tradition.10 It should be noted, however, that even if Mossner and Livingston have captured Hume’s views, it is difficult to see how this could qualify as a religion by 18th century standards, and it is hard to believe that Hume would want to classify it as such. Finally, for James Noxon, Hume is simply an agnostic (as opposed to an atheist):

no one of the characters in the Dialogues... speaks consistently for Hume. Every attempt to identify Hume’s spokesman could be forestalled by quoting lines given to that speaker which were inconsistent with statements published elsewhere under Hume’s own name.11
Insofar as no one of the characters speaks consistently for Hume, Noxon argues that this expresses Hume’s view about the limits of human understanding and, consequently, indicates that Hume is an agnostic.

Most of the above contemporary debate about Hume’s views traces back to three sources. First, in Hume’s Natural History of Religion, in no less than nine passages Hume seems to defend the design argument for God’s existence. Second, in several of Hume’s above quoted letters (to Gilbert Elliot and William Strahan) Hume appears sympathetic to Cleanthes’ position. Third, in the concluding section of the Dialogues Hume seems to endorse the design argument: Cleanthes, the defender of natural religion, wins the debate, and Philo, the religious skeptic, eventually concedes that “the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence.” However, all three of these sources can be seen, and probably should be seen, as instances of concealment. Although contemporary commentators do note Hume’s use of irony in his writings, they have lost sight of how pervasive and complex it is, especially with politically sensitive issues such as religion. Early commentators had this well in view when they interpreted Hume. They lived at the same time and under the same political conditions as Hume did, and they were accustomed to decoding the concealed meaning in other nontraditional writers. The principle value of Horne’s farcical dialog between Tim and Tom is that it shows the absurdity of seeing Philo as a champion of religion, especially in the pivotal Part 12 of the Dialogues. From Horne’s perspective, contemporary commentators who take Part 12 as evidence for Hume’s theism have fallen into Hume’s trap.

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PAMPHILUS TO HERMIPPUS

It has been remarked, my HERMIPPUS, that though the ancient philosophers conveyed most of their instruction in the form of dialogue, this method of composition has been little practised in later ages, and has seldom succeeded in the hands of those who have attempted it. Accurate and regular argument, indeed, such as is now expected of philosophical inquirers, naturally throws a man into the methodical and didactic manner; where he can immediately, without preparation, explain the point at which he aims; and thence proceed, without interruption, to deduce the proofs on which it is established. To deliver a SYSTEM in conversation, scarcely appears natural; and while the dialogue-writer desires, by departing from the direct style of composition, to give a freer air to his performance, and avoid the appearance of Author and Reader, he is apt to run into a worse inconvenience, and convey the image of Pedagogue and Pupil. Or, if he carries on the dispute in the natural spirit of good company, by throwing in a variety of topics, and preserving a proper balance among the speakers, he often loses so much time in preparations and transitions, that the reader will scarcely think himself compensated, by all the graces of dialogue, for the order, brevity, and precision, which are sacrificed to them.
There are some subjects, however, to which dialogue-writing is peculiarly adapted, and where it is still preferable to the direct and simple method of composition.

Any point of doctrine, which is so obvious that it scarcely admits of dispute, but at the same time so important that it cannot be too often inculcated, seems to require some such method of handling it; where the novelty of the manner may compensate the triteness of the subject; where the vivacity of conversation may enforce the precept; and where the variety of lights, presented by various personages and characters, may appear neither tedious nor redundant.

Any question of philosophy, on the other hand, which is so obscure and uncertain, that human reason can reach no fixed determination with regard to it; if it should be treated at all, seems to lead us naturally into the style of dialogue and conversation. Reasonable men may be allowed to differ, where no one can reasonably be positive. Opposite sentiments, even without any decision, afford an agreeable amusement; and if the subject be curious and interesting, the book carries us, in a manner, into company; and unites the two greatest and purest pleasures of human life, study and society.

Happily, these circumstances are all to be found in the subject of NATURAL RELIGION. What truth so obvious, so certain, as the being of a God, which the most ignorant ages have acknowledged, for which the most refined geniuses have ambitiously striven to produce new proofs and arguments? What truth so important as this, which is the ground of all our hopes, the surest foundation of morality, the firmest support of society, and the only principle which ought never to be a moment absent from our thoughts and meditations? But, in treating of this obvious and important truth, what obscure questions occur concerning the nature of that Divine Being, his attributes, his decrees, his plan of providence? These have been always subjected to the disputations of men; concerning these human reason has not reached any certain determination. But these are topics so interesting, that we cannot restrain our restless inquiry with regard to them; though nothing but doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction, have as yet been the result of our most accurate researches.

This I had lately occasion to observe, while I passed, as usual, part of the summer season with C/LEANTHES, and was present at those conversations of his with P/HILO and D/EMEA, of which I gave you lately some imperfect account. Your curiosity, you then told me, was so excited, that I must, of necessity, enter into a more exact detail of their reasonings, and display those various systems which they advanced with regard to so delicate a subject as that of natural religion. The remarkable contrast in their characters still further raised your expectations; while you opposed the accurate philosophical turn of C/LEANTHES to the careless scepticism of P/HILO, or compared either of their dispositions with the rigid inflexible orthodoxy of D/EMEA. My youth rendered me a mere auditor of their disputes; and that curiosity, natural to the early season of life, has so deeply imprinted in my memory the whole chain and connection of their arguments, that, I hope, I shall not omit or
confound any considerable part of them in the recital.

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PART 1

After I joined the company, whom I found sitting in C/LEANTHES’s library, D/EMEA paid C/LEANTHES some compliments on the great care which he took of my education, and on his unwearied perseverance and constancy in all his friendships. The father of P/AMPHILUS, said he, was your intimate friend: The son is your pupil; and may indeed be regarded as your adopted son, were we to judge by the pains which you bestow in conveying to him every useful branch of literature and science. You are no more wanting, I am persuaded, in prudence, than in industry. I shall, therefore, communicate to you a maxim, which I have observed with regard to my own children, that I may learn how far it agrees with your practice. The method I follow in their education is founded on the saying of an ancient, "That students of philosophy ought first to learn logics, then ethics, next physics, last of all the nature of the gods." This science of natural theology, according to him, being the most profound and abstruse of any, required the maturest judgement in its students; and none but a mind enriched with all the other sciences, can safely be entrusted with it.

Are you so late, says P/HILO, in teaching your children the principles of religion? Is there no danger of their neglecting, or rejecting altogether those opinions of which they have heard so little during the whole course of their education? It is only as a science, replied D/EMEA, subjected to human reasoning and disputation, that I postpone the study of Natural Theology. To season their minds with early piety, is my chief care; and by continual precept and instruction, and I hope too by example, I imprint deeply on their tender minds an habitual reverence for all the principles of religion. While they pass through every other science, I still remark the uncertainty of each part; the eternal disputations of men; the obscurity of all philosophy; and the strange, ridiculous conclusions, which some of the greatest geniuses have derived from the principles of mere human reason. Having thus tamed their mind to a proper submission and self-diffidence, I have no longer any scruple of opening to them the greatest mysteries of religion; nor apprehend any danger from that assuming arrogance of philosophy, which may lead them to reject the most established doctrines and opinions.

Your precaution, says P/HILO, of seasoning your children’s minds early with piety, is certainly very reasonable; and no more than is requisite in this profane and irreligious age. But what I chiefly admire in your plan of education, is your method of drawing advantage from the very principles of philosophy and learning, which, by inspiring pride and self-sufficiency, have commonly, in all ages, been found so destructive to the principles of religion. The vulgar, indeed, we may remark, who are unacquainted with science and profound inquiry, observing the endless disputes of the learned, have commonly a thorough contempt for philosophy; and rivet themselves the faster, by that means, in the great points of theology which have been taught them. Those who enter a little into study and study and inquiry,
finding many appearances of evidence in doctrines the newest and most extraordinary, think nothing too difficult for human reason; and, presumptuously breaking through all fences, profane the inmost sanctuaries of the temple. But C/LEANTHES\ will, I hope, agree with me, that, after we have abandoned ignorance, the surest remedy, there is still one expedient left to prevent this profane liberty. Let D/EMEA\’s principles be improved and cultivated: Let us become thoroughly sensible of the weakness, blindness, and narrow limits of human reason; Let us duly consider its uncertainty and endless contrarieties, even in subjects of common life and practice: Let the errors and deceits of our very senses be set before us; the insuperable difficulties which attend first principles in all systems; the contradictions which adhere to the very ideas of matter, cause and effect, extension, space, time, motion; and in a word, quantity of all kinds, the object of the only science that can fairly pretend to any certainty or evidence. When these topics are displayed in their full light, as they are by some philosophers and almost all divines; who can retain such confidence in this frail faculty of reason as to pay any regard to its determinations in points so sublime, so abstruse, so remote from common life and experience? When the coherence of the parts of a stone, or even that composition of parts which renders it extended; when these familiar objects, I say, are so inexplicable, and contain circumstances so repugnant and contradictory; with what assurance can we decide concerning the origin of worlds, or trace their history from eternity to eternity?

While P/HILO\ pronounced these words, I could observe a smile in the countenance both of D/EMEA\ and C/LEANTHES\. That of D/EMEA\ seemed to imply an unreserved satisfaction in the doctrines delivered: But, in C/LEANTHES\’s features, I could distinguish an air of finesse; as if he perceived some raillery or artificial malice in the reasonings of P/HILO\.

You propose then, P/HILO\, said C/LEANTHES\, to erect religious faith on philosophical scepticism; and you think, that if certainty or evidence be expelled from every other subject of inquiry, it will all retire to these theological doctrines, and there acquire a superior force and authority. Whether your scepticism be as absolute and sincere as you pretend, we shall learn by and by, when the company breaks up: We shall then see, whether you go out at the door or the window; and whether you really doubt if your body has gravity, or can be injured by its fall; according to popular opinion, derived from our fallacious senses, and more fallacious experience. And this consideration, D/EMEA\, may, I think, fairly serve to abate our ill-will to this humorous sect of the sceptics. If they be thoroughly in earnest, they will not long trouble the world with their doubts, cavils, and disputes: If they be only in jest, they are, perhaps, bad railers; but can never be very dangerous, either to the state, to philosophy, or to religion.

In reality, P/HILO\, continued he, it seems certain, that though a man, in a flush of humour, after intense reflection on the many contradictions and imperfections of human reason, may entirely renounce all belief and opinion, it is impossible for him to persevere in this total scepticism, or make it appear in his conduct for a few hours. External objects press in upon him;
passions solicit him; his philosophical melancholy dissipates; and even the utmost violence upon his own temper will not be able, during any time, to preserve the poor appearance of scepticism. And for what reason impose on himself such a violence? This is a point in which it will be impossible for him ever to satisfy himself, consistently with his sceptical principles. So that, upon the whole, nothing could be more ridiculous than the principles of the ancient PYRRHONIANS; if in reality they endeavoured, as is pretended, to extend, throughout, the same scepticism which they had learned from the declamations of their schools, and which they ought to have confined to them.

In this view, there appears a great resemblance between the sects of the STOICS and PYRRHONIANS, though perpetual antagonists; and both of them seem founded on this erroneous maxim, That what a man can perform sometimes, and in some dispositions, he can perform always, and in every disposition. When the mind, by Stoical reflections, is elevated into a sublime enthusiasm of virtue, and strongly smit with any species of honour or public good, the utmost bodily pain and sufferings will not prevail over such a high sense of duty; and it is possible, perhaps, by its means, even to smile and exult in the midst of tortures. If this sometimes may be the case in fact and reality, much more may a philosopher, in his school, or even in his closet, work himself up to such an enthusiasm, and support in imagination the acutest pain or most calamitous event which he can possibly conceive. But how shall he support this enthusiasm itself? The bent of his mind relaxes, and cannot be recalled at pleasure; avocations lead him astray; misfortunes attack him unawares; and the philosopher sinks by degrees into the plebeian.

I allow of your comparison between the STOICS and SKEPTICS, replied PHILO. But you may observe, at the same time, that though the mind cannot, in Stoicism, support the highest flights of philosophy, yet, even when it sinks lower, it still retains somewhat of its former disposition; and the effects of the Stoic's reasoning will appear in his conduct in common life, and through the whole tenor of his actions. The ancient schools, particularly that of ZENO, produced examples of virtue and constancy which seem astonishing to present times.

Vain Wisdom all and false Philosophy.

Yet with a pleasing sorcery could charm

Pain, for a while, or anguish; and excite

Fallacious Hope, or arm the obdurate breast

With stubborn Patience, as with triple steel.13

In like manner, if a man has accustomed himself to sceptical considerations on the uncertainty and narrow limits of reason, he will not entirely forget them when he turns his reflection on other subjects; but in all his philosophical principles and reasoning, I dare not say in his common conduct, he will be found different from those, who either never formed any opinions in the case, or have entertained sentiments more favourable to human
To whatever length any one may push his speculative principles of scepticism, he must act, I own, and live, and converse, like other men; and for this conduct he is not obliged to give any other reason, than the absolute necessity he lies under of so doing. If he ever carries his speculations further than this necessity constrains him, and philosophises either on natural or moral subjects, he is allured by a certain pleasure and satisfaction which he finds in employing himself after that manner. He considers besides, that every one, even in common life, is constrained to have more or less of this philosophy; that from our earliest infancy we make continual advances in forming more general principles of conduct and reasoning; that the larger experience we acquire, and the stronger reason we are endued with, we always render our principles the more general and comprehensive; and that what we call philosophy is nothing but a more regular and methodical operation of the same kind. To philosophise on such subjects, is nothing essentially different from reasoning on common life; and we may only expect greater stability, if not greater truth, from our philosophy, on account of its exacter and more scrupulous method of proceeding.

But when we look beyond human affairs and the properties of the surrounding bodies: when we carry our speculations into the two eternities, before and after the present state of things; into the creation and formation of the universe; the existence and properties of spirits; the powers and operations of one universal Spirit existing without beginning and without end; omnipotent, omniscient, immutable, infinite, and incomprehensible: We must be far removed from the smallest tendency to scepticism not to be apprehensive, that we have here got quite beyond the reach of our faculties. So long as we confine our speculations to trade, or morals, or politics, or criticism, we make appeals, every moment, to common sense and experience, which strengthen our philosophical conclusions, and remove, at least in part, the suspicion which we so justly entertain with regard to every reasoning that is very subtle and refined. But, in theological reasonings, we have not this advantage; while, at the same time, we are employed upon objects, which, we must be sensible, are too large for our grasp, and of all others, require most to be familiarised to our apprehension. We are like foreigners in a strange country, to whom every thing must seem suspicious, and who are in danger every moment of transgressing against the laws and customs of the people with whom they live and converse. We know not how far we ought to trust our vulgar methods of reasoning in such a subject; since, even in common life, and in that province which is peculiarly appropriated to them, we cannot account for them, and are entirely guided by a kind of instinct or necessity in employing them.

All sceptics pretend, that, if reason be considered in an abstract view, it furnishes invincible arguments against itself; and that we could never retain any conviction or assurance, on any subject, were not the sceptical reasonings so refined and subtle, that they are not able to counterpoise the more solid and more natural arguments derived from the senses and experience. But it is evident, whenever our arguments lose this advantage,
and run wide of common life, that the most refined scepticism comes to be upon a footing with them, and is able to oppose and counterbalance them. The one has no more weight than the other. The mind must remain in suspense between them; and it is that very suspense or balance, which is the triumph of scepticism.

But I observe, says CLEANTHES, with regard to you, PHILO, and all speculative sceptics, that your doctrine and practice are as much at variance in the most abstruse points of theory as in the conduct of common life. Wherever evidence discovers itself, you adhere to it, notwithstanding your pretended scepticism; and I can observe, too, some of your sect to be as decisive as those who make greater professions of certainty and assurance. In reality, would not a man be ridiculous, who pretended to reject NEWTON's explication of the wonderful phenomenon of the rainbow, because that explication gives a minute anatomy of the rays of light; a subject, forsooth, too refined for human comprehension? And what would you say to one, who, having nothing particular to object to the arguments of COPERNICUS and GALILEO for the motion of the earth, should withhold his assent, on that general principle, that these subjects were too magnificent and remote to be explained by the narrow and fallacious reason of mankind?

There is indeed a kind of brutish and ignorant scepticism, as you well observed, which gives the vulgar a general prejudice against what they do not easily understand, and makes them reject every principle which requires elaborate reasoning to prove and establish it. This species of scepticism is fatal to knowledge, not to religion; since we find, that those who make greatest profession of it, give often their assent, not only to the great truths of Theism and natural theology, but even to the most absurd tenets which a traditional superstition has recommended to them. They firmly believe in witches, though they will not believe nor attend to the most simple proposition of Euclid. But the refined and philosophical sceptics fall into an inconsistency of an opposite nature. They push their researches into the most abstruse corners of science; and their assent attends them in every step, proportioned to the evidence which they meet with. They are even obliged to acknowledge, that the most abstruse and remote objects are those which are best explained by philosophy. Light is in reality anatomised. The true system of the heavenly bodies is discovered and ascertained. But the nourishment of bodies by food is still an inexplicable mystery. The cohesion of the parts of matter is still incomprehensible. These sceptics, therefore, are obliged, in every question, to consider each particular evidence apart, and proportion their assent to the precise degree of evidence which occurs. This is their practice in all natural, mathematical, moral, and political science. And why not the same, I ask, in the theological and religious? Why must conclusions of this nature be alone rejected on the general presumption of the insufficiency of human reason, without any particular discussion of the evidence? Is not such an unequal conduct a plain proof of prejudice and passion?

Our senses, you say, are fallacious; our understanding erroneous; our ideas, even of the most familiar objects, extension, duration, motion, full of absurdities and contradictions. You defy me to solve the difficulties, or
reconcile the repugnancies which you discover in them. I have not
capacity for so great an undertaking: I have not leisure for it:
I perceive it to be superfluous. Your own conduct, in every
circumstance, refutes your principles, and shows the firmest
reliance on all the received maxims of science, morals, prudence,
and behaviour. I shall never assent to so harsh an opinion as
that of a celebrated writer,14 who says, that the Sceptics are
not a sect of philosophers: They are only a sect of liars. I may,
however, affirm (I hope without offence), that they are a sect of
jesters or raillers. But for my part, whenever I find myself
disposed to mirth and amusement, I shall certainly choose my
entertainment of a less perplexing and abstruse nature. A comedy,
a novel, or at most a history, seems a more natural recreation
than such metaphysical subtleties and abstractions.

In vain would the sceptic make a distinction between science
and common life, or between one science and another. The
arguments employed in all, if just, are of a similar nature, and
contain the same force and evidence. Or if there be any
difference among them, the advantage lies entirely on the side of
theology and natural religion. Many principles of mechanics are
founded on very abstruse reasoning; yet no man who has any
pretensions to science, even no speculative sceptic, pretends to
entertain the least doubt with regard to them. The COPERNICAN
system contains the most surprising paradox, and the most
contrary to our natural conceptions, to appearances, and to our
very senses: yet even monks and inquisitors are now constrained
to withdraw their opposition to it. And shall P/HILO, a man of
so liberal a genius and extensive knowledge, entertain any
general undistinguished scruples with regard to the religious
hypothesis, which is founded on the simplest and most obvious
arguments, and, unless it meets with artificial obstacles, has
such easy access and admission into the mind of man?

And here we may observe, continued he, turning himself
towards D/EMEA, a pretty curious circumstance in the history of
the sciences. After the union of philosophy with the popular
religion, upon the first establishment of Christianity, nothing
was more usual, among all religious teachers, than declamations
against reason, against the senses, against every principle
derived merely from human research and inquiry. All the topics of
the ancient academics were adopted by the fathers; and thence
propagated for several ages in every school and pulpit throughout
Christendom. The Reformers embraced the same principles of
reasoning, or rather declamation; and all panegyrics on the
excellency of faith, were sure to be interlarded with some severe
strokes of satire against natural reason. A celebrated prelate
too,15 of the Romish communion, a man of the most extensive
learning, who wrote a demonstration of Christianity, has also
composed a treatise, which contains all the cavils of the boldest
and most determined P/YRRHONISM. L/OCKE seems to have been the
first Christian who ventured openly to assert, that faith was
nothing but a species of reason; that religion was only a branch
of philosophy; and that a chain of arguments, similar to that
which established any truth in morals, politics, or physics, was
always employed in discovering all the principles of theology,
natural and revealed. The ill use which B/AYLE\ and other
libertines made of the philosophical scepticism of the fathers
and first reformers, still further propagated the judicious
sentiment of Mr. L/OCKE\: And it is now in a manner avowed, by all pretenders to reasoning and philosophy, that Atheist and Sceptic are almost synonymous. And as it is certain that no man is in earnest when he professes the latter principle, I would fain hope that there are as few who seriously maintain the former.

Don’t you remember, said P/HILO\, the excellent saying of L/ORD\ B/ACON\ on this head? That a little philosophy, replied C/LEANTHES\, makes a man an Atheist: A great deal converts him to religion. That is a very judicious remark too, said P/HILO\. But what I have in my eye is another passage, where, having mentioned D/AVID\’s fool, who said in his heart there is no God, this great philosopher observes, that the Atheists nowadays have a double share of folly; for they are not contented to say in their hearts there is no God, but they also utter that impiety with their lips, and are thereby guilty of multiplied indiscretion and imprudence. Such people, though they were ever so much in earnest, cannot, methinks, be very formidable.

But though you should rank me in this class of fools, I cannot forbear communicating a remark that occurs to me, from the history of the religious and irreligious scepticism with which you have entertained us. It appears to me, that there are strong symptoms of priestcraft in the whole progress of this affair. During ignorant ages, such as those which followed the dissolution of the ancient schools, the priests perceived, that Atheism, Deism, or heresy of any kind, could only proceed from the presumptuous questioning of received opinions, and from a belief that human reason was equal to every thing. Education had then a mighty influence over the minds of men, and was almost equal in force to those suggestions of the senses and common understanding, by which the most determined sceptic must allow himself to be governed. But at present, when the influence of education is much diminished, and men, from a more open commerce of the world, have learned to compare the popular principles of different nations and ages, our sagacious divines have changed their whole system of philosophy, and talk the language of S/TOICS\, P/LATONISTS\, and P/ERIPATETICS\, not that of P/YRRHONIANS\ and A/CADEMICS\. If we distrust human reason, we have now no other principle to lead us into religion. Thus, sceptics in one age, dogmatists in another; whichever system best suits the purpose of these reverend gentlemen, in giving them an ascendant over mankind, they are sure to make it their favourite principle, and established tenet.

It is very natural, said C/LEANTHES\, for men to embrace those principles, by which they find they can best defend their doctrines; nor need we have any recourse to priestcraft to account for so reasonable an expedient. And, surely nothing can afford a stronger presumption, that any set of principles are true, and ought to be embraced, than to observe that they tend to the confirmation of true religion, and serve to confound the cavils of Atheists, Libertines, and Freethinkers of all denominations.

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PART 2
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I must own, CLEANTHES, said DEMEA, that nothing can more surprise me, than the light in which you have all along put this argument. By the whole tenor of your discourse, one would imagine that you were maintaining the Being of a God, against the cavils of Atheists and Infidels; and were necessitated to become a champion for that fundamental principle of all religion. But this, I hope, is not by any means a question among us. No man, no man at least of common sense, I am persuaded, ever entertained a serious doubt with regard to a truth so certain and self-evident. The question is not concerning the being, but the nature of God. This, I affirm, from the infirmities of human understanding, to be altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us. The essence of that supreme Mind, his attributes, the manner of his existence, the very nature of his duration; these, and every particular which regards so divine a Being, are mysterious to men. Finite, weak, and blind creatures, we ought to humble ourselves in his august presence; and, conscious of our frailties, adore in silence his infinite perfections, which eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. They are covered in a deep cloud from human curiosity. It is profaneness to attempt penetrating through these sacred obscurities. And, next to the impiety of denying his existence, is the temerity of prying into his nature and essence, decrees and attributes.

But lest you should think that my piety has here got the better of my philosophy, I shall support my opinion, if it needs any support, by a very great authority. I might cite all the divines, almost, from the foundation of Christianity, who have ever treated of this or any other theological subject: But I shall confine myself, at present, to one equally celebrated for piety and philosophy. It is Father MALEBRANCHE, who, I remember, thus expresses himself.16 "One ought not so much," says he, "to call God a spirit, in order to express positively what he is, as in order to signify that he is not matter. He is a Being infinitely perfect: Of this we cannot doubt. But in the same manner as we ought not to imagine, even supposing him corporeal, that he is clothed with a human body, as the ANTHROPOMORPHITES asserted, under colour that that figure was the most perfect of any; so, neither ought we to imagine that the spirit of God has human ideas, or bears any resemblance to our spirit, under colour that we know nothing more perfect than a human mind. We ought rather to believe, that as he comprehends the perfections of matter without being material.... he comprehends also the perfections of created spirits without being spirit, in the manner we conceive spirit: That his true name is, He that is; or, in other words, Being without restriction, All Being, the Being infinite and universal."

After so great an authority, DEMEA, replied PHILO, as that which you have produced, and a thousand more which you might produce, it would appear ridiculous in me to add my sentiment, or express my approbation of your doctrine. But surely, where reasonable men treat these subjects, the question can never be concerning the Being, but only the Nature, of the Deity. The former truth, as you well observe, is unquestionable and self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause; and the original cause of this universe (whatever it be) we call God; and piously
ascribe to him every species of perfection. Whoever scruples this
fundamental truth, deserves every punishment which can be
inflicted among philosophers, to wit, the greatest ridicule,
contempt, and disapprobation. But as all perfection is entirely
relative, we ought never to imagine that we comprehend the
attributes of this divine Being, or to suppose that his
perfections have any analogy or likeness to the perfections of a
human creature. Wisdom, Thought, Design, Knowledge; these we
justly ascribe to him; because these words are honourable among
men, and we have no other language or other conceptions by which
we can express our adoration of him. But let us beware, lest we
think that our ideas anywise correspond to his perfections, or
that his attributes have any resemblance to these qualities among
men. He is infinitely superior to our limited view and
comprehension; and is more the object of worship in the temple,
than of disputation in the schools.

In reality, C/LEANThES, continued he, there is no need of
having recourse to that affected scepticism so displeasing to
you, in order to come at this determination. Our ideas reach no
further than our experience. We have no experience of divine
attributes and operations. I need not conclude my syllogism. You
can draw the inference yourself. And it is a pleasure to me (and
I hope to you too) that just reasoning and sound piety here
concur in the same conclusion, and both of them establish the
adorably mysterious and incomprehensible nature of the Supreme
Being.

Not to lose any time in circumlocutions, said C/LEANThES,
addressing himself to D/EMEA, much less in replying to the pious
declamations of P/HILO; I shall briefly explain how I conceive
this matter. Look round the world: contemplate the whole and
every part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great
machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines,
which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human
senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various
machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each
other with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who
have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to
ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much
exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human designs,
thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since, therefore, the effects
resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of
analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of
Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed
of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the
work which he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by
this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a
Deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligence.

I shall be so free, C/LEANThES, said D/EMEA, as to tell
you, that from the beginning, I could not approve of your
conclusion concerning the similarity of the Deity to men; still
less can I approve of the mediums by which you endeavour to
establish it. What! No demonstration of the Being of God! No
abstract arguments! No proofs a priori! Are these, which have
hitherto been so much insisted on by philosophers, all fallacy,
all sophism? Can we reach no further in this subject than
experience and probability? I will not say that this is betraying
the cause of a Deity: But surely, by this affected candour, you
give advantages to Atheists, which they never could obtain by the
mere dint of argument and reasoning.

What I chiefly scruple in this subject, said P/HILO, is not
so much that all religious arguments are by C/LEANTHES reduced
to experience, as that they appear not to be even the most
certain and irrefrangible of that inferior kind. That a stone will
fall, that fire will burn, that the earth has solidity, we have
observed a thousand and a thousand times; and when any new
instance of this nature is presented, we draw without hesitation
the accustomed inference. The exact similarity of the cases gives
us a perfect assurance of a similar event; and a stronger
evidence is never desired nor sought after. But wherever you
depart, in the least, from the similarity of the cases, you
diminish proportionally the evidence; and may at last bring it to
a very weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and
uncertainty. After having experienced the circulation of the
blood in human creatures, we make no doubt that it takes place in
T/ITIUS and M/ÆVIUS. But from its circulation in frogs and
fishes, it is only a presumption, though a strong one, from
analogy, that it takes place in men and other animals. The
analogical reasoning is much weaker, when we infer the
circulation of the sap in vegetables from our experience that the
blood circulates in animals; and those, who hastily followed that
imperfect analogy, are found, by more accurate experiments, to
have been mistaken.

If we see a house, C/LEANTHES, we conclude, with the
greatest certainty, that it had an architect or builder; because
this is precisely that species of effect which we have
experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely you
will not affirm, that the universe bears such a resemblance to a
house, that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause,
or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude
is so striking, that the utmost you can here pretend to is a
guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause;
and how that pretension will be received in the world, I leave
you to consider.

It would surely be very ill received, replied C/LEANTHES;
and I should be deservedly blamed and detested, did I allow, that
the proofs of a Deity amounted to no more than a guess or
conjecture. But is the whole adjustment of means to ends in a
house and in the universe so slight a resemblance? The economy of
final causes? The order, proportion, and arrangement of every
part? Steps of a stair are plainly contrived, that human legs may
use them in mounting; and this inference is certain and
infallible. Human legs are also contrived for walking and
mounting; and this inference, I allow, is not altogether so
certain, because of the dissimilarity which you remark; but does
it, therefore, deserve the name only of presumption or
conjecture?17

Good God! cried D/EMEA, interrupting him, where are we?
Zealous defenders of religion allow, that the proofs of a Deity
fall short of perfect evidence! And you, P/HILO, on whose
assistance I depended in proving the adorable mysteriousness of
the Divine Nature, do you assent to all these extravagant
You seem not to apprehend, replied P/HILO, that I argue with C/LEANTHES in his own way; and, by showing him the dangerous consequences of his tenets, hope at last to reduce him to our opinion. But what sticks most with you, I observe, is the representation which C/LEANTHES has made of the argument a posteriori; and finding that that argument is likely to escape your hold and vanish into air, you think it so disguised, that you can scarcely believe it to be set in its true light. Now, however much I may dissent, in other respects, from the dangerous principles of C/LEANTHES, I must allow that he has fairly represented that argument; and I shall endeavour so to state the matter to you, that you will entertain no further scruples with regard to it.

Were a man to abstract from every thing which he knows or has seen, he would be altogether incapable, merely from his own ideas, to determine what kind of scene the universe must be, or to give the preference to one state or situation of things above another. For as nothing which he clearly conceives could be esteemed impossible or implying a contradiction, every chimera of his fancy would be upon an equal footing; nor could he assign any just reason why he adheres to one idea or system, and rejects the others which are equally possible.

Again; after he opens his eyes, and contemplates the world as it really is, it would be impossible for him at first to assign the cause of any one event, much less of the whole of things, or of the universe. He might set his fancy a rambling; and she might bring him in an infinite variety of reports and representations. These would all be possible; but being all equally possible, he would never of himself give a satisfactory account for his preferring one of them to the rest. Experience alone can point out to him the true cause of any phenomenon.

Now, according to this method of reasoning, D/EMEA, it follows, (and is, indeed, tacitly allowed by C/LEANTHES himself,) that order, arrangement, or the adjustment of final causes, is not of itself any proof of design; but only so far as it has been experienced to proceed from that principle. For aught we can know a priori, matter may contain the source or spring of order originally within itself, as well as mind does; and there is no more difficulty in conceiving, that the several elements, from an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite arrangement, than to conceive that their ideas, in the great universal mind, from a like internal unknown cause, fall into that arrangement. The equal possibility of both these suppositions is allowed. But, by experience, we find, (according to C/LEANTHES), that there is a difference between them. Throw several pieces of steel together, without shape or form; they will never arrange themselves so as to compose a watch. Stone, and mortar, and wood, without an architect, never erect a house. But the ideas in a human mind, we see, by an unknown, inexplicable economy, arrange themselves so as to form the plan of a watch or house. Experience, therefore, proves, that there is
an original principle of order in mind, not in matter. From similar effects we infer similar causes. The adjustment of means to ends is alike in the universe, as in a machine of human contrivance. The causes, therefore, must be resembling.

I was from the beginning scandalised, I must own, with this resemblance, which is asserted, between the Deity and human creatures; and must conceive it to imply such a degradation of the Supreme Being as no sound Theist could endure. With your assistance, therefore, D/EMEA, I shall endeavour to defend what you justly call the adorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature, and shall refute this reasoning of C/LEANTHES, provided he allows that I have made a fair representation of it.

When C/LEANTHES had assented, P/HILO, after a short pause, proceeded in the following manner.

That all inferences, C/LEANTHES, concerning fact, are founded on experience; and that all experimental reasonings are founded on the supposition that similar causes prove similar effects, and similar effects similar causes; I shall not at present much dispute with you. But observe, I entreat you, with what extreme caution all just reasoners proceed in the transferring of experiments to similar cases. Unless the cases be exactly similar, they repose no perfect confidence in applying their past observation to any particular phenomenon. Every alteration of circumstances occasions a doubt concerning the event; and it requires new experiments to prove certainly, that the new circumstances are of no moment or importance. A change in bulk, situation, arrangement, age, disposition of the air, or surrounding bodies; any of these particulars may be attended with the most unexpected consequences: And unless the objects be quite familiar to us, it is the highest temerity to expect with assurance, after any of these changes, an event similar to that which before fell under our observation. The slow and deliberate steps of philosophers here, if any where, are distinguished from the precipitate march of the vulgar, who, hurried on by the smallest similitude, are incapable of all discernment or consideration.

But can you think, C/LEANTHES, that your usual phlegm and philosophy have been preserved in so wide a step as you have taken, when you compared to the universe houses, ships, furniture, machines, and, from their similarity in some circumstances, inferred a similarity in their causes? Thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred others, which fall under daily observation. It is an active cause, by which some particular parts of nature, we find, produce alterations on other parts. But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all comparison and inference? From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn any thing concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a leaf’s blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree?

But, allowing that we were to take the operations of one
part of nature upon another, for the foundation of our judgement
concerning the origin of the whole, (which never can be
admitted,) yet why select so minute, so weak, so bounded a
principle, as the reason and design of animals is found to be
upon this planet? What peculiar privilege has this little
agitation of the brain which we call thought, that we must thus
make it the model of the whole universe? Our partiality in our
own favour does indeed present it on all occasions; but sound
philosophy ought carefully to guard against so natural an
illusion.

So far from admitting, continued P/HILO, that the
operations of a part can afford us any just conclusion concerning
the origin of the whole, I will not allow any one part to form a
rule for another part, if the latter be very remote from the
former. Is there any reasonable ground to conclude, that the
inhabitants of other planets possess thought, intelligence,
reason, or any thing similar to these faculties in men? When
nature has so extremely diversified her manner of operation in
this small globe, can we imagine that she incessantly copies
herself throughout so immense a universe? And if thought, as we
may well suppose, be confined merely to this narrow corner, and
has even there so limited a sphere of action, with what propriety
can we assign it for the original cause of all things? The narrow
views of a peasant, who makes his domestic economy the rule for
the government of kingdoms, is in comparison a pardonable
 sophism.

But were we ever so much assured, that a thought and reason,
resembling the human, were to be found throughout the whole
universe, and were its activity elsewhere vastly greater and more
commanding than it appears in this globe; yet I cannot see, why
the operations of a world constituted, arranged, adjusted, can
with any propriety be extended to a world which is in its embryo
state, and is advancing towards that constitution and
arrangement. By observation, we know somewhat of the economy,
action, and nourishment of a finished animal; but we must
transfer with great caution that observation to the growth of a
foetus in the womb, and still more to the formation of an
animalcule in the loins of its male parent. Nature, we find, even
from our limited experience, possesses an infinite number of
springs and principles, which incessantly discover themselves on
every change of her position and situation. And what new and
unknown principles would actuate her in so new and unknown a
situation as that of the formation of a universe, we cannot,
without the utmost temerity, pretend to determine.

A very small part of this great system, during a very short
time, is very imperfectly discovered to us; and do we thence
pronounce decisively concerning the origin of the whole?

Admirable conclusion! Stone, wood, brick, iron, brass, have
not, at this time, in this minute globe of earth, an order or
arrangement without human art and contrivance; therefore the
universe could not originally attain its order and arrangement,
without something similar to human art. But is a part of nature a
rule for another part very wide of the former? Is it a rule for
the whole? Is a very small part a rule for the universe? Is
nature in one situation, a certain rule for nature in another
situation vastly different from the former?

And can you blame me, C/LEANTHES, if I here imitate the prudent reserve of S/IMONIDES, who, according to the noted story, being asked by H/IERO, What God was? desired a day to think of it, and then two days more; and after that manner continually prolonged the term, without ever bringing in his definition or description? Could you even blame me, if I had answered at first, that I did not know, and was sensible that this subject lay vastly beyond the reach of my faculties? You might cry out sceptic and railler, as much as you pleased: but having found, in so many other subjects much more familiar, the imperfections and even contradictions of human reason, I never should expect any success from its feeble conjectures, in a subject so sublime, and so remote from the sphere of our observation. When two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one wherever I see the existence of the other; and this I call an argument from experience. But how this argument can have place, where the objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel, or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will any man tell me with a serious countenance, that an orderly universe must arise from some thought and art like the human, because we have experience of it? To ascertain this reasoning, it were requisite that we had experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely, that we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance.

P/HILO was proceeding in this vehement manner, somewhat between jest and earnest, as it appeared to me, when he observed some signs of impatience in C/LEANTHES, and then immediately stopped short. What I had to suggest, said C/LEANTHES, is only that you would not abuse terms, or make use of popular expressions to subvert philosophical reasonings. You know, that the vulgar often distinguish reason from experience, even where the question relates only to matter of fact and existence; though it is found, where that reason is properly analysed, that it is nothing but a species of experience. To prove by experience the origin of the universe from mind, is not more contrary to common speech, than to prove the motion of the earth from the same principle. And a caviller might raise all the same objections to the Copernican system, which you have urged against my reasonings. Have you other earths, might he say, which you have seen to move? Have _

Yes! cried P/HILO, interrupting him, we have other earths. Is not the moon another earth, which we see to turn round its centre? Is not Venus another earth, where we observe the same phenomenon? Are not the revolutions of the sun also a confirmation, from analogy, of the same theory? All the planets, are they not earths, which revolve about the sun? Are not the satellites moons, which move round Jupiter and Saturn, and along with these primary planets round the sun? These analogies and resemblances, with others which I have not mentioned, are the sole proofs of the C/OPERNICAN system; and to you it belongs to consider, whether you have any analogies of the same kind to support your theory.
In reality, C/LEANTHES\, continued he, the modern system of astronomy is now so much received by all inquirers, and has become so essential a part even of our earliest education, that we are not commonly very scrupulous in examining the reasons upon which it is founded. It is now become a matter of mere curiosity to study the first writers on that subject, who had the full force of prejudice to encounter, and were obliged to turn their arguments on every side in order to render them popular and convincing. But if we peruse G/ALILEO\'s famous Dialogues concerning the system of the world, we shall find, that that great genius, one of the sublimest that ever existed, first bent all his endeavours to prove, that there was no foundation for the distinction commonly made between elementary and celestial substances. The schools, proceeding from the illusions of sense, had carried this distinction very far; and had established the latter substances to be ingenerable, incorruptible, unalterable, impassable; and had assigned all the opposite qualities to the former. But G/ALILEO, beginning with the moon, proved its similarity in every particular to the earth; its convex figure, its natural darkness when not illuminated, its density, its distinction into solid and liquid, the variations of its phases, the mutual illuminations of the earth and moon, their mutual eclipses, the inequalities of the lunar surface, &c. After many instances of this kind, with regard to all the planets, men plainly saw that these bodies became proper objects of experience; and that the similarity of their nature enabled us to extend the same arguments and phenomena from one to the other.

In this cautious proceeding of the astronomers, you may read your own condemnation, C/LEANTHES; or rather may see, that the subject in which you are engaged exceeds all human reason and inquiry. Can you pretend to show any such similarity between the fabric of a house, and the generation of a universe? Have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles the first arrangement of the elements? Have worlds ever been formed under your eye; and have you had leisure to observe the whole progress of the phenomenon, from the first appearance of order to its final consummation? If you have, then cite your experience, and deliver your theory.

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PART 3

How the most absurd argument, replied C/LEANTHES, in the hands of a man of ingenuity and invention, may acquire an air of probability! Are you not aware, P/HILO, that it became necessary for Copernicus and his first disciples to prove the similarity of the terrestrial and celestial matter; because several philosophers, blinded by old systems, and supported by some sensible appearances, had denied this similarity? but that it is by no means necessary, that Theists should prove the similarity of the works of Nature to those of Art; because this similarity is self-evident and undeniable? The same matter, a like form; what more is requisite to show an analogy between their causes, and to ascertain the origin of all things from a divine purpose and intention? Your objections, I must freely tell you, are no better than the abstruse cavils of those philosophers who denied motion; and ought to be refuted in the same manner, by
Suppose, therefore, that an articulate voice were heard in the clouds, much louder and more melodious than any which human art could ever reach: Suppose, that this voice were extended in the same instant over all nations, and spoke to each nation in its own language and dialect: Suppose, that the words delivered not only contain a just sense and meaning, but convey some instruction altogether worthy of a benevolent Being, superior to mankind: Could you possibly hesitate a moment concerning the cause of this voice? and must you not instantly ascribe it to some design or purpose? Yet I cannot see but all the same objections (if they merit that appellation) which lie against the system of Theism, may also be produced against this inference.

Might you not say, that all conclusions concerning fact were founded on experience: that when we hear an articulate voice in the dark, and thence infer a man, it is only the resemblance of the effects which leads us to conclude that there is a like resemblance in the cause: but that this extraordinary voice, by its loudness, extent, and flexibility to all languages, bears so little analogy to any human voice, that we have no reason to suppose any analogy in their causes: and consequently, that a rational, wise, coherent speech proceeded, you know not whence, from some accidental whistling of the winds, not from any divine reason or intelligence? You see clearly your own objections in these cavils, and I hope too you see clearly, that they cannot possibly have more force in the one case than in the other.

But to bring the case still nearer the present one of the universe, I shall make two suppositions, which imply not any absurdity or impossibility. Suppose that there is a natural, universal, invariable language, common to every individual of human race; and that books are natural productions, which perpetuate themselves in the same manner with animals and vegetables, by descent and propagation. Several expressions of our passions contain a universal language: all brute animals have a natural speech, which, however limited, is very intelligible to their own species. And as there are infinitely fewer parts and less contrivance in the finest composition of eloquence, than in the coarsest organised body, the propagation of an Iliad or Aeneid is an easier supposition than that of any plant or animal.

Suppose, therefore, that you enter into your library, thus peopled by natural volumes, containing the most refined reason and most exquisite beauty; could you possibly open one of them, and doubt, that its original cause bore the strongest analogy to mind and intelligence? When it reasons and discourses; when it expostulates, argues, and enforces its views and topics; when it applies sometimes to the pure intellect, sometimes to the affections; when it collects, disposes, and adorns every consideration suited to the subject; could you persist in asserting, that all this, at the bottom, had really no meaning; and that the first formation of this volume in the loins of its original parent proceeded not from thought and design? Your obstinacy, I know, reaches not that degree of firmness: even your sceptical play and wantonness would be abashed at so glaring an absurdity.
But if there be any difference, P/HILO\, between this supposed case and the real one of the universe, it is all to the advantage of the latter. The anatomy of an animal affords many stronger instances of design than the perusal of L/IVY\ or T/ACITUS\; and any objection which you start in the former case, by carrying me back to so unusual and extraordinary a scene as the first formation of worlds, the same objection has place on the supposition of our vegetating library. Choose, then, your party, P/HILO\, without ambiguity or evasion; assert either that a rational volume is no proof of a rational cause, or admit of a similar cause to all the works of nature.

Let me here observe too, continued C/LEANTHES\, that this religious argument, instead of being weakened by that scepticism so much affected by you, rather acquires force from it, and becomes more firm and undisputed. To exclude all argument or reasoning of every kind, is either affectation or madness. The declared profession of every reasonable sceptic is only to reject abstruse, remote, and refined arguments; to adhere to common sense and the plain instincts of nature; and to assent, wherever any reasons strike him with so full a force that he cannot, without the greatest violence, prevent it. Now the arguments for Natural Religion are plainly of this kind; and nothing but the most perverse, obstinate metaphysics can reject them. Consider, anatomise the eye; survey its structure and contrivance; and tell me, from your own feeling, if the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a force like that of sensation. The most obvious conclusion, surely, is in favour of design; and it requires time, reflection, and study, to summon up those frivolous, though abstruse objections, which can support Infidelity. Who can behold the male and female of each species, the correspondence of their parts and instincts, their passions, and whole course of life before and after generation, but must be sensible, that the propagation of the species is intended by Nature? Millions and millions of such instances present themselves through every part of the universe; and no language can convey a more intelligible irresistible meaning, than the curious adjustment of final causes. To what degree, therefore, of blind dogmatism must one have attained, to reject such natural and such convincing arguments?

Some beauties in writing we may meet with, which seem contrary to rules, and which gain the affections, and animate the imagination, in opposition to all the precepts of criticism, and to the authority of the established masters of art. And if the argument for Theism be, as you pretend, contradictory to the principles of logic; its universal, its irresistible influence proves clearly, that there may be arguments of a like irregular nature. Whatever cavils may be urged, an orderly world, as well as a coherent, articulate speech, will still be received as an incontestable proof of design and intention.

It sometimes happens, I own, that the religious arguments have not their due influence on an ignorant savage and barbarian; not because they are obscure and difficult, but because he never asks himself any question with regard to them. Whence arises the curious structure of an animal? From the copulation of its parents. And these whence? From their parents? A few removes set
the objects at such a distance, that to him they are lost in
darkness and confusion; nor is he actuated by any curiosity to
trace them further. But this is neither dogmatism nor scepticism,
but stupidity; a state of mind very different from your sifting,
inquisitive disposition, my ingenious friend. You can trace
causes from effects: You can compare the most distant and remote
objects: and your greatest errors proceed not from barrenness of
thought and invention, but from too luxuriant a fertility, which
suppresses your natural good sense, by a profusion of unnecessary
scruples and objections.

Here I could observe, HERMIPPUS, that PHILO was a little
embarrassed and confounded: But while he hesitated in delivering
an answer, luckily for him, DEMEA broke in upon the discourse,
and saved his countenance.

Your instance, CLEANTHES, said he, drawn from books and
language, being familiar, has, I confess, so much more force on
that account: but is there not some danger too in this very
circumstance; and may it not render us presumptuous, by making us
imagine we comprehend the Deity, and have some adequate idea of
his nature and attributes? When I read a volume, I enter into the
mind and intention of the author: I become him, in a manner, for
the instant; and have an immediate feeling and conception of
those ideas which revolved in his imagination while employed in
that composition. But so near an approach we never surely can
make to the Deity. His ways are not our ways. His attributes are
perfect, but incomprehensible. And this volume of nature contains
a great and inexplicable riddle, more than any intelligible
discourse or reasoning.

The ancient PLATONISTS, you know, were the most religious
and devout of all the Pagan philosophers; yet many of them,
particularly LOTINUS, expressly declare, that intellect or
understanding is not to be ascribed to the Deity; and that our
most perfect worship of him consists, not in acts of veneration,
reverence, gratitude, or love; but in a certain mysterious self-
annihilation, or total extinction of all our faculties. These
ideas are, perhaps, too far stretched; but still it must be
acknowledged, that, by representing the Deity as so intelligible
and comprehensible, and so similar to a human mind, we are guilty
of the grossest and most narrow partiality, and make ourselves
the model of the whole universe.

All the sentiments of the human mind, gratitude, resentment,
love, friendship, approbation, blame, pity, emulation, envy, have
a plain reference to the state and situation of man, and are
calculated for preserving the existence and promoting the
activity of such a being in such circumstances. It seems,
therefore, unreasonable to transfer such sentiments to a supreme
existence, or to suppose him actuated by them; and the phenomena
besides of the universe will not support us in such a theory. All
our ideas, derived from the senses, are confessedly false and
illusory; and cannot therefore be supposed to have place in a
supreme intelligence: And as the ideas of internal sentiment,
added to those of the external senses, compose the whole
furniture of human understanding, we may conclude, that none of
the materials of thought are in any respect similar in the human
and in the divine intelligence. Now, as to the manner of
thinking; how can we make any comparison between them, or suppose
them any wise resembling? Our thought is fluctuating, uncertain,
fleeting, successive, and compounded; and were we to remove these
circumstances, we absolutely annihilate its essence, and it would
in such a case be an abuse of terms to apply to it the name of
thought or reason. At least if it appear more pious and
respectful (as it really is) still to retain these terms, when we
mention the Supreme Being, we ought to acknowledge, that their
meaning, in that case, is totally incomprehensible; and that the
infirmities of our nature do not permit us to reach any ideas
which in the least correspond to the ineffable sublimity of the
Divine attributes.

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PART 4

It seems strange to me, said C/LEANTHES\, that you, D/EMEA\,
who are so sincere in the cause of religion, should still
maintain the mysterious, incomprehensible nature of the Deity,
and should insist so strenuously that he has no manner of
 likeness or resemblance to human creatures. The Deity, I can
readily allow, possesses many powers and attributes of which we
can have no comprehension: But if our ideas, so far as they go,
be not just, and adequate, and correspondent to his real nature,
I know not what there is in this subject worth insisting on. Is
the name, without any meaning, of such mighty importance? Or how
do you mystics, who maintain the absolute incomprehensibility of
the Deity, differ from Sceptics or Atheists, who assert, that the
first cause of all is unknown and unintelligible? Their temerity
must be very great, if, after rejecting the production by a mind,
I mean a mind resembling the human, (for I know of no other,) they pretend to assign, with certainty, any other specific
intelligible cause: And their conscience must be very scrupulous
indeed, if they refuse to call the universal unknown cause a God
or Deity; and to bestow on him as many sublime eulogies and
unmeaning epithets as you shall please to require of them.

Who could imagine, replied D/EMEA\, that C/LEANTHES\, the
calm philosophical C/LEANTHES\, would attempt to refute his
antagonists by affixing a nickname to them; and, like the common
bigots and inquisitors of the age, have recourse to invective and
declamation, instead of reasoning? Or does he not perceive, that
these topics are easily retorted, and that Anthropomorphite is an
appellation as invidious, and implies as dangerous consequences,
as the epithet of Mystic, with which he has honoured us? In
reality, C/LEANTHES\, consider what it is you assert when you
represent the Deity as similar to a human mind and understanding.
What is the soul of man? A composition of various faculties,
passions, sentiments, ideas; united, indeed, into one self or
person, but still distinct from each other. When it reasons, the
ideas, which are the parts of its discourse, arrange themselves
in a certain form or order; which is not preserved entire for a
moment, but immediately gives place to another arrangement. New
opinions, new passions, new affections, new feelings arise, which
continually diversify the mental scene, and produce in it the
greatest variety and most rapid succession imaginable. How is
this compatible with that perfect immutability and simplicity
which all true Theists ascribe to the Deity? By the same act, say
they, he sees past, present, and future: His love and hatred, his mercy and justice, are one individual operation: He is entire in every point of space; and complete in every instant of duration. No succession, no change, no acquisition, no diminution. What he is implies not in it any shadow of distinction or diversity. And what he is this moment he ever has been, and ever will be, without any new judgement, sentiment, or operation. He stands fixed in one simple, perfect state: nor can you ever say, with any propriety, that this act of his is different from that other; or that this judgement or idea has been lately formed, and will give place, by succession, to any different judgement or idea.

I can readily allow, said Climantes, that those who maintain the perfect simplicity of the Supreme Being, to the extent in which you have explained it, are complete Mystics, and chargeable with all the consequences which I have drawn from their opinion. They are, in a word, Atheists, without knowing it. For though it be allowed, that the Deity possesses attributes of which we have no comprehension, yet ought we never to ascribe to him any attributes which are absolutely incompatible with that intelligent nature essential to him. A mind, whose acts and sentiments and ideas are not distinct and successive; one, that is wholly simple, and totally immutable, is a mind which has no thought, no reason, no will, no sentiment, no love, no hatred; or, in a word, is no mind at all. It is an abuse of terms to give it that appellation; and we may as well speak of limited extension without figure, or of number without composition.

Pray consider, said Philo, whom you are at present inveighing against. You are honouring with the appellation of Atheist all the sound, orthodox divines, almost, who have treated of this subject; and you will at last be, yourself, found, according to your reckoning, the only sound Theist in the world. But if idolaters be Atheists, as, I think, may justly be asserted, and Christian Theologians the same, what becomes of the argument, so much celebrated, derived from the universal consent of mankind?

But because I know you are not much swayed by names and authorities, I shall endeavour to show you, a little more distinctly, the inconveniences of that Anthropomorphism, which you have embraced; and shall prove, that there is no ground to suppose a plan of the world to be formed in the Divine mind, consisting of distinct ideas, differently arranged, in the same manner as an architect forms in his head the plan of a house which he intends to execute.

It is not easy, I own, to see what is gained by this supposition, whether we judge of the matter by Reason or by Experience. We are still obliged to mount higher, in order to find the cause of this cause, which you had assigned as satisfactory and conclusive.

If Reason (I mean abstract reason, derived from inquiries a priori) be not alike mute with regard to all questions concerning cause and effect, this sentence at least it will venture to pronounce, That a mental world, or universe of ideas, requires a cause as much, as does a material world, or universe of objects; and, if similar in its arrangement, must require a similar cause.
For what is there in this subject, which should occasion a

different conclusion or inference? In an abstract view, they are
totally alike; and no difficulty attends the one supposition,
which is not common to both of them.

Again, when we will needs force Experience to pronounce some
sentence, even on these subjects which lie beyond her sphere,
neither can she perceive any material difference in this
particular, between these two kinds of worlds; but finds them to
be governed by similar principles, and to depend upon an equal
variety of causes in their operations. We have specimens in
miniature of both of them. Our own mind resembles the one; a
vegetable or animal body the other. Let experience, therefore,
judge from these samples. Nothing seems more delicate, with
regard to its causes, than thought; and as these causes never
operate in two persons after the same manner, so we never find
two persons who think exactly alike. Nor indeed does the same
person think exactly alike at any two different periods of time.
A difference of age, of the disposition of his body, of weather,
of food, of company, of books, of passions; any of these
particulars, or others more minute, are sufficient to alter the
curious machinery of thought, and communicate to it very
different movements and operations. As far as we can judge,
vegetables and animal bodies are not more delicate in their
motions, nor depend upon a greater variety or more curious
adjustment of springs and principles.

How, therefore, shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the
cause of that Being whom you suppose the Author of Nature, or,
according to your system of Anthropomorphism, the ideal world,
into which you trace the material? Have we not the same reason to
trace that ideal world into another ideal world, or new
intelligent principle? But if we stop, and go no further; why go
so far? why not stop at the material world? How can we satisfy
ourselves without going on in infinitum? And, after all, what
satisfaction is there in that infinite progression? Let us
remember the story of the Indian philosopher and his elephant. It
was never more applicable than to the present subject. If the
material world rests upon a similar ideal world, this ideal world
must rest upon some other; and so on, without end. It were
better, therefore, never to look beyond the present material
world. By supposing it to contain the principle of its order
within itself, we really assert it to be God; and the sooner we
arrive at that Divine Being, so much the better. When you go one
step beyond the mundane system, you only excite an inquisitive
humour which it is impossible ever to satisfy.

To say, that the different ideas which compose the reason of
the Supreme Being, fall into order of themselves, and by their
own nature, is really to talk without any precise meaning. If it
has a meaning, I would fain know, why it is not as good sense to
say, that the parts of the material world fall into order of
themselves and by their own nature. Can the one opinion be
intelligible, while the other is not so?

We have, indeed, experience of ideas which fall into order
of themselves, and without any known cause. But, I am sure, we
have a much larger experience of matter which does the same; as,
in all instances of generation and vegetation, where the accurate
analysis of the cause exceeds all human comprehension. We have also experience of particular systems of thought and of matter which have no order; of the first in madness, of the second in corruption. Why, then, should we think, that order is more essential to one than the other? And if it requires a cause in both, what do we gain by your system, in tracing the universe of objects into a similar universe of ideas? The first step which we make leads us on for ever. It were, therefore, wise in us to limit all our inquiries to the present world, without looking further. No satisfaction can ever be attained by these speculations, which so far exceed the narrow bounds of human understanding.

It was usual with the Peripatetics, you know, CLEANTHES, when the cause of any phenomenon was demanded, to have recourse to their faculties or occult qualities; and to say, for instance, that bread nourished by its nutritive faculty, and senna purged by its purgative. But it has been discovered, that this subterfuge was nothing but the disguise of ignorance; and that these philosophers, though less ingenuous, really said the same thing with the sceptics or the vulgar, who fairly confessed that they knew not the cause of these phenomena. In like manner, when it is asked, what cause produces order in the ideas of the Supreme Being; can any other reason be assigned by you, Anthropomorphites, than that it is a rational faculty, and that such is the nature of the Deity? But why a similar answer will not be equally satisfactory in accounting for the order of the world, without having recourse to any such intelligent creator as you insist on, may be difficult to determine. It is only to say, that such is the nature of material objects, and that they are all originally possessed of a faculty of order and proportion. These are only more learned and elaborate ways of confessing our ignorance; nor has the one hypothesis any real advantage above the other, except in its greater conformity to vulgar prejudices.

You have displayed this argument with great emphasis, replied CLEANTHES: You seem not sensible how easy it is to answer it. Even in common life, if I assign a cause for any event, is it any objection, PHILO, that I cannot assign the cause of that cause, and answer every new question which may incessantly be started? And what philosophers could possibly submit to so rigid a rule? philosophers, who confess ultimate causes to be totally unknown; and are sensible, that the most refined principles into which they trace the phenomena, are still to them as inexplicable as these phenomena themselves are to the vulgar. The order and arrangement of nature, the curious adjustment of final causes, the plain use and intention of every part and organ; all these bespeak in the clearest language an intelligent cause or author. The heavens and the earth join in the same testimony: The whole chorus of Nature raises one hymn to the praises of its Creator. You alone, or almost alone, disturb this general harmony. You start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections: You ask me, what is the cause of this cause? I know not; I care not; that concerns not me. I have found a Deity; and here I stop my inquiry. Let those go further, who are wiser or more enterprising.

I pretend to be neither, replied PHILO: And for that very reason, I should never perhaps have attempted to go so far;
especially when I am sensible, that I must at last be contented
to sit down with the same answer, which, without further trouble,
might have satisfied me from the beginning. If I am still to
remain in utter ignorance of causes, and can absolutely give an
explication of nothing, I shall never esteem it any advantage to
shove off for a moment a difficulty, which, you acknowledge, must
immediately, in its full force, recur upon me. Naturalists indeed
very justly explain particular effects by more general causes,
though these general causes themselves should remain in the end
totally inexplicable; but they never surely thought it
satisfactory to explain a particular effect by a particular
cause, which was no more to be accounted for than the effect
itself. An ideal system, arranged of itself, without a precedent
design, is not a whit more explicable than a material one, which
attains its order in a like manner; nor is there any more
difficulty in the latter supposition than in the former.

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PART 5

But to show you still more inconveniences, continued
P/HILO\, in your Anthropomorphism, please to take a new survey of
your principles. Like effects prove like causes. This is the
experimental argument; and this, you say too, is the sole
theological argument. Now, it is certain, that the liker the
effects are which are seen, and the liker the causes which are
inferred, the stronger is the argument. Every departure on either
side diminishes the probability, and renders the experiment less
conclusive. You cannot doubt of the principle; neither ought you
to reject its consequences.

All the new discoveries in astronomy, which prove the
immense grandeur and magnificence of the works of Nature, are so
many additional arguments for a Deity, according to the true
system of Theism; but, according to your hypothesis of
experimental Theism, they become so many objections, by removing
the effect still further from all resemblance to the effects of
human art and contrivance. For, if L/UCRETIUS]\, even following
the old system of the world, could exclaim,

   Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi
   Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas?
   Quis pariter coelos omnes convertere? et omnes
   Ignibus aetheriis terras suffire feraces?
   Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore praesto?20

   If T/ULLY\ esteemed this reasoning so natural, as to put it
into the mouth of his E/PICUREAN\:

   "Quibus enim oculis animi intueri potuit vester Plato
   fabricam illam tanti operis, qua construi a Deo atque
If this argument, I say, had any force in former ages, how much greater must it have at present, when the bounds of Nature are so infinitely enlarged, and such a magnificent scene is opened to us? It is still more unreasonable to form our idea of so unlimited a cause from our experience of the narrow productions of human design and invention.

The discoveries by microscopes, as they open a new universe in miniature, are still objections, according to you, arguments, according to me. The further we push our researches of this kind, we are still led to infer the universal cause of all to be vastly different from mankind, or from any object of human experience and observation.

And what say you to the discoveries in anatomy, chemistry, botany? These surely are no objections, replied CLEANTHES; they only discover new instances of art and contrivance. It is still the image of mind reflected on us from innumerable objects. Add, a mind like the human, said PHILO. I know of no other, replied CLEANTHES. And the liker the better, insisted PHILO. To be sure, said CLEANTHES.

Now, CLEANTHES, said PHILO, with an air of alacrity and triumph, mark the consequences. First, By this method of reasoning, you renounce all claim to infinity in any of the attributes of the Deity. For, as the cause ought only to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognisance, is not infinite; what pretensions have we, upon your suppositions, to ascribe that attribute to the Divine Being? You will still insist, that, by removing him so much from all similarity to human creatures, we give in to the most arbitrary hypothesis, and at the same time weaken all proofs of his existence.

Secondly, You have no reason, on your theory, for ascribing perfection to the Deity, even in his finite capacity, or for supposing him free from every error, mistake, or incoherence, in his undertakings. There are many inexplicable difficulties in the works of Nature, which, if we allow a perfect author to be proved a priori, are easily solved, and become only seeming difficulties, from the narrow capacity of man, who cannot trace infinite relations. But according to your method of reasoning, these difficulties become all real; and perhaps will be insisted on, as new instances of likeness to human art and contrivance. At least, you must acknowledge, that it is impossible for us to tell, from our limited views, whether this system contains any great faults, or deserves any considerable praise, if compared to other possible, and even real systems. Could a peasant, if the Aeneid were read to him, pronounce that poem to be absolutely faultless, or even assign to it its proper rank among the
productions of human wit, he, who had never seen any other production?

But were this world ever so perfect a production, it must still remain uncertain, whether all the excellences of the work can justly be ascribed to the workman. If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and beautiful a machine? And what surprise must we feel, when we find him a stupid mechanic, who imitated others, and copied an art, which, through a long succession of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections, deliberations, and controversies, had been gradually improving? Many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere this system was struck out; much labour lost, many fruitless trials made; and a slow, but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in the art of world-making. In such subjects, who can determine, where the truth; nay, who can conjecture where the probability lies, amidst a great number of hypotheses which may be proposed, and a still greater which may be imagined?

And what shadow of an argument, continued P/HILO\, can you produce, from your hypothesis, to prove the unity of the Deity? A great number of men join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a commonwealth; why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world? This is only so much greater similarity to human affairs. By sharing the work among several, we may so much further limit the attributes of each, and get rid of that extensive power and knowledge, which must be supposed in one deity, and which, according to you, can only serve to weaken the proof of his existence. And if such foolish, such vicious creatures as man, can yet often unite in framing and executing one plan, how much more those deities or demons, whom we may suppose several degrees more perfect!

To multiply causes without necessity, is indeed contrary to true philosophy: but this principle applies not to the present case. Were one deity antecedently proved by your theory, who were possessed of every attribute requisite to the production of the universe; it would be needless, I own, (though not absurd,) to suppose any other deity existent. But while it is still a question, Whether all these attributes are united in one subject, or dispersed among several independent beings, by what phenomena in nature can we pretend to decide the controversy? Where we see a body raised in a scale, we are sure that there is in the opposite scale, however concealed from sight, some counterpoising weight equal to it; but it is still allowed to doubt, whether that weight be an aggregate of several distinct bodies, or one uniform united mass. And if the weight requisite very much exceeds any thing which we have ever seen conjoined in any single body, the former supposition becomes still more probable and natural. An intelligent being of such vast power and capacity as is necessary to produce the universe, or, to speak in the language of ancient philosophy, so prodigious an animal exceeds all analogy, and even comprehension.

But further, C/LEANTHES\: men are mortal, and renew their species by generation; and this is common to all living creatures. The two great sexes of male and female, says M/ILTON\,
animate the world. Why must this circumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous and limited deities? Behold, then, the theogony of ancient times brought back upon us.

And why not become a perfect Anthropomorphite? Why not assert the deity or deities to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears, &c.? E/PICURUS\ maintained, that no man had ever seen reason but in a human figure; therefore the gods must have a human figure. And this argument, which is deservedly so much ridiculed by C/ICERO\, becomes, according to you, solid and philosophical.

In a word, C/LEANTHES\, a man who follows your hypothesis is able perhaps to assert, or conjecture, that the universe, sometime, arose from something like design: but beyond that position he cannot ascertain one single circumstance; and is left afterwards to fix every point of his theology by the utmost license of fancy and hypothesis. This world, for aught he knows, is very faulty and imperfect, compared to a superior standard; and was only the first rude essay of some infant deity, who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance: it is the work only of some dependent, inferior deity; and is the object of derision to his superiors: it is the production of old age and dotage in some superannuated deity; and ever since his death, has run on at adventures, from the first impulse and active force which it received from him. You justly give signs of horror, D/EMEA\, at these strange suppositions; but these, and a thousand more of the same kind, are C/LEANTHES\'s suppositions, not mine. From the moment the attributes of the Deity are supposed finite, all these have place. And I cannot, for my part, think that so wild and unsettled a system of theology is, in any respect, preferable to none at all.

These suppositions I absolutely disown, cried C/LEANTHES\: they strike me, however, with no horror, especially when proposed in that rambling way in which they drop from you. On the contrary, they give me pleasure, when I see, that, by the utmost indulgence of your imagination, you never get rid of the hypothesis of design in the universe, but are obliged at every turn to have recourse to it. To this concession I adhere steadily; and this I regard as a sufficient foundation for religion.

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PART 6

It must be a slight fabric, indeed, said D/EMEA\, which can be erected on so tottering a foundation. While we are uncertain whether there is one deity or many; whether the deity or deities, to whom we owe our existence, be perfect or imperfect, subordinate or supreme, dead or alive, what trust or confidence can we repose in them? What devotion or worship address to them? What veneration or obedience pay them? To all the purposes of life the theory of religion becomes altogether useless: and even with regard to speculative consequences, its uncertainty, according to you, must render it totally precarious and unsatisfactory.
To render it still more unsatisfactory, said P/HILO\, there occurs to me another hypothesis, which must acquire an air of probability from the method of reasoning so much insisted on by C/LEANTHES\: That like effects arise from like causes: this principle he supposes the foundation of all religion. But there is another principle of the same kind, no less certain, and derived from the same source of experience; that where several known circumstances are observed to be similar, the unknown will also be found similar. Thus, if we see the limbs of a human body, we conclude that it is also attended with a human head, though hid from us. Thus, if we see, through a chink in a wall, a small part of the sun, we conclude, that, were the wall removed, we should see the whole body. In short, this method of reasoning is so obvious and familiar, that no scruple can ever be made with regard to its solidity.

Now, if we survey the universe, so far as it falls under our knowledge, it bears a great resemblance to an animal or organised body, and seems actuated with a like principle of life and motion. A continual circulation of matter in it produces no disorder: a continual waste in every part is incessantly repaired: the closest sympathy is perceived throughout the entire system: and each part or member, in performing its proper offices, operates both to its own preservation and to that of the whole. The world, therefore, I infer, is an animal; and the Deity is the SOUL of the world, actuating it, and actuated by it.

You have too much learning, C/LEANTHES\, to be at all surprised at this opinion, which, you know, was maintained by almost all the Theists of antiquity, and chiefly prevails in their discourses and reasonings. For though, sometimes, the ancient philosophers reason from final causes, as if they thought the world the workmanship of God; yet it appears rather their favourite notion to consider it as his body, whose organisation renders it subservient to him. And it must be confessed, that, as the universe resembles more a human body than it does the works of human art and contrivance, if our limited analogy could ever, with any propriety, be extended to the whole of nature, the inference seems juster in favour of the ancient than the modern theory.

There are many other advantages, too, in the former theory, which recommended it to the ancient theologians. Nothing more repugnant to all their notions, because nothing more repugnant to common experience, than mind without body; a mere spiritual substance, which fell not under their senses nor comprehension, and of which they had not observed one single instance throughout all nature. Mind and body they knew, because they felt both: an order, arrangement, organisation, or internal machinery, in both, they likewise knew, after the same manner: and it could not but seem reasonable to transfer this experience to the universe; and to suppose the divine mind and body to be also coeval, and to have, both of them, order and arrangement naturally inherent in them, and inseparable from them.

Here, therefore, is a new species of Anthropomorphism, C/LEANTHES\, on which you may deliberate; and a theory which seems not liable to any considerable difficulties. You are too much superior, surely, to systematical prejudices, to find any
more difficulty in supposing an animal body to be, originally, of itself, or from unknown causes, possessed of order and organisation, than in supposing a similar order to belong to mind. But the vulgar prejudice, that body and mind ought always to accompany each other, ought not, one should think, to be entirely neglected; since it is founded on vulgar experience, the only guide which you profess to follow in all these theological inquiries. And if you assert, that our limited experience is an unequal standard, by which to judge of the unlimited extent of nature; you entirely abandon your own hypothesis, and must thenceforward adopt our Mysticism, as you call it, and admit of the absolute incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature.

This theory, I own, replied Cleanthes, has never before occurred to me, though a pretty natural one; and I cannot readily, upon so short an examination and reflection, deliver any opinion with regard to it. You are very scrupulous, indeed, said Philo: were I to examine any system of yours, I should not have acted with half that caution and reserve, in starting objections and difficulties to it. However, if any thing occur to you, you will oblige us by proposing it.

Why then, replied Cleanthes, it seems to me, that, though the world does, in many circumstances, resemble an animal body; yet is the analogy also defective in many circumstances the most material: no organs of sense; no seat of thought or reason; no one precise origin of motion and action. In short, it seems to bear a stronger resemblance to a vegetable than to an animal, and your inference would be so far inconclusive in favour of the soul of the world.

But, in the next place, your theory seems to imply the eternity of the world; and that is a principle, which, I think, can be refuted by the strongest reasons and probabilities. I shall suggest an argument to this purpose, which, I believe, has not been insisted on by any writer. Those, who reason from the late origin of arts and sciences, though their inference wants not force, may perhaps be refuted by considerations derived from the nature of human society, which is in continual revolution, between ignorance and knowledge, liberty and slavery, riches and poverty; so that it is impossible for us, from our limited experience, to foretell with assurance what events may or may not be expected. Ancient learning and history seem to have been in great danger of entirely perishing after the inundation of the barbarous nations; and had these convulsions continued a little longer, or been a little more violent, we should not probably have now known what passed in the world a few centuries before us. Nay, were it not for the superstition of the Popes, who preserved a little jargon of Latin, in order to support the appearance of an ancient and universal church, that tongue must have been utterly lost; in which case, the Western world, being totally barbarous, would not have been in a fit disposition for receiving the Greek language and learning, which was conveyed to them after the sacking of Constantinople. When learning and books had been extinguished, even the mechanical arts would have fallen considerably to decay; and it is easily imagined, that fable or tradition might ascribe to them a much later origin than the true one. This vulgar argument, therefore, against the eternity of the world, seems a little precarious.
But here appears to be the foundation of a better argument. LUCULLUS was the first that brought cherry-trees from ASIA to EUROPE; though that tree thrives so well in many EUROPEAN climates, that it grows in the woods without any culture. Is it possible, that throughout a whole eternity, no EUROPEAN had ever passed into ASIA, and thought of transplanting so delicious a fruit into his own country? Or if the tree was once transplanted and propagated, how could it ever afterwards perish? Empires may rise and fall, liberty and slavery succeed alternately, ignorance and knowledge give place to each other; but the cherry-tree will still remain in the woods of GREECE, SPAIN, and ITALY, and will never be affected by the revolutions of human society.

It is not two thousand years since vines were transplanted into FRANCE, though there is no climate in the world more favourable to them. It is not three centuries since horses, cows, sheep, swine, dogs, corn, were known in AMERICA. Is it possible, that during the revolutions of a whole eternity, there never arose a COLUMBUS, who might open the communication between EUROPE and that continent? We may as well imagine, that all men would wear stockings for ten thousand years, and never have the sense to think of garters to tie them. All these seem convincing proofs of the youth, or rather infancy, of the world; as being founded on the operation of principles more constant and steady than those by which human society is governed and directed. Nothing less than a total convulsion of the elements will ever destroy all the EUROPEAN animals and vegetables which are now to be found in the Western world.

And what argument have you against such convulsions? replied PHILO. Strong and almost incontestable proofs may be traced over the whole earth, that every part of this globe has continued for many ages entirely covered with water. And though order were supposed inseparable from matter, and inherent in it; yet may matter be susceptible of many and great revolutions, through the endless periods of eternal duration. The incessant changes, to which every part of it is subject, seem to intimate some such general transformations; though, at the same time, it is observable, that all the changes and corruptions of which we have ever had experience, are but passages from one state of order to another; nor can matter ever rest in total deformity and confusion. What we see in the parts, we may infer in the whole; at least, that is the method of reasoning on which you rest your whole theory. And were I obliged to defend any particular system of this nature, which I never willingly should do, I esteem none more plausible than that which ascribes an eternal inherent principle of order to the world, though attended with great and continual revolutions and alterations. This at once solves all difficulties; and if the solution, by being so general, is not entirely complete and satisfactory, it is at least a theory that we must sooner or later have recourse to, whatever system we embrace. How could things have been as they are, were there not an original inherent principle of order somewhere, in thought or in matter? And it is very indifferent to which of these we give the preference. Chance has no place, on any hypothesis, sceptical or religious. Every thing is surely governed by steady, inviolable laws. And were the inmost essence of things laid open
to us, we should then discover a scene, of which, at present, we can have no idea. Instead of admiring the order of natural beings, we should clearly see that it was absolutely impossible for them, in the smallest article, ever to admit of any other disposition.

Were any one inclined to revive the ancient Pagan Theology, which maintained, as we learn from HESIOD, that this globe was governed by 30,000 deities, who arose from the unknown powers of nature: you would naturally object, CLEANTHES, that nothing is gained by this hypothesis; and that it is as easy to suppose all men animals, beings more numerous, but less perfect, to have sprung immediately from a like origin. Push the same inference a step further, and you will find a numerous society of deities as explicable as one universal deity, who possesses within himself the powers and perfections of the whole society. All these systems, then, of Scepticism, Polytheism, and Theism, you must allow, on your principles, to be on a like footing, and that no one of them has any advantage over the others. You may thence learn the fallacy of your principles.

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PART 7

But here, continued PHILO, in examining the ancient system of the soul of the world, there strikes me, all on a sudden, a new idea, which, if just, must go near to subvert all your reasoning, and destroy even your first inferences, on which you repose such confidence. If the universe bears a greater likeness to animal bodies and to vegetables, than to the works of human art, it is more probable that its cause resembles the cause of the former than that of the latter, and its origin ought rather to be ascribed to generation or vegetation, than to reason or design. Your conclusion, even according to your own principles, is therefore lame and defective.

Pray open up this argument a little further, said DEMEA, for I do not rightly apprehend it in that concise manner in which you have expressed it.

Our friend CLEANTHES, replied PHILO, as you have heard, asserts, that since no question of fact can be proved otherwise than by experience, the existence of a Deity admits not of proof from any other medium. The world, says he, resembles the works of human contrivance; therefore its cause must also resemble that of the other. Here we may remark, that the operation of one very small part of nature, to wit man, upon another very small part, to wit that inanimate matter lying within his reach, is the rule by which CLEANTHES judges of the origin of the whole; and he measures objects, so widely disproportioned, by the same individual standard. But to waive all objections drawn from this topic, I affirm, that there are other parts of the universe (besides the machines of human invention) which bear still a greater resemblance to the fabric of the world, and which, therefore, afford a better conjecture concerning the universal origin of this system. These parts are animals and vegetables. The world plainly resembles more an animal or a vegetable, than it does a watch or a knitting-loom. Its cause, therefore, it is
more probable, resembles the cause of the former. The cause of
the former is generation or vegetation. The cause, therefore, of
the world, we may infer to be something similar or analogous to
generation or vegetation.

But how is it conceivable, said D/EMEA\, that the world can
arise from any thing similar to vegetation or generation?

Very easily, replied P/HILO\. In like manner as a tree sheds
its seed into the neighbouring fields, and produces other trees;
so the great vegetable, the world, or this planetary system,
produces within itself certain seeds, which, being scattered into
the surrounding chaos, vegetate into new worlds. A comet, for
instance, is the seed of a world; and after it has been fully
ripened, by passing from sun to sun, and star to star, it is at
last tossed into the unformed elements which every where surround
this universe, and immediately sprouts up into a new system.

Or if, for the sake of variety (for I see no other
advantage), we should suppose this world to be an animal; a comet
is the egg of this animal: and in like manner as an ostrich lays
its egg in the sand, which, without any further care, hatches the
egg, and produces a new animal; so....

I understand you, says D/EMEA:\ But what wild, arbitrary
suppositions are these! What data have you for such extraordinary
conclusions? And is the slight, imaginary resemblance of the
world to a vegetable or an animal sufficient to establish the
same inference with regard to both? Objects, which are in general
so widely different, ought they to be a standard for each other?

Right, cries P/HILO\: This is the topic on which I have all
along insisted. I have still asserted, that we have no data to
establish any system of cosmogony. Our experience, so imperfect
in itself, and so limited both in extent and duration, can afford
us no probable conjecture concerning the whole of things. But if
we must needs fix on some hypothesis; by what rule, pray, ought
we to determine our choice? Is there any other rule than the
greater similarity of the objects compared? And does not a plant
or an animal, which springs from vegetation or generation, bear a
stronger resemblance to the world, than does any artificial
machine, which arises from reason and design?

But what is this vegetation and generation of which you
talk? said D/EMEA\. Can you explain their operations, and
anatomise that fine internal structure on which they depend?

As much, at least, replied P/HILO\, as C/LEANThES\ can
explain the operations of reason, or anatomise that internal
structure on which it depends. But without any such elaborate
disquisitions, when I see an animal, I infer, that it sprang from
generation; and that with as great certainty as you conclude a
house to have been reared by design. These words, generation,
reason, mark only certain powers and energies in nature, whose
effects are known, but whose essence is incomprehensible; and one
of these principles, more than the other, has no privilege for
being made a standard to the whole of nature.

In reality, D/EMEA\, it may reasonably be expected, that the
larger the views are which we take of things, the better will they conduct us in our conclusions concerning such extraordinary and such magnificent subjects. In this little corner of the world alone, there are four principles, reason, instinct, generation, vegetation, which are similar to each other, and are the causes of similar effects. What a number of other principles may we naturally suppose in the immense extent and variety of the universe, could we travel from planet to planet, and from system to system, in order to examine each part of this mighty fabric? Any one of these four principles above mentioned, (and a hundred others which lie open to our conjecture,) may afford us a theory by which to judge of the origin of the world; and it is a palpable and egregious partiality to confine our view entirely to that principle by which our own minds operate. Were this principle more intelligible on that account, such a partiality might be somewhat excusable: But reason, in its internal fabric and structure, is really as little known to us as instinct or vegetation; and, perhaps, even that vague, indeterminate word, Nature, to which the vulgar refer every thing, is not at the bottom more inexplicable. The effects of these principles are all known to us from experience; but the principles themselves, and their manner of operation, are totally unknown; nor is it less intelligible, or less conformable to experience, to say, that the world arose by vegetation, from a seed shed by another world, than to say that it arose from a divine reason or contrivance, according to the sense in which C/LEANTHES\ understands it.

But methinks, said D/EMEA\, if the world had a vegetative quality, and could sow the seeds of new worlds into the infinite chaos, this power would be still an additional argument for design in its author. For whence could arise so wonderful a faculty but from design? Or how can order spring from any thing which perceives not that order which it bestows?

You need only look around you, replied P/HILO\, to satisfy yourself with regard to this question. A tree bestows order and organisation on that tree which springs from it, without knowing the order; an animal in the same manner on its offspring; a bird on its nest; and instances of this kind are even more frequent in the world than those of order, which arise from reason and contrivance. To say, that all this order in animals and vegetables proceeds ultimately from design, is begging the question; nor can that great point be ascertained otherwise than by proving, a priori, both that order is, from its nature, inseparably attached to thought; and that it can never of itself, or from original unknown principles, belong to matter.

But further, D/EMEA\; this objection which you urge can never be made use of by C/LEANTHES\, without renouncing a defence which he has already made against one of my objections. When I inquired concerning the cause of that supreme reason and intelligence into which he resolves every thing; he told me, that the impossibility of satisfying such inquiries could never be admitted as an objection in any species of philosophy. We must stop somewhere, says he; nor is it ever within the reach of human capacity to explain ultimate causes, or show the last connections of any objects. It is sufficient, if any steps, so far as we go, are supported by experience and observation. Now, that vegetation and generation, as well as reason, are experienced to be
principles of order in nature, is undeniable. If I rest my system of cosmogony on the former, preferably to the latter, it is at my choice. The matter seems entirely arbitrary. And when C/LEANTHES\ asks me what is the cause of my great vegetative or generative faculty, I am equally entitled to ask him the cause of his great reasoning principle. These questions we have agreed to forbear on both sides; and it is chiefly his interest on the present occasion to stick to this agreement. Judging by our limited and imperfect experience, generation has some privileges above reason: for we see every day the latter arise from the former, never the former from the latter.

Compare, I beseech you, the consequences on both sides. The world, say I, resembles an animal; therefore it is an animal, therefore it arose from generation. The steps, I confess, are wide; yet there is some small appearance of analogy in each step. The world, says C/LEANTHES\, resembles a machine; therefore it is a machine, therefore it arose from design. The steps are here equally wide, and the analogy less striking. And if he pretends to carry on my hypothesis a step further, and to infer design or reason from the great principle of generation, on which I insist; I may, with better authority, use the same freedom to push further his hypothesis, and infer a divine generation or theogony from his principle of reason. I have at least some faint shadow of experience, which is the utmost that can ever be attained in the present subject. Reason, in innumerable instances, is observed to arise from the principle of generation, and never to arise from any other principle.

H/ESIOD\, and all the ancient mythologists, were so struck with this analogy, that they universally explained the origin of nature from an animal birth, and copulation. P/LATO\ too, so far as he is intelligible, seems to have adopted some such notion in his T/IMAEUS\.

The B/RAHMINS\ assert, that the world arose from an infinite spider, who spun this whole complicated mass from his bowels, and annihilates afterwards the whole or any part of it, by absorbing it again, and resolving it into his own essence. Here is a species of cosmogony, which appears to us ridiculous; because a spider is a little contemptible animal, whose operations we are never likely to take for a model of the whole universe. But still here is a new species of analogy, even in our globe. And were there a planet wholly inhabited by spiders, (which is very possible,) this inference would there appear as natural and irrefragable as that which in our planet ascribes the origin of all things to design and intelligence, as explained by C/LEANTHES\. Why an orderly system may not be spun from the belly as well as from the brain, it will be difficult for him to give a satisfactory reason.

I must confess, P/HILO\, replied C/LEANTHES\, that of all men living, the task which you have undertaken, of raising doubts and objections, suits you best, and seems, in a manner, natural and unavoidable to you. So great is your fertility of invention, that I am not ashamed to acknowledge myself unable, on a sudden, to solve regularly such out-of-the-way difficulties as you incessantly start upon me: though I clearly see, in general, their fallacy and error. And I question not, but you are
yourself, at present, in the same case, and have not the solution so ready as the objection: while you must be sensible, that common sense and reason are entirely against you; and that such whimsies as you have delivered, may puzzle, but never can convince us.

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PART 8

What you ascribe to the fertility of my invention, replied P/HILO\, is entirely owing to the nature of the subject. In subjects adapted to the narrow compass of human reason, there is commonly but one determination, which carries probability or conviction with it; and to a man of sound judgement, all other suppositions, but that one, appear entirely absurd and chimerical. But in such questions as the present, a hundred contradictory views may preserve a kind of imperfect analogy; and invention has here full scope to exert itself. Without any great effort of thought, I believe that I could, in an instant, propose other systems of cosmogony, which would have some faint appearance of truth, though it is a thousand, a million to one, if either yours or any one of mine be the true system.

For instance, what if I should revive the old E/PICUREAN\ hypothesis? This is commonly, and I believe justly, esteemed the most absurd system that has yet been proposed; yet I know not whether, with a few alterations, it might not be brought to bear a faint appearance of probability. Instead of supposing matter infinite, as E/PICURUS\ did, let us suppose it finite. A finite number of particles is only susceptible of finite transpositions: and it must happen, in an eternal duration, that every possible order or position must be tried an infinite number of times. This world, therefore, with all its events, even the most minute, has before been produced and destroyed, and will again be produced and destroyed, without any bounds and limitations. No one, who has a conception of the powers of infinite, in comparison of finite, will ever scruple this determination.

But this supposes, said D/EMEA\, that matter can acquire motion, without any voluntary agent or first mover.

And where is the difficulty, replied P/HILO\, of that supposition? Every event, before experience, is equally difficult and incomprehensible; and every event, after experience, is equally easy and intelligible. Motion, in many instances, from gravity, from elasticity, from electricity, begins in matter, without any known voluntary agent: and to suppose always, in these cases, an unknown voluntary agent, is mere hypothesis; and hypothesis attended with no advantages. The beginning of motion in matter itself is as conceivable a priori as its communication from mind and intelligence.

Besides, why may not motion have been propagated by impulse through all eternity, and the same stock of it, or nearly the same, be still upheld in the universe? As much is lost by the composition of motion, as much is gained by its resolution. And whatever the causes are, the fact is certain, that matter is, and always has been, in continual agitation, as far as human
experience or tradition reaches. There is not probably, at present, in the whole universe, one particle of matter at absolute rest.

And this very consideration too, continued P/HILO\, which we have stumbled on in the course of the argument, suggests a new hypothesis of cosmogony, that is not absolutely absurd and improbable. Is there a system, an order, an economy of things, by which matter can preserve that perpetual agitation which seems essential to it, and yet maintain a constancy in the forms which it produces? There certainly is such an economy; for this is actually the case with the present world. The continual motion of matter, therefore, in less than infinite transpositions, must produce this economy or order; and by its very nature, that order, when once established, supports itself, for many ages, if not to eternity. But wherever matter is so poised, arranged, and adjusted, as to continue in perpetual motion, and yet preserve a constancy in the forms, its situation must, of necessity, have all the same appearance of art and contrivance which we observe at present. All the parts of each form must have a relation to each other, and to the whole; and the whole itself must have a relation to the other parts of the universe; to the element in which the form subsists; to the materials with which it repairs its waste and decay; and to every other form which is hostile or friendly. A defect in any of these particulars destroys the form; and the matter of which it is composed is again set loose, and is thrown into irregular motions and fermentations, till it unite itself to some other regular form. If no such form be prepared to receive it, and if there be a great quantity of this corrupted matter in the universe, the universe itself is entirely disordered; whether it be the feeble embryo of a world in its first beginnings that is thus destroyed, or the rotten carcass of one languishing in old age and infirmity. In either case, a chaos ensues; till finite, though innumeruble revolutions produce at last some forms, whose parts and organs are so adjusted as to support the forms amidst a continued succession of matter.

Suppose (for we shall endeavour to vary the expression), that matter were thrown into any position, by a blind, unguided force; it is evident that this first position must, in all probability, be the most confused and most disorderly imaginable, without any resemblance to those works of human contrivance, which, along with a symmetry of parts, discover an adjustment of means to ends, and a tendency to self-preservation. If the actuating force cease after this operation, matter must remain for ever in disorder, and continue an immense chaos, without any proportion or activity. But suppose that the actuating force, whatever it be, still continues in matter, this first position will immediately give place to a second, which will likewise in all probability be as disorderly as the first, and so on through many successions of changes and revolutions. No particular order or position ever continues a moment unaltered. The original force, still remaining in activity, gives a perpetual restlessness to matter. Every possible situation is produced, and instantly destroyed. If a glimpse or dawn of order appears for a moment, it is instantly hurried away, and confounded, by that never-ceasing force which actuates every part of matter.

Thus the universe goes on for many ages in a continued
succession of chaos and disorder. But is it not possible that it may settle at last, so as not to lose its motion and active force (for that we have supposed inherent in it), yet so as to preserve an uniformity of appearance, amidst the continual motion and fluctuation of its parts? This we find to be the case with the universe at present. Every individual is perpetually changing, and every part of every individual; and yet the whole remains, in appearance, the same. May we not hope for such a position, or rather be assured of it, from the eternal revolutions of unguided matter; and may not this account for all the appearing wisdom and contrivance which is in the universe? Let us contemplate the subject a little, and we shall find, that this adjustment, if attained by matter of a seeming stability in the forms, with a real and perpetual revolution or motion of parts, affords a plausible, if not a true solution of the difficulty.

It is in vain, therefore, to insist upon the uses of the parts in animals or vegetables, and their curious adjustment to each other. I would fain know, how an animal could subsist, unless its parts were so adjusted? Do we not find, that it immediately perishes whenever this adjustment ceases, and that its matter corrupting tries some new form? It happens indeed, that the parts of the world are so well adjusted, that some regular form immediately lays claim to this corrupted matter: and if it were not so, could the world subsist? Must it not dissolve as well as the animal, and pass through new positions and situations, till in great, but finite succession, it falls at last into the present or some such order?

It is well, replied CLEANTHES, you told us, that this hypothesis was suggested on a sudden, in the course of the argument. Had you had leisure to examine it, you would soon have perceived the insuperable objections to which it is exposed. No form, you say, can subsist, unless it possess those powers and organs requisite for its subsistence: some new order or economy must be tried, and so on, without intermission; till at last some order, which can support and maintain itself, is fallen upon. But according to this hypothesis, whence arise the many conveniences and advantages which men and all animals possess? Two eyes, two ears, are not absolutely necessary for the subsistence of the species. Human race might have been propagated and preserved, without horses, dogs, cows, sheep, and those innumerable fruits and products which serve to our satisfaction and enjoyment. If no camels had been created for the use of man in the sandy deserts of AFRICA and ARABIA, would the world have been dissolved? If no lodestone had been framed to give that wonderful and useful direction to the needle, would human society and the human kind have been immediately extinguished? Though the maxims of Nature be in general very frugal, yet instances of this kind are far from being rare; and any one of them is a sufficient proof of design, and of a benevolent design, which gave rise to the order and arrangement of the universe.

At least, you may safely infer, said PHILO, that the foregoing hypothesis is so far incomplete and imperfect, which I shall not scruple to allow. But can we ever reasonably expect greater success in any attempts of this nature? Or can we ever
hope to erect a system of cosmogony, that will be liable to no exceptions, and will contain no circumstance repugnant to our limited and imperfect experience of the analogy of Nature? Your theory itself cannot surely pretend to any such advantage, even though you have run into Anthropomorphism, the better to preserve a conformity to common experience. Let us once more put it to trial. In all instances which we have ever seen, ideas are copied from real objects, and are ectypal, not archetypal, to express myself in learned terms: You reverse this order, and give thought the precedence. In all instances which we have ever seen, thought has no influence upon matter, except where that matter is so conjoined with it as to have an equal reciprocal influence upon it. No animal can move immediately any thing but the members of its own body; and indeed, the equality of action and reaction seems to be an universal law of nature: But your theory implies a contradiction to this experience. These instances, with many more, which it were easy to collect, (particularly the supposition of a mind or system of thought that is eternal, or, in other words, an animal ingenerable and immortal); these instances, I say, may teach all of us sobriety in condemning each other, and let us see, that as no system of this kind ought ever to be received from a slight analogy, so neither ought any to be rejected on account of a small incongruity. For that is an inconvenience from which we can justly pronounce no one to be exempted.

All religious systems, it is confessed, are subject to great and insuperable difficulties. Each disputant triumphs in his turn; while he carries on an offensive war, and exposes the absurdities, barbarities, and pernicious tenets of his antagonist. But all of them, on the whole, prepare a complete triumph for the Sceptic; who tells them, that no system ought ever to be embraced with regard to such subjects: For this plain reason, that no absurdity ought ever to be assented to with regard to any subject. A total suspense of judgement is here our only reasonable resource. And if every attack, as is commonly observed, and no defence, among Theologians, is successful; how complete must be his victory, who remains always, with all mankind, on the offensive, and has himself no fixed station or abiding city, which he is ever, on any occasion, obliged to defend?

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PART 9

But if so many difficulties attend the argument a posteriori, said D/EMEA, had we not better adhere to that simple and sublime argument a priori, which, by offering to us infallible demonstration, cuts off at once all doubt and difficulty? By this argument, too, we may prove the infinity of the Divine attributes, which, I am afraid, can never be ascertained with certainty from any other topic. For how can an effect, which either is finite, or, for aught we know, may be so; how can such an effect, I say, prove an infinite cause? The unity too of the Divine Nature, it is very difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to deduce merely from contemplating the works of nature; nor will the uniformity alone of the plan, even were it allowed, give us any assurance of that attribute. Whereas the
argument a priori ....

You seem to reason, D/EMEA\, interposed C/LEANTHES\, as if those advantages and conveniences in the abstract argument were full proofs of its solidity. But it is first proper, in my opinion, to determine what argument of this nature you choose to insist on; and we shall afterwards, from itself, better than from its useful consequences, endeavour to determine what value we ought to put upon it.

The argument, replied D/EMEA\, which I would insist on, is the common one. Whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence; it being absolutely impossible for any thing to produce itself, or be the cause of its own existence. In mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, we must either go on in tracing an infinite succession, without any ultimate cause at all; or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause, that is necessarily existent: Now, that the first supposition is absurd, may be thus proved. In the infinite chain or succession of causes and effects, each single effect is determined to exist by the power and efficacy of that cause which immediately preceded; but the whole eternal chain or succession, taken together, is not determined or caused by any thing; and yet it is evident that it requires a cause or reason, as much as any particular object which begins to exist in time. The question is still reasonable, why this particular succession of causes existed from eternity, and not any other succession, or no succession at all. If there be no necessarily existent being, any supposition which can be formed is equally possible; nor is there any more absurdity in Nothing’s having existed from eternity, than there is in that succession of causes which constitutes the universe. What was it, then, which determined Something to exist rather than Nothing, and bestowed being on a particular possibility, exclusive of the rest? External causes, there are supposed to be none. Chance is a word without a meaning. Was it Nothing? But that can never produce any thing. We must, therefore, have recourse to a necessarily existent Being, who carries the REASON of his existence in himself, and who cannot be supposed not to exist, without an express contradiction. There is, consequently, such a Being; that is, there is a Deity.

I shall not leave it to P/HILO\, said C/LEANTHES\, though I know that the starting objections is his chief delight, to point out the weakness of this metaphysical reasoning. It seems to me so obviously ill-grounded, and at the same time of so little consequence to the cause of true piety and religion, that I shall myself venture to show the fallacy of it.

I shall begin with observing, that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it.
It is pretended that the Deity is a necessarily existent being; and this necessity of his existence is attempted to be explained by asserting, that if we knew his whole essence or nature, we should perceive it to be as impossible for him not to exist, as for twice two not to be four. But it is evident that this can never happen, while our faculties remain the same as at present. It will still be possible for us, at any time, to conceive the non-existence of what we formerly conceived to exist; nor can the mind ever lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain always in being; in the same manner as we lie under a necessity of always conceiving twice two to be four. The words, therefore, necessary existence, have no meaning; or, which is the same thing, none that is consistent.

But further, why may not the material universe be the necessarily existent Being, according to this pretended explication of necessity? We dare not affirm that we know all the qualities of matter; and for aught we can determine, it may contain some qualities, which, were they known, would make its non-existence appear as great a contradiction as that twice two is five. I find only one argument employed to prove, that the material world is not the necessarily existent Being: and this argument is derived from the contingency both of the matter and the form of the world. "Any particle of matter," it is said, "may be conceived to be annihilated; and any form may be conceived to be altered. Such an annihilation or alteration, therefore, is not impossible."22 But it seems a great partiality not to perceive, that the same argument extends equally to the Deity, so far as we have any conception of him; and that the mind can at least imagine him to be non-existent, or his attributes to be altered. It must be some unknown, inconceivable qualities, which can make his non-existence appear impossible, or his attributes unalterable: And no reason can be assigned, why these qualities may not belong to matter. As they are altogether unknown and inconceivable, they can never be proved incompatible with it.

Add to this, that in tracing an eternal succession of objects, it seems absurd to inquire for a general cause or first author. How can any thing, that exists from eternity, have a cause, since that relation implies a priority in time, and a beginning of existence?

In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each part is caused by that which preceded it, and causes that which succeeds it. Where then is the difficulty? But the whole, you say, wants a cause. I answer, that the uniting of these parts into a whole, like the uniting of several distinct countries into one kingdom, or several distinct members into one body, is performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on the nature of things. Did I show you the particular causes of each individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts.

Though the reasonings which you have urged, C/LEANThES, may well excuse me, said P/HILO, from starting any further difficulties, yet I cannot forbear insisting still upon another topic. It is observed by arithmeticians, that the products of 9,
compose always either 9, or some lesser product of 9, if you add
together all the characters of which any of the former products
is composed. Thus, of 18, 27, 36, which are products of 9, you
make 9 by adding 1 to 8, 2 to 7, 3 to 6. Thus, 369 is a product
also of 9; and if you add 3, 6, and 9, you make 18, a lesser
product of 9. To a superficial observer, so wonderful a
regularity may be admired as the effect either of chance or
design: but a skilful algebraist immediately concludes it to be
the work of necessity, and demonstrates, that it must for ever
result from the nature of these numbers. Is it not probable, I
ask, that the whole economy of the universe is conducted by a
like necessity, though no human algebra can furnish a key which
solves the difficulty? And instead of admiring the order of
natural beings, may it not happen, that, could we penetrate into
the intimate nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it was
absolutely impossible they could ever admit of any other
disposition? So dangerous is it to introduce this idea of
necessity into the present question! and so naturally does it
afford an inference directly opposite to the religious
hypothesis!

But dropping all these abstractions, continued P/HILO, and
confining ourselves to more familiar topics, I shall venture to
add an observation, that the argument a priori has seldom been
found very convincing, except to people of a metaphysical head,
who have accustomed themselves to abstract reasoning, and who,
finding from mathematics, that the understanding frequently leads
to truth through obscurity, and, contrary to first appearances,
have transferred the same habit of thinking to subjects where it
ought not to have place. Other people, even of good sense and the
best inclined to religion, feel always some deficiency in such
arguments, though they are not perhaps able to explain distinctly
where it lies; a certain proof that men ever did, and ever will
derive their religion from other sources than from this species
of reasoning.

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PART 10

It is my opinion, I own, replied D/EMEA, that each man
feels, in a manner, the truth of religion within his own breast,
and, from a consciousness of his imbecility and misery, rather
than from any reasoning, is led to seek protection from that
Being, on whom he and all nature is dependent. So anxious or so
tedious are even the best scenes of life, that futurity is still
the object of all our hopes and fears. We incessantly look
forward, and endeavour, by prayers, adoration, and sacrifice, to
appease those unknown powers, whom we find, by experience, so
able to afflict and oppress us. Wretched creatures that we are!
what resource for us amidst the innumerable ills of life, did not
religion suggest some methods of atonement, and appease those
terrors with which we are incessantly agitated and tormented?

I am indeed persuaded, said P/HILO, that the best, and
indeed the only method of bringing every one to a due sense of
religion, is by just representations of the misery and wickedness
of men. And for that purpose a talent of eloquence and strong
imagery is more requisite than that of reasoning and argument.
For is it necessary to prove what every one feels within himself? It is only necessary to make us feel it, if possible, more intimately and sensibly.

The people, indeed, replied D/EMEA, are sufficiently convinced of this great and melancholy truth. The miseries of life; the unhappiness of man; the general corruptions of our nature; the unsatisfactory enjoyment of pleasures, riches, honours; these phrases have become almost proverbial in all languages. And who can doubt of what all men declare from their own immediate feeling and experience?

In this point, said P/HILO, the learned are perfectly agreed with the vulgar; and in all letters, sacred and profane, the topic of human misery has been insisted on with the most pathetic eloquence that sorrow and melancholy could inspire. The poets, who speak from sentiment, without a system, and whose testimony has therefore the more authority, abound in images of this nature. From Homer down to Dr. Young, the whole inspired tribe have ever been sensible, that no other representation of things would suit the feeling and observation of each individual.

As to authorities, replied D/EMEA, you need not seek them. Look round this library of C/LEANTHES. I shall venture to affirm, that, except authors of particular sciences, such as chemistry or botany, who have no occasion to treat of human life, there is scarce one of those innumerable writers, from whom the sense of human misery has not, in some passage or other, extorted a complaint and confession of it. At least, the chance is entirely on that side; and no one author has ever, so far as I can recollect, been so extravagant as to deny it.

There you must excuse me, said P/HILO: L/EIBNIZ has denied it; and is perhaps the first who ventured upon so bold and paradoxical an opinion; at least, the first who made it essential to his philosophical system.

And by being the first, replied D/EMEA, might he not have been sensible of his error? For is this a subject in which philosophers can propose to make discoveries especially in so late an age? And can any man hope by a simple denial (for the subject scarcely admits of reasoning), to bear down the united testimony of mankind, founded on sense and consciousness?

And why should man, added he, pretend to an exemption from the lot of all other animals? The whole earth, believe me, P/HILO, is cursed and polluted. A perpetual war is kindled amongst all living creatures. Necessity, hunger, want, stimulate the strong and courageous: Fear, anxiety, terror, agitate the weak and infirm. The first entrance into life gives anguish to the new-born infant and to its wretched parent: Weakness, impotence, distress, attend each stage of that life: and it is at last finished in agony and horror.

Observe too, says P/HILO, the curious artifices of Nature, in order to embitter the life of every living being. The stronger prey upon the weaker, and keep them in perpetual terror and anxiety. The weaker too, in their turn, often prey upon the stronger, and vex and molest them without relaxation. Consider
that innumerable race of insects, which either are bred on the
body of each animal, or, flying about, infix their stings in him.
These insects have others still less than themselves, which
torment them. And thus on each hand, before and behind, above and
below, every animal is surrounded with enemies, which incessantly
seek his misery and destruction.

Man alone, said D/EMEA, seems to be, in part, an exception
to this rule. For by combination in society, he can easily master
lions, tigers, and bears, whose greater strength and agility
naturally enable them to prey upon him.

On the contrary, it is here chiefly, cried P/HILO, that the
uniform and equal maxims of Nature are most apparent. Man, it is
true, can, by combination, surmount all his real enemies, and
become master of the whole animal creation: but does he not
immediately raise up to himself imaginary enemies, the demons of
his fancy, who haunt him with superstitious terrors, and blast
every enjoyment of life? His pleasure, as he imagines, becomes,
in their eyes, a crime: his food and repose give them umbrage and
offence: his very sleep and dreams furnish new materials to
anxious fear: and even death, his refuge from every other ill,
presents only the dread of endless and innumerable woes. Nor does
the wolf molest more the timid flock, than superstition does the
anxious breast of wretched mortals.

Besides, consider, D/EMEA: This very society, by which we
surmount those wild beasts, our natural enemies; what new enemies
does it not raise to us? What woe and misery does it not
occasion? Man is the greatest enemy of man. Oppression,
injustice, contempt, contumely, violence, sedition, war, calumny,
treachery, fraud; by these they mutually torment each other; and
they would soon dissolve that society which they had formed, were
it not for the dread of still greater ills, which must attend
their separation.

But though these external insults, said D/EMEA, from
animals, from men, from all the elements, which assault us, form
a frightful catalogue of woes, they are nothing in comparison of
those which arise within ourselves, from the distempered
condition of our mind and body. How many lie under the lingering
torment of diseases? Hear the pathetic enumeration of the great
poet.

Intestine stone and ulcer, colic-pangs,

Demoniac frenzy, moping melancholy,

And moon-struck madness, pining atrophy,

Marasmus, and wide-wasting pestilence.

Dire was the tossing, deep the groans: despair

Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch.

And over them triumphant death his dart

Shook: but delay’d to strike, though oft invok’d
With vows, as their chief good and final hope.

The disorders of the mind, continued, though more secret, are not perhaps less dismal and vexatious. Remorse, shame, anguish, rage, disappointment, anxiety, fear, dejection, despair; who has ever passed through life without cruel inroads from these tormentors? How many have scarcely ever felt any better sensations? Labour and poverty, so abhorred by every one, are the certain lot of the far greater number; and those few privileged persons, who enjoy ease and opulence, never reach contentment or true felicity. All the goods of life united would not make a very happy man; but all the ills united would make a wretch indeed; and any one of them almost (and who can be free from every one?) nay often the absence of one good (and who can possess all?) is sufficient to render life ineligible.

Were a stranger to drop on a sudden into this world, I would show him, as a specimen of its ills, a hospital full of diseases, a prison crowded with malefactors and debtors, a field of battle strewed with carcasses, a fleet foundering in the ocean, a nation languishing under tyranny, famine, or pestilence. To turn the gay side of life to him, and give him a notion of its pleasures; whither should I conduct him? to a ball, to an opera, to court? He might justly think, that I was only showing him a diversity of distress and sorrow.

There is no evading such striking instances, said P/HILO, but by apologies, which still further aggravate the charge. Why have all men, I ask, in all ages, complained incessantly of the miseries of life? ... They have no just reason, says one: these complaints proceed only from their discontented, repining, anxious disposition.... And can there possibly, I reply, be a more certain foundation of misery, than such a wretched temper?

But if they were really as unhappy as they pretend, says my antagonist, why do they remain in life? ...

Not satisfied with life, afraid of death.

This is the secret chain, say I, that holds us. We are terrified, not bribed to the continuance of our existence.

It is only a false delicacy, he may insist, which a few refined spirits indulge, and which has spread these complaints among the whole race of mankind. . . . And what is this delicacy, I ask, which you blame? Is it any thing but a greater sensibility to all the pleasures and pains of life? and if the man of a delicate, refined temper, by being so much more alive than the rest of the world, is only so much more unhappy, what judgement must we form in general of human life?

Let men remain at rest, says our adversary, and they will be easy. They are willing artificers of their own misery. . . . No! reply I: an anxious languor follows their repose; disappointment, vexation, trouble, their activity and ambition.
I can observe something like what you mention in some others, replied C/LEANTHES: but I confess I feel little or nothing of it in myself, and hope that it is not so common as you represent it.

If you feel not human misery yourself, cried D/EMEA, I congratulate you on so happy a singularity. Others, seemingly the most prosperous, have not been ashamed to vent their complaints in the most melancholy strains. Let us attend to the great, the fortunate emperor, C/HARLES\ V, when, tired with human grandeur, he resigned all his extensive dominions into the hands of his son. In the last harangue which he made on that memorable occasion, he publicly avowed, that the greatest prosperities which he had ever enjoyed, had been mixed with so many adversities, that he might truly say he had never enjoyed any satisfaction or contentment. But did the retired life, in which he sought for shelter, afford him any greater happiness? If we may credit his son’s account, his repentance commenced the very day of his resignation.

C/ICERO’s fortune, from small beginnings, rose to the greatest lustre and renown; yet what pathetic complaints of the ills of life do his familiar letters, as well as philosophical discourses, contain? And suitably to his own experience, he introduces C/ATO, the great, the fortunate C/ATO, protesting in his old age, that had he a new life in his offer, he would reject the present.

Ask yourself, ask any of your acquaintance, whether they would live over again the last ten or twenty years of their life. No! but the next twenty, they say, will be better:

And from the dregs of life, hope to receive

What the first sprightly running could not give.26

Thus at last they find (such is the greatness of human misery, it reconciles even contradictions), that they complain at once of the shortness of life, and of its vanity and sorrow.

And is it possible, C/LEANTHES, said P/HILO, that after all these reflections, and infinitely more, which might be suggested, you can still persevere in your Anthropomorphism, and assert the moral attributes of the Deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of the same nature with these virtues in human creatures? His power we allow is infinite: whatever he wills is executed: but neither man nor any other animal is happy: therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: He is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: But the course of Nature tends not to human or animal felicity: therefore it is not established for that purpose. Through the whole compass of human knowledge, there are no inferences more certain and infallible than these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men?

E/PICURUS’s old questions are yet unanswered.

Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he

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impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?

You ascribe, CLEANTHES, (and I believe justly), a purpose and intention to Nature. But what, I beseech you, is the object of that curious artifice and machinery, which she has displayed in all animals? The preservation alone of individuals, and propagation of the species. It seems enough for her purpose, if such a rank be barely upheld in the universe, without any care or concern for the happiness of the members that compose it. No resource for this purpose: no machinery, in order merely to give pleasure or ease: no fund of pure joy and contentment: no indulgence, without some want or necessity accompanying it. At least, the few phenomena of this nature are overbalanced by opposite phenomena of still greater importance.

Our sense of music, harmony, and indeed beauty of all kinds, gives satisfaction, without being absolutely necessary to the preservation and propagation of the species. But what racking pains, on the other hand, arise from gouts, gravels, megrims, toothaches, rheumatisms, where the injury to the animal machinery is either small or incurable? Mirth, laughter, play, frolic, seem gratuitous satisfactions, which have no further tendency: spleen, melancholy, discontent, superstition, are pains of the same nature. How then does the Divine benevolence display itself, in the sense of you Anthropomorphites? None but we Mystics, as you were pleased to call us, can account for this strange mixture of phenomena, by deriving it from attributes, infinitely perfect, but incomprehensible.

And have you at last, said CLEANTHES, smiling, betrayed your intentions, PHILO? Your long agreement with EMEA did indeed a little surprise me; but I find you were all the while erecting a concealed battery against me. And I must confess, that you have now fallen upon a subject worthy of your noble spirit of opposition and controversy. If you can make out the present point, and prove mankind to be unhappy or corrupted, there is an end at once of all religion. For to what purpose establish the natural attributes of the Deity, while the moral are still doubtful and uncertain?

You take umbrage very easily, replied EMEA, at opinions the most innocent, and the most generally received, even amongst the religious and devout themselves: and nothing can be more surprising than to find a topic like this, concerning the wickedness and misery of man, charged with no less than Atheism and profaneness. Have not all pious divines and preachers, who have indulged their rhetoric on so fertile a subject; have they not easily, I say, given a solution of any difficulties which may attend it? This world is but a point in comparison of the universe; this life but a moment in comparison of eternity. The present evil phenomena, therefore, are rectified in other regions, and in some future period of existence. And the eyes of men, being then opened to larger views of things, see the whole connection of general laws; and trace with adoration, the benevolence and rectitude of the Deity, through all the mazes and intricacies of his providence.

No! replied CLEANTHES, No! These arbitrary suppositions
can never be admitted, contrary to matter of fact, visible and
uncontroverted. Whence can any cause be known but from its known
effects? Whence can any hypothesis be proved but from the
apparent phenomena? To establish one hypothesis upon another, is
building entirely in the air; and the utmost we ever attain, by
these conjectures and fictions, is to ascertain the bare
possibility of our opinion; but never can we, upon such terms,
establish its reality.

The only method of supporting Divine benevolence, and it is
what I willingly embrace, is to deny absolutely the misery and
wickedness of man. Your representations are exaggerated; your
melancholy views mostly fictitious; your inferences contrary to
fact and experience. Health is more common than sickness;
pleasure than pain; happiness than misery. And for one vexation
which we meet with, we attain, upon computation, a hundred
enjoyments.

Admitting your position, replied P/HILO\, which yet is
extremely doubtful, you must at the same time allow, that if pain
be less frequent than pleasure, it is infinitely more violent and
durable. One hour of it is often able to outweigh a day, a week,
a month of our common insipid enjoyments; and how many days,
weeks, and months, are passed by several in the most acute
torments? Pleasure, scarcely in one instance, is ever able to
reach ecstasy and rapture; and in no one instance can it continue
for any time at its highest pitch and altitude. The spirits
evaporate, the nerves relax, the fabric is disordered, and the
enjoyment quickly degenerates into fatigue and uneasiness. But
pain often, good God, how often! rises to torture and agony; and
the longer it continues, it becomes still more genuine agony and
torture. Patience is exhausted, courage languishes, melancholy
seizes us, and nothing terminates our misery but the removal of
its cause, or another event, which is the sole cure of all evil,
but which, from our natural folly, we regard with still greater
horror and consternation.

But not to insist upon these topics, continued P/HILO\, though most obvious, certain, and important; I must use the
freedom to admonish you, C/LEANTHES\, that you have put the
controversy upon a most dangerous issue, and are unawares
introducing a total scepticism into the most essential articles
of natural and revealed theology. What! no method of fixing a
just foundation for religion, unless we allow the happiness of
human life, and maintain a continued existence even in this
world, with all our present pains, infirmities, vexations, and
follies, to be eligible and desirable! But this is contrary to
every one’s feeling and experience: It is contrary to an
authority so established as nothing can subvert. No decisive
proofs can ever be produced against this authority; nor is it
possible for you to compute, estimate, and compare, all the pains
and all the pleasures in the lives of all men and of all animals:
And thus, by your resting the whole system of religion on a
point, which, from its very nature, must for ever be uncertain,
you tacitly confess, that that system is equally uncertain.

But allowing you what never will be believed, at least what
you never possibly can prove, that animal, or at least human
happiness, in this life, exceeds its misery, you have yet done
nothing: For this is not, by any means, what we expect from infinite power, infinite wisdom, and infinite goodness. Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by chance surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the Deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short, so clear, so decisive; except we assert, that these subjects exceed all human capacity, and that our common measures of truth and falsehood are not applicable to them; a topic which I have all along insisted on, but which you have, from the beginning, rejected with scorn and indignation.

But I will be contented to retire still from this entrenchment, for I deny that you can ever force me in it. I will allow, that pain or misery in man is compatible with infinite power and goodness in the Deity, even in your sense of these attributes: What are you advanced by all these concessions? A mere possible compatibility is not sufficient. You must prove these pure, unmixed, and uncontrollable attributes from the present mixed and confused phenomena, and from these alone. A hopeful undertaking! Were the phenomena ever so pure and unmixed, yet being finite, they would be insufficient for that purpose. How much more, where they are also so jarring and discordant!

Here, C/LEANTHES\, I find myself at ease in my argument. Here I triumph. Formerly, when we argued concerning the natural attributes of intelligence and design, I needed all my sceptical and metaphysical subtlety to elude your grasp. In many views of the universe, and of its parts, particularly the latter, the beauty and fitness of final causes strike us with such irresistible force, that all objections appear (what I believe they really are) mere cavils and sophisms; nor can we then imagine how it was ever possible for us to repose any weight on them. But there is no view of human life, or of the condition of mankind, from which, without the greatest violence, we can infer the moral attributes, or learn that infinite benevolence, conjoined with infinite power and infinite wisdom, which we must discover by the eyes of faith alone. It is your turn now to tug the labouring oar, and to support your philosophical subtleties against the dictates of plain reason and experience.

* * * *

PART 11

I scruple not to allow, said C/LEANTHES\, that I have been apt to suspect the frequent repetition of the word infinite, which we meet with in all theological writers, to savour more of panegyric than of philosophy; and that any purposes of reasoning, and even of religion, would be better served, were we to rest contented with more accurate and more moderate expressions. The terms, admirable, excellent, superlatively great, wise, and holy; these sufficiently fill the imaginations of men; and any thing beyond, besides that it leads into absurdities, has no influence on the affections or sentiments. Thus, in the present subject, if we abandon all human analogy, as seems your intention, D/EMEA\, I am afraid we abandon all religion, and retain no conception of the great object of our adoration. If we preserve human analogy, we must for ever find it impossible to reconcile any mixture of
evil in the universe with infinite attributes; much less can we ever prove the latter from the former. But supposing the Author of Nature to be finitely perfect, though far exceeding mankind, a satisfactory account may then be given of natural and moral evil, and every untoward phenomenon be explained and adjusted. A less evil may then be chosen, in order to avoid a greater; inconveniences be submitted to, in order to reach a desirable end; and in a word, benevolence, regulated by wisdom, and limited by necessity, may produce just such a world as the present. You, P/HILO, who are so prompt at starting views, and reflections, and analogies, I would gladly hear, at length, without interruption, your opinion of this new theory; and if it deserve our attention, we may afterwards, at more leisure, reduce it into form.

My sentiments, replied P/HILO, are not worth being made a mystery of; and therefore, without any ceremony, I shall deliver what occurs to me with regard to the present subject. It must, I think, be allowed, that if a very limited intelligence, whom we shall suppose utterly unacquainted with the universe, were assured, that it were the production of a very good, wise, and powerful Being, however finite, he would, from his conjectures, form beforehand a different notion of it from what we find it to be by experience; nor would he ever imagine, merely from these attributes of the cause, of which he is informed, that the effect could be so full of vice and misery and disorder, as it appears in this life. Supposing now, that this person were brought into the world, still assured that it was the workmanship of such a sublime and benevolent Being; he might, perhaps, be surprised at the disappointment; but would never retract his former belief, if founded on any very solid argument; since such a limited intelligence must be sensible of his own blindness and ignorance, and must allow, that there may be many solutions of those phenomena, which will for ever escape his comprehension. But supposing, which is the real case with regard to man, that this creature is not antecedently convinced of a supreme intelligence, benevolent, and powerful, but is left to gather such a belief from the appearances of things; this entirely alters the case, nor will he ever find any reason for such a conclusion. He may be fully convinced of the narrow limits of his understanding; but this will not help him in forming an inference concerning the goodness of superior powers, since he must form that inference from what he knows, not from what he is ignorant of. The more you exaggerate his weakness and ignorance, the more diffident you render him, and give him the greater suspicion that such subjects are beyond the reach of his faculties. You are obliged, therefore, to reason with him merely from the known phenomena, and to drop every arbitrary supposition or conjecture.

Did I show you a house or palace, where there was not one apartment convenient or agreeable; where the windows, doors, fires, passages, stairs, and the whole economy of the building, were the source of noise, confusion, fatigue, darkness, and the extremes of heat and cold; you would certainly blame the contrivance, without any further examination. The architect would in vain display his subtlety, and prove to you, that if this door or that window were altered, greater ills would ensue. What he says may be strictly true: The alteration of one particular, while the other parts of the building remain, may only augment
the inconveniences. But still you would assert in general, that, if the architect had had skill and good intentions, he might have formed such a plan of the whole, and might have adjusted the parts in such a manner, as would have remedied all or most of these inconveniences. His ignorance, or even your own ignorance of such a plan, will never convince you of the impossibility of it. If you find any inconveniences and deformities in the building, you will always, without entering into any detail, condemn the architect.

In short, I repeat the question: Is the world, considered in general, and as it appears to us in this life, different from what a man, or such a limited being, would, beforehand, expect from a very powerful, wise, and benevolent Deity? It must be strange prejudice to assert the contrary. And from thence I conclude, that however consistent the world may be, allowing certain suppositions and conjectures, with the idea of such a Deity, it can never afford us an inference concerning his existence. The consistence is not absolutely denied, only the inference. Conjectures, especially where infinity is excluded from the Divine attributes, may perhaps be sufficient to prove a consistence, but can never be foundations for any inference.

There seem to be four circumstances, on which depend all, or the greatest part of the ills, that molest sensible creatures; and it is not impossible but all these circumstances may be necessary and unavoidable. We know so little beyond common life, or even of common life, that, with regard to the economy of a universe, there is no conjecture, however wild, which may not be just; nor any one, however plausible, which may not be erroneous. All that belongs to human understanding, in this deep ignorance and obscurity, is to be sceptical, or at least cautious, and not to admit of any hypothesis whatever, much less of any which is supported by no appearance of probability. Now, this I assert to be the case with regard to all the causes of evil, and the circumstances on which it depends. None of them appear to human reason in the least degree necessary or unavoidable; nor can we suppose them such, without the utmost license of imagination.

The first circumstance which introduces evil, is that contrivance or economy of the animal creation, by which pains, as well as pleasures, are employed to excite all creatures to action, and make them vigilant in the great work of self-preservation. Now pleasure alone, in its various degrees, seems to human understanding sufficient for this purpose. All animals might be constantly in a state of enjoyment: but when urged by any of the necessities of nature, such as thirst, hunger, weariness; instead of pain, they might feel a diminution of pleasure, by which they might be prompted to seek that object which is necessary to their subsistence. Men pursue pleasure as eagerly as they avoid pain; at least they might have been so constituted. It seems, therefore, plainly possible to carry on the business of life without any pain. Why then is any animal ever rendered susceptible of such a sensation? If animals can be free from it an hour, they might enjoy a perpetual exemption from it; and it required as particular a contrivance of their organs to produce that feeling, as to endow them with sight, hearing, or any of the senses. Shall we conjecture, that such a contrivance was necessary, without any appearance of reason? and shall we
build on that conjecture as on the most certain truth?

But a capacity of pain would not alone produce pain, were it not for the second circumstance, viz. the conducting of the world by general laws; and this seems nowise necessary to a very perfect Being. It is true, if everything were conducted by particular volitions, the course of nature would be perpetually broken, and no man could employ his reason in the conduct of life. But might not other particular volitions remedy this inconvenience? In short, might not the Deity exterminate all ill, wherever it were to be found; and produce all good, without any preparation, or long progress of causes and effects?

Besides, we must consider, that, according to the present economy of the world, the course of nature, though supposed exactly regular, yet to us appears not so, and many events are uncertain, and many disappoint our expectations. Health and sickness, calm and tempest, with an infinite number of other accidents, whose causes are unknown and variable, have a great influence both on the fortunes of particular persons and on the prosperity of public societies; and indeed all human life, in a manner, depends on such accidents. A being, therefore, who knows the secret springs of the universe, might easily, by particular volitions, turn all these accidents to the good of mankind, and render the whole world happy, without discovering himself in any operation. A fleet, whose purposes were salutary to society, might always meet with a fair wind. Good princes enjoy sound health and long life. Persons born to power and authority, be framed with good tempers and virtuous dispositions. A few such events as these, regularly and wisely conducted, would change the face of the world; and yet would no more seem to disturb the course of nature, or confound human conduct, than the present economy of things, where the causes are secret, and variable, and compounded. Some small touches given to C/ALIGULA\'s brain in his infancy, might have converted him into a T/RAJAN\. One wave, a little higher than the rest, by burying C/AESAR\ and his fortune in the bottom of the ocean, might have restored liberty to a considerable part of mankind. There may, for aught we know, be good reasons why Providence interposes not in this manner; but they are unknown to us; and though the mere supposition, that such reasons exist, may be sufficient to save the conclusion concerning the Divine attributes, yet surely it can never be sufficient to establish that conclusion.

If every thing in the universe be conducted by general laws, and if animals be rendered susceptible of pain, it scarcely seems possible but some ill must arise in the various shocks of matter, and the various concurrence and opposition of general laws; but this ill would be very rare, were it not for the third circumstance, which I proposed to mention, viz. the great frugality with which all powers and faculties are distributed to every particular being. So well adjusted are the organs and capacities of all animals, and so well fitted to their preservation, that, as far as history or tradition reaches, there appears not to be any single species which has yet been extinguished in the universe. Every animal has the requisite endowments; but these endowments are bestowed with so scrupulous an economy, that any considerable diminution must entirely destroy the creature. Wherever one power is increased, there is a
proportional abatement in the others. Animals which excel in swiftness are commonly defective in force. Those which possess both are either imperfect in some of their senses, or are oppressed with the most craving wants. The human species, whose chief excellency is reason and sagacity, is of all others the most necessitous, and the most deficient in bodily advantages; without clothes, without arms, without food, without lodging, without any convenience of life, except what they owe to their own skill and industry. In short, nature seems to have formed an exact calculation of the necessities of her creatures; and, like a rigid master, has afforded them little more powers or endowments than what are strictly sufficient to supply those necessities. An indulgent parent would have bestowed a large stock, in order to guard against accidents, and secure the happiness and welfare of the creature in the most unfortunate concurrence of circumstances. Every course of life would not have been so surrounded with precipices, that the least departure from the true path, by mistake or necessity, must involve us in misery and ruin. Some reserve, some fund, would have been provided to ensure happiness; nor would the powers and the necessities have been adjusted with so rigid an economy. The Author of Nature is inconceivably powerful: his force is supposed great, if not altogether inexhaustible: nor is there any reason, as far as we can judge, to make him observe this strict frugality in his dealings with his creatures. It would have been better, were his power extremely limited, to have created fewer animals, and to have endowed these with more faculties for their happiness and preservation. A builder is never esteemed prudent, who undertakes a plan beyond what his stock will enable him to finish.

In order to cure most of the ills of human life, I require not that man should have the wings of the eagle, the swiftness of the stag, the force of the ox, the arms of the lion, the scales of the crocodile or rhinoceros; much less do I demand the sagacity of an angel or cherubim. I am contented to take an increase in one single power or faculty of his soul. Let him be endowed with a greater propensity to industry and labour; a more vigorous spring and activity of mind; a more constant bent to business and application. Let the whole species possess naturally an equal diligence with that which many individuals are able to attain by habit and reflection; and the most beneficial consequences, without any allay of ill, is the immediate and necessary result of this endowment. Almost all the moral, as well as natural evils of human life, arise from idleness; and were our species, by the original constitution of their frame, exempt from this vice or infirmity, the perfect cultivation of land, the improvement of arts and manufactures, the exact execution of every office and duty, immediately follow; and men at once may fully reach that state of society, which is so imperfectly attained by the best regulated government. But as industry is a power, and the most valuable of any, Nature seems determined, suitably to her usual maxims, to bestow it on men with a very sparing hand; and rather to punish him severely for his deficiency in it, than to reward him for his attainments. She has so contrived his frame, that nothing but the most violent necessity can oblige him to labour; and she employs all his other wants to overcome, at least in part, the want of diligence, and to endow him with some share of a faculty of which she has thought fit naturally to bereave him. Here our demands may be
allowed very humble, and therefore the more reasonable. If we required the endowments of superior penetration and judgement, of a more delicate taste of beauty, of a nicer sensibility to benevolence and friendship; we might be told, that we impiously pretend to break the order of Nature; that we want to exalt ourselves into a higher rank of being; that the presents which we require, not being suitable to our state and condition, would only be pernicious to us. But it is hard; I dare to repeat it, it is hard, that being placed in a world so full of wants and necessities, where almost every being and element is either our foe or refuses its assistance ... we should also have our own temper to struggle with, and should be deprived of that faculty which can alone fence against these multiplied evils.

The fourth circumstance, whence arises the misery and ill of the universe, is the inaccurate workmanship of all the springs and principles of the great machine of nature. It must be acknowledged, that there are few parts of the universe, which seem not to serve some purpose, and whose removal would not produce a visible defect and disorder in the whole. The parts hang all together; nor can one be touched without affecting the rest, in a greater or less degree. But at the same time, it must be observed, that none of these parts or principles, however useful, are so accurately adjusted, as to keep precisely within those bounds in which their utility consists; but they are, all of them, apt, on every occasion, to run into the one extreme or the other. One would imagine, that this grand production had not received the last hand of the maker; so little finished is every part, and so coarse are the strokes with which it is executed.

Thus, the winds are requisite to convey the vapours along the surface of the globe, and to assist men in navigation: but how oft, rising up to tempests and hurricanes, do they become pernicious? Rains are necessary to nourish all the plants and animals of the earth: but how often are they defective? how often excessive? Heat is requisite to all life and vegetation: but is not always found in the due proportion. On the mixture and secretion of the humours and juices of the body depend the health and prosperity of the animal: but the parts perform not regularly their proper function. What more useful than all the passions of the mind, ambition, vanity, love, anger? But how oft do they break their bounds, and cause the greatest convulsions in society? There is nothing so advantageous in the universe, but what frequently becomes pernicious, by its excess or defect; nor has Nature guarded, with the requisite accuracy, against all disorder or confusion. The irregularity is never perhaps so great as to destroy any species; but is often sufficient to involve the individuals in ruin and misery.

On the concurrence, then, of these four circumstances, does all or the greatest part of natural evil depend. Were all living creatures incapable of pain, or were the world administered by particular volitions, evil never could have found access into the universe: and were animals endowed with a large stock of powers and faculties, beyond what strict necessity requires; or were the several springs and principles of the universe so accurately framed as to preserve always the just temperament and medium; there must have been very little ill in comparison of what we feel at present. What then shall we pronounce on this occasion? Shall we say that these circumstances are not necessary, and that
they might easily have been altered in the contrivance of the universe? This decision seems too presumptuous for creatures so blind and ignorant. Let us be more modest in our conclusions. Let us allow, that, if the goodness of the Deity (I mean a goodness like the human) could be established on any tolerable reasons a priori, these phenomena, however untoward, would not be sufficient to subvert that principle; but might easily, in some unknown manner, be reconcilable to it. But let us still assert, that as this goodness is not antecedently established, but must be inferred from the phenomena, there can be no grounds for such an inference, while there are so many ills in the universe, and while these ills might so easily have been remedied, as far as human understanding can be allowed to judge on such a subject. I am Sceptic enough to allow, that the bad appearances, notwithstanding all my reasonings, may be compatible with such attributes as you suppose; but surely they can never prove these attributes. Such a conclusion cannot result from Scepticism, but must arise from the phenomena, and from our confidence in the reasonings which we deduce from these phenomena.

Look round this universe. What an immense profusion of beings, animated and organised, sensible and active! You admire this prodigious variety and fecundity. But inspect a little more narrowly these living existences, the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and destructive to each other! How insufficient all of them for their own happiness! How contemptible or odious to the spectator! The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind Nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children!

Here the MANICHAEAN system occurs as a proper hypothesis to solve the difficulty: and no doubt, in some respects, it is very specious, and has more probability than the common hypothesis, by giving a plausible account of the strange mixture of good and ill which appears in life. But if we consider, on the other hand, the perfect uniformity and agreement of the parts of the universe, we shall not discover in it any marks of the combat of a malevolent with a benevolent being. There is indeed an opposition of pains and pleasures in the feelings of sensible creatures: but are not all the operations of Nature carried on by an opposition of principles, of hot and cold, moist and dry, light and heavy? The true conclusion is, that the original Source of all things is entirely indifferent to all these principles; and has no more regard to good above ill, than to heat above cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light above heavy.

There may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the universe: that they are endowed with perfect goodness; that they have perfect malice; that they are opposite, and have both goodness and malice; that they have neither goodness nor malice. Mixed phenomena can never prove the two former unmixed principles; and the uniformity and steadiness of general laws seem to oppose the third. The fourth, therefore, seems by far the most probable.

What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little or no variation; and we have no more reason to infer, that the rectitude of the Supreme Being resembles human
rectitude, than that his benevolence resembles the human. Nay, it will be thought, that we have still greater cause to exclude from him moral sentiments, such as we feel them; since moral evil, in the opinion of many, is much more predominant above moral good than natural evil above natural good.

But even though this should not be allowed, and though the virtue which is in mankind should be acknowledged much superior to the vice, yet so long as there is any vice at all in the universe, it will very much puzzle you Anthropomorphites, how to account for it. You must assign a cause for it, without having recourse to the first cause. But as every effect must have a cause, and that cause another, you must either carry on the progression in infinitum, or rest on that original principle, who is the ultimate cause of all things....

Hold! hold! cried D/EMEA: Whither does your imagination hurry you? I joined in alliance with you, in order to prove the incomprehensible nature of the Divine Being, and refute the principles of C/LEANTHES, who would measure every thing by human rule and standard. But I now find you running into all the topics of the greatest libertines and infidels, and betraying that holy cause which you seemingly espoused. Are you secretly, then, a more dangerous enemy than C/LEANTHES himself?

And are you so late in perceiving it? replied C/LEANTHES. Believe me, D/EMEA, your friend P/HILO, from the beginning, has been amusing himself at both our expense; and it must be confessed, that the injudicious reasoning of our vulgar theology has given him but too just a handle of ridicule. The total infirmity of human reason, the absolute incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature, the great and universal misery, and still greater wickedness of men; these are strange topics, surely, to be so fondly cherished by orthodox divines and doctors. In ages of stupidity and ignorance, indeed, these principles may safely be espoused; and perhaps no views of things are more proper to promote superstition, than such as encourage the blind amazement, the diffidence, and melancholy of mankind. But at present....

Blame not so much, interposed P/HILO, the ignorance of these reverend gentlemen. They know how to change their style with the times. Formerly it was a most popular theological topic to maintain, that human life was vanity and misery, and to exaggerate all the ills and pains which are incident to men. But of late years, divines, we find, begin to retract this position; and maintain, though still with some hesitation, that there are more goods than evils, more pleasures than pains, even in this life. When religion stood entirely upon temper and education, it was thought proper to encourage melancholy; as indeed mankind never have recourse to superior powers so readily as in that disposition. But as men have now learned to form principles, and to draw consequences, it is necessary to change the batteries, and to make use of such arguments as will endure at least some scrutiny and examination. This variation is the same (and from the same causes) with that which I formerly remarked with regard to Scepticism.

Thus P/HILO continued to the last his spirit of opposition, and his censure of established opinions. But I could observe that
D/EMEA\ did not at all relish the latter part of the discourse; and he took occasion soon after, on some pretence or other, to leave the company.

* * * *

PART 12

After D/EMEA\’s departure, C/LEANTHES\ and P/HILO\ continued the conversation in the following manner. Our friend, I am afraid, said C/LEANTHES\, will have little inclination to revive this topic of discourse, while you are in company; and to tell truth, P/HILO\, I should rather wish to reason with either of you apart on a subject so sublime and interesting. Your spirit of controversy, joined to your abhorrence of vulgar superstition, carries you strange lengths, when engaged in an argument; and there is nothing so sacred and venerable, even in your own eyes, which you spare on that occasion.

I must confess, replied P/HILO, that I am less cautious on the subject of Natural Religion than on any other; both because I know that I can never, on that head, corrupt the principles of any man of common sense; and because no one, I am confident, in whose eyes I appear a man of common sense, will ever mistake my intentions. You, in particular, C/LEANTHES\, with whom I live in unreserved intimacy; you are sensible, that notwithstanding the freedom of my conversation, and my love of singular arguments, no one has a deeper sense of religion impressed on his mind, or pays more profound adoration to the Divine Being, as he discovers himself to reason, in the inexplicable contrivance and artifice of nature. A purpose, an intention, a design, strikes every where the most careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened in absurd systems, as at all times to reject it. That Nature does nothing in vain, is a maxim established in all the schools, merely from the contemplation of the works of Nature, without any religious purpose; and, from a firm conviction of its truth, an anatomist, who had observed a new organ or canal, would never be satisfied till he had also discovered its use and intention. One great foundation of the Copernican system is the maxim, That Nature acts by the simplest methods, and chooses the most proper means to any end; and astronomers often, without thinking of it, lay this strong foundation of piety and religion. The same thing is observable in other parts of philosophy: And thus all the sciences almost lead us insensibly to acknowledge a first intelligent Author; and their authority is often so much the greater, as they do not directly profess that intention.

It is with pleasure I hear G/ALEN\ reason concerning the structure of the human body. The anatomy of a man, says he,27 discovers above 600 different muscles; and whoever duly considers these, will find, that, in each of them, Nature must have adjusted at least ten different circumstances, in order to attain the end which she proposed; proper figure, just magnitude, right disposition of the several ends, upper and lower position of the whole, the due insertion of the several nerves, veins, and arteries: So that, in the muscles alone, above 6000 several views and intentions must have been formed and executed. The bones he calculates to be 284: The distinct purposes aimed at in the structure of each, above forty. What a prodigious display of
artifice, even in these simple and homogeneous parts! But if we consider the skin, ligaments, vessels, glandules, humours, the several limbs and members of the body; how must our astonishment rise upon us, in proportion to the number and intricacy of the parts so artificially adjusted! The further we advance in these researches, we discover new scenes of art and wisdom: But descry still, at a distance, further scenes beyond our reach; in the fine internal structure of the parts, in the economy of the brain, in the fabric of the seminal vessels. All these artifices are repeated in every different species of animal, with wonderful variety, and with exact propriety, suited to the different intentions of Nature in framing each species. And if the infidelity of G/ALEN\, even when these natural sciences were still imperfect, could not withstand such striking appearances, to what pitch of pertinacious obstinacy must a philosopher in this age have attained, who can now doubt of a Supreme Intelligence!

Could I meet with one of this species (who, I thank God, are very rare), I would ask him: Supposing there were a God, who did not discover himself immediately to our senses, were it possible for him to give stronger proofs of his existence, than what appear on the whole face of Nature? What indeed could such a Divine Being do, but copy the present economy of things; render many of his artifices so plain, that no stupidity could mistake them; afford glimpses of still greater artifices, which demonstrate his prodigious superiority above our narrow apprehensions; and conceal altogether a great many from such imperfect creatures? Now, according to all rules of just reasoning, every fact must pass for undisputed, when it is supported by all the arguments which its nature admits of; even though these arguments be not, in themselves, very numerous or forcible: How much more, in the present case, where no human imagination can compute their number, and no understanding estimate their cogency!

I shall further add, said C/LEANTHES\, to what you have so well urged, that one great advantage of the principle of Theism, is, that it is the only system of cosmogony which can be rendered intelligible and complete, and yet can throughout preserve a strong analogy to what we every day see and experience in the world. The comparison of the universe to a machine of human contrivance, is so obvious and natural, and is justified by so many instances of order and design in Nature, that it must immediately strike all unprejudiced apprehensions, and procure universal approbation. Whoever attempts to weaken this theory, cannot pretend to succeed by establishing in its place any other that is precise and determinate: It is sufficient for him if he start doubts and difficulties; and by remote and abstract views of things, reach that suspense of judgement, which is here the utmost boundary of his wishes. But, besides that this state of mind is in itself unsatisfactory, it can never be steadily maintained against such striking appearances as continually engage us into the religious hypothesis. A false, absurd system, human nature, from the force of prejudice, is capable of adhering to with obstinacy and perseverance: But no system at all, in opposition to a theory supported by strong and obvious reason, by natural propensity, and by early education, I think it absolutely impossible to maintain or defend.
So little, replied P/HILO, do I esteem this suspense of judgement in the present case to be possible, that I am apt to suspect there enters somewhat of a dispute of words into this controversy, more than is usually imagined. That the works of Nature bear a great analogy to the productions of art, is evident; and according to all the rules of good reasoning, we ought to infer, if we argue at all concerning them, that their causes have a proportional analogy. But as there are also considerable differences, we have reason to suppose a proportional difference in the causes; and in particular, ought to attribute a much higher degree of power and energy to the supreme cause, than any we have ever observed in mankind. Here then the existence of a D/EITY is plainly ascertained by reason: and if we make it a question, whether, on account of these analogies, we can properly call him a mind or intelligence, notwithstanding the vast difference which may reasonably be supposed between him and human minds; what is this but a mere verbal controversy? No man can deny the analogies between the effects: To restrain ourselves from inquiring concerning the causes is scarcely possible. From this inquiry, the legitimate conclusion is, that the causes have also an analogy: And if we are not contented with calling the first and supreme cause a G/OD or D/EITY, but desire to vary the expression; what can we call him but /MIND or /THOUGHT, to which he is justly supposed to bear a considerable resemblance?

All men of sound reason are disgusted with verbal disputes, which abound so much in philosophical and theological inquiries; and it is found, that the only remedy for this abuse must arise from clear definitions, from the precision of those ideas which enter into any argument, and from the strict and uniform use of those terms which are employed. But there is a species of controversy, which, from the very nature of language and of human ideas, is involved in perpetual ambiguity, and can never, by any precaution or any definitions, be able to reach a reasonable certainty or precision. These are the controversies concerning the degrees of any quality or circumstance. Men may argue to all eternity, whether H/ANNIBAL be a great, or a very great, or a superlatively great man, what degree of beauty C/LEOPATRA possessed, what epithet of praise L/IVY or T/HUCYDIDES is entitled to, without bringing the controversy to any determination. The disputants may here agree in their sense, and differ in the terms, or vice versa; yet never be able to define their terms, so as to enter into each other’s meaning: Because the degrees of these qualities are not, like quantity or number, susceptible of any exact mensuration, which may be the standard in the controversy. That the dispute concerning Theism is of this nature, and consequently is merely verbal, or perhaps, if possible, still more incurably ambiguous, will appear upon the slightest inquiry. I ask the Theist, if he does not allow, that there is a great and immeasurable, because incomprehensible difference between the human and the divine mind: The more pious he is, the more readily will he assent to the affirmative, and the more will he be disposed to magnify the difference: He will even assert, that the difference is of a nature which cannot be too much magnified. I next turn to the Atheist, who, I assert, is only nominally so, and can never possibly be in earnest; and I ask him, whether, from the coherence and apparent sympathy in all
the parts of this world, there be not a certain degree of analogy among all the operations of Nature, in every situation and in every age; whether the rotting of a turnip, the generation of an animal, and the structure of human thought, be not energies that probably bear some remote analogy to each other: It is impossible he can deny it: He will readily acknowledge it. Having obtained this concession, I push him still further in his retreat; and I ask him, if it be not probable, that the principle which first arranged, and still maintains order in this universe, bears not also some remote inconceivable analogy to the other operations of nature, and, among the rest, to the economy of human mind and thought. However reluctant, he must give his assent. Where then, cry I to both these antagonists, is the subject of your dispute? The Theist allows, that the original intelligence is very different from human reason: The Atheist allows, that the original principle of order bears some remote analogy to it. Will you quarrel, Gentlemen, about the degrees, and enter into a controversy, which admits not of any precise meaning, nor consequently of any determination? If you should be so obstinate, I should not be surprised to find you insensibly change sides; while the Theist, on the one hand, exaggerates the dissimilarity between the Supreme Being, and frail, imperfect, variable, fleeting, and mortal creatures; and the Atheist, on the other, magnifies the analogy among all the operations of Nature, in every period, every situation, and every position. Consider then, where the real point of controversy lies; and if you cannot lay aside your disputes, endeavour, at least, to cure yourselves of your animosity.

And here I must also acknowledge, CLEANTHES, that as the works of Nature have a much greater analogy to the effects of our art and contrivance, than to those of our benevolence and justice, we have reason to infer, that the natural attributes of the Deity have a greater resemblance to those of men, than his moral have to human virtues. But what is the consequence? Nothing but this, that the moral qualities of man are more defective in their kind than his natural abilities. For, as the Supreme Being is allowed to be absolutely and entirely perfect, whatever differs most from him, departs the furthest from the supreme standard of rectitude and perfection.

These, CLEANTHES, are my unfeigned sentiments on this subject; and these sentiments, you know, I have ever cherished and maintained. But in proportion to my veneration for true religion, is my abhorrence of vulgar superstitions; and I indulge a peculiar pleasure, I confess, in pushing such principles, sometimes into absurdity, sometimes into impiety. And you are sensible, that all bigots, notwithstanding their great aversion to the latter above the former, are commonly equally guilty of both.

My inclination, replied CLEANTHES, lies, I own, a contrary way. Religion, however corrupted, is still better than no religion at all. The doctrine of a future state is so strong and necessary a security to morals, that we never ought to abandon or neglect it. For if finite and temporary rewards and punishments have so great an effect, as we daily find; how much greater must be expected from such as are infinite and eternal?
How happens it then, said P/HILO\, if vulgar superstition be so salutary to society, that all history abounds so much with accounts of its pernicious consequences on public affairs? Factions, civil wars, persecutions, subversions of government, oppression, slavery; these are the dismal consequences which always attend its prevalency over the minds of men. If the religious spirit be ever mentioned in any historical narration, we are sure to meet afterwards with a detail of the miseries which attend it. And no period of time can be happier or more prosperous, than those in which it is never regarded or heard of.

The reason of this observation, replied C/LEANTHES\, is obvious. The proper office of religion is to regulate the heart of men, humanise their conduct, infuse the spirit of temperance, order, and obedience; and as its operation is silent, and only enforces the motives of morality and justice, it is in danger of being overlooked, and confounded with these other motives. When it distinguishes itself, and acts as a separate principle over men, it has departed from its proper sphere, and has become only a cover to faction and ambition.

And so will all religion, said P/HILO\, except the philosophical and rational kind. Your reasonings are more easily eluded than my facts. The inference is not just, because finite and temporary rewards and punishments have so great influence, that therefore such as are infinite and eternal must have so much greater. Consider, I beseech you, the attachment which we have to present things, and the little concern which we discover for objects so remote and uncertain. When divines are declaiming against the common behaviour and conduct of the world, they always represent this principle as the strongest imaginable (which indeed it is); and describe almost all human kind as lying under the influence of it, and sunk into the deepest lethargy and unconcern about their religious interests. Yet these same divines, when they refute their speculative antagonists, suppose the motives of religion to be so powerful, that, without them, it were impossible for civil society to subsist; nor are they ashamed of so palpable a contradiction. It is certain, from experience, that the smallest grain of natural honesty and benevolence has more effect on men’s conduct, than the most pompous views suggested by theological theories and systems. A man’s natural inclination works incessantly upon him; it is for ever present to the mind, and mingles itself with every view and consideration: whereas religious motives, where they act at all, operate only by starts and bounds; and it is scarcely possible for them to become altogether habitual to the mind. The force of the greatest gravity, say the philosophers, is infinitely small, in comparison of that of the least impulse: yet it is certain, that the smallest gravity will, in the end, prevail above a great impulse; because no strokes or blows can be repeated with such constancy as attraction and gravitation.

Another advantage of inclination: It engages on its side all the wit and ingenuity of the mind; and when set in opposition to religious principles, seeks every method and art of eluding them: In which it is almost always successful. Who can explain the heart of man, or account for those strange salvos and excuses, with which people satisfy themselves, when they follow their inclinations in opposition to their religious duty? This is well
understood in the world; and none but fools ever repose less
trust in a man, because they hear, that from study and
philosophy, he has entertained some speculative doubts with
regard to theological subjects. And when we have to do with a
man, who makes a great profession of religion and devotion, has
this any other effect upon several, who pass for prudent, than to
put them on their guard, lest they be cheated and deceived by
him?

We must further consider, that philosophers, who cultivate
reason and reflection, stand less in need of such motives to keep
them under the restraint of morals; and that the vulgar, who
alone may need them, are utterly incapable of so pure a religion
as represents the Deity to be pleased with nothing but virtue in
human behaviour. The recommendations to the Divinity are
generally supposed to be either frivolous observances, or
rapturous ecstasies, or a bigoted credulity. We need not run back
into antiquity, or wander into remote regions, to find instances
of this degeneracy. Amongst ourselves, some have been guilty of
that atrociousness, unknown to the Egyptian and Grecian
superstitions, of declaiming in express terms, against morality;
and representing it as a sure forfeiture of the Divine favour, if
the least trust or reliance be laid upon it.

But even though superstition or enthusiasm should not put
itself in direct opposition to morality; the very diverting of
the attention, the raising up a new and frivolous species of
merit, the preposterous distribution which it makes of praise and
blame, must have the most pernicious consequences, and weaken
extremely men’s attachment to the natural motives of justice and
humanity.

Such a principle of action likewise, not being any of the
familiar motives of human conduct, acts only by intervals on the
temper; and must be roused by continual efforts, in order to
render the pious zealot satisfied with his own conduct, and make
him fulfil his devotional task. Many religious exercises are
entered into with seeming fervour, where the heart, at the time,
feels cold and languid: A habit of dissimulation is by degrees
contracted; and fraud and falsehood become the predominant
principle. Hence the reason of that vulgar observation, that the
highest zeal in religion and the deepest hypocrisy, so far from
being inconsistent, are often or commonly united in the same
individual character.

The bad effects of such habits, even in common life, are
easily imagined; but where the interests of religion are
concerned, no morality can be forcible enough to bind the
enthusiastic zealot. The sacredness of the cause sanctifies every
measure which can be made use of to promote it.

The steady attention alone to so important an interest as
that of eternal salvation, is apt to extinguish the benevolent
affections, and beget a narrow, contracted selfishness. And when
such a temper is encouraged, it easily eludes all the general
precepts of charity and benevolence.

Thus, the motives of vulgar superstition have no great
influence on general conduct; nor is their operation favourable
to morality, in the instances where they predominate.

Is there any maxim in politics more certain and infallible, than that both the number and authority of priests should be confined within very narrow limits; and that the civil magistrate ought, for ever, to keep his fasces and axes from such dangerous hands? But if the spirit of popular religion were so salutary to society, a contrary maxim ought to prevail. The greater number of priests, and their greater authority and riches, will always augment the religious spirit. And though the priests have the guidance of this spirit, why may we not expect a superior sanctity of life, and greater benevolence and moderation, from persons who are set apart for religion, who are continually inculcating it upon others, and who must themselves imibe a greater share of it? Whence comes it then, that, in fact, the utmost a wise magistrate can propose with regard to popular religions, is, as far as possible, to make a saving game of it, and to prevent their pernicious consequences with regard to society? Every expedient which he tries for so humble a purpose is surrounded with inconveniences. If he admits only one religion among his subjects, he must sacrifice, to an uncertain prospect of tranquillity, every consideration of public liberty, science, reason, industry, and even his own independency. If he gives indulgence to several sects, which is the wiser maxim, he must preserve a very philosophical indifference to all of them, and carefully restrain the pretensions of the prevailing sect; otherwise he can expect nothing but endless disputes, quarrels, factions, persecutions, and civil commotions.

True religion, I allow, has no such pernicious consequences: but we must treat of religion, as it has commonly been found in the world; nor have I any thing to do with that speculative tenet of Theism, which, as it is a species of philosophy, must partake of the beneficial influence of that principle, and at the same time must lie under a like inconvenience, of being always confined to very few persons.

Oaths are requisite in all courts of judicature; but it is a question whether their authority arises from any popular religion. It is the solemnity and importance of the occasion, the regard to reputation, and the reflecting on the general interests of society, which are the chief restraints upon mankind. Custom-house oaths and political oaths are but little regarded even by some who pretend to principles of honesty and religion; and a Quaker’s asseveration is with us justly put upon the same footing with the oath of any other person. I know, that POLYBIUS ascribes the infamy of GREEK faith to the prevalency of the EPICUREAN philosophy; but I know also, that Punic faith had as bad a reputation in ancient times as Irish evidence has in modern; though we cannot account for these vulgar observations by the same reason. Not to mention that Greek faith was infamous before the rise of the Epicurean philosophy; and EURIPIDES, in a passage which I shall point out to you, has glanced a remarkable stroke of satire against his nation, with regard to this circumstance.

Take care, PHILO, replied CLEANTHES, take care: push not matters too far: allow not your zeal against false religion to undermine your veneration for the true. Forfeit not this
principle, the chief, the only great comfort in life; and our
principal support amidst all the attacks of adverse fortune. The
most agreeable reflection, which it is possible for human
imagination to suggest, is that of genuine Theism, which
represents us as the workmanship of a Being perfectly good, wise,
and powerful; who created us for happiness; and who, having
implanted in us immeasurable desires of good, will prolong our
existence to all eternity, and will transfer us into an infinite
variety of scenes, in order to satisfy those desires, and render
our felicity complete and durable. Next to such a Being himself
(if the comparison be allowed), the happiest lot which we can
imagine, is that of being under his guardianship and protection.

These appearances, said P/HILO, are most engaging and
alluring; and with regard to the true philosopher, they are more
than appearances. But it happens here, as in the former case,
that, with regard to the greater part of mankind, the appearances
are deceitful, and that the terrors of religion commonly prevail
above its comforts.

It is allowed, that men never have recourse to devotion so
readily as when dejected with grief or depressed with sickness.
Is not this a proof, that the religious spirit is not so nearly
allied to joy as to sorrow?

But men, when afflicted, find consolation in religion,
replied C/LEANTHES. Sometimes, said P/HILO: but it is natural
to imagine, that they will form a notion of those unknown beings,
suitably to the present gloom and melancholy of their temper,
when they betake themselves to the contemplation of them.
Accordingly, we find the tremendous images to predominate in all
religions; and we ourselves, after having employed the most
exalted expression in our descriptions of the Deity, fall into
the flattest contradiction in affirming that the damned are
infinitely superior in number to the elect.

I shall venture to affirm, that there never was a popular
religion, which represented the state of departed souls in such a
light, as would render it eligible for human kind that there
should be such a state. These fine models of religion are the
mere product of philosophy. For as death lies between the eye and
the prospect of futurity, that event is so shocking to Nature,
that it must throw a gloom on all the regions which lie beyond
it; and suggest to the generality of mankind the idea of
C/ERBERUS and F/URIES; devils, and torrents of fire and
brimstone.

It is true, both fear and hope enter into religion; because
both these passions, at different times, agitate the human mind,
and each of them forms a species of divinity suitable to itself.
But when a man is in a cheerful disposition, he is fit for
business, or company, or entertainment of any kind; and he
naturally applies himself to these, and thinks not of religion.
When melancholy and dejected, he has nothing to do but brood upon
the terrors of the invisible world, and to plunge himself still
deeper in affliction. It may indeed happen, that after he has, in
this manner, engraved the religious opinions deep into his
thought and imagination, there may arrive a change of health or
circumstances, which may restore his good humour, and raising
cheerful prospects of futurity, make him run into the other extreme of joy and triumph. But still it must be acknowledged, that, as terror is the primary principle of religion, it is the passion which always predominates in it, and admits but of short intervals of pleasure.

Not to mention, that these fits of excessive, enthusiastic joy, by exhausting the spirits, always prepare the way for equal fits of superstitious terror and dejection; nor is there any state of mind so happy as the calm and equable. But this state it is impossible to support, where a man thinks that he lies in such profound darkness and uncertainty, between an eternity of happiness and an eternity of misery. No wonder that such an opinion disjoins the ordinary frame of the mind, and throws it into the utmost confusion. And though that opinion is seldom so steady in its operation as to influence all the actions; yet it is apt to make a considerable breach in the temper, and to produce that gloom and melancholy so remarkable in all devout people.

It is contrary to common sense to entertain apprehensions or terrors upon account of any opinion whatsoever, or to imagine that we run any risk hereafter, by the freest use of our reason. Such a sentiment implies both an absurdity and an inconsistency. It is an absurdity to believe that the Deity has human passions, and one of the lowest of human passions, a restless appetite for applause. It is an inconsistency to believe, that, since the Deity has this human passion, he has not others also; and, in particular, a disregard to the opinions of creatures so much inferior.

To know God, says Seneca, is to worship him. All other worship is indeed absurd, superstitious, and even impious. It degrades him to the low condition of mankind, who are delighted with entreaty, solicitation, presents, and flattery. Yet is this impiety the smallest of which superstition is guilty. Commonly, it depresses the Deity far below the condition of mankind; and represents him as a capricious demon, who exercises his power without reason and without humanity! And were that Divine Being disposed to be offended at the vices and follies of silly mortals, who are his own workmanship, ill would it surely fare with the votaries of most popular superstitions. Nor would any of human race merit his favour, but a very few, the philosophical Theists, who entertain, or rather indeed endeavour to entertain, suitable notions of his Divine perfections: As the only persons entitled to his compassion and indulgence would be the philosophical Sceptics, a sect almost equally rare, who, from a natural diffidence of their own capacity, suspend, or endeavour to suspend, all judgement with regard to such sublime and such extraordinary subjects.

If the whole of Natural Theology, as some people seem to maintain, resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, That the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence: If this proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular explication: If it affords no inference that affects human life, or can be the source of any action or forbearance: And if the analogy,
imperfect as it is, can be carried no further than to the human intelligence, and cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other qualities of the mind; if this really be the case, what can the most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than give a plain, philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs, and believe that the arguments on which it is established exceed the objections which lie against it? Some astonishment, indeed, will naturally arise from the greatness of the object; some melancholy from its obscurity; some contempt of human reason, that it can give no solution more satisfactory with regard to so extraordinary and magnificent a question. But believe me, C/LEANTHES, the most natural sentiment which a well-disposed mind will feel on this occasion, is a longing desire and expectation that Heaven would be pleased to dissipate, at least alleviate, this profound ignorance, by affording some more particular revelation to mankind, and making discoveries of the nature, attributes, and operations of the Divine object of our faith. A person, seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of natural reason, will fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity: While the haughty Dogmatist, persuaded that he can erect a complete system of Theology by the mere help of philosophy, disdains any further aid, and rejects this adventitious instructor. To be a philosophical Sceptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian; a proposition which I would willingly recommend to the attention of P/HILO: And I hope C/LEANTHES will forgive me for interposing so far in the education and instruction of his pupil.

C/LEANTHES and P/HILO pursued not this conversation much further: and as nothing ever made greater impression on me, than all the reasonings of that day, so I confess, that, upon a serious review of the whole, I cannot but think, that P/HILO’s principles are more probable than D/EMEA’s: but that those of C/LEANTHES approach still nearer to the truth.

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2Thomas Hayter, Remarks on Mr. Hume’s Dialogues, concerning natural religion, Cambridge, 1780, T. Cadell.


4John Ogilvie, Inquiry into the causes of the infidelity and scepticism of the times, London, 1783, Richardson and Urquhart. After considering Philo’s four hypotheses concerning the causes of the universe, Ogilvie writes ’Philo, the author’s sceptical dialogist, is the speaker upon this occasion. But, as his
opinions are not impugned or confuted by Cleanthes, they appear to be those of the author" (pp. 68-69). The context of Ogilvie’s other comments on the Dialogues make it clear that Philo speaks for Hume except when Philo concedes the existence of a creative Mind.


7 Norman Kemp Smith Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, p. 24. Kemp Smith bases his view on the conclusions to the "Natural History" and Dialogues, and Hume’s 1743 letter to William Mure.


12 Chrysippus apud Plut. De repug. Stoicorum. [Chrysippus (c. 280-207 BCE.), as appears in Plutarch’s Stoic Inconsistencies, Ch. 9, 1035 a-b - Ed.]

13 [John Milton, Paradise Lost, Bk. 2. - Ed.]

14 L’art de penser. [Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694), La Logique ou l’art de penser (The Port Royal Logic, 1662). - Ed.]

15 Mons. Huet. [Peter Daniel Huet (1630-1721), Traite philosophique de la faiblesse de l’esprit humain (1723) - Ed.]

16 Recherche de la Verite, liv. 3, cap. 9. [Nicholas Melbranche (1638-1715), The Search after Truth, Bk 3, Ch. 9 - Ed.]

17 [In his letter of March 10, 1751 to Gilbert Eliot, Hume comments on Cleanthes’ argument in this paragraph. "If you’ll be persuaded to assist me in supporting Cleanthes, I fancy you need not take Matters any higher than Part 3. He allows, indeed, in Part 2, that all our Inference is founded on the Similitude of the Works of Nature to the usual Effects of Mind. Otherwise they must appear a mere Chaos. The only Difficulty is, why the other Dissimilitudes do not weaken the Argument. And indeed it woud seem from Experience & Feeling, that they do not weaken it so much as we might naturally expect. A Theory to solve this woud be very acceptable."

18 [Cicero, De Natura Deorum, Bk. 1:22 - Ed.]

19 [Senna is a laxative drug made from various plants. - Ed.]

20 Lib. XI. 1094. [Lucretius (98-55 BCE.) On the Nature of Things, Bk. 2: "Who can rule the sum, who hold in his hand with controlling force the strong reins, of the immeasurable deep? Who can at once make all the different heavens to roll and warm with ethereal fires all the fruitful earths, or be present in all places at all times." - Ed.]

21 De Nat. Deor. Lib. 1. [Cicero (106-43 BCE.), De Natura Deorum, Bk. 1: 8: "For with what eyes of the mind could your Plato have beheld that workshop of such stupendous toil, in which he represents the world as having been put together and built by God? How was so vast an undertaking set about? What tools, what levers, what machines, what servants were employed in so great a work? How came air, fire, water, and earth to obey and submit to
the architect’s will?”]

22 Dr. Clarke. [Samuel Clarke (1675-1729), A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God. - Ed.]

23 Republique des Lettres, Aout 1685.

24 That sentiment had been maintained by Dr. King, and some few others, before Leibniz, though by none of so great fame as that German philosopher.

25 [John Milton (1608-1674), Paradise Lost, Bk. 11. - Ed.]

26 [John Dryden (1631-1700), Aureng-Zebe, Act 4, sc. 1. - Ed.]

27 De Formatione Foetus. [Claudius Galenus (c. 130-200 CE) De Foetu Formatione Libelus, Bk. 6. - Ed.]

28 [Mensuration is a branch of geometry dealing with the measurement of length, area, or volume. - Ed.]

29 It seems evident that the dispute between the Skeptics and Dogmatists is entirely verbal, or at least regards only the degrees of doubt and assurance which we ought to indulge with regard to all reasoning; and such disputes are commonly, at the bottom, verbal, and admit not of any precise determination. No philosophical Dogmatist denies that there are difficulties both with regard to the senses and to all science, and that these difficulties are in a regular, logical method, absolutely insolvable. No Skeptic denies that we lie under an absolute necessity, notwithstanding these difficulties, of thinking, and believing, and reasoning, with regard to all kinds of subjects, and even of frequently assenting with confidence and security. The only difference, then, between these sects, if they merit that name, is, that the Sceptic, from habit, caprice, or inclination, insists most on the difficulties; the Dogmatist, for like reasons, on the necessity.

30 [A fasces is a bundle of rods containing a projecting ax blade. - Ed.]

31 Lib. vi. cap. 54. [Polybius, (c. 205-123 BCE) The Histories, Bk. 6, Ch. 54. - Ed.]

32 Iphigenia in Tauride. [Euripides, (c 480-406 BCE), Iphigenia in Tauris, v. 1200-1205. - Ed.]

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